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Lonewolf_50;
IIRC from our discussions a few threads ago, AoA can be called up already on one of the pages (maintenance?). Further, regarding the safety recommendations, I doubt if the recommendation to include the AoA in the available displays for crews is a realistic, or even helpful idea. Airline pilots don't fly "AoA" and it would be a significant transition from pitch, power and speed to train crews to fly primarily AoA. I don't think it would have helped or saved this situation because AoA wasn't being taught/trained. Besides, this is the only accident we know of which could have made use of an AoA display to save the aircraft. The Turkish B737 could not have been saved as there wasn't sufficent altitude by the time the aircraft stalled, and they weren't paying attention to the airspeed, so an AoA indication may not have helped. airtren, thanks for your very kind response. |
Going over this twice, the following passage looks somewhat like the PF has an attitude indication that's gone wrong.
Yes, I know there's no ACARS hit, but he does not seem to be seeing what the PNF is seeing. I am not sure what he was looking at, but I have a suspicion that he was on a performance instrument scan rather than an attitude scan during part of this, and it may have been due to his attitude not matching what he was seeing ... but I think that if PNF had seen PF's display as being different from his, he might have done something ... what was "putting you on ATT" mean? Was he switching attitude indicator reference? 2 h 10 min 27 to 2 h 10 min 31 PNF: Fais attention à ta vitesse Fais attention à ta vitesse Watch your speed Watch your speed PF: Okay, okay okay je redescends ok ok ok I'm going back down PNF: Tu stabilises stabilize (“stay there”) PF: Ouais Yeah PNF: Tu redescends You're going back down 2 h 10 min 33 PNF: Selon les trois tu montes donc tu redescends According to the three you're going up, so you go back down (meaning the three vertical speed indicators... ) 2 h 10 min 35 PF: D’accord Agreed 2 h 10 min 36 PNF: T’es à ... Redescends You're at ... go back down ! PF: C’est parti on (re)descend On our way we're going (back) down 2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46 PNF: Je te mets en en A T T I'm putting you in in A T T 2 h 10 min 42 PF: On est en ouais on est en climb We're in yeah we're in climb |
spagiola,
Great job! I might disagree with a couple of translations, but they would depend on intonation, etc. so I've no intention to argue about them. Yours is probably better than the "official" BEA English translation, which I haven't bothered to read yet. |
PJ, what I was getting to is that the AoA data is already fed into the system anyway, as you describe: it's there for the taking. My thought was to allow it to be direct fed to a different page rather than having to page down to dig it out.
If I am reading correctly, the F/CTL page comes up with one or two movements or touches, or comes up on its own if a given malfunction circuit completes. (If I misunderstand, sorry). Put another way, have it on the first floor rather or the lobby of the hotel, not the seventh level of the underground parking garage. No need to change anything else. Buuuuuuuuuuut, that means you'd need to believe you needed to look at AoA to summon F/CTL and see what it is. Different scan and Cockpit coordination drill, certainly. I also appreciate your point on the AoA in the scan: what scans do you teach for which aggregate tasks or task sequences? It's a cross check, not a primary, as I see it. |
French translation...
"J'ai plus du tout controle de l'avion" means "I have no control at all of the plane".
Good French would read: "Je n'ai plus du tout controle de l'avion", but of course most people in France and elsewhere do not speak their own language properly, creating ambiguities and confusion for any kind of automated software translation. |
Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50
(Post 6605250)
Going over this twice, the following passage looks somewhat like the PF has an attitude indication that's gone wrong.
Originally Posted by spagiola
(Post 6604857)
2 h 13 min 25
PF: Qu’est-ce qu’y… comment ça se fait qu’on continue à descendre à fond là? What is... how come we're continuing to descend so fast? 2 h 13 min 28 PNF: Essaye de trouver ce que tu peux faire avec tes commandes là-haut Les primaires et cetera Try to see what you can do with your controls up there. The primaries etc 2 h 13 min 32 PF: au niveau cent At level 100 2 h 13 min 36 PF: Neuf mille pieds 9000 feet 2 h 13 min 38 CAP: Doucement avec le palonnier là Easy with the rudder 2 h 13 min 39 PNF: Remonte remonte remonte remonte Climb climb climb climb (literally, "remonte" is "climb back up") 2 h 13 min 40 PF: Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure But I'm nose up to the limit since earlier CAP: Non non non ne remonte pas No no no don't climb back up PNF: Alors descends Go down, then |
Originally Posted by Dozy
CAP: Là je sais pas
That one I have no idea of Could be airspeed. PNF: what do we have to do? CAP: No idea (basically, it is the meaning = here, I don't know.), we are going down (constat ; statement). See: 2 h 12 min 13 PNF: Qu’est-ce que tu en penses qu’est-ce que tu en penses, qu’est-ce qu’il faut faire ? What do you think ?what do you think ? what do we have to do? 2 h 12 min 15 to 2 h 12 min 19 CAP: Là je sais pas là ça descend I don't know we're going down |
@JCJEANT:
You mean this period? I did draw some lines and added text.
Indeed most peculiar, TOGA? sorry no answer yet, I have to wait for full translation. http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/r...b999/GRAPH.jpg |
Originally Posted by takata
(Post 6605290)
Not at all. The Captain is answering the previous question from the PNF addressed to him:
That doesn't change my reading of what the captain was getting at though, which must have been an awful realisation when it hit him. |
Dozy, you and I are quoting different parts of the discussion.
Can we try and discuss the same parts? Early on, we seem to have a disagreement in what the two of them are seeing, as the PNF keeps telling him about what he's doing and what's going on. It may be that they were seeing something different. It is also possible they were seeing the same thing and interpreting it differently. It is also possible that PF's scan began to break down about the time he took controls in Alt 2 ... |
Good points!
A further departure from the original recorded voices seems to be also the French notation, which is not capturing the use of the "imperative", as in to giving directions of what to do: do that !, don't do that!, sort of giving orders... Like the first instances of "redescend", should have been "redescend ! "., as an imperative, as an order - the PNF tells PF what he should do to correct the altitude gain. airtren
Originally Posted by takata
(Post 6605233)
Hi Lonewolf,
Be carefull (everybody) about the transcript meaning. It is better to wait for the English translation which will be painful to do (I guess it is the reason why they are late on it). French talk (especially in high stress context) is using a lot of undefined terms; here, "il est où" could mean "where it is?" or "where he is?". In context, I understand that something is missing on his pannel (like Flight Director, or another indication he was looking at that disapeared) rather than "someone" -the captain. A lot of these sentences are completely meaningless without the tone -might be interrogative, or talking to one or to the other or to himself or even to the aircraft. .... |
A first post from a non aviation-professional who has lurked here for 3 years:
Is there a detailed time-stamped control input graphic available somewhere? If already posted, would appreciate the post #. Specifically, I am interested in the seconds after the nose down input at around 2:17:17. Was the limited amplitude of this input the reason why the TLS stayed fully up? Or was the limited duration of this input the reason why the THS did not change position from fully up? Bear with me please, I appreciate I have no understanding of the autotrim algorithms in any mode. Also, how many seconds elapsed between the stall warning following the nose-down input around 2:12:17, and the subsequent nose-up input? Did the PF immediately move the stick nose-down after the stall warning sounded? What I am trying to get an estimate for is, how much time would have been needed before the aircraft regained enough speed to turn off the stall warning (i.e. because of adequate airspeed and not because of the warning being disabled by illegal angle of attack), in 2 hypothetical situations:
Informed estimates, anyone? |
Dumb non-pilot SLF question here, and I apologise for posting in the Tech forum - but this has been nagging at me.
The a/c described almost a complete circle, anti-clockwise, before it hit the sea. Is this typical of what happens in a stall, or does it suggest the plane was wing-down all the way? The Captain sounded concerned about getting the wings level before anything else, and the whole mess kicked off with the PF trying to correct a roll to the right. Is there something in this that might have confused / distracted them? Would a persistent tilt to the right, or a roll from one side to the other, have confused the sensation of being light in the seat, or made it harder to distinguish dive from stall? Apologies again. Please ignore if stupid. |
Hi A33Zab, jcjeant, (post #966)
I think the portion to the right which is cut out from your chart, which shows that the elevators positions corresponding to the ND stick commands, go from -30 to -15, which is still on the same side of the Y-axle as the HTS, which is steady at -13.
Originally Posted by A33Zab
(Post 6605301)
You mean this period? I did draw some lines and added text.
Indeed most peculiar, TOGA? sorry no answer yet, I have to wait for full translation. |
Hi Lonewoolf_50 (post #918)
The Tarom pilots were on "the top of it", from the start of the ascent, before the stall, and during the undesired ascent, trying to bring the nose down. The A/THR pushed the HTS all the way UP. According to the BEA report, at some point the HTS was full UP, the Elevators full DOWN. Remember this guys were at 60 degree pitch up, and 30knots, at stall, and they still managed to turn the nose downwards, get enough speed and lift, to level at 800ft (within 3300ft).... Now the AF 447's 10000ft/min could have worked to their advantage, of having an initial speed, had they been able to just pitch it down enough, from the nose up pitch, so that the falling speed would have started putting lift into the wings. airtren
Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50
(Post 6604418)
I doubt that aircraft developed a 10,000 fpm rate of descent. (And good thing, the pilots reacted promptly! :) Overcoming that 10,000 fpm from first unstalling, then getting knots on, then recovering with a nice firm pull without heading toward accelerated stall, since you are not in Normal Law ... how much altitude that takes is a question worth thinking through.
|
Hi,
Is there a detailed time-stamped control input graphic available somewhere? If already posted, would appreciate the post #. |
Lonewolf_50
"PJ, what I was getting to is that the AoA data is already fed into the system anyway, as you describe: it's there for the taking. My thought was to allow it to be direct fed to a different page rather than having to page down to dig it out." If you are going down at 10,000 f/min in a more-or-less horizontal attitude you must have a very large AOA. You are either stalled or the fuselage has come off. |
p110 - the 'TEMPERATURE STATIQUE' is also clearly affected by ice at same time as the speeds - temp rises to 0 as ice melting - so what about the super-cooled ice theory again - and could it have also frozen the PF's static pressure and altitude readings?
|
Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50
(Post 6605361)
Dozy, you and I are quoting different parts of the discussion.
Can we try and discuss the same parts? Unfortunately because we can't know that, there will always be a question mark about what caused the PF to make those inputs. Sadly this is a thread that has run through accident investigation for some time, examples being BEA548 - where the FDR explained what happened but there was no CVR to give definitive clues as to why, UA535 - where the FDR was a primitive model that didn't record enough parameters to give a full picture, and Tenerife, where full CVR, FDR and ATC recordings were available but the error was so basic and yet so gargantuan that one of the investigating teams had a tough time believing what they were hearing and seeing. "If we only had that parameter recorded" is a sad lament in an age where we can store hours of nonvolatile audio-visual information on a sliver of metal about the size of a child's little fingernail. I think ultimately what needs to come out of this is an understanding of the psychology of pressure situations - how one pilot can lose both engines and yet rely on his training to ditch the aircraft in a river and save everyone on board, yet at least two others have lost airspeed indications and been so confused by what their instruments were presenting them with that they stalled an otherwise serviceable airliner into the sea. It's not really a fair comparison, because in the former case all the instruments were working - but it's the level of pressure and knowing that this situation is for real that really interests me. China 006 (The 747SP that went aerobatic over northern California) is another example of instrument perception being clouded by pressure and stress. All three of the flight crew swore that their horizons had tumbled when in fact they had not. |
Hi,
then logically the first thing to do would be to hand control to the PNF, who seemed to have a better handle on things. Seem's they had good informants as the BEA report show now that it was the youngest pilot as PF during the event |
Originally Posted by Dozywannabe
Unfortunately because we can't know that, there will always be a question mark about what caused the PF to make those inputs.
0211:41 - PF: J’ai l’impression (qu’on a de) la vitesse... ~ I've got the feeling of speed [of flying fast] 0212:04 - PF: J’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou ! Non ? Qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ? ~ I've got the feeling that we are flying extremely fast! Don't you think? What do you think? [=> He orders and releases SPEEDBRAKES] 0212:07 - PNF: Non! Surtout ne ne (les) sors pas! [VS : « Stall, stall »] ~ NO! Don't use them! [Speedbrakes] - [Stall Alarm sounding] |
Originally Posted by jcjeant
(Post 6605621)
You make me remember that "Der Spiegel" had used "baby pilot" for the PF
Seem's they had good informants as the BEA report show now that it was the youngest pilot as PF during the event 3rd Interim Report, page 75: A son retour dans le poste de pilotage, le second copilote dit qu’il a somnolé. Il s’assied sur le siège de gauche et le copilote en place droite lui fait un briefing (...) , après le départ du commandant de bord, le copilote de droite reste PF et le copilote de gauche est PNF. |
Hi wozzo,
Originally Posted by wozzo
RHS/PF was first Co-pilot, age 37. 2nd Co-pilot (LHS/PNF) was 32.
|
My take on what happened
After reflecting on what I've read from the report (and thanks to the various posters who translated and then refined the CVR transcript over the course of the last few hours), here's what I think happened taking a big picture look:
- AP disconnect took the crew by surprise with immediate confusion related to speed - At no point was UAS identified or the appropriate procedure/SOP - The PF input was significant in terms of SS deflection resulting in the over-correction of the initial mild roll, coupled with a 3/4-travel deflection NU input leading to a climb - Despite the climb, the focus appears to have been on the lost speed indications - Since speed was the focus (and was unavailable), the true loss of speed due to the zoom-climb was masked - When the speeds did return the aircraft was truly slow and correspondingly trimmed nose high with negative AoA (the stall warnings and attitude of the aircraft were not acknowledged) - The aircraft was descending NU in the stall when the Capt returned to the cockpit - Since he was not in the cockpit at the beginning of the event, he arrives to find the aircraft altitude unwinding, the attitude indicators showing pitch up, with the power in TO/GA - At no point was the initial climb discussed to allow the Capt to understand where all the airspeed went - Speed continues to be a focus, but distractions due to roll seem to predominate - Altitude was not commented until very late in the sequence and seems to be identified with surprise (as if the loss of altitude was not noticed prior) - Once the altitude loss was identified, the confusion at this point led to continued NU and TO/GA, seemingly in an attempt to power out of the condition, but with no diagnosis of the AoA or trim - Since NU (climb) did not seem to be working, ND was tried, but this occurred way late and was not sustained - At FL100 control was passed to the PNF, but NU/climb commands continue basically until impact I have purposefully not added details in the sequencing above, since it is too easy to get lost in the fine print and ignore the bigger picture. Above all, the initial loss of the speeds and the transition from "loss of speed indications" to "we've no speed due to stall" seems to have been the root here. |
Originally Posted by takata
(Post 6605685)
It is what I also believed but I was wrong and the press seems to have been better informed. This report is mentioning the curriculum of each pilot and their seat occupied (pp.11-17). The younger F/O was the PF.
thanks, I get it now: "Le second copilote" from Interim Report 3 ist the "first" co-pilot from the Interim Report 1. Confusing! |
Some report stuff in English, please
Salute!
I still cannot find any official BEA report in English. I realize that I am a primitive Anglo from the Colonies, but PLZ. Would be nice to see what the other few dozen folks here are talking about with quotes and such. I found a partial English version courtesy of the main Pprune AF447 thread, but no CVR, no ADR, just basic B.S. respectfully, |
Originally Posted by jcjeant
(Post 6605621)
You make me remember that "Der Spiegel" had used "baby pilot" for the PF Seem's they had good informants as the BEA report show now that it was the youngest pilot as PF during the event
In a lot of cases, age and experience help, but in pressure situations sometimes the reaction can be almost random. As I said in the R&N thread, the Birgenair PF, a senior captain and ex-military pilot, was also unable to read the situation he was put in, with the same result. Gums, that link was to the earlier report. As yet there is no English version of the 3rd (current) report, which is why we're lucky to have people on here who can help translate for us. |
Hi Gums,
This post > http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45687...ml#post6605209 is the most refined CVR translation so far. The report has more what you are expecting with timeline, altitude, control inputs/comments and voice remarks in columns, but is all in French - I worked my way through using Google translate page by page, but it is hard work. As for the rest of the full report, I'm in the same boat as you - meaning I'm language impaired. :{ |
Originally posted by gums ... I still cannot find any official BEA report in English. One can only assume that pressure has been placed on the BEA to produce their Interim Report No.3 by Friday, and the work required to validate the other language versions has not been completed. There are currently no English, German or Brazilian language reports available. The English one (when posted) should be found at:- http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e3.en.pdf or http://media.webcastor.fr/web/bea/f-cp090601e3.en.pdf Meanwhile the French version is at:- http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...cp090601e3.pdf |
2 h 13 min 40 PF: Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure But I've been pulling to the back stop for a good while This seems to be what the Captain picked up on, and reversed his advice He probably then realised this had been a full stall sometime before he'd entered the cockpit Indeed was it then that the CAPN glanced at the THS trimwheel position to confirm his worst fears And was the PF also trying to communicate that he knew the THS trim was (or must be) very NU too ? ================================ AoA gauge or not, the constant and rather crude sounding references to simply Nose Up (or even just Go up) and Nose Down (or even just, Going Down) surely bear many of the hallmarks, even accepting the stress, incomprehension and tunnel vision of rather one dimensional training alongside a very hands-off cockpit experience. Any reasonable CRM does seem to have broken down. As noticed, PNF's main contribution was to recall the Captain promptly. It is painful to contemplate they were effectively passengers until a late and saddening eureka moment. ======================= That said, if what we mostly all believe to be true, in the way this ocurred, many questions need to be answered of the aircraft systems and controls and cockpit & flight ergonomics. This is not about icing pitots... the crew are there for just that reason, and potentially many other unforseen situations. There also seems to be a significant gap developing between flight crew capabilities - and those required for safe flight under emergency and/or exceptional conditions. The CAPN, FO 1 and FO 2 crewing that replaced the Flight Engineer system so many years ago, this crew complement itself... was it even functioning in any way as originally promised and intended? |
OK, so this is largely Google Translate, with a bit of what I've picked up from here, but this seems to be the meat of it:
Translated version of cvr.doc 2 - HISTORY OF FLIGHT: ANALYSIS POINTS The flight was divided into three phases: Phase 1: the beginning of the CVR recording to the autopilot disconnect. Phase 2: disconnecting the autopilot until the outbreak of the stall alarm. Phase 3: the onset of stall warning until the end of the flight. • Phase 1 At the beginning of the CVR recording shortly after midnight, the aircraft was cruising at flight level 350. 2 The autopilot and auto-thrust incurred. Automatic transfer of fuel in the "trim tank" was performed during the climb, and the center of gravity is then 27.5%, to a mass of 218 tonnes. The flight is calm. The crew, consisting of the captain and co-pilot, VHF is in contact with the control center of Recife. The crew discusses the high temperature (standard plus eleven) and reported the estimated amount of fuel remaining on arrival, which is evolving. The crew sees the city of Natal and finds that the weather has not been a problem. He is concerned about the closure of a land support ETOPS, Sal-Cape Verde Amilcar. It requires a change to the CCO, who said that the field is open in an emergency. The captain offers the first officer to take a rest because of the length of his vacation. The latter replied that he did not want to sleep. 35 to 1 pm, the plane gets to the point INTOL and crew leave the frequency of Recife to switch HF communication with the control center Oceanic Atlantico. A trial is SELCAL effectué5 successfully, but attempts to connect with ADS ocean Dakar fail. Soon after, the first officer change the scale of the ND 320 NM 160 NM and found that "there is something ahead," which presumably refers to echoes detected by weather radar. The captain and the crew discusses confirms again that the high temperature does not allow them to ride at 370. A 1: 45 pm, the aircraft enters a turbulent zone slightly, just before the point SALPU. Note: the crew had received a 30 to 0 h information from the OCC on the presence of a convective zone associated with the ITCZ between SALPU and TASIL. The crew reduced the lighting in flight deck and turns on the headlights "to see outside." The first officer noted that they will "return to the layer" and it would have been nice to ride. A few minutes later, the turbulence slightly and reinforce the co-pilot suggested asking up in 360 non-standard as it thinks is "really on the edge" of the layer. The captain says they will wait. It reduces the scale of the ND 40 NM, the weather radar will go into mode + weather turbulence. Soon after, he reported the appearance of St. Elmo's fire and said that "rotor as it goes" when he goes to rest. Shortly after 1 h 52, the turbulence ceases. The first officer again draws the attention of the captain on the value MAX REC, which then reaches the FL 375. The captain did not comment and a few moments later, he wakes up in the second co-pilot, said he will take his place, and asks the copilot in the right seat if it has a pilot license online. Thus it ensures that it is entitled to the supplement and refers implicitly as reserve driver. This question probably means that the first officer issues the driver alternate the captain had not been addressed during the briefing before the flight. On his return to the cockpit, the second co-pilot said he dozed. He sits on the left seat and the copilot in the right seat makes it a briefing, pointing out that "little bit of turbulence that you come to see you go ... we should find the same before it is actually in the layer Unfortunately we can not get over for now because the temperature decreases more slowly than expected. " Before leaving the cockpit, the captain recalled the HF frequencies to contact Atlantico and Dakar ocean. In fact, after the departure of captain, first officer on the left is PNF and co-pilot on the right is PF. The two co-pilots are still discussing the temperature and REC MAX. The turbulence increases slightly and they decide to prevent cabin crew from entering an area more turbulent. The first officer on the right says they are "apparently in the boundary layer," before adding that he would have preferred to climb to FL 360. Go to the next level is a constant concern of the crew. The drivers clearly want change outside of the layer, presumably to minimize turbulence. 08 to 2 pm, the first officer on the left, probably after seeing the echoes detected by radar weather, proposes to "alter a little to the left." The HDG mode is activated and select the course dropped 12 degrees to the road. The first officer left pass the gain setting up the weather radar, after observing that it was calibrated mode. The discussion is interrupted by a sensation of temperature increase and the appearance of an odor about which drivers exchange for more than a minute. The first officer on the left identifies this as the smell of ozone. Conversations in the cockpit did not reveal any malfunction of the weather radar and show that it has submitted a usable image. The background noise changes rapidly to 2 h 09 min 46. This change in background noise has been identified as being characteristic of the presence of ice crystals but does not give rise to any particular crew, the phenomenon was little known drivers at the time. The PNF then takes the initiative to reduce the Mach 0.8 and anti-icing engines are engaged. The departure of captain has been without a clear operational guidelines, particularly on the role of each of the two co-pilots. The absence of a formal framework of operation of a crew consisting of two co-pilots have led to the division of labor is not optimal seen them. • Phase 2 A 2 h 10 min 05, the sharp drop in measured velocities, presumably due to blockage of the Pitot probes by ice crystals, causing the disengagement of the autopilot and auto-thrust (thrust is then fixed) and the change of control law of flying to alternate normal. The presence of turbulence, as evidenced by the activity of the PA to control body roll in the seconds before, led to a disconnection from the plane to roll right up to about 8 °. The co-pilot PF says "I have control" and has fast action and high amplitude side, almost lock to lock. He was also an action that increases the pitch attitude of the aircraft to 11 ° in ten seconds. Flight directors are not disengaged by the crew, but the trend bars disappear. A 2 h 10 min 10, the PF are increasing the incidence and the stall warning activated twice unexpectedly. Probably in response to this alarm, the PNF exclaims, "What's that?". The PF then said "there was not a good one ... you do not speed ... good news" and the PNF "we lost the speed." The reported incidence is about 5 °, a value theoretical threshold for triggering the alarm just over 4 °. The crew identifies the loss anemometer indications but none of the two co-pilots then calls the associated procedure. The emergency maneuver "IAS dubious" requires first to disconnect and disengage the automatic flight directors. The two co-pilots had been trained at the emergency maneuver in low layer, at which the plate to adopt is 10 ° or 15 °. However, a note describing the problem OSV loss anemometer indications previously encountered on the cruise and A330/A340 fleet reminiscent of the procedures to be applied. The note had been circulated to all NTP division A330/A340. Between 2 and 18 h 10 min 2 h 10 min 25, the PNF read the ECAM messages in a disorderly manner, but mention the loss of self-driven and alternate passage into law. Thrust lock function is disabled. PNF calls and triggers anti-icing of the wings. The PNF then attracts the attention of the PF on speed. At that time, the two speeds recorded (the one displayed on the PFD of the left and ISIS) are less than 100 knots and vertical speed reaches a maximum of 7000 ft / min. Longitudinal movements of the aircraft are the result of the actions of PF, which also continues to perform actions of high amplitude side to control the roll, less than 10 ° right and left. A reading of the three instruments (both PFD and ISIS), the SOP notes that the aircraft climbs and asked repeatedly to go back down to the PF. The latter then makes a number of actions that have to bite the effect of reducing the tax base and the vertical velocity, whose values ??are nevertheless still excessive and the aircraft is about 37,000 ft and continues to rise, without the intervention of PNF. Although the REC MAX was a constant concern before disconnecting the PA, none of the two co-pilots there refers. To 2 h 10 min 34, the speed displayed on the left side becomes valid and then to 215 kt, the speed of the ISIS is always wrong. The aircraft then lost about 60 kt from disconnecting the autopilot and the start of the climb, which is consistent with increasing altitude of about 2000 ft. A 2 h 10 min 47, the thrust levers are slightly remote to 2 / 3 of the beach IDLE / CLB (85% N1). Two seconds later, the plate came back a little below 6 degrees, roll is controlled, the impact is slightly less than 5 ° and the PHR is 3 ° nose. The vertical velocity is always high at a 100 ft / min. From a few seconds, the PNF tries to recall the captain. In this phase, at any time one of the two co-pilots has announced value of speed, attitude, vertical speed and altitude. The flight directors were not disengaged, the bars tend to have disappeared and reappeared several times it is not possible at this stage of the investigation to know what orders they were able to identify or determine whether these orders may have influenced the actions of the PF. At this point, after a quick trim and altitude, which is the consequence of the actions of PF, the trajectory of the aircraft appears to be controlled. The increased pitch angle and the initial vertical velocity resulting were excessive for the altitude and should have been advertised immediate difference from the PNF. The lack of specific training manual flying at high altitudes likely contributed to the actions of steering and monitoring inadequate. The low synergy observed between the two co-pilots can originate on one hand the lack of clear division of roles by the captain, and also the lack of CRM training between two co-pilots in a situation substitute the captain. Note: no regulation requiring such training or criteria such as experience or ability in the decision to designate an alternate captain during flights by crews strengthened. • Phase 3 A 2 h 10 min 51, the stall alarm is activated again, with an incidence of approximately 6 °, which corresponds to the theoretical threshold for triggering the alarm for the Mach 0.68 worth while. PF continues to hold considerable nose-up input: the plate increases by 6 to 13 and the incidence of 6 ° to 10 °. The vertical acceleration recorded reflects the rapid onset of vibration can be the buffet. Five seconds later, probably in response to the stall warning, the PF advance thrust levers to the notch TO / GA and the announcement. That's about at that moment that the plane out of its flight. Despite some actions to sting, the PF maintains a global action to pitch up. The plate is between 11 ° and 18 ° and the incidence between 11 ° and 23 °. The THS begins a movement consistent with the actions of PF and will reach the value of 13 ° nose about a minute later. It should be recalled that in alternate law, auto trim is still active. By cons, it is difficult for the crew to know the position of the trim and no alarm does not notify the crew that place. A 2 h 11 min 06, after several attempts to call, the PNF is concerned about the lack of new captain. This concern probably increases the stress of the PNF in front of a situation he does not understand. A second later, the speed of the ISIS becomes valid. ADR 3 is selected on the right side PFD, the speed of the PF becomes equally valid. It is 183 kt and then the three speeds shown are consistent. This requires no comment from the crew. Within 30 seconds after the start of the stall warning, the airspeed decreased from 205 to about 160 kt. The vertical velocity is zero and then gradually became strongly negative (4000 ft / min). The maximum altitude of about 38,000 ft was reached at 2 h 11 min 10. Shortly after 2 h 11 min 30, the OP said twice that he lost control of the aircraft. This may reflect the difficulty of controlling a roll, the airplane banked to the right when he maintains his grip on the left stop. However, his few actions to sting every time cause a reduction of assessment. A 2 h 11 min 37, the PNF called "controls on the left," takes precedence and gives a short-acting to a stop on the left, the PF takes priority almost immediately without any announcement and continue to drive. To 2 h 11 min 42, the captain enters the cockpit shortly before the stall warning stops. The parameters of the plane are then: altitude of about 35,800 ft, vertical speed of 9100 ft / min, calibrated airspeed of 100 kt down, base 12 ° and N1 engine 102%. Neither of the two co-pilots will not result in a detailed account of problems or actions taken, except that they have lost control of the aircraft and they have tried everything. In response, the CDB said many times "take it", probably referring to the FPV. The parameters show that the stall warning stopped because the three values ??of incidence have become invalid. Note: from 2 h 11 min 45, the speeds are no longer displayed continuously on the PFD. A 2 h 12 min 04, the OP said he thinks they are overspeed condition, perhaps because of high aerodynamic noise prevailing in the cockpit. None of the other two drivers parse this hypothesis when it is inconsistent with the pitch attitude and vertical speed high descent. Until the end of the flight, the values ??revert incidence successively valid and invalid. Every time that at least one value becomes valid, the stall alarm is reactivated, and each time that the effects are disabled, the alarm stops. Several actions to sting causes a decrease in the impact assessment and whose values ??revert while valid, so that a free action to sting results in the activation of stall warning. It seems that the drivers then react with a nose-up action, the consequences are an increased incidence, a decrease in measured velocities and therefore stopping the stall alarm. Until the end of the flight, no value will be valid incidence below 35 °. Neither of the two co-pilots has formally identified the dropout situation in which was the plane or through the alarm either by recognition of the buffet, or by the interpretation of high values ??of vertical velocity and the base. It should be noted that the buffet is the only indication of approaching the stall at high altitude on other airplanes of the alarm threshold stall does not vary with the Mach. In the absence of relevant information from the co-pilots, the only reading of information available on the screens (plate, roll, push, vertical speed, altitude, etc ...) did not allow the CBD to quickly realize the situation of the aircraft. He did not then ask questions that might help them understand the sequence of events. The stall warning lasted 54 seconds continuously, during which none of the co-pilots are referred to. It is likely that the CBD has heard the alarm a few moments before entering the office, but it is also likely that its many stops and reactivations were added to the confusion and disrupted his diagnosis of the situation. Despite several references to the altitude, which decreased, none of the three crew members did not seem able to determine what information to trust: the values of trim, roll and thrust might have seemed inconsistent with the values vertical speed and altitude. 3 - CONCLUSIONS 3.1 New Findings the composition of the crew was in accordance with the procedures of the operator, the weight and center of gravity were within operational limits, at the time of autopilot disconnect, the captain was at rest, the departure of captain has been without a clear operational guidelines, particularly on the role of each co-pilots, the crew had identified the echoes on radar weather, the crew made ??a change in direction of 12 ° to the left of the road The PA has withdrawn while the aircraft was operating in an upper cloud layer of slightly turbulent co-pilots had not received training at high altitude, the procedure "IAS questionable" and flight manual there was inconsistency between the measured velocities, presumably as a result of obstruction of Pitot probes in environment of ice crystals, although identified and announced the loss of airspeed indications, none of the two co-pilots has called the procedure "IAS questionable" the invalidity of the speed displayed on the PFD lasted 29 seconds left, the speed of the ISIS 54 seconds, in less than a minute after the disengagement of the autopilot, the plane went out of its flight as a result of manual control actions predominantly to pitch, The captain returned to the cockpit about 30 minutes after a disengagement of the autopilot, throughout the flight, movements of the elevators and PHR were consistent with the actions of the pilot to the exit of the flight, the longitudinal movements of the aircraft were consistent with the position of the control, there was no explicit allocation of tasks between the two co-pilots, there is no CRM training for crew consists of two co-pilots in a position of substitution of the captain, no announcement regarding the standard deviations of attitude and vertical speed has been made, the impact of the plane is not directly presented to pilots, approaching the stall was characterized by the activation of the alarm and the onset of buffet, neither pilot refers to the stall warning, neither pilot formally identified the situation stall the stall warning was triggered continuously for 54 seconds, shortly after activation of stall warning, the PF applied thrust TO / GA and had a nose-up action, the incidence is the parameter to activate the stall warning and if the values of angle-of-attack become disabled, the alarm stops, by design, when the speed values were measured below 60 kt, the three values of incidence/AoA have become invalid whenever the stall warning was activated, the incidence exceeded the value of the theoretical threshold of activation, engines worked and always responded to the commands of the crew, no announcement has been made to passengers. 4 - SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS Reminder: in accordance with Article 17.3 of Regulation No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation, a safety recommendation does by no means a presumption of fault or liability in an accident, serious incident or incident. The recipients of safety recommendations report to the authority responsible for security investigations that issued the actions taken or planned to ensure their implementation, as provided by Article 18 of the Regulation. 4.1 Recommendations on operation Flight Training Manual The survey has highlighted the weaknesses of the two co-drivers: the inappropriate actions of PF on the flight controls at high altitude have not been identified by the PNF by lack of effective monitoring of the trajectory. The stall warning buffet and have not been identified. This is probably due to a lack of specific training despite compliance with regulatory programs. Manual control can not be improvised and requires precision and measured actions on the controls. There are other opportunities for disengagement of the autopilot for which only a specific and regular training can provide the necessary expertise to ensure flight safety. A reading of their latest training and checking, it was shown that co-pilots were not trained in manual control, approach and recovery stall at high altitude. Consequently, the BEA recommends: • that the EFSA review the content of training programs and to impose such control and the introduction of specific exercises and regular dedicated to manual control, the approach and stall recovery, including high altitude. Replacement of the command The survey revealed that lack of education and training a crew of two co-pilots do not guarantee a performance level equivalent to that of a crew of one captain and a co-pilot in a situation worse. The lack of hierarchy and efficient allocation of tasks in the cockpit have greatly contributed to the low synergy. The concern arose from the absence of captain in the cockpit shows that the two co-pilots lacked the capacity to address this emergency. This can be explained both by the lack of adequate training and lack of decision-making practice of the two co-pilots. Many events have had a favorable outcome due to the presence of the captain whose training and experience have enabled a more robust and more serene reactions to the situation. Consequently, the BEA recommends: • that the EFSA defines additional criteria for access to the function Deputy of the captain to ensure a better distribution of work crews in case of reinforced and • that, temporarily, the DGAC defines additional criteria for access to the function of deputy commander to ensure better division of labor in cases of crews strengthened. 4.2. Recommendation for certification Measuring impact The crew was never formally identified the dropout situation. The angle-of-attack information is not directly accessible to the pilots. The angle-of-attack of cruise flight is close to the angle-of-attack of the onset of stall warning in a law other than the normal. Under these conditions, manual control can cause the aircraft to high incidences such as those encountered during the event. It is essential to ensure the safety of the flight to reduce the angle-of-attack when the stall is imminent. Only a direct reading of the impact could allow crews to quickly identify the location of the aircraft aerodynamic and have any necessary actions. Consequently, the BEA recommends: • that the EASA and the FAA evaluate the merits of integrating the presence of an impact indicator directly accessible by the pilots on board aircraft. 4.3. Recommendations for flight recorders The operating parameters of the FDR and CVR listening to provide information essential to understanding the event. However it is difficult to reconstruct the information available to the crew on their flight instruments, including the orders given by the bars in the trend of flight directors when they reappear. We can not see if there have been attempts to re-engagement of the autopilot. A view of the dashboard complement the information given by the FDR and CVR and would confirm the information available to the crew and the actions it has taken. Many recommendations have already been issued on the subject over the last ten years without a breakthrough has occurred. Consequently, the BEA recommends that again: • that ICAO imposes on aircraft performing public transport passengers an image recording for viewing the entire panel, and That, at the same time, ICAO establish very strict rules of operation of such records to ensure confidentiality of stored data. Today, regulations require the registration of conduct of the flight parameters displayed on the left. Some key parameters for the analysis of flight control are lacking, particularly those presented in the right seat driver: speed, altitude, attitude, position bars tend flight director, etc.. In addition, aircraft are equipped with complex systems whose analysis of the operation is limited and hampered by the lack of registration of the parameters of all the data sources they use. Consequently, the BEA recommends: • that the EASA and the FAA mandate the recording: o the position of the bars tend flight directors, o the conduct of the flight parameters displayed in the right seat, in addition to those shown on the left, and • that the EASA and the FAA are studying the merits of mandatory recording anemometer and inertial parameters of all sources used by the systems. 4.4 Recommendations on the transmission of flight data In the Progress Report No. 2, BEA has issued safety recommendations regarding the increase in the duration and scope of the ULB, sending regular data recorders and carriage of ejection. These recommendations are based on the findings of an international working group led by government-industrie12 the BEA as part of the safety investigation into the crash of flight AF-447, which has since studied the feasibility of transmission triggered flight data. The concept is to analyze real-time flight data on aircraft to detect emergency situations. In these cases, the transmission of flight data is triggered to facilitate the location of an aircraft in emergency situations. The working group's results show that it is technically feasible to define reliable criteria based on flight parameters to detect emergency situations, while limiting the false detection. The group also concluded that it is technically feasible to obtain an impact position. |
Hi,
This is not about icing pitots... the crew are there for just that reason The pilots are not "there" to correct a instrument fitted and designed for other purpose By other purpose i mean .. not designed for work in the domain where was the plane It's not to the pilots to correct bad design .. but it's the duty of the designers and the duty of the certification bodies ... The problem was know .. and despite this .. planes (passengers and pilots) were send in a aera (altitude - region) when the problem can arise ... If they had not icing .. never this tragedy had happened ... period End of rant about pitot tubes ... |
Spag's cvr transcript translation
Thanks to all for potential links and such.
Reading Spag's translation makes me cry. Remember, the plane "protects" you. Makes me cry again. Over 3 minutes to see what's happening and decide to do something besides debate why the plane is going down so fast but "we're" "commanding" it to go up. Sheesh. |
I want to disagree ... I really thought you'd analyse that differently.. This accident throws up much more important things than those already known (pitot icing propensity) |
Hi,
Shortly after 1 h 52, the turbulence ceases. The first officer again draws the attention of the captain on the value MAX REC, which then reaches the FL 375. The captain did not comment and a few moments later, he wakes up in the second co-pilot, said he will take his place, and asks the copilot in the right seat if it has a pilot license online. Thus it ensures that it is entitled to the supplement and refers implicitly as reserve driver. This question probably means that the first officer issues the driver alternate the captain had not been addressed during the briefing before the flight. Why ask this in flight ?? seem's to be late ... Is this a usual thing to the captain to not know the qualifications of his crew or a usual thing from a airline to not inform the captain of the crew composition ? From the 3 interim report it's unfortunately no informations about the crew who made the prior flight Paris - Rio I wonder if it is the same crew or another ... |
After the stall, and start of the fall, the pitch (assiette) went several times from positive (nose up) to negative values (nose down) - it is explicitly mentioned on the CVR/FDR sync recording transcript (3rd column).
On the graphs, the Pitch (Assiette) Curve going negative (Nose Down) coincides with Elevator ( Governe de Profondeur) Curve going from -30 to -15, and with Vertical Speed (Vitesse) Curve slowing down significantly close to 0 (zero), or even going positive. The Vertical Speed Curve shows continuous variations during the fall, indicating that the fall was very bumpy, and not at constant speed. Close to the end of the Vertical Speed Curve (right side), there are two spikes significantly above Zero. If they reflect the reality, the plane had two moments in which not only it stopped falling, but it climbed. I could not access Page 47 for quite sometime, while I can access 46, and 48. It seems there is a problem with it. I wonder if that behavior is seen by others too. |
Gums, hope this helps.
Some points from my reading of the French (not a native speaker). The first two are my thoughts, the rest is my best attempt to translate the salient parts of the report; thoughts are theirs, not mine. I'm sure I've made mistakes, will correct them as people point them out to me. 1. The pitots seemed to fail at 3 different points and differently. See p 31. The ISIS speed dropped, rose then dropped again. Not certain about this, but given the statement at 2:10:17 "we've lost the the the speeds", the third (unrecorded) speed might not to have fallen as far at that moment, so there was one high(er) (unrecorded speed) and two that had dropped to 73kt and coincided at that value. 2. The aircraft apparently left its known flight envelope at 2:10:54: p43: "La validité du modèle se limite au domaine de vol connu d’après les essais en soufflerie et les essais en vol. Ainsi, la simulation a pu être menée sur la période de 2 h 10 min 00 jusqu’à 2 h 10 min 54." As I read it, Airbus conducted a simulation limited to the flight envelope as known from wind tunnel/test flights. The ending of the simulation at 2:10:54 suggests that that was the limit of the envelope. "Phase 1" 3. Background noise changed, sounds characteristic of ice crystals encountered at 2:09:46 (p75) "Phase 2" 4. Indicated airspeeds first dropped at 2:10:05 (p76). The sharp ("brutale") drop caused disconnection of AP and autothrust. Turbulence caused a right roll of up to 8 degrees (p76) 5. PF's sidestick inputs were quick and large, almost from stop to stop (native speaker pilot might assist - "butee" (Lemurian?)). They caused a pitch increase of 11 degree in 10 seconds, and increased the AoA. The stall warning activated twice. [As I read it, activated briefly or intermittently - not certain about "de manière furtive", as I understand it to mean "almost silent/hidden"] This is probably what caused PNF to say "what's that?" (qu’est-ce que c’est que ça?). [2:10:10] 6. Although they identified unreliable airspeeds, neither of the two performed the associated procedure. They had only been trained in emergency procedures at low altitude. (There is a passage observing that a note had been circulated following earlier UAS encounters in the A330/340 fleet.) 7. Between 2:10:18 and 2:10:25 the PNF read the ECAM messages out of order (I read it as uncoordinated, ie not usual). He notes loss of auto thrust and alt law, and calls for wing anti icing. 8. PNF draws the PF's attention to speed. The two known (ie in the data recorders) speeds are less than 100 kts. Vertical speed has reached a maximum of 7000 ft/min. PNF notes the climb, tells PF several times to descend. PF does take action but the rate of climb is nonetheless still excessive. (p76) 9. Near 2:10:34, the left displayed speed becomes valid and increases to 215kt. The ISIS speed is still wrong. The aircraft has already lost about 60kt from the time the AP disconnected, which is consistent with climbing about 2000ft. 10. At 2:10:47, thrust is moved back to about 2/3 (N1 85%). 2 seconds later, pitch returns to a little under 6 degrees, roll is controlled, AoA is under 5 degrees, THS is 3 degrees up. Vertical speeds is still above 1100 ft min. The PNF calls for the captain. 11. Up to this point, neither of the two pilots has mentioned the values of speed, pitch, vertical speed or altitude. The flight directors had not disengaged but the "bars" have disappeared and reappeared several times. They can't say at this stage how this might have affected what the PF was doing. 12. At this point, the PF seems to have controlled the aircraft's trajectory. The initial increase in pitch and the resulting vertical speed were excessive for that altitude and should have been mentioned to the PNF. There is a passage about the lack of CRM and the lack of clear division of resposibilities by the captain. (p77) "Phase 3" 13. At 2:10:51, the stall warning sounded again. AoA is aobut 6 degrees, which is the theoretical threshold for stall warning activation at M0.68. PF mostly continues to apply nose-up: pitch increases from 6 to 13 degrees, AoA from 6 to 10 degrees. The recorded values for vertical acceleration reflect a rapid onset of vibrations that could be buffet. Five seconds later, probably as a result of the stall warning, PF applies TOGA. "That is about the moment the aircraft left its flight envelope." 14. Despite some small contrary actions [I think this is what they mean by "piquer"] the PF generally maintains nose up inputs. Pitch is between 11 and 13 degrees and AoA between 11 and 23. The THS starts moving consistently with the PF's inputs and reaches a value of about 13 degrees about a minute later. Note that in alt law, auto trim is still active. On the other hand ,it is difficult for the crew to know the trim position and there is no alarm that it is moving [check: "deroule" - I usually understand as "unroll"]. 15. At 2:11:06, after several attempts to call the captain, the PNF again notes his absence. "This concern probably increases the PNF's stress, who has found himself in a situation he does not understand." 16. A second later, the ISIS speed becomes valid again. ADR 3 is selected on the right hand PFD, and the PF's speed also becomes valid. It is then 183 kt and the three speeds are consistent. This is not the subject of any comment by the crew. 17. In the 30 seconds after the stall warning started, airspeed fell from 205 to about 160 kts. Vertical velocity fell to zero, then strongly negative (-4000 ft/min). Maximum altitude of 38,000 ft was at 2:11:10 18. A little after 2:11:30, PF announced that he had lost control of the plane. This might be explained by difficulty in maintaining roll control: it was rolling to the right even though he had the stick at full left stop (again, "butee"). 19. At 2:11:37, PNF said "command to the left" [I read it potentially as "I have control"?], and made a short input to the left stop. PF took control again almost immediately without saying anything and continued to fly ("piloter"). 20. About 2:11:42, the captain re-entered the cockpit, not long before the stall warning stopped. Altitude was 35,800 ft, vertical speed was -9,100 ft/min, IAS [I think - "vitesse conventionnelle"] was 100kts and dropping, pitch at 12 degrees and N1 at 102%. Neither of the pilots knew exactly what was going on ("what problems they had encountered or the actions undertaken"), other than that they had lost control of the aircraft and they had tried everything. In response, the Capt several times said "look at that"; he was undoubtedly pointing to the FPV. The recorders show the stall warning had stopped because the 3 AoA values had become invalid. After 2:11:45, the speeds were no longer continuously displayed on the PFD. 21. At 2:12:04, PF said he thought they were in an overspeed situation, possibly because of the high aerodynamic noise inside the cockpit. Neither of the other two pilots analysed this hypothesis even though it was inconsistent with the pitch and the high negative vertical speed. 22. Until the end of the flight, the AoA values became successively valid and invalid. Each time that at least one value becomes valid, the stall alarm starts; when the values become invalid again, the alarm stops. Several small inputs are made that reduce pitch, and each time they make the AoA values valid again and cause the stall alarm to sound. It seems that the pilots react by making nose up inputs, which cause the AoA to increase, the measured speeds to decrease and hence cause the stall warning to stop. Until the end of hte flight, the AoA never drops below 35 degrees. 23. Neither of the two copilots formally identified the stall. They did not recognise it from the stall warning, by recognition of the buffet, or by the high value of the vertical speed and the pitch. Not quite certain of this: "It is notable that the buffet is the only indication of the onset [or approach] to stall at high altitude on other aircraft where the stall warning does not depend on Mach". 24. Not having been given relevant information by the copilots, the only information the Capt had, from the screens, was not enough to give him rapid situational awareness. He did not then ask questions that could have helped him understand the sequence of events. 25. The stall alarm sounded continuously for 54 seconds but neither of the copilots referred to it. It is likely that the Capt heard it briefly before he returned to the cockpit but it is equally probably that the multiple start/stops added to the confusion and affected his understanding of the situation. Despite several references to the decreasing altitude, none of the three pilots seemed to know which information to trust: the pitch, roll and thrust values could have seemed inconsistent to them with the vertical speed values. |
Originally Posted by auraflyer
(Post 6605891)
19. At 2:11:17, PNF said "command to the left" [I read it potentially as "I have control"?], and made a short input to the left stop. PF took control again immediately without saying anything and continued to fly ("piloter").
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There are several instances in which the left side stick - manche CDB (Commandant de Bord) - has participated to the controls. Dual input took place towards the end of the recordings.
The graphs show the controls applied to the left side stick, and right side stick - page 114.
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
(Post 6605904)
Yes- what the hell was that about?
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Originally Posted by ACARS
.1/FLR/FR090601 0210 279334 06
EFCS1 X2,EFCS2X,,,,,, FCPC2 (2CE2) /WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2,HARD It seems to be simply due to PNF selection of ADR3 in place of its own ADR1 displayed. Hence, he switched to ADR3 (wrong) shortly before ADR1 returned "good" again. A while later, it seems that ADR+IR 3 was switched for ADR+IR 2 on PF display. |
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