Quote:
Anti icing system is not certified for LSD larg supercooled droplets , freezing rain , freezing dreezle. LSD is probably what they encountered.

I disagree it is SLD. Due to altitude and temperture it more for a ice crystals event. SLD would occurr at much higher tempertures and low altitudes.

todays training
 

Well i do not blame the crew. I would say todays training is very poor from very begining of the flight training , teaching methods are bad etc..I see this every day..

Take an example of stall recovery..how do you get beyond critical AoA is by abusing the elevator so the elevator is the flight control that stalls and the flight control that unstalls AC. It s your AoA control and or speed control so you MUST push that stick fwd BUT some teach just add power keep the same pitch as we can see today.

Now flight schools or airlines teach something new the ,,new way'' to recover from the stall and even they don t teach full stall recovery.I see this with EU students who never heard of elevator trim stall,turning stall,cross control stall etc.Just not too long ago a student who finished the training did t know pitot static system failures and instrument errors.

Today we train OPERATORS not pilots..think of it you have pilots flying who never been upside down in an airplane and they are supose to recover from any attitude???? Blame flight training and my friend it will get worse...

So many contradictions and disagreements on translation - we will have to wait for Wednesday to see how BEA do at it, and to see the FDR traces annotated in English.

So far, what I see of this tragic accident is:-

PF completely surprised by the loss of A/P and A/T and enters a steep climb - why? Unknown. I am not sure what he was 'seeing' on his panel.,

PNF and PF appear to disregard the pitch attitude and altitude change to above ?MAXREC? - why? Unknown, Ditto

At the apogee, at less than 6 deg of pitch and an unknown (low ) airspeed (having 'traded' KE for PE), it is probable the aircraft was not 'stalled', but was flying too slowly for the actual IAS to support its weight, hence it would start to descend.

Now, a confused PF ?sees this? and selects TOGA and raises the nose to arrest the descent, thereby 'stalling' the wing. A perhaps logical reaction since he had no idea of the IAS, and may have had some background 'trust' in the AB 'protecting' him. Add the change in AoA due to the descent and we are now well into 'stalled'. A long period now of 'STALL STALL' audio which as we know can be 'lost' in 'difficult' cockpit situations. Continuing 'disbelief' that the a/c can be going down with this pitch and power and constant nose-up to try and stop it.

From there on I suspect pandemonium was rife in the cockpit and no-one, including the Captain on arrival, was able to logically deduce that high pitch, high R of D and high thrust meant stall.

It is very rare for airline pilots to ever 'see' a full stall - in military (and civil) QFI days I used to hold the a/c in the stall to demonstrate such ('symptoms of the stall'). The BAC Lightning was particularly adept at producing a fairly stable stall with high r of d. I guess if you have never seen this demonstrated you would not recognise it?

I have made my comments on the absence of the Captain for ITCZ passage much earlier and my views on the necessary changes in training philosophy on another forum here.

I am still very puzzled by the CVR at

"2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46
PNF: Je te mets en en A T T
I'm putting you in in A T T"

Sorry BOAC, but it's a 117-page pdf..... not to mention a remarkable amount of alphabetti-spaghetti (abbreviations and acronyms).
It took me enough time to read the French original.
It would take me several days to translate, even using a Google translation as a starting text, and since I'm not being paid for it, I have no intention of doing so.

That doesn't mean I'm not willing to try and help out with resolving ambiguities in the translation of given paragraphs or phrases. But I have no intention of working through the entire document, comparing the English to the original French.

LSD
 

Go to ADDS web site there is prediction for LSD..if you do icing training and this is from NASA it s available on AOPA and FAA/ FAST TEAM / you we ll read about it..Second have you seen documentary on NOVA about AF 447 ? if not watch it on netflix under crash of flight 447..this investigators had very good idea what happened..even they mentioned something that the Franch did not and that is..Several crews responded only with pitch change and they were up to 60 sec late reacting with power by that time they put AC into stall when pitot failed.


As far as LSD i stand by that cause it s part of the training /FAA/

During the time slot 2:12:15 - 2:12:19

Capt says:... ca descend

and 2:12:19 - 2:12:45

Capt says: Les ailes a plat !!! (exclamation signs are my addition, as it is an "imperative", an order.... to correct the "pitch up".

Could understand training deficiency if there was low awareness/misunderstanding of modes and protections in degraded states. Not sure I would agree if it's about the existence of an aerodynamic condition called a stall, what causes it and what must be done, at the basic level, to get the wing flying again.

AF 447 June 29 2011 BEA report
 

Air France crash blamed on pilot error | World news | The Guardian

And this is being said without detailed technical evidence. I have heard and seen too many questions as to accept such a simplistic statement.

What is the reaction by this forum?

Do not expect something unambiguous as such talk meanings are clearly based on interpretation of the context, the particular focus of talkers. Add to it translations issues for few typical expressions, and one can get it totally wrong.

There is no grammar, many sentences are only suit of words, started but unfinished. The tone is the primary clue but, even hearing the record, it would be hard to figure out many interjections due to stress level: hence, there can not be a single meaning of what is said.

At one point, (0213:39) the PNF says:
- remonte remonte remonte remonte
a) he is ordering the PF: climb! climb! climb! climb!
b) he is encouraging the aircraft to go up;
c) he is talking to the altitude gauge, or at everything (everybody) at once... who could make the difference? His tone would be about the same : high stress near panic? high stress but confidence? : one would need to see his face, where he is looking at.

AF 447 June 29, 2011 BEA report
 

And this is being said without detailed technical evidence. I have heard and seen too many questions as to accept such a simplistic statement.

What is the reaction by this forum?

A quick correction; I meant the technical detailed report in English so that wider audience can acquaint themselves with the report.

The note is saying:
0210:39 -> 0210:46: "le selecteur AIR DATA puis le sélecteur "ATT/HDG sont positionnés sur F/O on 3"
PNF : "je te mets en ATT (*)"

0210:39 -> 0210:46: "AIR DATA then ATT/HDG are switched on F/O on 3"
PNF : "I'm switching you to ATT [word(s) missing]"

This is a PF action on ADIR switching pedestal panel; he switches F/O from ADR2 to ADR3, then switches also IR2 to IR3 (ATT/HDG).
http://takata1940.free.fr/att.jpg

JC-EE

Those tears, many have them I am sure, frustration all around especially considering AF's reply....

Looking at the graphs that the BEA has published in the latest report, I notice that at the time AF447 made the initial climb, the temperature had increased and the wind had not only increased, looks like off the scale, but changed direction ~180. Would this be significant, or am I talking the "proverbial"?

That's typical from UAS event. TAT probes are frozen also, and most of the time they are the first to be frozen (temp climb to zero C°, temp of ice inside probes). Wind speed and direction is derived from ADR data. When speed drops a lot, TAS is wrong, Wind speed is wrong (and out of boundaries) as it is derived from comparing TAS with Ground speed (GPS).
If no wind: before 490 TAS; after 150 TAS = 340 kt wind speed.
From DFDR, they have deduced a head wind of about 15 kt during the sequence.

jcjeant,

Alas, I at least fail to see your point. The 3rd interim rpt gives simply more precision to the CV, but there is no contradiction to the 1st one. That this pilot did not have in its youth a straightforward career with the airlines (as so many others) is also obvios from the 1st report.

Cheers

Hello, HarryMann;

Is someone making the suggestion that the cockpit crew didn't have their seatbelts on? Does the Interim Report #3 discuss this somewhere?

Under the circumstances I can't imagine how this could be true. The captain would likely have belted himself into the center seat but I haven't read that anywhere - it's the first thing I'd do though.

Sorry... "les ailes à plat", if an imperative, means "level off" and has nothing to do with pitch attitude.

Added:
See how easily translations can confuse ? "Level off" in English can still refer to pitch attitude, or altitude.
"Les ailes à plat" in French refers to roll attitude, not pitch.

Hi PJ2,
Yes, it is in the report. page 41.
1.12.4.2.1 3 Les sièges du cockpit
- Sur le siège situé en place gauche, les ceintures ventrales étaient attachées, la ceinture de l’entrejambe et les harnais d’épaules ne l’étaient pas.
- Sur le siège situé en place droite aucune ceinture n’était attachée.
From the recovered seats, they found that PNF had used only the belly seat belts, none were used on PF seat (and it was suggested elsewhere that Captain was standing behind them - not seated).

At the apogee, at less than 6 deg of pitch and an unknown (low ) airspeed (having 'traded' KE for PE), it is probable the aircraft was not 'stalled', but was flying too slowly for the actual IAS to support its weight, hence it would start to descend.

Agree 100%..if you demo in flight that s what happens


Now, a confused PF ?sees this? and selects TOGA and raises the nose to arrest the descent, thereby 'stalling' the wing. Aperhaps logical reaction [

Yes by natural instinct it s logical and it s logical if he thinks that pitch/elevator control altitude that s what happenes when one miss label flight controls..

Add the change in AoA due to the descent and we are now well into 'stalled'. A long period now of 'STALL STALL' audio which as we know can be 'lost' in 'difficult' cockpit situations. Continuing 'disbelief' that the a/c can be going down with this pitch and power and constant nose-up to try and stop it.

Power on stall by the book.You can stall at any pitch attitude and power setting. If you demo that s what you will observe


[/B] It is very rare for airline pilots to ever 'see' a full stall - in military (and civil) QFI days I used to hold the a/c in the stall to demonstrate such ('symptoms of the stall'). The BAC Lightning was particularly adept at producing a fairly stable stall with high r of d. I guess if you have never seen this demonstrated you would not recognise it?

Agree 100 % that s why I said poor training as far as stall/spin awareness


[/B]I have made my comments on the absence of the Captain for ITCZ passage much earlier and my views on the necessary changes in training philosophy on another forum here

AMEN brother....the question is does anyone want to listen to uspilots instructors who see the problem? Look at the training today it s production line from 0 to right seat in a year..Some one said ,,It takes one to two years to learn how to fly ..10 to 20 years to intelligently fly''..

Thank you, Takata. The lower belt only for the PNF is easily explained as the shoulder harnesses are never used during cruise. The "no seat belt" for the PF requires greater explanation. At some point it went from fastened to unfastened. That requires that in the recovery from the sea bottom the buckles for the lap belt were undamaged and were not fastened. If they were not fastened as recovered, then either the PF unbuckled at some point or the belt was unbuckled in the impact. Without closer examination one cannot judge which is more likely.

Understand the captain was standing...I now recall that his body was found and that he was standing made sense at the time, as it does now.

Seat belts ? Was going to suggest perhaps unbuckling was in readiness to allow Capt to take place but on reflection seems odd the two seats were recovered with occupants if one was unbuckled. Hard injuries would probably show it if the autopsy looked.

It would appear that both PF and PNF may not have been scanning their instrument panels. When the Captain returned he was not briefed ( in time ) to take positive action.
A light showing that excessive trim had been selected, just might have served to prompt ONE of the three pilots that something was amiss, sooner.

The ISIS might well have been outside the visual scan of this PF. To me, it appears a wonderful piece of " Watch-making". It is all there, but too small to read in any turbulence.
Has it ever been used in anger from the right hand seat ? ( Try using it as the primary instrument ... on a Simulator, of course !)

All those years ago sometimes I would be left under the hood of a Link Trainer with instructions to make the instructor's Crab draw a picture of a hand, complete with index finger and thumb. This required accuracy of maintaining a straight course with precise turns at the right times. It was easier to do with a full panel and the rough air "off". Surely it should be possible to use this as an economical training device, if fitted with a side stick. And this SS could be arranged to have increasing sensitivity with altitude.

A few days ago we saw the required power settings for UAS. It would appear to be what the PNF had to look these up...
Just a very minor point... A whole block of figures may be easier to read if they are broken up with either a small space or a line, every four, five or six lines. The human eye is used to reading horizontal lines. A little turbulence could cause an error.

Hi,

I'm happy that at least two people read my message ...
Unfortunately those two people don't understand why I posted this message (certainly Lemurian)
I wanted to put the light on a discripancy between the two reports.
This is about the licences of the PF (and this is a important point)
Read again ... if you had not seen the PF licenses discripancy as reported by BEA
If this is an omission by the BEA (in the first report) .. this is a serious issue .. as the BEA is not a avertissement agency who promote beans or carrots .. with those reports but instead .. a agency who analyse a accident with a result of the loss of 228 lifes
What is true about the licenses ? ... the N°1 or the N°3 report ?
The minimum duty for the BEA is to be accurate with such informations easy to collect

It was a speculation. Cockpit seats were recovered and they never gave further details about who was or wasn't seated. Hence, don't take it as a fact.

Just read it was pilot error.

I am curious how long apologizing and making excuses for the pilots will continue here and elsewhere in the lack of realization and denial that keeping the rubber side down on an aircraft isn't that hard.

Reminds of the Concord crash...certainly they weren't overweight, certainly they didn't know they didn't continue with an engine fire...no way, not them...

Have a little back bone guys...people screw up. And yes, they might be your friends.

Report #1 was 30 days after the crash, Nr.#3 is 25 months later. In between, they have completed what could have been lacking (few dates) at the time of the first one. Don't you think it's quite probable?
In fact, you would like to sell us that they have fabricated this pilot's licences to cover up Air France ass?
Why don't you try to explain us how you can be such a dedicated BEA or Air France or Airbus or (whatever) hater?
Something very personnal, obviously. Did you ever get yourself (or a close friend of you) a forged licence to show up? I've heard a fairly sad story about that.

Selected V/S
 

I'm puzzled by something. I would like to know what significance it has and would welcome any comments: -

Page 114 (Annexe 4 - Paramètres longitudinaux):
The "Vitesse verticale selectée" starts to fluctuate at 2:10:17 and from 2:10:20 to 2:10:41 it is 5000 fpm, then changes to about 1300 fpm.

Page 93 (Annexe 1)
2 h 10 min 17 -- Altitude (ft): 34 976 -- Les FD 1 et 2 redeviennent disponibles ; les modes actifs sont HDG/ALT CRZ*. (...)
2 h 10 min 42 -- La vitesse verticale est de 1 900 ft/min et la vitesse verticale sélectée est de 1 300 ft/min.

whenrealityhurts (#1064) “… it was pilot error. ...people screw up.”

I aspire to more modern views of human error, even those which suggest error is a meaningless term, and particularly unhelpful in accident investigation.
The industry, your friends, and even you, might benefit from an understanding of why the crew behaved as they did.

Focussing on error looks at negative aspects and fails to look for positive human contributions, and possibly why they were not employed.
We all make errors (variations in human performance); most are identified and corrected. It’s the ones that aren’t which can hurt; we need to know why they weren’t seen.
It’s not the error itself that is important, but consequences of the error, which more often depend on the culmination of many contributing factors.
Error is always tainted by hindsight, thus always a biased view.
Error directs attention to the individual the sharp end, which may overlook a chain of events or contributions from technical and organisational sources.

Aspects from all of the above are in this accident. However, because it is impossible to know precisely what the individuals thought at the time, any views we might have as to what was seen, understood, or reasoned, can only by supposition; but at least by determining such views it enables us an opportunity to learn.

Concluding ‘pilot error’ as a cause is like closing an investigation without benefit; like closing the mind without learning, and thus preventing opportunity to help avoid similar human responses in similar demanding situations.

Hi,

takata write:

No further details ?

Interim report N°3 page 41

So at least they give details about the state of the seat belts
This is not so important to know if the pilots were remaining in their seat .. as we know who was seated when airplane was flying ..
It's (speculation) almost certain that the PF was not retrieved in his seat .. (no secured seat belts)

About the CV's .. you know that BEA will collect the CV's and not parts from there or there ...
The CV is complete when collected and it was certainly not interest from Air France or other authorized agencies to give incomplete CV with a lack of mention of a important thing as a license .... !!
Nothing personnal .. I just read the reports of the BEA ...
Anyone who read it will find those differences ...

takata

Remonte ! remonte! remonte! remonte!
If you native language is french you know certainly that is not concerning something on the panel
He tell just to climb again .. to take more altitude
or maybe he is indeed encouraging the aircraft (he speak to the aircraft - irrational) and this if true show a certain state of intense stress or panic.

I was talking about the recovered bodies in relation to the recovered seats. Saying that any cockpit seat was recovered with its occupant "strapped" is a pure speculation. There was certainly no official comment about that.

About the licences, you may believe in whatever conspiracy you want. Very few people around here, me excluded, still bother about your daily rants anymore.

Hi,

I don't bother who read or not my or your messages ... that's not important.

You get me right. Note that I changed the grammar above as I thought (afterall) that this sentence didn't make a lot of sense previously.:p

jcj,
You're way out of your league and your agenda becomes tiring.
So, you're disputing the fact that the first report didn't mention the ATPL qual of the second copilot ?
Big deal ! At Air France, all pilots pass their ALTP, plus long range nav before their first long haul aircraft type-rating.
Not mentioning that licence is an oversight.

Slected V/S
 

HN39, It appears that each time the FDs become available again and engage in HDG/VS mode the selected V/S in the FCU window resets to the instantaneous V/S.

EDIT: "Vitesse verticale sélectée" = Selected V/S = target vertical speed for AFS in HDG / VS mode, normally adjustable by a knob on the FCU.

that is the line I ask for, but sorry I dont understand what it mean .......

How would he know that the aircraft is going down beside looking at the variomètre? Everybody in the cockpit seems to have been totally focused on it and this is certainly understandable.
So yes, it may be addressed to the gauge (figurative), hence the aircraft, hence not the PF. Seriously, would you have any doubt about their stress level with such a high sinking rate with so few altitude left?
Such kind of talk to the machine is pretty common on CVRs.

There is another passage with a possible double meaning:
- 2 h 11 min 06 "(…) il vient ou pas"
a) ... is he comming or not? (the captain)
b) ... is she doing it or not? (the aircraft related to imputs applied)
I'm closer to the second sense.

Hi HazelNuts39,
It might be related to ISIS, "barometric pressure selected" (see #2 below, 1.34.25) but I'll look at other possibilities.
About your previous "pseudo-flight curves" k-energy study, no matter what BOAC could think about it, it looks that you were very very close to the real data. Very good job indeed.

ISIS Altitude:
http://takata1940.free.fr/isis_alt.jpg

Hi Takata,

Txs for yr kind reply. Do I note correctly from the picture of the ISIS that it doesn't show a 'variom`etre'?

Right, lol. It is a target fixation about ISIS recordings because I thought that V/S could be derived from it. Forget it.
"V/S selected" p.114, right? It looks to be related with Flight Guidance. I'm looking at it.

HN39;
La vitesse verticale refers to the Vertical Speed indicator on the PFD. The IVSI, (Inertial Vertical Speed Indicator) on the right indicates climbing at a rate of 800fpm.

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-QxQT...-QxQTz3m-L.jpg

The la vitesse verticale sélectée refers to the Vertical Speed Selector knob located on the FCU, (Flight Control Unit), shown below. The VS shows a selected rate of "2500"fpm.

This knob also sets the FPA, (Flight Path Angle), when the HDG-VS/TRK-FPA button is toggled to "TRK/FPA".

For these FCU controls to have any effect on the aircraft, the autopilot must be engaged.

Just to acknowledge, DJ77 describes the function in his post above, and mentioned correctly that the VS resets instantaneously if the FDs become available.

The difference referred to here (1900fpm, vice 1300fpm) merely refers to the difference between the indication on the PFD, and the VS setting in the FCU window. I'm unsure why it is mentioned in the report except perhaps to indicate that the FDs were at that moment, functioning.

ADD EDIT after examing page 114:

There is an "ADR" and "IR" vertical speed selection I see. The Vertical Speed has two components which work together to provide the most accurate VSI - a barometric component and an inertial component. The parameter is showing the switching between the two.

I made a cursory examination of what was occurring in the data at the time the Vertical Speed indication switched from IR to ADR and it appears to be the point at which the stall had fully developed, at 02:11:47 or so; a number of other parameters change significantly at this point as well. The THS had reached its maximum setting, the thrust levers were momentarily closed to idle and the engine N1s reduced, (but not to Idle), and the stall warning was inhibited for reasons with which we are now familiar.


http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-rqxZ...-rqxZkbz-M.jpg