jcjeant

Is that you do not see there somewhat paradoxical
If you do not see I can explain

xcitation

It could be made available for download or on data media rather than a print out or punch card!

DozyWannabe

That's not the difficult part. As A33Zab says:
The data is stored in a machine-orientated format that must be converted, then cross-checked by hand to ensure accuracy. We're talking serious man-hours for even 10 minutes of the 300-odd mandatory parameters, let alone the full 1,300 (approx.). Call me kooky, but I'd need some serious evidence that the published data was doubtful before even considering diverting resources into that effort.

As a member of the lay public, I see no such evidence - perhaps those calling for this would care to provide some?

Capn Bloggs

This should fit: I agree. My pet hate: no change bars and old change bars not removed.

A33Zab

The request was to publish RAW data, any other format will not satisfy the critics because beforehand data will be edited by the authorities.

roulishollandais

The interest of air safety improvement should be that BEA would work like scientists, conforming to science production laws. Everyhing is OPEN to criticizing eyes. That is not the case with BEA reports.
First of that, dangerously missing in BEA reports since "Europe" puts its nose there, are the raw data copy, and the names and adress of people who did the inquiry, analysis and reports.Missing too is the possibility to ask more precisions.
That is how science works. You may keep secrecy so long you are not publishing.Since you are publishing you must prove everything publicly and sign the work.

DozyWannabe

For those that find my input dubious as a result of my non-pilot status - here's another take (from the Asiana/SFO thread):

roulishollandais

Thank you to Australia for the open reports.

Why and how many more odds, computer guys like Chris Johnson & al. after their short and concise work are still wayting to stop that lettal war between designers of complex systems in airliners and pilots. ?

I was both airline pilot and computer guy (the latter first during ten years) and my ethic of science never allowed me to risk the lifes of the users or dependant from my algorithms by designing systems that users are not unanim to request FREELY after due information and explaination. and coordination and long and accurate testing at office. If they don't have enough money to do so, dodn't do it. If they have to much money and think they can buy you, so don't do it. I had to say a strong and definitive "NO" a few times. The scientist knows, the scientist is responsible from such hazardous results.

I say it again an aircraft is not to be designed as a complex system. Otherwise you cannot survive when you have fire on board, loss of electricity, loss of hydraulics, bad waether, and the experienced flight crew here know it happens and had to overcome such flights and possible traumatism with enough motivation to continue to fly, qiet.

CONF iture

Your non-pilot status has nothing to do with the fact you can spread totally erroneous information, like this one.


Flight Safety Improvement : CEFA Aviation is a wonderful tool.
No wonder investigatory authorities use it too.

Beside it, PJ2 was mentioning "data" not data, but do you only make the difference ... ?

DozyWannabe

@CONF - coming from a poster who venerates and promulgates the opinions of an ex-pilot who was certified delusional and seriously mentally ill, that takes chutzpah.

xcitation

If reading the flight data is so nebulus then why are some airlines routinely using it to monitor performance of all pilots (FOQA)?
What about the flight data is inaccurate?

PJ2

xcitation;
Re, The data is easy for airlines to read because they invest tons of money, (hundreds of thousands, in some case millions) in their FOQA programs, which includes the proprietary software which is capable of reading the information that comes from the SSFDR.

This is not "Excel spreadsheet" work, nor is it "hacker's" work.

If, as I take it, you are speaking for those who would have this data on their laptops etc so they can for themselves make up their own minds as to the veridicality of the SSFDR data, please tell me what you know about flight data analysis - not in general; the details, so at least you may establish yourself as someone who comprehends what is being demanded here.

xcitation

PJ,
I know nothing about flight data analysis, hence my posts only ask questions on the subject.
What I would speculate is that if data was to be made available then maybe someone sharper than me with access to specialist software/skills might take a look and run analysis. These might be industry professionals, software companies, academics etc. Who knows they might contribute something new to the incident/safety, use it as a case study or corroborate the BEA. What harm could it do?
Perhaps the reality is that the legal council for the stake holders would throw a fit so we are probably wasting time talking data sharing.

PJ2

xcitation;
I realize you're not alone in the view expressed regarding possession of flight data, so I appreciate your response.

From an experienced view, (35 years flying transports, 25 concurrent years doing flight data analysis and running FOQA programs), the general thrust of the interminable argument,"give us the data and we'll make up our own minds about how this accident occurred", notwithstanding a scent of underlying arrogance, has sufficient flaws in it to cause a lot of material harm to established flight safety processes in which the industry has invested billions and for which our passengers may be thankful in terms of real outcomes.

In any one instance we are always a breath away from the threat of subpoena of the data, not for the purposes of advancing this or that principle of operational flight safety but for reasons of legal discovery. Such turns in the purposes of flight data would ultimately destroy these programs which, at the present time, airlines are increasinbly embracing. The industry would rapidly respond to any "public interest release" of flight data with the logical question, "Why voluntarily collect the prosecution's evidence?"

At least in the U.S., the FAA has chosen to protect FOQA data so long as the carrier in question is conducting such a program in accordance with the FARs. In Canada, no such protection and no such legislation exists, (in fact, either under the CARs or the Aeronautics Act, flight data analysis programs are not required in Canada), and in Asia flight data is used by most carriers to fine pilots, punish them and otherwise enforce strict behaviours. It is a most unenlightened use of safety information.

The outcomes of distributing data for a specific accident to all and sundry for individual purposes as per the arguments on these threads are at most, indeterminate, the benefits abundantly unclear, the arguments conflated.

The desire for access to "all" the data is first illusory as there is insufficent data to resolve some of the questions genuinely asked, and second, demonstrates an obvious lack of concern and understanding for why flight data is expensively collected and legally protected (at least in the U.S.), for use in safety programs. Flight data is not for the use of those who have an agenda and wish to use data to prove it. I have encountered many internal requests for such data and always, there is a point of view wanting evidence, the desire to enhance flight safety nowhere to be seen.

The counter-argument is clear: The release through some legal fashion (because it certainly will not occur voluntarily) may satisfy a tiny group's desire for a bit more data but,it will never resolve some questions and will always raise others, and unless one is willing and capable of going where the data leads and does not bring preconceived notions of how and why this accident occurred, more data will resolve nothing.

One only need view what happened when AF447's data was released in May, 2011 (IIRC) which was going to end the questions. For demanding "more", it settled and will settle nothing, primarily because the data was not in accord with their views of how the accident occurred because surely something was being kept hidden and secret or they just plain aren't experienced at interpreting flight data and don't fly airplanes. Believe it or not in this day of internet 'experts', some things do take years to understand in order to employ judiciously, and if one has an agenda, the interpretation of flight data will most certainly cause harm for obvious reasons.

There is one legitimate frustration in terms of there not being sufficient data for those who understand flight data, the frustration was the absence of certain parameters, some being what the PF's PFD & ND displays were showing during the UAS event. Resolving that problem is complicated and expensive and if you wish for further I can delve into the details of why this is so.

I hope this has illustrated why harm can come to flight safety programs and FOQA specifically should the release of flight data occur in the ways contemplated here.

Lonewolf_50

PJ, given the overly chatty nature of the NTSB spokesperson regarding the SFO accident, I think I'll post a link to your points on FOQA and safety data in that thread to help some folks understand the problems with flight data release and flight safety culture.

Once again, sir, very well said.

DozyWannabe

PJ2, I believe the term I'm looking for here is "knocked it for six". I fervently hope people will take note.

I think there was something of an initial sense of disbelief from most, if not all interested parties at the time, because the data was not what people were expecting.

I'd feel more sympathy for their position if they could provide a shred of evidence that such things were done in the last 30 years, when the fact is that they cannot.

Agreed - though the argument that there was little or no discrepancy between the LHS display data (which was recorded) and the RHS (which was not) is a reasonably strong one, due to the fact that there is no mention of any such discrepancy on the CVR.

Again - thanks for a well-reasoned and cogent summary, sir.

jcjeant

I fully agree with the very arguments of PJ2 and Doze
So what would the general public with the raw data DFDR? .. nothing ..
All that interests the general public (and even more) was published in the official BEA report on this accident
But as everyone knows .. this is one of the episodes following a plane crash
The first episode took place (the investigation into the accident and the resulting final report) and the second episode has not started yet .. that is to say the court case resulting from the judicial inquiry parallel to the technical investigation of BEA
The trial court has several actors (briefly):
The judge (Juge d'instruction) who lead the inquiry
The judge who will lead the trial
Stakeholders in the process .. that is to say the plaintiffs (victims families etc. ..) and the parties cited by the plaintiffs (Air France Airbus) and their respective attorneys and experts
If the judge in charge of the trial decide that is useful to join in the trial the documents of the BEA report , the plaintiffs (and their experts and attorneys) will have therefore the right (so that the trial is fair for all parties) to have access to all parts that had access other parties (Air France and Airbus)
The raw DFDR data will be one of those pieces

PJ2

What actually is "the raw DFDR data - what does the term "raw" mean?

PJ2

Lonewolf_50;

I'm glad the comments were of some use. It's a complicated subject!

We live in a world which increasingly considers itself an expert on anything that will advantage our own interests and so those thus pronouncing do feel free, without conditions and without a defense of personal expertise, to declare rights to such information that so advantages.

What is forgotten is, that such seemingly legitimate requests, occurring as they do in the groupthink environment described above, can (and do) do serious damage to the very processes which, though far more broadly, intend to accomplish the same ends - that of ensuring as high a standard of flight safety as is humanly and technically possible.

Any such contravention of these long-standing and historically-developed principles will unquestionably compromise those hard-won, hard-fought standards even as any one single, unique case may appear to have some semblance of legitimacy and therefore the inappropriate empathy of the courts.

Dozy, thank you for your response. From my viewpoint, it is that very disbelief upon initially viewing the data of what actually occurred on AF447 that I address the principles of good flight data work. It is anything but straightforward and if one does not instantly and immediately recuse oneself of all interests and preconceptions, then one is unfit to examine flight data and reach honest conclusions. Going where the data takes one, no matter who one may be, is the only way to do flight safety work. The gains made through prosecution are limited in scope and generally narrow in effect when compared with spectacularly successful flight safety processes which value data over opinion or politics.

There is little if anthing beyond that which has been cited in the BEA Final Report that can establish facts beyond current understandings.

For example, the possibility of what was displayed on the PF's PFD & ND being different from the PM's displays is always semantically positive but the actual probability, based upon both design and industry experience of such an occurence is vanishingly tiny. Almost certainly they were the same.

More broadly, given all the constraints and past decisions by regulators, airlines and manufacturers regarding logical-frame-layouts, (dataframes for SSFDRs and QARs) we are the beneficiaries of a system that even as some clamour for "more", what is actually available exceeds by factors of 10 or more, the legally-required parameters for such aircraft operating under North American, European, Australian & New Zealand regulations. If we are unsatisfied with such address, the place to enter the argument is not by demanding one flight's data for unique and specific purposes, especially under the notion that something is being hidden from the public interest. That doesn't mean the process is without warts and politics. It just means that giving "all the data", (whatever is meant by that), to a clamourous public gathering is by a very long mile, far worse for everyone for reasons given.

It is illogical that the industry would extend themselves in terms of data capture when such processes are extremely expensive and challenging to do well, and do right. But they do, because the value in knowing vice not knowing is key to the spectacular and enviable-for-any-industry advances in protecting those who use air travel every day. No other industry or government process including other modes of transportation and both private and public healthcare systems can come close to the safety levels achieved in this industry. There are very good reasons why this is so, even as such reasons may be dismissed at times.

jcjeant

Data that the BEA (collected on the flight data recorder) used to be able to make its final report
I'm certain that data was seen and is in hand of Airbus at least