Lonewolf_50;
I'm glad the comments were of some use. It's a complicated subject!
We live in a world which increasingly considers itself an expert on anything that will advantage our own interests and so those thus pronouncing do feel free, without conditions and without a defense of personal expertise, to declare rights to such information that so advantages.
What is forgotten is, that such seemingly legitimate requests, occurring as they do in the groupthink environment described above, can (and do) do serious damage to the very processes which, though far more broadly, intend to accomplish the same ends - that of ensuring as high a standard of flight safety as is humanly and technically possible.
Any such contravention of these long-standing and historically-developed principles will unquestionably compromise those hard-won, hard-fought standards even as any one single, unique case may appear to have some semblance of legitimacy and therefore the inappropriate empathy of the courts.
Dozy, thank you for your response. From my viewpoint, it is that very disbelief upon initially viewing the data of what actually occurred on AF447 that I address the principles of good flight data work. It is anything but straightforward and if one does not instantly and immediately recuse oneself of all interests and preconceptions, then one is unfit to examine flight data and reach honest conclusions. Going where the data takes one, no matter who one may be, is the only way to do flight safety work. The gains made through prosecution are limited in scope and generally narrow in effect when compared with spectacularly successful flight safety processes which value data over opinion or politics.
There is little if anthing beyond that which has been cited in the BEA Final Report that can establish facts beyond current understandings.
For example, the possibility of what was displayed on the PF's PFD & ND being different from the PM's displays is always semantically positive but the actual probability, based upon both design and industry experience of such an occurence is vanishingly tiny. Almost certainly they were the same.
More broadly, given all the constraints and past decisions by regulators, airlines and manufacturers regarding logical-frame-layouts, (dataframes for SSFDRs and QARs) we are the beneficiaries of a system that even as some clamour for "more", what is actually available exceeds by factors of 10 or more, the legally-required parameters for such aircraft operating under North American, European, Australian & New Zealand regulations. If we are unsatisfied with such address, the place to enter the argument is not by demanding one flight's data for unique and specific purposes, especially under the notion that something is being hidden from the public interest. That doesn't mean the process is without warts and politics. It just means that giving "all the data", (whatever is meant by that), to a clamourous public gathering is by a very long mile, far worse for everyone for reasons given.
It is illogical that the industry would extend themselves in terms of data capture when such processes are extremely expensive and challenging to do well, and do right. But they do, because the value in knowing vice not knowing is key to the spectacular and enviable-for-any-industry advances in protecting those who use air travel every day. No other industry or government process including other modes of transportation and both private and public healthcare systems can come close to the safety levels achieved in this industry. There are very good reasons why this is so, even as such reasons may be dismissed at times.
Last edited by PJ2; 11th Jul 2013 at 16:51.