jcjeant

AFAIK .. Mr Otelli is not a journalist .. he is a writer
Also .. if a family is suing him in court for the fact of false or misleading writing .. he can not take refuge behind the law protecting journalists' sources
But .. maybe .. his source is a journalist
That's all .....

DozyWannabe

Or the yoke for that matter - remember that modern airliners have been using airspeed data as a factor in force/deflection interpretation for several decades now.

Rockhound

According to the blurb on the back of Erreurs de Pilotage 5, Otelli is a demonstration pilot, with 14000 hours total time, leads an aerobatic team, is an instructor in aerobatics, and has written a number of books on aviation safety.
The CVR transcript from AF447 in his book is essentially identical with that published in the BEA final report. Clearly it was leaked to him not long after the CVR was read, probably by someone within the BEA.
I presume any differences between the transcript in the book and that in the BEA report arise from different interpretations of the audio.

jcjeant

1 On va pas se laisser emmerder par des cunimbs (black)
2 On n'a pas été emmerdé par les cunimb hein (white)
This is not interpretable .. it's black or white
Also in the context of this accident .. this sentence was certainly important for those who were investigating the human side (human factors group)
The trick is knowing which one of them told (write) the truth
In the context of the accident ... the sentence N°2 is weird .. but must be true as it's from the BEA (who was not the only official body to hear the VCR .. provided other international investigators were fluent in french )
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/48977...ml#post7285724
About other investigators present (International ... NTSB .. etc. ..) the final report does not say a word .. and feature no comments from them
Which probably means they are no disagreement between them and the BEA ...

Rockhound

I checked back to read JCJ's earlier post (#185) concerning what the captain is supposed to have said about cunims.
Otelli writes that the weather and visibility since takeoff from Rio have been excellent and continue to be so in the vicinity of Natal, the lights of which the crew can see ahead at 00:44:45. Beyond Natal, of course, is the South Atlantic.
Otelli concludes that the captain's comment on cunim must refer to the ITCZ ahead, particularly as, four minutes earlier, the captain and Bonin were discussing the outside air temperature during the crossing of the zone.

Rockhound

Hi JCJ,
Just read your last post.
I confess I know nothing about playback of a CVR tape. I just naively assumed that if the audio quality is not the best, different interpretations may result.
Otelli's version of what the captain said makes sense IF what he wrote earlier is correct whereas the BEA version seems out of context.
It would be interesting to find out which version is correct.

jcjeant

And the sentence in the BEA report means exactly the contrary
The captain sentence (BEA) indicates a past event .. and that of Otelli .. an event to come
It was a bunch of specialists in the "human factors group" .. so I suppose they were enough smart ( better than Otelli and co )to outline (sort) the best from the CVR sentences ? no ?
Weird .. ?

mm43

Just to recap, there was light turbulence during the climb to FL350 which was reached at 23:00 and the turbulence then gradually dies away over the next 45 minutes. So at the time these remarks were made, there had been some turb and the ride since had been smooth for the last hour.

Zeroninesevenone

I've been following the AF447 case from the beginning.
PPRuNe has been very valuable to get deeper understanding of what has happened.
Very knowledegable and professional people, and I wish to say thank you.

After reading the final report of BEA, mixing it with the nine or more threads of PPRunE, I still have some question marks in my head.

First of all, if I have understood correctly, if the pilots did not do anything, all this could have not happened. If so, what was the reason the pilots started to, IMHO, degenerate the situation with bad "moves". The plane was stable and weather was not really that bad.

Was there something in the displays the saw that made them to decide to make "corrective" measures? I can understand that many ECAM messages, AP/ATHR disengagement can be disturbing but usually doing nothing is a must until you understand the situation. The pilots seemed not to understand what was happening and still they started to react. Nose up? What indicator or information would warrant a pilot to do that? The only indication of trouble I have read was UAS with some detail low level "nonsense" messages.

Which leads me to the second point. It seems that the pilots (PF, PNF) did not understand that they have a UAS situation. The plane did really nothing to help them to get understand what was really the trouble (non working pitot tube) and instead sent out a load of different low level information that the pilots could not digest in that, for them "critical" situation. Now, when the situation is confusing, the last thing you need is more details. The plane "knew" what was wrong (ADR disagree -> UAS) but did not inform the pilots in a quick, clear manner. It would have been the planes job to analyze those lower level detail problems and to build up a better message to the pilots "One pitot is malfunctioning. Apply UAS/ADR disagree procedure". Now it was left to the pilots to build up that info, from all the confusion and other ECAM messages. Also the messages are quite cryptic, with lot of acronyms and ohter things that puts pilots brains in even more pressure in a situation where the brains are already overloaded. I don't understand, from the engineering point, what is the reason, if not economical, to raise the level of the information in the planes for more easier diagnosis.

Just my humble opinion.

TTex600

You want to know why the aircraft failed to pass along information that it's logic knew? I'll say this, then duck for incoming from certain persons who take years to design something that I the pilot have seconds to deal with.

The aircraft doesn't tell everything because there would be liability in doing so. Every part of this Godforsaken industry hides behind the pilot. No matter what, the pilot is legally responsible, which leads to manufacturers making statements to the effect that pilots are expected to follow procedure and understand situation before they act. If they produce a product that an attorney could represent in court as being infallible, they would then be responsible for the fallibility of that product. It's far easier to leave all final responsibility on the shoulders of those of us who veins carry a slightly more substantial mixture of guts and ice water.

Edit: and one more thing. Pilots are also guilty of the same mindset. This business eats its young in a non discriminatory manner.

mary meagher

Been thinking about PJ2's analysis of the effect of reliance on automation to replace experienced pilots, which has resulted in at least two aviation disasters. AF, and Colgan. He emphasises that automation is a tool, which enables pilots with experience and judgement to fly even more safely complex aircraft accurately, further enabling air traffic to shoehorn even more aircraft safely into ever busier airspace.

Beancounters love it because new pilots can now fly hands off and brains disengaged, while the automation delivers the cargo/SL or otherwise, safely to the destination on time. Most of the time.

Except that even the finest designs are surprised by events as simple as ice in the pitot tubes, and the responsible guys with the four stripes are suddenly asking "What is it doing now!" and the FO without experience in a panic does exactly the wrong thing. And the design of the sidesticks ensures that the others don't realise he is pulling when he ought to be pushing....meanwhile all the bells, whoops, whistles, overload and distract from the simple and most important information; this aircraft is STALLED.
TOGA is not going to help.

I am sure that pilots have tried to set up this situation in a simulator; how real can it be? when you crash a simulator (I've done that, at Cranebank) the lights go out, they open the door and tell you sorry, chaps, you're dead.
How can new recruits get real stick time? how can hours - thousands of hours sitting in the pointy end letting the computer fly the plane, add up to experience? - Sullenberger was a gliding instructor, and always was thinking ahead in flying his plane, so when the geese were cooked, he was calm and ready and did the right thing, with only seconds to make the decisions. How do we make sure that future professional pilots have this quality?

A33Zab

1// It was not only one pitot, it were all 3 and not at the same value and duration. If it had been only 1 this one was isolated and that would have been clear to both A/C as pilots.

2// Due to the difference in both values as in duration the automation could not set the ADR disagree message in the initial phase.

3// The messages are not cryptic (at least NOT to airbii insiders) they are brief and if any crew action is required it will be displayed in a cyan color and idented to distinct it from the message itself.

f.i. there was no ECAM action to select RH PFD to ADR 3, with this action they extended the duration of unreliable airspeed indication on his display.

There is no need to make an epistle with detailed information were you will forget the first part before you ever read the last part, one can select (after regaining control!) the status page for detailed information and affected (inop) systems.

@CONF iture:

That will be correct once it was already in stall condition, but the AP would have prevented itself to 'PULL' into stall.

PJ2

We need to think about that statement.

First, as pilots we all know that the captain is legally responsible; that is ancient maritime and aviation law.

That said, I think it is entirely reasonable that manufacturers expect pilots to follow procedures and understand the situation before they act. That is what we do. However I believe what you may be saying is that the manufacturer may possibly hand the pilot a situation which is completely confusing for which there is no training, no information in the FCTM, poor indications of what is wrong or no industry experience with the abnormal and the crew has to make up a response. I don't think that is the case here. The failure and the correct response was well understood by June 2009, the industry had had many such events and information was out as early as 2006 on how to treat the failure when the aircraft is not at immediate risk. The question within this context is, Why didn't this crew know this and why did they respond the way they did prior to the stall?, (all bets are off once the airplane was stalled).

The notion of the "organizational accident" has been around since Perrow's work in 1984. I'm not exactly sure what is meant by the term, "industry", but despite what some corporate lawyers may argue and want because we're seen as their 50,000A fuse, many organizations in this industry cannot duck responsibility for design, process, structure, priorities etc., any more. Pick up Diane Vaughn's, "The Challenger Launch Decision" or anything by Chick Perrow or Sidney Dekker. From airline managements to airframers to systems engineers, the legal net is cast broadly in many countries though there are notable exceptions.

There are very few abnormals or even emergencies which require you, as the pilot, to deal with "in seconds". The rejected takeoff, an engine fire/failure/severe damage, rapid depressurization/emergency descent, runaway stab, aircraft stall indications, TCAS & EGPWS warnings, (by design, both require moderate, not extreme responses), loss of airspeed/altitude information at/right after takeoff and perhaps some go-arounds, (from CATII/III) all require immediate and accurate responses. Right after these, smoke of unknown origin requires an urgent but measured response using checklist/QRH. Hydraulic, electrical, landing gear and flight controls require attention but not as rapidly as the two former emergencies. Then there are numerous abnormalities associated with aircraft systems which are type-specific and may, though likely not, require an immediate response.

I wrote in June 2009 that the loss of airspeed information at cruise altitude is not an emergency and does not require immediate action. What is required immediately is calm, then a collection of thoughts to ensure cockpit discipline which means launching into standard procedures. Ensure control and stability of the flight path and navigation, call for the drill or checklist while taking the radios (if necessary) and as per training, confirm any non-reversible items before actioning them.

Nowhere is there a call for the actions that took place here. If the crew does not maintain the standard required cockpit discipline, there is no system or aircraft design that can overcome the unpredictable outcomes that may, and here did, follow.

The business is not going to hell in a handbasket, but there are indications that in specific quarters, all is not well. This accident among a few others, is in my view an indication of that fact, especially when thirty-odd other crews dealt to varying degrees of perception and action with a similar loss without major incident.

My views on automation and the industry are expressed but I am an enthusiastic supporter of automation providing we don't forget who we are or permit others to define who we are when in the cockpit and flying their airplanes. Skills, knowledge, readiness and discipline are our responsibility alone and where we deem them threatened we have to speak up, just as we are doing here, at conferences and in management meetings. Hopefully we're paying attention to our safety reporting system and FOQA data as well.

jcjeant

Indeed ...
But some reports readings indicate the contrary ..
How many (in the UAS incidents before AF447) crew applied the correct procedure in force at date ?

TTex600

PJ, you are informed, articulate, well spoken, etc, but the quoted statement is part of the problem. It's true, but that doesn't matter. The pilot being "responsible" does nothing to bring back 228 dead people. The pilot being "responsible" does nothing when he/she is responsible for a system that has outgrown his capability. Allowing the pilot to take "responsibility" for failures in training, checking, regulation, oversight, design and design philosophy will accomplish nothing in our quest to remain safe.

I suspect you are either a senior Check Pilot or other instructor for a legacy carrier. Come down a bit lower in the ranks and you might see what I see - new hire pilots that go straight from the right seat of a B1900 to the right seat of a CRJ to the right seat of an A321. I know of exactly that background pilot today flying left seat of international ops A320's. They've never had an hour of instruction in high altitude, high speed ops. They have somewhere around 100 hours flying pitch and power with no Flight Director. I can go on, but I'll sum it up with this. As previously posted, sometimes you don't know what you don't know. I believe a significant portion of the younger generation is in exactly that state. They don't know what they don't know, and very few airlines are willing to spend the money to inform them.

So it's nice that they are "responsible" but we all better hope they have some luck to go along with it.

Lyman

Hi Tex...

"Come down a bit lower in the ranks and you might see what I see - new hire pilots that go straight from the right seat of a B1900 to the right seat of a CRJ to the right seat of an A321."

That is striking re: flight time, but erm, where does command experience come from?

PJ2

I realize that after I re-read it. I wasn't clear on my meaning but I touch on the matter in my response.

Clearly we don't run the show at an airline and are at the beck-and-call of our airline's training program, scripting and the regulator's requirements. If those requirements or training regimes don't cover sufficient territory to ensure the kinds of skills that were missing in this accident then the training program, the airline and the regulator need to be examined as to why. My point was, a loss of airspeed information should not have "outgrown a pilot's capability" - it's not unknown territory. Now we both know that training regimes and sim time are jammed to the hilt already, so covering everything is not possible. I don't have the answer to that.
As my public profile says, I'm now retired, so yes, I am "senior" . I instructed in line indoctrination, (A320) but I was never management and never a check pilot. I worked in our pilots' union for a number of years. I was down in the ranks as an ordinary line pilot from Day One in 1973 to the last in 2007. I am not an engineer nor do I have such a background but I like to learn as much as I can from those who are and who do that wonderful work. I am a flight data analysis specialist so I see many of the things under discussion.

I find this profession and industry deeply fascinating and love discussing it, especially human factors and flight safety work. In terms of A vs B or whatever, I have no favourite types but pushed, it would be the L1011-500.

That's the only "place" all this comes from and here on PPRuNe is about the only online site where a good dialogue can get going and be sustained with those from whom one can really learn stuff.

I don't mean to appear to be in a level which I should "come down from" to see the ranks - that's where I was for 35 years. But I have seen a lot of sides of this business and while I don't mean to push it, I think as broad a view of what we do/did for a living is important and valuable and I sincerely believe that such an attitude is good for those getting into this industry, and so is constant reading and learning. That's what defines a professional, I think.
I watched how priorities, knowledge and skills changed over the years too. We're on precisely the same page.

bubbers44

Mary, you are absolutely right. Soon and even to a degree now experienced pilots are going away with retirements. Some of the new people have not learned hand flying as in the past. AF proved it and we just have to wait a while for the next one.

If the autopilot failed it used to be a non event in the past, now it is an event. We probably will only get entry level pilots now but at least if they increase the FO requirements as they plan or did maybe that will help a little. Flying automatic airplanes doesn't make you an experienced pilot, just a monitor of an autopilot.

RR_NDB

Despite RB211 delays, etc.

CONF iture

No Sir, the AP would have done exactly what the PF actually did : Follow the FD to 'PULL' the aircraft into stall.