The plane "knew" what was wrong (ADR disagree -> UAS) but did not inform the pilots in a quick, clear manner. It would have been the planes job to analyze those lower level detail problems and to build up a better message to the pilots "One pitot is malfunctioning. Apply UAS/ADR disagree procedure". Now it was left to the pilots to build up that info, from all the confusion and other ECAM messages. Also the messages are quite cryptic, with lot of acronyms and ohter things that puts pilots brains in even more pressure in a situation where the brains are already overloaded. I don't understand, from the engineering point, what is the reason, if not economical, to raise the level of the information in the planes for more easier diagnosis.
1// It was not only one pitot, it were all 3 and not at the same value and duration. If it had been only 1 this one was isolated and that would have been clear to both A/C as pilots.
2// Due to the difference in both values as in duration the automation could not set the ADR disagree message in the initial phase.
3// The messages are not cryptic (at least NOT to airbii insiders) they are brief and if any crew action is required it will be displayed in a cyan color and idented to distinct it from the message itself.
f.i. there was no ECAM action to select RH PFD to ADR 3, with this action they extended the duration of unreliable airspeed indication on his display.
There is no need to make an epistle with detailed information were you will forget the first part before you ever read the last part, one can select (after regaining control!) the status page for detailed information and affected (inop) systems.
@CONF iture:
But obviously the AP would not have done anything better.
That will be correct once it was already in stall condition, but the AP would have prevented itself to 'PULL' into stall.