HazelNuts39

The data used for the following chart are the traces of pitch attitude and normal acceleration from the Airbus simulation shown on page 42 of IR#3(EN), and the traces of longitudinal side stick angle on pages 29 -31.

While there is possibly a relation between side stick angle Ss, pitch rate q and incremental normal load factor nz of the form:

a*Ss = b*nz + q

it is not possible with the available data to establish the coëfficients a and b with any certainty. There is a wide range of a&b combinations that provide an acceptable match between the calculated and simulated pitch angles. The coefficients chosen for the following chart give the best 'fit', but should be regarded as an example only.

pcoletti

Dear PPRuNers,

With the publication of the final AF 447 report by the BEA on 5th July I'm wondering if any current or retired Boeing or Airbus pilots would be interested in a debate for Newshour on BBC World Service Radio about the role of automation in commercial passenger flight?

We'd be looking to record this on the 5th July itself sometime after 2.30pm Frennch time (when the report is published).

If you're interested then whatever side of the automation debate you sit on I'd love to hear from you. It would be in English, 2 people (maybe 3), probably about 15 minutes duration. Logistics/connections TBC.

I'm on [email protected] or +44 7770820056 if you wanna get in touch.

Paul Coletti
Newshour
BBC World Service Radio

Machinbird

Quote:
Originally Posted by Machinbird
Post#1390

-BOAC
I do not disagree at all with Retired's post. We do deserve aircrew with better qualifications than impressively starched shirts. What I have suggested regarding a cueing system for pilots who are looking at the wrong mouse hole would also help non-automation dependent pilots. Do you think they don't have lapses of situational awareness too?

The problem is that the regulators appear to have ignored the problems created by automation dependency. The flying game has changed. It is time they stepped up to the plate.

BOAC

- from what we know so far, 447 does not represent a 'lapse of situational awareness' but a complete failure of any awareness by the crew. It is difficult for me to contemplate, even if woken from a deep sleep, that I could ignore what we think the signs were. This is the reason so many of us are concerned at the quality or mental attitude of 'new' pilots.

I also become increasingly concerned for the prominence given to all the 'psychological' work on human factors in aviation. I am not denying that all this work is important and of great value, it is just that there is a constant stream of pdf's and other papers thrust down our throats at every opportunity, and I personally believe this is conditioning Mr/Mrs 'Average' pilot into thinking "It's not my problem, it is human factors/design/management/training/CRM - you name it - and instead of making sure they have, and exercise, the basic flying/logic skills to deal with a situation, they will be conditioned into a subconscious state where it is someone else's problem - eg focussing on calling the Captain back to the cockpit to the degredation of monitoring the flight path.

I don't have the answers, but someone needs to get them PDQ. Another sheaf of papers will not help a rookie crew in the ITCZ with IAS failure in the middle of the night. Basic skills will.

roulishollandais

I agree 100%

Lonewolf_50

Dozy
I tend to agree.

BOAC: well said, in re the mountain of published material from the shrinks and psychologists. Some one must still "do it" in terms of "do it" being "fly the machine."

Clandestino

Sorry, I have mistaken your reference to trajectory apex to be referring to pitch. My bad.


No idea how many of them banked to the whole 11° right / 9° left but I find interesting some of them went through stronger turbulence than AF 447 (0.2 / 1.9 compared to 0.7/1.6)

You are mistaken about the source of what you call "precising". It's not me, it's all written in the procedure - the one a whole bunch of PPRuNers malign while displaying enviable ignorance.

Why 5 degrees and climb power?

It's to be used when pilots' primary concern is staying within the envelope while level bust takes back seat. It is preferable to keep flying on your assigned FL when speed goes AWOL but if you are unsure if you can make it, go for memory items, they 'll keep you flying. That is not to say it is the only combination of attitude and performance that maintains one unstalled and this side of the Macrit. 5° ANU was clearly marked on any AH/ADI I've ever flown so it would be safe bet it is so on the large majority therefore making it easy to set the aeroplane symbol against the mark. Climb power is there for all the pilots who can't remember exact cruise power for their weight when proverbial hits the fan at 4 AM. Especially if they are involved in mixed fleet flying - CFM A320 with IAE A321 can be pretty interesting mix, not to mention SA/TA combinations.

5°/climb thrust works for every aeroplane except:

1. low mach limited, high trust to weight ratio, turbojet powered ones, of which none flies passengers anymore.

2. those which stall below 5° AoA in steady, low Ma flight. None of these has successfully taken-off so far. Such a machines can be safely omitted from further consideration.

Reference, please.

When you are low & slow, option of trading potential energy for kinetic is unavailable. As it is policy to train for the most critical failures (V1 cut, anyone?), during approach to stall recovery practice it is assumed that it happens very low, that's why minimal loss of altitude is emphasized. Of course, the ignorant then wrongly assume that minimum loss of altitude is applicable for every approach to stall recovery or stall recovery itself.

It is preferable to miss the obstacle, even if by the narrowest of margins, at 1.1 Vs than hit it at 1.3. Knowing when the situation is so desperate to grant using up the normal margins is the part of what we call "airmanship". Avoiding such situations is another part of it.

There is absolutely no recovery from low altitude, low speed stall that would not involve hitting the ground in the process. Only pilot with realistic chances of survival is the one strapped to high-performance ejection seat, who doesn't hesitate much when time comes to part the company with the aeroplane.

My last flight on A320 was in January 2009. No mention of "if safe conduct of flight affected" at the time. We were using company customized manuals.

We don't know that yet. Interim 2 mentions variation in altitude remained within 1000 ft or so while not mentioning what was the exact distribution. Five cases of descent following the stall warning are mentioned.

Exactly! I'm pretty sure I've heard it before my first hour in groundschool has expired.

Absolutely, but we'll get it only if it's valuable for management. I got mine only because it reduced ILS minima to 200/50 from 300/100. Our Airbi are 75/NO DH so no gain there.

As altimeter and vario did. If they believed whole air data system went tits up, they could have flown attitude+power. They said or did nothing that would indicate it was the case. Only coherent picture from FDR and CVR is of total confusion on both sides of the cockpit. If just one pilot kept the presence of mind, chances are PPRuNe discussion regarding the UAS on A330/340 would make it barely to the second page.

Yes. Absolutely. Interim 2, chapter 1.16.3 refers.

Not me. Not with the whole crop, that is. All of my F/Os confirm DP Davies maxim that the enthusiasm about flying is one of the best things a pilot can have. Most of them affirm it positively.

Not all of it is important and of great value. It's easy to sell well sounding psychobabble to people who are mostly trained in technical stuff, such as pilots.

That's a very nice example of survivor bias. Spare some thought for your colleagues that did not make it to retirement through no fault of their Rhinos or lack of good intentions.

They were not bad pilots. They did not intend to make that last mistake.

It can happen to anyone. It's just the matter of reducing chances.

RetiredF4

Global strategy envisions training all air carrier pilots in airplane upset prevention and recovery.
Flightsafety.org

bubbers44

gums and I are about the same age so flew with seasoned pilots, not 300 hr wonders. I flew with a few that had ins when I was a brand new 737 captain and it was single pilot. I don't think anything has changed.

We are now in a new generation of automation so to get cheap help the start up and regionals are hiring them. The majors, thank god, are not yet. Eventually they will be good pilots but not in the beginning. The captain will have to help and if they came from this same group we are in trouble. They don't have the experience required to fly single pilot with the new guy occupying a seat like I did. He could not copy a clearance, fly or talk on the radio. One of our check airmen got him in and expected us to teach him how to fly an airliner as brand new captains on a new airplane. That is not right. I flew charter and corporate before so could do both jobs but these guys can't, trust me.

mm43

This link to the high altitude operations power point file at flightsafety.org has possibly been posted previously, but well worth a look. It was revised in November 2008, and incorporates everything that has been discussed here in relation to AF447. A pity that AF didn't bring it into their training syllabus sooner - assuming they have done now.

RetiredF4

A Typical clandestino answer, taking one sentence out of context , reading something into the lines whatīs not there and commenting on it. What for?

Be sure that i remember my close comrades and others who lost their lifes in combat aircraft. In 5 years we lost 5 aircraft in my squadron with 11 dead crewmembers. We looked detailed into those accidents, and none of those gizmoīs i mentioned would have saved their day, not saying they are superfluous though. Airmanship and common sense (with or without those gizmoīs) would have. That did not make them bad people or bad pilots, but it got them killed unfortunately.

No, but they did not recognize, that they were doing that final mistake.

With more gizmos or better training, whatīs your answer? If itīs both, thatīs fine with me. At the moment we have the unfortunate situation that all the gizmoīs and asociated regulations seem not to favor thorough training and built up of long lasting airmanship and expierience.

If your statement is something like sh*t happens, then that is not something i can accept as accident prevention handling.

roulishollandais

@Turbine_D

Thank you for the videos !

Would anybody be able to have a video from simulated AF447 with HUD ?

CONF iture

The guy needs full attention on him - In need to correct or lecture each and everyone - Just glad I don't have to share a flight deck with that type of character ...

(an 'ignorant' among others)

DozyWannabe

Actually I've always found him (Clandestino) a very useful contributor. I may not always agree with what he says, but he's always been honest, upfront and willing to cut through the bull and get to the point.

In this case I think he was right to pull Franzl up for extrapolating a general theory from individual experience. Franzl himself makes a false dichotomy here:

Because a belt-and-braces approach would include improvements to both. We're back to the false idea that technological advances are intended to reduce the role of the human pilot when they are in fact intended to augment the information available to said human pilot.

(Well, we're almost in July... )

RetiredF4

I disagree, this is a wrong interpretation of my posts.
We are still at the practice (which has unfortunately nothing to do with an idea) that technological advances are used to degrade training and expierience from piloting to monitoring, which might be not intended, but itīs happening. Not everywhere, but even if itīs only 10% itīs 10% too much. Or do you turn a blind eye there?
Itīs not my position to get rid of those technological advances,or to hinder new ones, but the crews have to be trained to handle an aircraft when those gizmos go on leave and they have to be allowed to gain expierience with those situations and manual handling skills. Therefore the first step is not to cry for aditional elo-helpers, but to improve training and expierience and with it airmanship firsthand.

gums

I can tell you what the AF447 HUD display would have looked like.

- UAS happens. No change in FPV, sucker is on the horizon line and bank angle oscillating.

- Gradual pull up reflected by FPV increasing "x" degrees" above the horizon line and pilot can see exactly how many degrees.

- Inertial vertical velocity decreasing as FPV slowly descends back to horizon line.

- FPV eventually reaches lower limit of the HUD. Meanwhile, pitch attitude remains way up there. Some shuddering from the stall. No spin or violent attitude changes, just a slow right turn until impact.

DozyWannabe

I'm aware of what your full post was - however the way it was phrased was leading, and somewhat indicative of the opinion that it was the technological advances themselves that caused a drop in airmanship, which isn't true.

I don't think the regulations care one way or another (except in the case of hyper-accurate positioning in RVSM airspace) - the issue is that the *airlines* seem to in some cases have misinterpreted the advances in technology and used them as an excuse to skimp on revision of basic airmanship. Given PJ2's excellent outlining of the trend towards managerialism as an end in itself, and the decline in industry specialisation at management level, I'd be prepared to wager a fair amount that if they hadn't used technology as an excuse, they'd have found something else.

Even then, that's just considering the reactions of this one crew (with a very distinct HF profile) - the 30-odd successful recoveries from the problem indicate that we're looking at an anomaly here.

RetiredF4

How about that one?

Another anomaly?

Its like an iceberg; most of it is underwater.

To spend more and more money on technology and neglecting the required training to the aircrews (because no more money is available for that task) is the wrong approach.

roulishollandais

Thank you Gums.

What do you think of the oscillations of the two last minutes ?

Machinbird said us the importance of his AoA information immediatly after cat shot for the vital decision : fly or pull the ejection handle ! Could you compare the "best" raw AoA and the HUD AoA information in their qualities of time delay ,speed, liability, sensitivity, robustess, other...? Thank you

DozyWannabe

But are they spending more on technology? I'm not in a position to do the maths, but taking inflation and airline profitability into account I'd be surprised if modern airliners were a great deal more expensive - relatively speaking - than their counterparts of four decades ago.

Don't get me wrong, I'm in total agreement that the state of airmanship training needs a thorough going over, I just think that blaming technology is an overly simplistic viewpoint.