AF 447 Thread No. 5

[vbp.net]

BEA report ommission (translation)

Here is a quick (Google) translation of the paper :

According to our information, a recommendation on the stall warning of the Airbus planned in the near-final report of the BEA, 48 hours before publication, did not show up in the official version. Air France brought this to the European Aviation Safety.

The controversy over the crash of the AF 447 Paris-Rio is not going to go out. The shadows hangs on the third progress report of the Investigation & Analysis Bureau (BEA) released on Friday that pointed to the responsibility of the pilot of the Airbus A330-200.

According to several sources, a recommendation on stall warning device, which was part of the near-final version of the report 48 hours before its official publication, has not been published. Envisaged under the precautionary principle, this recommendation was to immediately begin a process of analysis and reassessment of the logic of operation of such alarms.

When asked by The Tribune, the BEA said "they did not comment on the steps that led to a recommendation or not." Inside BEA, some did not appreciate and even threaten to resign.

According to our sources, Air France has sent a letter to the EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) requesting that the matter be reviewed quickly. When questioned, Air France has confirmed that they took the EASA on August 1 about the failures of the stall warning.

For pilots and Air France, these problems have played a major role, since "the multiple activations and stops unwanted and misleading, contrary to the state of the aircraft, have greatly contributed to the difficulty for the crew to analyze the situation, "stated the airline in a statement released Friday in response to the report of the BEA.

Between 2:11 minutes and 45 seconds, the night of the accident on 1 June 2009, and the crash time, the alarm has reactivated a dozen times with durations ranging from 2 to 8 seconds. The longuest reactivation of the alarm took place when the crew tried to restore the plane to a normal attitude. As a matter of fact, the alarm can stop when the aircraft is stalled and recur if recovery of a valid speed. Experts speak of a "case of reverse operation of the alarm."

Indeed, it stops when the speed is less than 60 knots, because it was considered that there was no reason why the aircraft can be found at this speed. But every time the pilot gave the order to lower the nose (the correct order) and sped it on over 60 knots (rearing, its speed had slowed considerably), the alarm went on, making him believe that his action was wrong.

Therefore they had no comprehension to the actual situation of the aircraft. This explains why the actions of the pilots of flight Rio-Paris appeared incomprehensible according to their colleagues.