AF447 wreckage found

[Lyman]

If you are talkin' to me, the difference is irrelevant. Comparing accidents, like comparing a/c, is a Hangar game. Each one is exquisitely individual, and in lumping them together, the trap is set for continued human nonsense.

edit. IMHO

[RWA]

Quoting Lyman:-

"The a/c lost a/p, changed FlghtLaw, and required handling.

"The LAW eliminates PITCH protection, and the a/c is considered lively, certainly more active than NORMAL.

"No judgment, but a starting point, and one suspiciously missing some easy to include safety features, and training changes.

"Judgment: There is confusion, among the people who fly her......"

Terrific point, in my view, Lyman.

Does anyone know whether Airbus simulators are configured to 'simulate' the effects of 'law changes'? I'd be very surprised to hear that they are - but (given that the pilots cannot overrule the 'laws') introducing such a training facility would seem to be a very logical step?

After all - as we've all sensed from this accident - when the pilots had less than four minutes to save the aeroplane, the passengers, AND themselves, surely the last thing they should have had to do was to try to recall the small print of the various 'laws'?

Hope it's done, anyway. I've encountered a certain amount of flak by suggesting areas, following this crash, in which safety might be augmented by constructive changes in current SOPs. That's second nature to me; in my own career (like those of most other people) a policy of 'continuous improvement' became second nature.

However good you may reckon anything you and your colleagues have devised to be, it's never going to be perfect. But - if the will is there - you can always find ways to move CLOSER to perfection.

Sincerely hope that Airbus (and the other manufacturers) rapidly learn, and respond to, the lessons of this accident.

[Safety Concerns]

If you are talkin' to me, the difference is irrelevant.

actually its not. Now we are getting to the nitty gritty of it all.
Just one post after yours come this nonsense

After all - as we've all sensed from this accident - when the pilots had less than four minutes to save the aeroplane, the passengers, AND themselves, surely the last thing they should have had to do was to try to recall the small print of the various 'laws'?

The post was clearly directed at Airbus, heavily implying some perceived design flaw.

Yet NW6231 (a boeing 727) also only had a few minutes to save the aircraft, DID NOT have to concern themselves with the small print of which law and still crashed. As did aeroperu (757) and birgenair (757) after both suffering from pitot or static issues.

So the real issue is not manufacturer related at all.

[Lonewolf_50]

I quote again the President of the Flight Safety Foundation
"This should have resulted in a log entry"

Should, yes, considering the matter of 32 other (similar but not identical) incidents that did not impact terra firma, nor terra aqua.

Perhaps there is more to this than you'd prefer to admit.

Originally Posted by Ret F4

Automatic trim was working in Alternate Law, only in direct law autotrim is not available. Autotrim was not cutting out, the situation with loadfactor demand by SS and decreasing speed caused the NU trim to travel full up and also kept it there. The crew did not understand that and it looks that after some hundred of pages it´s still not understood.

Back to the systemic issues, which involves humans and decisions: why not understood?

The pilot comunity will bring the old reference as a way to describe the need for change in layman terms, not as a demand that it has to be in the exact old way. I told you that before, and i thought you got it and would be able to communicate in the future on that basis.

Originally Posted by Mac

From the CVR and their subsequent actions it appears that the UAS indications with sudden AP disconnection and reversion to alternate law took them completely by surprise.

With 32 previous incidents of something related, why by surprise? Which human errors lead to that situation?

Originally Posted by Mac

A tragedy composed of overconfident automation design compounded by pilot complacency and inadequate systems training. .

Those are three factors whose weight we can quibble about, but I think Mack summed up the major human factors, less one.

Why the equipment change (airworthiness directive relates to this) had not been completed.

As before, while it "should" have been a logbook entry, the necessary condition for this mishap, which arose from a multiple malfunction, was a piece of hardware that failed in triplicate, in a known failure mode. Absent the iced up tubes, not even a log book entry.

Safety, not the manufacturer "at all"?"

Sorry, I don't care about A vs B, just about good system and good interface and good tools.

If you can explain to me, in plain language, why a stall warning system goes dormant while the aircraft is stalled, in flight, and tell me why this is allegedlyl a good design, I'd sure like to hear it.

In this case, would it have made a difference?

No idea, the crew were behind the aircraft, and how that might have helped them catch up I can only guess. It might have helped the Captain when he arrived, not sure.

[Lyman]

"so the real issue is not the manufacturer at all."

As that is what I intended to say,

May I make a further Point? Some discussion here tends to lump Training in with something that I associate with autoflight. ROTE.

It is the very difference between Human piloting and autoflight that creates the possibility of near perfect safety numbers.

Sadly, it is glossed over. Training is not (should not be, only) the drive to commit to memory.

It must be the pursuit of what Humans do so well, and why I think we will never see "unattended" (commercial) Flight?

Innovation, and Intuition. Tempered with EXPERIENCE, NOT TRAINING.

Knowledge plus experience = WISDOM. And wisdom is priceless, deserves a comfortable salary, and dismissal of errant critique, absent the same WISDOM.

Program your computers, and I say, BULLY! Programming the human animal is a fools errand. And ignorant of the resource to hand.

386 or SULLY? For crying out loud, can we not have both?

[RWA]

Quoting Safety Concerns:-

"The post was clearly directed at Airbus, heavily implying some perceived design flaw."

Can't help recalling my days as Reserve artilleryman, Safety. And a marvellously-humorous lecture that an American officer gave us on the perennial subject of the 'Dual-Purpose Gun' - which could have operated with equal efficiency against both tanks and infantry (if only someone had ever managed to invent one).

I recall him saying at one stage, "Frankly, gentlemen - and ladies - after a long career in weapons development - I can't help but conclude, up to the present time, that the only truly-effective 'dual-purpose gun' ever invented was the one God gave to man......"

Do you believe that the design of the A330 (and the relevant training procedures) are already so perfect that they cannot be improved?

If not, surely you'll agree that it is the duty of both the designers and the trainers to learn as much as they can from this event?

[MountainBear]

@BOAC

MBear - they did not need to know what had caused the loss of IAS indication.

I agree with you. Go back and read my post because you appear to have misunderstood my point.

Comparing accidents, like comparing a/c, is a Hangar game. Each one is exquisitely individual, and in lumping them together, the trap is set for continued human nonsense.

This is the point I was trying to make. It is a grievous error and frankly an endless game to design training around preventing the last accident. I have harped on this point before. Safety is a process.

[Lyman]

Elaboration? Comparing accidents, then, is not only unhelpful, but infects the process with the tentacles of the flaws of the past.

Contrast? yes, there we go? because to compare is to get stuck, to contrast is to allow progress, not (but approaching!) perfection.

[jcjeant]

Two years ago ...

Hi,

Since we seem to going in circles .. why not leave the circle and take a tangent that takes us back two years ago when the first research to refresh our memories and try to understand why these two years have passed before we could go round in circles around preliminary BEA reports.
Of the beginning and certainly after the publication of ACARS and expert commentary it soon became apparent that the AF447 had not made a gliding flight but instead of ... the fall had to be fast or because of a stall or a result of a spin entry
Whether one or both of these reasons .. obviously has the time it was known that the fall was rapid (nearly vertical)
Early research in the area near last known position (with inadequate equipment .. and we knew it) did not yield results.
The experts knows that this first search was not correct (inadequate gear)
Instead of repeating the research in this area (with the good gear) .. and despite all this knowledge and despite some warnings of external analysis it was decided to do (with the right equipment this time) for further research in areas where it was impossible (practically) that the aircraft go ( 100 km from the last pos)
After the discovery of the black boxes the BEA give some explanations for the failure of the first search.
In fact the BEA explanations shown some things .. the complete failure of the BEA to conduct professionally a search for a disappeared plane (for this particular plane at least) .. or more things for imaginative people
And BEA can't argue that they don't know that pingers can fail .. they can fail
And anyways .. the first research gear used was not good even if the pingers were active at this time.
The BEA duty is to improve safety ... and in the most quickest time possible
By the BEA failure in researches a precious time was lost for publish new recommendations
The BEA explanations are not satisfactory .. and as many other subjects related AF447 .. they will be scrutinized accurately in a other room than a press meeting venue or a forum
We can now return in our AF447 hamsterwheel

[Safety Concerns]

Do you believe that the design of the A330 (and the relevant training procedures) are already so perfect that they cannot be improved?

This is the point I was trying to make. It is a grievous error and frankly an endless game to design training around preventing the last accident. I have harped on this point before. Safety is a process.

And here we clearly have the problem. In the first quote a specific manufacturer is mentioned, why for what purpose other then to run down the manufacturer.

The second quote is intended to further enhance the position of far too many pilots that the airbus is somehow not really designed for them.

But there is hope because the last few words are safety is a process.

The FACT is that regardless of current design, regardless of analogue or digital, regardless of european or American or whatever, pilots when confronted with extraordinary circumstances, often miss the warning signs about a situation and then end up making a wrong decision. Safety is a process that will correct that in the end.

What the safety process won't do however is entertain you biased, uneducated comments specifically directed at one manufacturer. It may do if there is evidence or statistics confirming a significant difference in accident rate.

There isn't.

So don't mix issues. Everybody in aviation is committed to improving safety. It will be done on the back of facts and not emotions. Because if we did follow emotions and go backwards, safety levels will decrease.

The point I am making is quite simple and based upon todays facts. Apparently intelligent pilots keeping come back in a misguided attempt to prove that black is in fact white.

Stick feedback, throttle feedback, AOA indicators, direct law, normal law have had no effect on accidents for forty years. The weakest link has always been and will probably remain the human interface, the pilot.

Designers are working very hard to design a foolproof system. However one only has top read some of the posts here to comprehend what an impossible tasks they have.

[ChristiaanJ]

Originally Posted by jcjeant

In fact the BEA explanations shown some things .. the complete failure of the BEA to conduct professionally a search for a disappeared plane (for this particular plane at least)

I take it then that you are an expert professional in underwater searches in the Mid-Atlantic (3000m depth plus), to profess such a judgment.
Do you work for Wood Hole? If not, why didn't you offer your services?

And I even suppose you don't know the expression "needle in haystack".....

By the BEA failure in researches a precious time was lost for publish new recommendations

Slightly dumb remark.... Some recommendations HAVE already been published, and so far I haven't seen any crashes similar to AF447. What "precious time" was lost?

The BEA explanations are not satisfactory...

Maybe not to you, since they don't match your conspiracy theories.
I doubt you've ever been part of a real accident investigation.

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by BOAC

... and as I said before, that both AB and AB pilots are having some serious thoughts about the way they present and operate the type.

Airbus* changed their tune nearly two decades ago, after they lost Nick Warner. Honest question, and I don't want you to think I'm getting at you - when was the last time you honestly heard an Airbus pilot or TRE say that it was impossible to stall the aircraft under any circumstances? If it was more recent than the mid-'90s I'd be inclined to suggest you report them to their chief pilot, because that's a dangerous misapprehension.

I suspect/hope this and the PGF crash have opened a few eyes. The parallel I draw is the driver I saw last winter here who, dazzled by the brilliance of the 'perfect' ABS in his car, was amazed when it let him slide into another car on sheet ice.

Then that's another fundamental misunderstanding of how the ABS system works - it does exactly what it says on the tin in that it will release the brake pads for a split-second if it detects the wheels locking up - in essence it's just automating what is known as "cadence braking" if you do it manually. It doesn't necessarily stop you in any shorter distance than regular brakes (in fact some of the earlier systems actually induced a *longer* stopping distance than with correctly-applied conventional brakes), but what it does do is give you more control over steering than you have with locked wheels. On ice, even with ABS working full-chat, your stopping distance will still be significantly greater and your ability to steer will still be severely compromised. Heaven knows I've read many road safety articles over the years warning drivers that ABS will not necessarily stop them in a shorter distance even under normal conditions, let alone on wet roads or ice, and it's astonishing how little this information is understood by drivers, though in my experience most driving instructors are aware of those limitations if you ask them.

You'd like to think that pilots, TREs especially, would have a more in-depth knowledge of the systems they are training people to use!

@RWA - From what I understand from talking to current and former line pilots, the FBW Airbus simulators do indeed simulate the behaviour under different laws. I think it was PJ2 on the Tech Log threads who mentioned that he took a sim check that simulated failure all the way down to Manual Reversion mode, where the only controls available are the pitch trim and rudder - he also mentioned that he successfully landed the simulator, but was thankful he wasn't faced with the challenge in real life.

No design is perfect, but on here opinion seems to be clearly divided as to whether the decision to go without tactile feedback was a major oversight. The opinion that it was seems to be largely held by people who've never flown the thing, and it seems that most that have don't regard it as a major loss. As a non-pilot I'm bound to watch what I say and hold a neutral position on the subject, but from what I understand about the design and training as a holistic entity I'm inclined to agree with the latter. I have yet to be presented with incontrovertible evidence that any FBW Airbus incident to date would have been avoided by having the sidesticks connected via backdrive.

Opinion seems to be split as to how the A330 handles under Alternate Law - so far we've had one pilot saying that they were surprised at the increase in response, and IIRC two saying that there wasn't that much difference and they adapted to it fairly quickly. The pilot in the former case seemed to believe that Airbus was directly involved in the de-skilling of pilots, a claim which again I've seen no evidence to support - so I'm less inclined to trust his opinion. At least one of the latter is well-respected on here as a no-nonsense senior pilot whose opinion I therefore trust implicitly.

[* - By which I mean the marketing department and executives - the engineering department had always been realistic about the aircraft's capabilities (good though they were)... ]

[RetiredF4]

human interface

Safety Concerns
Stick feedback, throttle feedback, AOA indicators, direct law, normal law have had no effect on accidents for forty years.

That is your assumption, i know lots of accidents where one or another part was contributing to the cause.

The weakest link has always been and will probably remain the human interface, the pilot.

I hope that last sentence is a misspelling.

The pilot is not the human interface, he is the user of it.
The human interface starts with all aircraft systems which output information to the pilot and ends with all aircraft systems, the pilot operates, and the most important part is feedback.

If you see the pilot as human interface, then i understand your communication problem with the pilot community.

[PJ2]

Dozy;

it's astonishing how little this information is understood by drivers,

Yep. Nature trumps automation every time.

The sim experience (fully manual flight on THS and differential engine thrust) was done during the initial course on the A340 and it worked sufficiently to get onto the runway. The A320 was much easier to control under the same circumstances, primarily due to mass and the need to anticipate much earlier for the A340 and would be a huge challenge but doable.

Tactile feedback simply wasn't an issue for most. While there are always counterexamples, no pilots I discussed Airbus issues with commented that moving thrust levers, sidestick positions, artificial pressure during out-of-trim conditions etc were fundamental to flying the aircraft. The key discussion point for us was always the airline's restriction on hand-flying and the absence of such practise in the simulator. The manual was written in such a way as to permit/encourage hand-flying and there was also an "appropriate-level-of-automation" list which provided good guidance for the engagement of automation, (fully automatic, to fully manual), but the trouble was, because no one was practised at it, they lost the touch and the confidence to disengage everything and that is a self-fulfilling series of actions. The policies were good and permitted the decision to disengage, but were not actively encouraged, the reason given being "fuel consumption". But automation is a god-send at the end of a long-haul flight and is an enormous enhancement to flight safety - it just has to be understood, and trained/checked well.

At least one exercise should be included in any practise session (not on the ride), and that is climbing and descending S-turns with changes in speed - fully manual flight including manual thrust levers, and no flight directors. It is a worthwhile exercise which takes about 20 minutes of sim time for both pilots and is a lot of fun (and is very revealing!)

A no-FD hand-flown ILS approach to CATI limits is already in the script and so are steep turns, but the above exercise is a good coordination, instrument-scan one...it should be done in Alternate then Direct Law, but one thing at a time.

[RetiredF4]

human factors

Some pieces out of the final report from Gulf Air manamana 2000
final report

The accident itself has nothing in common with AF447, but it highlight the human factor somewhat closer. That might help the discussion in understanding the difference between blame and detailed accident investigation.

2.3 Analytical Methodology
A review of the factual information indicates that this accident was primarily
attributable to human factors, there being no technical deficiencies found with the aircraft and its systems. Consequently, the following analysis focuses on these human factors issues, both at the personal and the systemic levels. The analysis adopts the philosophy of Annex 13, which is well articulated by Dan Maurino, Coordinator of the Flight Safety and Human Factors Study Programme, ICAO. ‘To achieve progress in air safety investigation, every accident and incident, no matter how minor, must be considered as a failure of the system and not simply as the failure of a person, or people’.
The term ‘human factors’ refers to the study of humans as components of
complex systems made up of people and technology. These are often called ‘sociotechnical’ systems. The study of human factors is concerned with understanding the performance capabilities and limitations of the individual human operator, as well as the collective role of all the people in the system, which contribute to its output. There are two primary dimensions of human factors, these being the individual and the system.

In this context the following analysis addresses the human factors issues: at
the individual level, and at the systemic organisational and management level.

2.3.1 Individual Human Factors
In considering the role and performance of individuals it must be recognised
that people are not autonomous, they are components of a system. Therefore
human performance, including human errors and violations, must be onsidered in the context of the total system of which the person is a part. There is a need to investigate whether such errors or violations were totally or partially the products of systemic factors. Some examples are: training deficiencies, inadequate procedures, faulty documentation, lack of currency, poor equipment design, poor supervision, a company’s failure to take action on previous violations, commercial pressures to take short cuts, and so on.

2.3.3 The Reason Model of Safety Systems
At the 1992 ICAO AIG meeting it was recommended that the Reason Model
should be used as a guide to the investigation of organisational and management factors.

The Reason Model is described in the ICAO Human Factors Training
Manual (1998, Chapter 2). The model and its application is described in more detail in the book Managing the Risks of the Organisational Accident (Reason, 1997).

Operational experience, research and accident investigation have shown that
human error is inevitable. Error is a normal characteristic of human performance and while error can be reduced through measures such as intensive training, it can never be completely eliminated. Consequently, systems must be designed to manage human error. What follows is an integrated systemic analysis based on information drawn from all the specialist groups involved in the investigation. It is conceptually based on the Reason Model of safety systems.

2.4.6 Information Overload
The circumstances in the cockpit, and the behaviour of the captain, indicated
that at this time (1929:41) the captain was probably experiencing information
overload. While there are a number of theories of human information processing, one characteristic that they all share is the concept of some form of overall central limitation on the rate at which humans can process information. This may take the form of a ‘bottleneck’, a pool of limited attentional resources, or an ‘executive controller’, supervising and co-ordinating multiple information processing resources.
However, while the underlying more esoteric theoretical issues continue to be investigated, the research carried out over the last 50 years or so, combined with actual operational experience has provided a practical first order working model of the fundamental capabilities and limitations of human information processing. This model is applicable to ‘real world’ situations, such as the analysis of human performance in complex socio-technical systems, accident investigation and training.

Some key aspects of the model are briefly described as follows:

At the conscious level, the human brain functions as if it were a single channel information processor of limited capacity. Under conditions of information overload, responses fall into one or more of the following categories:

Omission - ignore some signals or responsibilities.
Error - process information incorrectly.
Queuing - delay responses during peak loads; catch up during lulls.
Filtering - systematic omission of certain categories of information according to some priority scheme. This can lead to the focussing, or ‘channelling’ of conscious attention on one element of a task, or situation, to the exclusion of all others.
Regression - reversion to a previously over-learned response pattern.
Approximation - make a less precise response.
Escape - give up, make no response.

High levels of stress and anxiety can increase these effects. The situation had progressively deteriorated from the time of high speed initial approach, and the subsequent actions not achieving the desired results. It is also probable that the captain’s level of stress and anxiety had progressively increased as the initial approach, and then the orbit, did not go as he had intended.

As said before, there are no similarities between the accidents, this post only should point to the fact, that pilots are no supermans and that human errors are also mostly systemic errors.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

Maybe not to you, since they don't match your conspiracy theories.
I doubt you've ever been part of a real accident investigation.

I suppose you will tell the same to the judges (and lawyers) in the court of justice to refute the findings or even possibly say that there are no courts to judge the case since the justices have never participated in an investigation of aviation accidents.
Do you think your arguments will be reviewed and considered ?

[Safety Concerns]

no retired F4 I just lost it with those tunnel visioned pilots determined to run down a perfectly good and very safe but not perfect technology at any cost.

My point is this isn't about A V B, this is about moving forward with design improving its user friendliness and ability to produce the necessary feedback in a manner which ensures maximum transfer of info without overloading.

I cannot and will not accept the constant uneducated, ill informed, negative comments about one manufacturer's approach based upon emotion and not fact.

There is no way to communicate that message politely because one is dealing with ignorance.

[DozyWannabe]

@jcjeant - As I said to Bearfoil/Lyman on the Tech Log threads, be very careful when tangling with ChristiaanJ - on the off-chance you're unaware, the man was a senior engineer on Concorde during development and service and - to coin a phrase - he's likely forgotten more about aircraft design in terms of aerodynamics and the human/machine interface than you or I could ever hope to know, and just from reading his public posts I've learned an absolute shedload.

Apropos of nothing, here's a brief blogpost on the man responsible more than anyone else for the A320's (and by extension her descendants) handling characteristics:

Gordon Corps (1929-1992)

Sentences that should be paid particular attention to include (emphasis mine):

In 1964, after his RAF service he joined the Air Registration Board. He became chief test pilot to the Civil Aviation Authority in 1981 on the retirement of Dave Davies.

(Yes - *that* Dave (D.P.) Davies, the one who wrote what many still consider the Bible of heavy jet handling characteristics nearly 40 years after it's last edition. Prior to that, Captain Corps was effectively Davies' SIC)

He joined Airbus Industrie in Toulouse in 1982 as an engineering test pilot. In the intervening 10 years, he had been involved in flight-testing the Airbus A310, A300-600 and A320 airliner family, with special responsibility for flying qualities.

I hope this helps to lay to rest any remaining belief that the A320 series was designed without the input of pilots, and indeed was designed with the input of at least one of the most skilled and safety-conscious pilots who ever lived.

It was Captain Corps who devised the previously-mentioned simulator test that proved to at least one sceptical pilot that the A320's systems, including bank and pitch limitations, were more than capable of permitting emergency escape maneouvres with a better success rate than conventional control designs.

Captain Corps sadly died of altitude sickness in 1992 when investigating a fatal accident on Talkuassir mountain, which, though tragic, demonstrated his commitment to safety in the air above all else (and frankly what our cousins in the US would call "brass balls") - how many 62-year-old men can you think of who would risk a treacherous journey to the Himalayas just to be the point man for an accident investigation?

From a personal perspective, another tragic consequence of his death, which I've mentioned before, is that the contributions of Captain Bernard Ziegler (who was first and foremost a sales evangelist) to the history of the Airbus FBW project, of which there were many that were controversial, are common knowledge among the piloting community - but the contributions of Captain Corps (who was a technical and engineering pilot with hours logged in more types than many can name off the top of their head, and an acute knowledge of the good and bad points of *all* of them) are nowhere near as well-known. Part of me wonders whether if he had lived long enough to complete his retirement, he'd have written a book which would have picked up where Davies left off, and left no doubt in the minds of the pilots and engineers who read it, that the design considerations of the A320 series were thoroughly thought through and had to get through the approval of this formidable aviator before they would pass muster.

[Lonewolf_50]

Safety Concerns

Stick feedback, throttle feedback, AOA indicators, direct law, normal law have had no effect on accidents for forty years.

I doubt you can support that statement, given how contributory factors add up in aircraft mishaps of any brand, not to mention the variety of change, modification, and adjustment the industry has made in forty years.

But let's try another view on this: is half a truth a whole lie? If it is, then you could be accused of lying (or simply being wrong) even if there is something in your statement close to the truth.

You can make a case that any single one of the above were not the sole cause of a mishap over the past 40 years, and my guess is that you'd be able to support it.

Since we may never get good granularity on the recent crash (early morning) in Libya, thanks to that bit of Arab Spring, whatever factors contributed to that remain lost to the industry at large.

(Here's hoping I am wrong about that).

[Lonewolf_50]

Dozy, FWIW ... from an older thread ... PPRuNerNorman Stanley Fletcher

The Airbus has to be considered as a box of tools - there is a tool for just about every occasion in the locker. The problem for many Airbus pilots is that they only use a few of those tools nearly all the time. Such skills as manual flying are often neglected. My personal philosophy is that at least once a week or so, I switch the autopilot, autothrust and flight directors off and do a raw data approach to minimums. It is hard work as raw data instrument flying is a perishable skill which significantly decays through lack of use. If you are not careful you end up losing key abilities that you had in your early years. To be a good Airbus pilot undoubtedly requires a solid grasp of the numerous flight guidance modes, but it also requires the ability to switch the whole lot off should the need arise. I personally encourage low-houred Airbus pilots who have become familiar with the Airbus over say the last year to stretch themselves and periodically switch off the automatics - weather and ATC environment permitting.

This is not just an Airbus problem but a problem related to all new aircraft types (B777, B787, A380 etc, etc). Increasingly we as pilots are becoming systems managers - and it is absolutely vital we have a full grasp of those systems.

Nonetheless, it is also imperative the basic handling skill are not allowed to erode. All the 'stick and rudder' men may despise the realities of modern aviation - they alas need to embrace the new skill set required of them. Equally a whole generation of Airbus pilots need to ensure their systems management capabilities, good as they may be, are not maintained at the expense of basic flying skills.

When there is a corporate disincentive to hand flying, and even punishment, Norman's appeal may become increasingly difficult for anyone to hear, particularly those who are not pilots, who need to hear it loudest.