AF447 wreckage found
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machinebird
Sorry, don't know how to crop from your post.
You asked 'how long before you get rusty on IFR flights. For me (50 years old. 10,000 hours) I get rusty after a long weekend. No kidding.
The more recent I am (today is good) the better I am.
Time constant? I don't claim to know.
That's an easy question to ask, but a very difficult one to answer.
My point is simple though.
Pilots should not rely on the autos to do stuff they CANNOT do themselves.
By all means use the autos, but only because you CHOOSE to, not because you NEED to.
I'm an experienced Capt. I see F/Os (tomorrows Capts.) who actually fly 1% or less of what they log.
Dammit, I'm not much better than them (but at least I have some experience of hand flying)
Sorry, don't know how to crop from your post.
You asked 'how long before you get rusty on IFR flights. For me (50 years old. 10,000 hours) I get rusty after a long weekend. No kidding.
The more recent I am (today is good) the better I am.
Time constant? I don't claim to know.
That's an easy question to ask, but a very difficult one to answer.
My point is simple though.
Pilots should not rely on the autos to do stuff they CANNOT do themselves.
By all means use the autos, but only because you CHOOSE to, not because you NEED to.
I'm an experienced Capt. I see F/Os (tomorrows Capts.) who actually fly 1% or less of what they log.
Dammit, I'm not much better than them (but at least I have some experience of hand flying)
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recurrent training isn't going to help much. By the time the check airman is through checking the squares rarely is any time left for hand flying. Your best opportunity is in benign conditions at lower altitudes just hand flying for a while. If you don't do this you will fly like these guys did. How would you like your name in a similar accident report showing your inability to hand fly?
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Bubbers.
If that q. was directed to me, then-no is my answer.
I only contributed a comment to this thread because I feel that the current 'autos' trend is killing my very hard won stick and rudder skills.
Also, those same skills- which the AF447 crew must have had back in their PPL days- were plainly absent when they, and all their passengers and crew, got killed.
Why go stick back in a stall?
Why go stick back at all?
Why did the Colgan crew go stick back in a stall?
Might I, or you go stick back in a stall someday? Kinda hard to rule it out, no?
If that q. was directed to me, then-no is my answer.
I only contributed a comment to this thread because I feel that the current 'autos' trend is killing my very hard won stick and rudder skills.
Also, those same skills- which the AF447 crew must have had back in their PPL days- were plainly absent when they, and all their passengers and crew, got killed.
Why go stick back in a stall?
Why go stick back at all?
Why did the Colgan crew go stick back in a stall?
Might I, or you go stick back in a stall someday? Kinda hard to rule it out, no?
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I'm not a pilot, but what I get from this thread is that the only guy in the cockpit who knew what control inputs were being made was the guy making them. The problem wasn't that HE had insufficient feedback, it was that he was pulling back on his stick, and the other pilot and the captain when he got back to the cockpit couldn't see that he was doing so, but possibly assumed that he was doing the opposite.
Clearly one solution would have been for the pilot who was flying the thing to tell everybody else on the cockpit what he was doing so that they had a chance to tell him he was doing it wrong.
Therefore, any verbal communication coming from the PF would have not been of real help, as it would have gone through the translation of his own senses, or in other words, his misperception of the Neutral position of the stick.
Anybody who has ever flown a computer game with a keyboard will surely be familiar with one of those little 'stick position' indicators that shows you where the joystick would be now if you had one... so, would a small circular display with a glowing 'stick position' display in the middle of the glass cockpit, showing the stick was 'being pulled back' have made it obvious to everybody else on the flight deck what control inputs the pilot flying was making? A lot easier to do (in software) than retrofitting force feedback, all the information is obviously available... presumably you'd only need/want it in certain circumstances, but would it have prevented this crash assuming one of the other humans in the cockpit had known the right thing to do but didn't realise that the pilot flying was doing the wrong thing?
Last edited by airtren; 18th Aug 2011 at 02:22.
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Not really. He could not see directly, constantly, and continuously what the PF was doing with the stick.
He had a clue, as he could infer based on some indirect information, but not see directly, each motion the PF was performing.
It was like a wall in between, a blanket over the PF, etc,...
He had a clue, as he could infer based on some indirect information, but not see directly, each motion the PF was performing.
It was like a wall in between, a blanket over the PF, etc,...
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I think PNF 'knew'. In the sense that he saw, felt and heard cues that prompted his scolds. I hesitate to say specifically (sometimes) that the ss was visible to PNF. I am not persuaded this is a flaw. It is not inadvertent, this design, so Airbus knows this also.
Unless a human is perfect in posture, his body will explain his movements. I don't believe the pull back full SS is perfect with the shoulderrs, and neck as the push SS. I do know it is very poor form to criticise a Frenchman in the way he performs hisd tasks. So to do this scolding is convincing, the PNF is very sure. He will not assume the controls, this is next to forbidden, and in Korea this is similar, the steal of the stick to humble the other.
I think it is not wise to avoid that this PF has created some doubt about Stall in the PNF, then Captain. When it is doubted, the command is left alone. "Some crazy Speed" is obvious on this flight deck, but the position of the Nose is in question, Dive, or Stall. So crazy speed is correct for this team, and that is the source of all following mistakes, an unknown attitude. Crazy speed by noise, and by VSI.
A slim chance for those who favor the pilot is not a fool is that we hear, read, what is released to us, and it fits like a glove to the conclusions.
In fact, not called conclusions, by the BEA, but only here.
Slim one though/
Unless a human is perfect in posture, his body will explain his movements. I don't believe the pull back full SS is perfect with the shoulderrs, and neck as the push SS. I do know it is very poor form to criticise a Frenchman in the way he performs hisd tasks. So to do this scolding is convincing, the PNF is very sure. He will not assume the controls, this is next to forbidden, and in Korea this is similar, the steal of the stick to humble the other.
I think it is not wise to avoid that this PF has created some doubt about Stall in the PNF, then Captain. When it is doubted, the command is left alone. "Some crazy Speed" is obvious on this flight deck, but the position of the Nose is in question, Dive, or Stall. So crazy speed is correct for this team, and that is the source of all following mistakes, an unknown attitude. Crazy speed by noise, and by VSI.
A slim chance for those who favor the pilot is not a fool is that we hear, read, what is released to us, and it fits like a glove to the conclusions.
In fact, not called conclusions, by the BEA, but only here.
Slim one though/
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IMO, the efficient and easy synchronization between the two pilots is a major Goal of the cockpit design. That Goal seems to be achieved with only one exception, which is the stick. Currently the active stick is controlled almost in complete secrecy, as the other pilot has no easy and natural ability to directly see what's going on with it.
I suspect that the PF's problem was that he was confused about the Neutral position, and instead of Neutral, he kept the stick off Neutral in a NU position.
Had that been clearly, and easily visible to the PNF, and later by the Captain, they would have reacted either by pointing that out, or simply taking the control away.
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BB
Fully in agreement here, and there should be precious little that a pilot cannot do himself, else he is on the slippery slope that can lead to an accident.
Bubbers44
That just goes to show that the system does not appreciate the value of hand flying.
There should be specific hand flying exercises that need to be performed and checked off. (Like the S-1 and S-3 patterns that I posted a week ago.)
Guess the regulators will have to step in and insist.
Pilots should not rely on the autos to do stuff they CANNOT do themselves.
Bubbers44
recurrent training isn't going to help much. By the time the check airman is through checking the squares rarely is any time left for hand flying.
There should be specific hand flying exercises that need to be performed and checked off. (Like the S-1 and S-3 patterns that I posted a week ago.)
Guess the regulators will have to step in and insist.
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@PJ2
Well... not really. According to AF book (see BEA's report appendix 9), when ALL IAS are unreliable "sécurité du vol" must be considered "affectée" and 5° NU/TOGA drill MUST be performed.
Momentary loss of airspeed information isn't an emergency, it is a minor abnormal that, according to the drill, requires setting the MCDU to the GPS page to monitor altitude and levelling off for troubleshooting which means get out the QRH for the pitch-power settings, and wait...
Upsets, AI v TBC, FBW v steam... old bold v MPL...
Correction: I must confess first up, that I was suspicious early on re an upset induced structural failure of the VS. Given the downlink info, there was some reason to consider that scenario. Having evaluated the structure and also real world piot inputs, I remain less than enthusiastic about the AI rudder limiter system, and the design of the primary and secondary load paths. The system remains sensitive to consequential failures particularly following DFCS sensor failures. Nonetheless, in the AF447 case, this did not occur, as the rudder appears to have been functionally dormant...
The CVR and DFDR have allowed another look into the operation of a flight deck and decision making in a condition of high stress and uncertainty.
It is very easy to post event slate the flight crew for the lack of SA, not being aware of the energy state of the aircraft, (PNF calls acknowledged...), but one assumes that this is a qualified, moderately alert crew of common competency dealing with a moderately complex problem that is probably compounded by the crews actions. On the day, the outcome was less than satisfactory. Unless this type of outcome is to be an accepted by product of cost savings, then the industry needs to learn the lessons that can be gained from this event and work on the fundamental problem which remains as always:
Loss of Situational Awareness
The fact that crew continue to apply incorrect flight control inputs on a depressingly growing number of events (RAL, AA, USAir, CAL, KAL, XL, AF etc...) is in part evidence of the relative ease of which the crew can be placed in a position where loss of SA occurs. Poor HMI design and inadequately documented system behaviour can increase this likelihood.
Training can provide some protection however, the existing FFS are not suited to high fidelity in the area of concern. Flying small aircraft may be beneficial (at least it can be fun...) but a spin in a S-1, S-2 SA-300 or Stearman bears little resemblance to departure from controlled flight in a swept wing jet. (What is consistent though is that any aircraft with normal stability will tend to recover from uncontrolled flight [inverted/upright/incipient/stabilised] if the controls are held positively in a neutral position, and a dive will result. The FBW aircraft if operating normally will recover rapidly if the controls are released (Boeing anyway, AI.... beware the stab trim). Caveat: Follow your normal procedures.
Where the sensors have failed, the problems for the flight crew are substantial, even if they are relatively benign in the commencement of the event. On FBW aircraft, pretty much all bets are off, as the behaviour of the system is going to be whatever the newly established control laws are... if the engineers chicken entrails correctly established the failure mode, then that will be relatively benign, however if the runes were not working that day, then the outcome is going to be at the very least entertaining.
Lets consider being a little bit more understanding of the stress that these guys were under, and acknowledge the fact that they are the product of the level of interest the travelling public have in safety (by proxy through the performance of the open skies/deregulated industry, "the race to the bottom").
Training can be improved, but it will occur only when the customers demand that the airlines stop killing them.
Boeing and Airbus both make adequate aircraft, both suffer from hubris, and the merits of automatics/FBW etc IMHO are subservient in causality to the loss of SA that exists for various reasons, but a number being within the purvey of the airlines to act to mitigate.
The CVR and DFDR have allowed another look into the operation of a flight deck and decision making in a condition of high stress and uncertainty.
It is very easy to post event slate the flight crew for the lack of SA, not being aware of the energy state of the aircraft, (PNF calls acknowledged...), but one assumes that this is a qualified, moderately alert crew of common competency dealing with a moderately complex problem that is probably compounded by the crews actions. On the day, the outcome was less than satisfactory. Unless this type of outcome is to be an accepted by product of cost savings, then the industry needs to learn the lessons that can be gained from this event and work on the fundamental problem which remains as always:
Loss of Situational Awareness
The fact that crew continue to apply incorrect flight control inputs on a depressingly growing number of events (RAL, AA, USAir, CAL, KAL, XL, AF etc...) is in part evidence of the relative ease of which the crew can be placed in a position where loss of SA occurs. Poor HMI design and inadequately documented system behaviour can increase this likelihood.
Training can provide some protection however, the existing FFS are not suited to high fidelity in the area of concern. Flying small aircraft may be beneficial (at least it can be fun...) but a spin in a S-1, S-2 SA-300 or Stearman bears little resemblance to departure from controlled flight in a swept wing jet. (What is consistent though is that any aircraft with normal stability will tend to recover from uncontrolled flight [inverted/upright/incipient/stabilised] if the controls are held positively in a neutral position, and a dive will result. The FBW aircraft if operating normally will recover rapidly if the controls are released (Boeing anyway, AI.... beware the stab trim). Caveat: Follow your normal procedures.
Where the sensors have failed, the problems for the flight crew are substantial, even if they are relatively benign in the commencement of the event. On FBW aircraft, pretty much all bets are off, as the behaviour of the system is going to be whatever the newly established control laws are... if the engineers chicken entrails correctly established the failure mode, then that will be relatively benign, however if the runes were not working that day, then the outcome is going to be at the very least entertaining.
Lets consider being a little bit more understanding of the stress that these guys were under, and acknowledge the fact that they are the product of the level of interest the travelling public have in safety (by proxy through the performance of the open skies/deregulated industry, "the race to the bottom").
Training can be improved, but it will occur only when the customers demand that the airlines stop killing them.
Boeing and Airbus both make adequate aircraft, both suffer from hubris, and the merits of automatics/FBW etc IMHO are subservient in causality to the loss of SA that exists for various reasons, but a number being within the purvey of the airlines to act to mitigate.
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when ALL IAS are unreliable "sécurité du vol" must be considered "affectée" and 5° NU/TOGA drill MUST be performed.
Short Sea Story. (I'm USN Ret)
Once had an instructor that demonstrated the approach to stall by forcibly unloading the aircraft to the point that g was actually fairly negative. (I acknowledged the procedure, but thought to myself, "No way in H#ll that I'm going to pop the stick forward like that."
Later I was on a 4 plane tactical hop, 2 students versus the instructor and another student. I was leading the student section, and we forced the instructor into an overshoot and split the flight so that my wingman was now on the instructors tail.
Instructor was embarrassed and tried to shake off his new "wingman". He went over the top of a loop at very low speed with my wingman in tow. Inverted at the top of the loop, my former wingman saw his airspeed at near zero and forcibly popped the stick forward by rote as he had been trained. Result-a very pretty and stable inverted spin that continued all the way to the ground. Fortunately his ejection seat worked as advertised but I was afraid we had lost him for quite a while.
End of Sea Story.
I am very suspicious of things you do by rote.
Originally Posted by GerardC, Post #3020
Well... not really. According to AF book (see BEA's report appendix 9), when ALL IAS are unreliable "sécurité du vol" must be considered "affectée" and 5° NU/TOGA drill MUST be performed.
In the UAS drill's design, the memorized items are for when the crew doesn't have time to look up the pitch and power, and instead must react very quickly, for example on takeoff. Remember, this drill has evolved from the original ones written a few years after the Birgenair and Aeroperu accidents.
When in stable cruise flight at FL350, a loss of any or all airspeed indications is not an emergency like the loss of engine thrust, loss of cabin pressure or a fire warning. One is not required to instantly act and "do something".
I think a mandatory pitch of 5degrees at cruise altitude if the airspeed is suddenly unreliable is a serious error in checklist design and the wrong guidance to the response given what would result if one pitched the aircraft from 2.5deg to 5deg.
The result would be destabilizing because level flight has been lost in the resulting climb and there is no longer any pitch and power reference with which to stabilize the speed because 5deg NU is going to cause a loss of energy/speed and if one is pitched up, one has no idea what one's speed is regardless of the power setting. At cruise altitude, there isn't much reserve power and pitch attitudes for most climbs when changing altitudes are usually a half to one degree higher than cruise pitch. A 2.5degree increase in pitch is huge.
Further, if the memorized drill requires "5deg" when the aircraft is clearly above both the MSA and circuit altitude" (the last memorized item in the box), then the drill is open-ended and does not provide for a level-off point from which to troubleshoot. It might be argued that at some point a crew flying this airplane, knowing that it is losing speed and energy, (one would hope they knew!), would level off because the result of a continued pitch-up is obvious. Of course, that then begs the question of the mandatory pitch-up in the first place, does it not, so why would anyone ever do it?
I think that if a mandatory pitch-up to 5deg whenever the aircraft is above FL100 which may have been the last training on this abnormal that the PF had received, then perhaps we have the reason why the PF pitched up almost instantly, and unannounced to the PNF, upon the loss of the speed indication. But I can't for the life of me really believe that that is what the drill means or requires, is it?
Pitching the aircraft up like that rather than maintaining level, stable flight is a guaranteed loss of situational awareness and potential loss of control as happened here, whereas maintaining level flight with pitch and power settings "as they were", keeps all factors in the "known" territory while the speeds sort themselves out.
I don't understand why two things aren't abundantly clear to everyone upon pitching up to 5deg - a) what the airplane would immediately do, and b) regardless of the memorized items which would mostly be applied during takeoff or early in the climb, why is there any support at all for a pitch-up to 5deg at cruise altitudes, when the outcome of such a manoeuvre is quite clear?
The question might be rephrased thus: Do we follow a bad checklist and place the flight at serious risk or are we pilots who think and fly to stay alive?
It isn't complicated and it certainly wasn't an emergency requiring the instant action that occurred.
Last edited by Jetdriver; 18th Aug 2011 at 08:26.
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@PJ2 and "machin" : to clarify.
"Si la sécurité du vol est affectée (toutes les indications de vitesse sont erronées ou si l'indication de vitesse fausse ne peut être clairement identifiée)...appliquer la procédure suivante
- appliquer les actions immédiates (équivalent de la maneuvre d'urgence)...
-AP/FD.....OFF
-A/THR.....OFF
[....]
Au dessus (above) FL 100
Poussee/assiette...CLB/5° (up)"
(Bold is from AF book)
"If flight safety is an issue (all IAS unreliable OR if unreliable AS indication is not clearly identified)... apply thereafter procedure : (same as unreliable IAS drill : AP/FD/ATHR OFF ; CLB thrust/5° NU).
I am not saying this is a smart idea, I am just saying that, from a notary/Court point of view : AF book mandates "AP/FD/ATHR OFF ; CLB thrust/5° NU" each time ALL IAS are unreliable or if THE unreliable/faulty IAS cannot be "clearly" identified
Any one of these two conditions is considered to be "affecting flight safety".
"Si la sécurité du vol est affectée (toutes les indications de vitesse sont erronées ou si l'indication de vitesse fausse ne peut être clairement identifiée)...appliquer la procédure suivante
- appliquer les actions immédiates (équivalent de la maneuvre d'urgence)...
-AP/FD.....OFF
-A/THR.....OFF
[....]
Au dessus (above) FL 100
Poussee/assiette...CLB/5° (up)"
(Bold is from AF book)
"If flight safety is an issue (all IAS unreliable OR if unreliable AS indication is not clearly identified)... apply thereafter procedure : (same as unreliable IAS drill : AP/FD/ATHR OFF ; CLB thrust/5° NU).
I am not saying this is a smart idea, I am just saying that, from a notary/Court point of view : AF book mandates "AP/FD/ATHR OFF ; CLB thrust/5° NU" each time ALL IAS are unreliable or if THE unreliable/faulty IAS cannot be "clearly" identified
Any one of these two conditions is considered to be "affecting flight safety".
Last edited by GerardC; 18th Aug 2011 at 08:07.
GerardC;
Okay, thanks very much.
Wow.
I am just saying that, from a notary/Court point of view : AF book mandates "AP/FD/ATHR OFF ; CLB thrust/5° NU" each time ALL IAS are unreliable or if THE unreliable/faulty IAS cannot be "clearly" identified
Any one of these two conditions is considered to be "affecting flight safety".
Any one of these two conditions is considered to be "affecting flight safety".
Wow.
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"If you read carefuly BEA's reports you will notice that most (if not ALL) affected crews wisely decided NOT to apply the 5° up/TOGA drill"
PNF knew what PF was doing, there was no mystery. It is a fairytale. He was constantly scolding the PF to descend. And probably not from looking at the ss.
In any case, we haven't had much discussion of the fact that about halfway down the pilot (or 'pilots') DID make some nose-down inputs; and both the attitude and the airspeed improved. Because of the increased IAS, though, these inputs resulted in the 'dormant' stall warning waking up and sounding again. This is the point that the pilots' union is stressing - it very probably just served to make the pilots (all three of them by that time) even more confused......?
Finally there's the question of the THS staying at 'full up.' BEA barely mentions this fact in the AF447 report, but they covered it very well in their report on the (similar) Perpignan crash the previous year. That report very clearly explains why that happened:-
"Footnote:- The elevators must go beyond the neutral position before the auto trim function adjusts the position of the stabilizer.
"When the stall warning sounded, the Captain reacted by placing the thrust levers in the TO/GA detent and by pitching the aeroplane down, in accordance with procedures.
"The nose-down input was not however sufficient for the automatic compensation system to vary the position of the horizontal stabilizer, which had been progressively deflected to the pitch-up stop by this system during the deceleration."
"When the stall warning sounded, the Captain reacted by placing the thrust levers in the TO/GA detent and by pitching the aeroplane down, in accordance with procedures.
"The nose-down input was not however sufficient for the automatic compensation system to vary the position of the horizontal stabilizer, which had been progressively deflected to the pitch-up stop by this system during the deceleration."
Sadly, I'm not sure that the flight crew had as much as a minute of life left to them by that stage?
Furthermore, that report goes on to say:-
"Under the combined effect of the thrust increase, the increasing speed and the horizontal stabilizer still at the pitch-up stop, the aeroplane was subject to pitch-up moment that the Captain could not manage to counter, even with the sidestick at the nose-down stop."
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...a081127.en.pdf
So it appears that the BEA considered that the 2008 Perpignan captain had no practical chance of regaining control, even with full nosedown inputs? Yet, in the AF447 report, the BEA says that the AF447 2009 situation (in exactly the same circumstances, in a deep stall with the THS full up) was 'recoverable'?
I can't overly blame Airbus for trying to offload as much liabilty as they can; that's the way business works, especially with hundreds of millions in compensation at stake. But I hope very much that they will act quickly and decisively 'behind the scenes'; as I believe that they already have by changing the stall recovery procedure.
In particular, I hope that they:-
1. Link the sidesticks at least to the point that both pilots are aware of inputs on either side;
2. Review the operation of the stall warning; ideally, if technically possible, add a second warning reacting to an actual stall rather than an imminent one;
3. Make sure that, in future, if the rest of the aeroplane 'gives up' and hands the pilots manual control, the THS does the same.
My guess is that none of those changes would cost a great deal; they'd mainly be 'software' rather than 'hardware.' Additionally, they could be introduced quite quickly, on existing aeroplanes as well as new ones. Furthermore, I don't see any way in which those changes would make the aeroplanes any more difficult to fly; and they sure MIGHT help to avoid further such accidents in the future?
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PJ2 - whatever you think of the "5 deg nose-up" it would not have killed all. The a/c would have flown reasonably happily while the UAS drill was actioned. Any stall warning that might have been thus induced could have been actioned as normal.
What the focus needs to be (apart from stall recovery training, of course) is why the pitch went from 0 deg to 11deg.
- this is not in fact the case. He had roll available. A perfectly 'practical' way to get the nose down and should be taught during 'unusual attitudes'.
What the focus needs to be (apart from stall recovery training, of course) is why the pitch went from 0 deg to 11deg.
Originally Posted by RWA
So it appears that the BEA considered that the 2008 Perpignan captain had no practical chance of regaining control, even with full nosedown inputs?
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Experiance and Training of the Pilots
The BEA report has some of the flying backgrounds of the three AF447 pilots. None of the three had been military pilots, and it's possible the two younger pilots had only flown whatever automated equipment Air France put them in. I don't know if you needed a PPL to train as a pilot for Air France, when the two co-pilots trained (Ages 37 and 32). I think Air France trains it's own pilots. Not sure if either one had so much as soloed in a 152. Maybe some of you guys know?
The Captain started out as a flight attendant with Air France, then trained as a pilot.
The apparent lack of leadership, airmanship, and teamwork heard on the CVR made my curious about the background of these pilots. The PNF calling the captain back anxiously, make it seem as if neither co-pilot knew how to fly in the aircraft in the situation they found themselves in, and the PNF knew it.
The Captain started out as a flight attendant with Air France, then trained as a pilot.
The apparent lack of leadership, airmanship, and teamwork heard on the CVR made my curious about the background of these pilots. The PNF calling the captain back anxiously, make it seem as if neither co-pilot knew how to fly in the aircraft in the situation they found themselves in, and the PNF knew it.
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lyman,pls answer a single question.just yes or no
do you believe,every pilot inthe whole wide world,capable of flying an jet
a/c would after a/p disconnect had put the a/c in a climb of 7000ft/m ?
yes or no ?
do you believe,every pilot inthe whole wide world,capable of flying an jet
a/c would after a/p disconnect had put the a/c in a climb of 7000ft/m ?
yes or no ?
O/T: MPL Training...
The lack of hand-flying experience was discussed a page or so back... some of you here are Captain's seeing new F/Os. Have any here experienced crew trained according to the (relatively) new MPL licensing scheme? These crew will NOT have necessarily been through what I would call the conventional PPL -> etc route, and may have "learned" to fly in a simulator. Entirely.
If I understand the MPL correctly, an F/O may be in the right-hand seat on a fare-carrying loaded commercial flight after no more than a total of 12 take-off and landings (of which 6 can be in a simulator...).
What hope is there given that level of experience?
If I understand the MPL correctly, an F/O may be in the right-hand seat on a fare-carrying loaded commercial flight after no more than a total of 12 take-off and landings (of which 6 can be in a simulator...).
What hope is there given that level of experience?
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Just had another look at the third report and was struck by how hard the PF appears to be working the roll axis right after the disconnect. See page 29..
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e3.en.pdf
In the 30-35 seconds following the AP disconnect he made 17 more or less alternate roll inputs with the aircraft rolling 10 degrees first one way then the other. Was he simply too busy or too focused on roll to notice he was climbing ?
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e3.en.pdf
In the 30-35 seconds following the AP disconnect he made 17 more or less alternate roll inputs with the aircraft rolling 10 degrees first one way then the other. Was he simply too busy or too focused on roll to notice he was climbing ?