I quote again the President of the Flight Safety Foundation
"This should have resulted in a log entry"
Should, yes, considering the matter of 32 other (similar but not identical) incidents that did not impact terra firma, nor terra aqua.
Perhaps there is more to this than you'd prefer to admit.
Originally Posted by Ret F4
Automatic trim was working in Alternate Law, only in direct law autotrim is not available. Autotrim was not cutting out, the situation with loadfactor demand by SS and decreasing speed caused the NU trim to travel full up and also kept it there. The crew did not understand that and it looks that after some hundred of pages itīs still not understood.
Back to the systemic issues, which involves humans and decisions: why not understood?
The pilot comunity will bring the old reference as a way to describe the need for change in layman terms, not as a demand that it has to be in the exact old way. I told you that before, and i thought you got it and would be able to communicate in the future on that basis.
Originally Posted by Mac
From the CVR and their subsequent actions it appears that the UAS indications with sudden AP disconnection and reversion to alternate law took them completely by surprise.
With 32 previous incidents of something related, why by surprise? Which human errors lead to that situation?
Originally Posted by Mac
A tragedy composed of overconfident automation design compounded by pilot complacency and inadequate systems training. .
Those are three factors whose weight we can quibble about, but I think Mack summed up the major human factors, less one.
Why the equipment change (airworthiness directive relates to this) had not been completed.
As before, while it "should" have been a logbook entry, the necessary condition for this mishap, which arose from a multiple malfunction, was a piece of hardware that failed in triplicate, in a known failure mode. Absent the iced up tubes, not even a log book entry.
Safety, not the manufacturer "at all"?"
Sorry, I don't care about A vs B, just about good system and good interface and good tools.
If you can explain to me, in plain language, why a stall warning system goes dormant while the aircraft is stalled, in flight, and tell me why this is allegedlyl a good design, I'd sure like to hear it.
In this case, would it have made a difference?
No idea, the crew were behind the aircraft, and how that might have helped them catch up I can only guess. It might have helped the Captain when he arrived, not sure.