AF447 wreckage found
“How did Airbus avoid the installation of a Shaker/Pusher? … this decision, to omit the stick shakers?”
The certification regulations do not require a shaker or stick pusher – or any other stall recovery ‘device’ if the aircraft meets the stalling criteria.
IMHO this would have been evaluated in all control law configurations, and thus we might assume, and as indicated by some incidents, that the A 330 has conventional stalling characteristics and does not require any special assistance or technique for stall identification or recovery.
A stick pusher is not installed to prevent a stall, it is a recovery device.
The certification regulations do not require a shaker or stick pusher – or any other stall recovery ‘device’ if the aircraft meets the stalling criteria.
IMHO this would have been evaluated in all control law configurations, and thus we might assume, and as indicated by some incidents, that the A 330 has conventional stalling characteristics and does not require any special assistance or technique for stall identification or recovery.
A stick pusher is not installed to prevent a stall, it is a recovery device.
Mistrust in Management
Dozy
However, as an interested SLF
The unions in the main are mostly innefectual against the onslaught of the beanconters. If as a man you stand up you will be shot down. ( I tried it once and the union were hopeless)
Any way my friend please do not take this post to be aggresive as it it not intended this way.
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Now - as I said, I don't care about blame, I don't care about legal bobbins (though I hope that the victims families are properly compensated at the end of all of this), but what it ultimately boils down to for me is that it is unacceptable to induce a nose-up attitude of that magnitude (or make any control inputs as large as the PF was making) in the cruise phase of flight. None of your "but the THS should have...", "Why did the autopilot kick out...", "What if the displays were confusing..." matters as far as I'm concerned. If a pilot is expected to handle the aircraft in the cruise phase then he should damn well be trained to handle the aircraft in the cruise phase - automatically, manually, on the trim dials if necessary - and if airlines have been neglecting the training to do so then we have serious problems here.
@exeng - I'm well aware, but I'm also aware that there comes a time when the potential outcry forces manufacturers and/or airlines to listen. The DC-10 crash in Ermnonville was one such time. The A330 test crash which killed senior test pilot Nick Warner was another. Heaven knows it must be a lonely place when you believe that you're the only one sticking your head above the parapet, but that's the point at which you must band together and draw a line in the proverbial sand. We've had one accident where the pilots were so damned tired that they stalled their aircraft and maintained the controls in a stall-inducing attitude until it hit the ground. It now appears that we have a transatlantic flight where the designated pilot in charge seemed to have no idea how to control the thing manually at altitude. Eventually something has got to give. Right now, public faith in the methods of the finance industry and the methods it employs is at an all-time low - with enough pressure you could have the beancounters on the ropes. I'm not saying it will be easy, but if it was ever possible it has to be possible now.
@testpanel (below) - Forgive the guy his wording, which was slightly inaccurate - his point is fairly valid though. They may not have a stick-shaker, but they do have an aural warning and if I recall correctly the word "STALL" flashing in large letters in the centre of the ADI display of the PFD. As such it isn't likely that the annunciations could have been missed (for nearly a minute) unless there was something terribly wrong with either the systems (which the CVR and FDR apparently refute), or the perception of the crew.
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But the ring comes round again, DOZE.
It does not matter for purposes of certification who is flying, that's the rub. Assume poor piloting, that is good.
Assuming poor piloting (the BUS does that subrosa, yes?) Without the Barn door doohickey, the STALL IS BENIGN, and recovery is straightforward, easies. It behaved in bizarre, untoward fashion, and would not behave in a straightforward manner. Protections are provided, STALL Recovery behaviour is Provided, on the basis of poor piloting...
We are now talking about survival after the fact, and ipso facto, how one gets to the dance is not about how one survives it.
It does not matter for purposes of certification who is flying, that's the rub. Assume poor piloting, that is good.
Assuming poor piloting (the BUS does that subrosa, yes?) Without the Barn door doohickey, the STALL IS BENIGN, and recovery is straightforward, easies. It behaved in bizarre, untoward fashion, and would not behave in a straightforward manner. Protections are provided, STALL Recovery behaviour is Provided, on the basis of poor piloting...
We are now talking about survival after the fact, and ipso facto, how one gets to the dance is not about how one survives it.
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No it sodding* doesn't. It has an interface that is designed in such a way that there are backstops to prevent inadvertant departure from controlled flight in the vast majority of cases, and to assist the pilots by taking a degree of workload off them during the more tedious portions of the flight (as has been the case with every airliner fitted with an FMS since the '70s).
If you continue with these wild generalisations, then I'm going to have to assume that you are simply trolling to create an argument and I'm not willing to rise to it.
* - I hope that expletive is within acceptable boundaries, mods!
If you continue with these wild generalisations, then I'm going to have to assume that you are simply trolling to create an argument and I'm not willing to rise to it.
* - I hope that expletive is within acceptable boundaries, mods!
The certification regulations do not require a shaker or stick pusher – or any other stall recovery ‘device’ if the aircraft meets the stalling criteria
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Hi,
SLF don't decide of seat price .. I tried once .. and it's no work 
Mostly unions launch a strike for their members have more privileges or better wages
Rarely for a safety issues ...
Indeed .. unions are useless for safety grow
unfortunately most of the SLF seem to be quite happy with the accident statistics as they are.
The unions in the main are mostly innefectual against the onslaught of the beanconters. If as a man you stand up you will be shot down. ( I tried it once and the union were hopeless)
Rarely for a safety issues ...
Indeed .. unions are useless for safety grow
Lyman, as there are no requirements for a ‘pusher’ (or any other device) in the stall certification requirements, then no waiver is required. CS 25 / FAR 25.201 onwards.
The circumstances leading to this accident do not appear to differ significantly from the certification demonstration requirements, although the lack of initial recovery action (post stall 'identification') and trimmed condition may represent aspects which were not, and perhaps did not need to be demonstrated.
testpannel, to ease your headache, and for clarification – no recovery device (stick push or otherwise) is required at the stall; I think that most pilots understand that a shaker is not a recovery device.
The circumstances leading to this accident do not appear to differ significantly from the certification demonstration requirements, although the lack of initial recovery action (post stall 'identification') and trimmed condition may represent aspects which were not, and perhaps did not need to be demonstrated.
testpannel, to ease your headache, and for clarification – no recovery device (stick push or otherwise) is required at the stall; I think that most pilots understand that a shaker is not a recovery device.
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Addressing pilots with an A320 type rating, is there anyone here who believes that had they been the PF AF447, without the benefit of hindsight, they would not have ended up in much the same situation?
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what has this to do with airbus?
have you not been reading the accident reports from analogue aircraft that have stalled in the past?
Exactly the same reaction from crew flying, leading to exactly the same end result.
As much as I respect Aguadalte, his comments about going back to the stone age apply here. We have been there done it, seen the film, read the book.
Aircraft with tactile feedback, stick shakers and all the rest have stalled and crashed in the past just like AF447. The only difference between then and now is that safety has never been better.
The way forward and away from this caveman approach is not to go back to the stone age and install tactile feedback and stick shakers. The way forward is to improve on the technology (with sensible pilot input void of emotion) and increase training where necessary.
have you not been reading the accident reports from analogue aircraft that have stalled in the past?
Exactly the same reaction from crew flying, leading to exactly the same end result.
As much as I respect Aguadalte, his comments about going back to the stone age apply here. We have been there done it, seen the film, read the book.
Aircraft with tactile feedback, stick shakers and all the rest have stalled and crashed in the past just like AF447. The only difference between then and now is that safety has never been better.
The way forward and away from this caveman approach is not to go back to the stone age and install tactile feedback and stick shakers. The way forward is to improve on the technology (with sensible pilot input void of emotion) and increase training where necessary.
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what has this to do with airbus?
have you not been reading the accident reports from analogue aircraft that have stalled in the past?
Exactly the same reaction from crew flying, leading to exactly the same end result.
have you not been reading the accident reports from analogue aircraft that have stalled in the past?
Exactly the same reaction from crew flying, leading to exactly the same end result.
It's just the pilots who stay the same ...
It's indeed a safety concern
Safety Concerns "stone age"
what has this to do with airbus?
It might apply to all FBW aircraft some way or the other.
have you not been reading the accident reports from analogue aircraft that have stalled in the past?
Exactly the same reaction from crew flying, leading to exactly the same end result.
As much as I respect Aguadalte, his comments about going back to the stone age apply here. We have been there done it, seen the film, read the book.
Aircraft with tactile feedback, stick shakers and all the rest have stalled and crashed in the past just like AF447. The only difference between then and now is that safety has never been better.
Exactly the same reaction from crew flying, leading to exactly the same end result.
As much as I respect Aguadalte, his comments about going back to the stone age apply here. We have been there done it, seen the film, read the book.
Aircraft with tactile feedback, stick shakers and all the rest have stalled and crashed in the past just like AF447. The only difference between then and now is that safety has never been better.
With lesser reliable aircraft, with other workloads, with other environmental information. yet lost to the same cause: Unable to recover due to different reasons. Although we have no statistic how much aircraft really expierienced a stall situation and how much of those recovered succesfully. The percentage of stall events versus resulting crash would be the interesting one.
The way forward and away from this caveman approach is not to go back to the stone age and install tactile feedback and stick shakers. The way forward is to improve on the technology (with sensible pilot input void of emotion) and increase training where necessary.
It has nothing to do with stone age to (re) add some features, which provide an aditional sensory input by a different sensor (not the eye). Nobody wants the old systems back, invent something brand new (must not bee JD-EE´s old pizza throwing device), something that helps to recognize the situation not only with eyes and ears. Let´s use the full engineering knowledge not to skip something for weight reduction and costs, but to add some new developped gadget despite weight and costs for safety concerns (nice username though).
By the way, we are back to the old stall recovery procedure (see TechLog) as well, why not use the formerly used tactile input channel as well? Pride? Cost? Stubborness?
Just work on a way to get the crews attention by using all available sensory channels to recognize and act to an extreme situation like AF447 got itself in. That must be the aim.
And to repeat it : No stick pushers like the old ones, no stick shakers like the old ones, no center yokes as the old ones, no pulleys and cables, no stone age. Invent something new instead of those with the same or even improved feedback results, and we won´t be back in stone age, but hopefully in a more safer future.
Originally Posted by vaneyck
In the BEA press conference linked by jcjeant, J-P Troadec says:
'the pilot should have applied the unreliable IAS procedure and in fact this procedure consists specifically of adopting a pitch attitude of 5°, whereas the pitch attitude that was adopted at that moment was greater.'
So once again we have confirmed, without comment, that the SOP in case of UAS in cruise involves raising the nose - just not as greatly as the PF with his large stick input raised it.
PJ2 has argued against any change in pitch before starting the checklist, and his arguments sound very convincing to me. Why would you make any change in the flight path of an aircraft in level cruise that has shown no signs of instability? And how long would you keep on at this pitch angle? Indefinitely? Surely the chances of inadvertent overspeed are less threatening than the chance of getting yourself too high, too slow.
'the pilot should have applied the unreliable IAS procedure and in fact this procedure consists specifically of adopting a pitch attitude of 5°, whereas the pitch attitude that was adopted at that moment was greater.'
So once again we have confirmed, without comment, that the SOP in case of UAS in cruise involves raising the nose - just not as greatly as the PF with his large stick input raised it.
PJ2 has argued against any change in pitch before starting the checklist, and his arguments sound very convincing to me. Why would you make any change in the flight path of an aircraft in level cruise that has shown no signs of instability? And how long would you keep on at this pitch angle? Indefinitely? Surely the chances of inadvertent overspeed are less threatening than the chance of getting yourself too high, too slow.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
Vaneyck Good point, in that a pitch increase to 5 deg at that power setting would seem to result in a climb and deceleration, where on wasn't required, nor desired. Indeed, some minutes before, the crew had remarked on how a planned climb could not be done since temps had not developed as forecast.
Why go from S & L to decelerating climb when there is no need for it? If this is what the BEA contact is suggesting, I am puzzled as to why.
Why go from S & L to decelerating climb when there is no need for it? If this is what the BEA contact is suggesting, I am puzzled as to why.
Originally Posted by ECAM actions
More to the point: if you have an aircraft flying in a known pitch/power combination that is sustaining level flight and stable speed quite happily, why use approximations from the book in the first instance?
Too keep nomenclature proper: UAS procedure is not SOP. If it is to be applied, you have departed the domain of standard operation. It is EMERGENCY / ABNORMAL.
Emergency procedures are not written by company lawyers, they are written by test pilots. They write them in blood in of those who were unfortunate to trespass into territories forbidden to them by aerodynamics, meteorology or mechanics and underline them in blood of those who were unable to follow them for whatever reasons.
If an emergency procedure could talk this would be what it says to pilot: "I am your emergency procedure. Know me well, apply me properly, timely and precisely when you need me or die. Second guess me only if you are absolutely sure you're better off without than with me but accept you very well might die if you are wrong."
Values of 5° degrees and climb power are written in the book but they are not to be set by the book. They are memory items, they have to be known by heart and set without undue delay. On Airbi they are to be maintained until attitude and setting appropriate for flight phase and weight are read out from QRH and set. They keep you both out of stall and overspeed at any weight even if you fumble with QRH and it takes you couple of minutes to find the table or even if you maintain them until fuel runs out.
5° pitch with climb power, applied at cruise altitude/level will keep you out of both stall and overspeed on any Airbus, 318 to 380, at any weight. So on Piper Cub, ATR-42, B737, Su-27 Flanker and her derivatives (provided external stores don't affect maximum allowable speed more than drag, that is), An-225 Mriya and almost anything in between. Designs on which it might or might not work are relatively overpowered ones with relatively low limiting Mach number, such as early jet transports.
It's basic aerodynamics and performance, folks.
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franzl you have gained my respect on 2 counts.
1) you have read and understood my posts
2)
That was very much a forward looking post.
1) you have read and understood my posts
2)
And to repeat it : No stick pushers like the old ones, no stick shakers like the old ones, no center yokes as the old ones, no pulleys and cables, no stone age. Invent something new instead of those with the same or even improved feedback results, and we won´t be back in stone age, but hopefully in a more safer future.
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Safety Concerns,
No disrespect,but your callsign is very ironic if you dont mind me saying.
Not an indictment of the aircraft,but of the pilot or training.It adds nothing to your argument.
Disagree.Strongly.Not for Airbus,no.They cant go back now,I agree.They must stick to their guns.But for other manufacturers,the way forward is not to copy Airbus.The only thing Airbus have actually done is invent a new way of crashing by totally disconnecting man from machine through its complex and not very user-friendly interface(visual feedback alone-myriad of changing laws during abnormals-autotrim that suddenly cuts out-SS with no feedback-no feedback TL's-stall warning that cuts out etc etc).
KISS.Old is good.Old is tried and tested.Train the pilots better.Thats the way forward.These are my safety concerns,old chap.
No disrespect,but your callsign is very ironic if you dont mind me saying.
Aircraft with tactile feedback, stick shakers and all the rest have stalled and crashed in the past just like AF447
The way forward and away from this caveman approach is not to go back to the stone age and install tactile feedback and stick shakers
KISS.Old is good.Old is tried and tested.Train the pilots better.Thats the way forward.These are my safety concerns,old chap.
Last edited by Rananim; 23rd Aug 2011 at 13:27.
Clandestino:
Whilst I appreciate your points enumerated above, I am more persuaded by PJ2's take on the UAS drill, which is that
1) UAS at cruise altitudes is a malfunction (rather than an emergency)
2) at altitude, the need to climb before trouble shooting is absent.
3) Hence, rote response of IF UAS THEN 5deg nose up does not apply to the malfunction arising in cruise.
On second thought, if you were posting a bit tongue in cheek, then a wry grin from me to you.
I fully understand EP's and required memory items. Used to teach such things, I did, and had to apply a few when things like compressor stalls and engine fires arose in flight. Memory itms are very handy at such times, to be sure.
Whilst I appreciate your points enumerated above, I am more persuaded by PJ2's take on the UAS drill, which is that
1) UAS at cruise altitudes is a malfunction (rather than an emergency)
2) at altitude, the need to climb before trouble shooting is absent.
3) Hence, rote response of IF UAS THEN 5deg nose up does not apply to the malfunction arising in cruise.
On second thought, if you were posting a bit tongue in cheek, then a wry grin from me to you.
I fully understand EP's and required memory items. Used to teach such things, I did, and had to apply a few when things like compressor stalls and engine fires arose in flight. Memory itms are very handy at such times, to be sure.
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The only thing Airbus have actually done is invent a new way of crashing
Older aircraft have suffered the same fate, it is documented that pilots reacted incorrectly in a similar situation with all your bells and buzzers yet somehow you twist that round to Airbus are responsible for designing a new way of crashing.
RetiredF4 hit the nail on the head.
Invent something new instead of those with the same or even improved feedback results, and we won´t be back in stone age, but hopefully in a more safer future.
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It may have escaped your attention but FBW accident rates are pretty impressive.
Older aircraft have suffered the same fate
RetiredF4 hit the nail on the head.
Invent something new instead of those with the same or even improved feedback results, and we won´t be back in stone age, but hopefully in a more safer future.
It is going that way whether you like it or not because flying is fundamentally safer with more automation.
