AF447 wreckage found
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As I said some time back. Flying an A330 at height is not that easy, it is very sensitive. Someone said treat the side stick as if it has Dog Sh*t on it, that may give you some idea.
As for practice in the SIM. Well up to now I have not flown any simulator that has the correct algorithms ,to give the correct feel at height. The sims fly the same at 5000ft as they do at 40000ft so until they are modified IMHO practice in the sim is pointless in terms of handling characteristic at height.
As for practice in the SIM. Well up to now I have not flown any simulator that has the correct algorithms ,to give the correct feel at height. The sims fly the same at 5000ft as they do at 40000ft so until they are modified IMHO practice in the sim is pointless in terms of handling characteristic at height.
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Lyman/Bearfoil/whatever,
There are no "sides". There are only questions for which we need to find answers, and they are:
Anything else is purely academic and/or lawyer fodder and has no place here.
There are no "sides". There are only questions for which we need to find answers, and they are:
- What happened?
- How did it happen?
- Why did it happen?
- How can we stop it from happening again to the best of our ability?
Anything else is purely academic and/or lawyer fodder and has no place here.
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Doze I cannot argue that. However, should sides be taken, I am available. One cannot have it both ways.
What is "HERE"? I think that as an engineer, you favor the TECH aspect, That is on the other thread. Bless you, I think that is appropriate. I am trying to fold my opinions into the frame, I promise you.
You are so on target, but we are humans, and have not the discipline I think you want/expect.
It is this lack of discipline and constant harping that prevented a career in the line. Guilty!
The career choice was my decision. I ended up in independent aeronautical pursuit, and I have held the gift. It is a gift, it is not a right, nor even a grant. It is a gift, and due the sacrifices of those before us whose names I cannot remember, it is not "inherently dangerous".
It is safe, when practiced with reason, and dare I say, Profitable?
What is "HERE"? I think that as an engineer, you favor the TECH aspect, That is on the other thread. Bless you, I think that is appropriate. I am trying to fold my opinions into the frame, I promise you.
You are so on target, but we are humans, and have not the discipline I think you want/expect.
It is this lack of discipline and constant harping that prevented a career in the line. Guilty!
The career choice was my decision. I ended up in independent aeronautical pursuit, and I have held the gift. It is a gift, it is not a right, nor even a grant. It is a gift, and due the sacrifices of those before us whose names I cannot remember, it is not "inherently dangerous".
It is safe, when practiced with reason, and dare I say, Profitable?
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Hi,
DW
Honestly .. the type of accident (stall situation and not recovery) is not the first .. so many were investigated .. and many recommendations made (in fact always the same .. and surely the BEA final report AF447 will again make the same recommendations)
The problem is not make recommendations (they are enough) .. the problem is who will take the hammer to drive the point and force those to whom the recommendations are intended to put them into practice
Recommendations are only words without value if they are not put into practice
If a donkey does not move forward with a carrot you should use a stick
DW
How can we stop it from happening again to the best of our ability?
The problem is not make recommendations (they are enough) .. the problem is who will take the hammer to drive the point and force those to whom the recommendations are intended to put them into practice
Recommendations are only words without value if they are not put into practice
If a donkey does not move forward with a carrot you should use a stick
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5 degrees?
In the BEA press conference linked by jcjeant, J-P Troadec says:
'the pilot should have applied the unreliable IAS procedure and in fact this procedure consists specifically of adopting a pitch attitude of 5°, whereas the pitch attitude that was adopted at that moment was greater.'
So once again we have confirmed, without comment, that the SOP in case of UAS in cruise involves raising the nose - just not as greatly as the PF with his large stick input raised it.
PJ2 has argued against any change in pitch before starting the checklist, and his arguments sound very convincing to me. Why would you make any change in the flight path of an aircraft in level cruise that has shown no signs of instability? And how long would you keep on at this pitch angle? Indefinitely? Surely the chances of inadvertent overspeed are less threatening than the chance of getting yourself too high, too slow.
Is that (overspeed) the only reason to raise the nose, or have I missed something?
'the pilot should have applied the unreliable IAS procedure and in fact this procedure consists specifically of adopting a pitch attitude of 5°, whereas the pitch attitude that was adopted at that moment was greater.'
So once again we have confirmed, without comment, that the SOP in case of UAS in cruise involves raising the nose - just not as greatly as the PF with his large stick input raised it.
PJ2 has argued against any change in pitch before starting the checklist, and his arguments sound very convincing to me. Why would you make any change in the flight path of an aircraft in level cruise that has shown no signs of instability? And how long would you keep on at this pitch angle? Indefinitely? Surely the chances of inadvertent overspeed are less threatening than the chance of getting yourself too high, too slow.
Is that (overspeed) the only reason to raise the nose, or have I missed something?
How can we stop it from happening again to the best of our ability?
Posted in another forum in response to the question:- “What might an Operations or Training manager learn from the AF 447 accident?”
General points:
1. Remind ourselves that it is not possible to understand, and thus predict, how humans will react in all situations, and that …
2. Humans cannot understand all of the interactive aspects of new technology in their operating environment (man, machine, and organisation); either from an operators view or that of a manager / regulator.
3. The operating environment has many threats which are believed to be contained, but can still pose serious problems due to changes in the aircraft, or the operation, or human behaviour, e.g. ice crystals, new aircraft type, operating closer to Cbs. The industry at large and individually we must be aware of the hazards due to change, assumption, and complacency.
Specific points:
A. Add knowledge of ice crystals to the Cb threat, reinforce the need to avoid Cbs by a large margin – more than any ‘legal’ minimum distance.
B. Re-evaluate situation assessment training, and surprise / stress management behaviours.
C. Re-evaluate SOPs for flight instrument failures and flight with unreliable airspeed (UAS). What do crews need to know to determine the difference?
• Determine in what circumstances each SOP might be used, state the assumptions made, and need to consider alternative actions.
• Reduce the complexity of drills – is there a need for a table of attitude vs wt vs thrust vs altitude for UAS. Confirm what is important and why – what are the assumptions.
D. Asses the crew’s dependency on automation; does this affect the currency of hand flying skills. Question if the use of the Fight Director detracts from basic instrument flying skills, or knowledge / rules of thumb for aircraft attitude / power setting for various stages of flight.
E. Consider what drills / crew action might be required in critical situations if either the crew misidentifies the situation, or with good awareness, acts incorrectly: ‘what if’; is there an 'undo' option'.
F. Report and share all incident / event data; follow up all technical investigations with a HF view. Share data with other operators, and seek data from other operators and consider applicability in your operation.
G. Require that aircraft type training identifies the significant differences between FBW and conventional aircraft control, and that the crew are trained in these features, e.g trim followup (autotrim) – when to check / use manual trim, lack of / differnt control force feedback or change of force with speed – what alternative crosschecks could be used.
Key items:
Safety management, safety culture, a learning culture, professionalism, reduce complexity.
Remember that certification requirements only provide a minimum standard.
The company Philosophy and Policy should reflect the need for a safety margin in all aspects of operations, publish this in Procedures (and training material), and Practice this both in training and operations – then check. PPPP
Epilogue:
Occasionally the industry encounters situations beyond the limits of certification, these are ‘black-swans’ where the industry depends, either consciously or not, on the human rescuing the situation. We celebrate many notable successes. Unfortunately we have to suffer failures because the situation is beyond human capability; this hurts our pride, beliefs, and our professional standards, yet correctly we search for a solution, we have to keep on doing our best.
In such circumstances the human is still best placed to evaluate and judge the situation; but the human might benefit from some generic human training to improve awareness, managing surprise, and recall knowledge; aspects of higher professional standards. (Excerpt from an earlier post to this forum).
And remember … (taken from a related blog) “… the software quit before the human.”
General points:
1. Remind ourselves that it is not possible to understand, and thus predict, how humans will react in all situations, and that …
2. Humans cannot understand all of the interactive aspects of new technology in their operating environment (man, machine, and organisation); either from an operators view or that of a manager / regulator.
3. The operating environment has many threats which are believed to be contained, but can still pose serious problems due to changes in the aircraft, or the operation, or human behaviour, e.g. ice crystals, new aircraft type, operating closer to Cbs. The industry at large and individually we must be aware of the hazards due to change, assumption, and complacency.
Specific points:
A. Add knowledge of ice crystals to the Cb threat, reinforce the need to avoid Cbs by a large margin – more than any ‘legal’ minimum distance.
B. Re-evaluate situation assessment training, and surprise / stress management behaviours.
C. Re-evaluate SOPs for flight instrument failures and flight with unreliable airspeed (UAS). What do crews need to know to determine the difference?
• Determine in what circumstances each SOP might be used, state the assumptions made, and need to consider alternative actions.
• Reduce the complexity of drills – is there a need for a table of attitude vs wt vs thrust vs altitude for UAS. Confirm what is important and why – what are the assumptions.
D. Asses the crew’s dependency on automation; does this affect the currency of hand flying skills. Question if the use of the Fight Director detracts from basic instrument flying skills, or knowledge / rules of thumb for aircraft attitude / power setting for various stages of flight.
E. Consider what drills / crew action might be required in critical situations if either the crew misidentifies the situation, or with good awareness, acts incorrectly: ‘what if’; is there an 'undo' option'.
F. Report and share all incident / event data; follow up all technical investigations with a HF view. Share data with other operators, and seek data from other operators and consider applicability in your operation.
G. Require that aircraft type training identifies the significant differences between FBW and conventional aircraft control, and that the crew are trained in these features, e.g trim followup (autotrim) – when to check / use manual trim, lack of / differnt control force feedback or change of force with speed – what alternative crosschecks could be used.
Key items:
Safety management, safety culture, a learning culture, professionalism, reduce complexity.
Remember that certification requirements only provide a minimum standard.
The company Philosophy and Policy should reflect the need for a safety margin in all aspects of operations, publish this in Procedures (and training material), and Practice this both in training and operations – then check. PPPP
Epilogue:
Occasionally the industry encounters situations beyond the limits of certification, these are ‘black-swans’ where the industry depends, either consciously or not, on the human rescuing the situation. We celebrate many notable successes. Unfortunately we have to suffer failures because the situation is beyond human capability; this hurts our pride, beliefs, and our professional standards, yet correctly we search for a solution, we have to keep on doing our best.
In such circumstances the human is still best placed to evaluate and judge the situation; but the human might benefit from some generic human training to improve awareness, managing surprise, and recall knowledge; aspects of higher professional standards. (Excerpt from an earlier post to this forum).
And remember … (taken from a related blog) “… the software quit before the human.”
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Is it legal?
I tried earlier, but it doesn't seem to be important. Here goes again...
It is legal for AF to leave the cockpit in the hands of pilots with no competence in manual flying at high altitude....
... when the plane is certified to oblige them to fly manually at high altitude if the autopilot disconnects... ?
It is legal for AF to leave the cockpit in the hands of pilots with no competence in manual flying at high altitude....
... when the plane is certified to oblige them to fly manually at high altitude if the autopilot disconnects... ?
oldchina:
I'll add to your "is it legal" a less concise question.
Is it right?
vaneyck
Good point, in that a pitch increase to 5 deg at that power setting would seem to result in a climb and deceleration, where on wasn't required, nor desired. Indeed, some minutes before, the crew had remarked on how a planned climb could not be done since temps had not developed as forecast.
Why go from S & L to decelerating climb when there is no need for it?
If this is what the BEA contact is suggesting, I am puzzled as to why.
I'll add to your "is it legal" a less concise question.
Is it right?
vaneyck
Good point, in that a pitch increase to 5 deg at that power setting would seem to result in a climb and deceleration, where on wasn't required, nor desired. Indeed, some minutes before, the crew had remarked on how a planned climb could not be done since temps had not developed as forecast.
Why go from S & L to decelerating climb when there is no need for it?
If this is what the BEA contact is suggesting, I am puzzled as to why.
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@oldchina: The problem is said aircraft was considered "impossible" to stall (no matter how crazy that idea actually is) prior to AF447. This has changed with stall awareness and recovery training now being mandated as a result.
Yes it is preposterous that any such suggestion would be made, but it is implied by the lack of training and the fact that FBW systems are infallible as far as Airbus and the regulators are concerned.
I'm willing to bet that whatever the outcome of the investigation, the systems and training will not be considered a root cause, merely a "contributing factor", and that the crew should have known better (but I'm straying into speculation now).
Yes it is preposterous that any such suggestion would be made, but it is implied by the lack of training and the fact that FBW systems are infallible as far as Airbus and the regulators are concerned.
I'm willing to bet that whatever the outcome of the investigation, the systems and training will not be considered a root cause, merely a "contributing factor", and that the crew should have known better (but I'm straying into speculation now).
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@Lonewolf and vaneyck:
More to the point: if you have an aircraft flying in a known pitch/power combination that is sustaining level flight and stable speed quite happily, why use approximations from the book in the first instance?
If the aircraft had been upset and at the same time airspeed became (or was already) unreliable then it is understandable, as it at least gets you back to a ball-park figure, but surely the crew were not so absent-minded as to have not made a mental note of the current pitch and power? They are, after all, supposed to be flying the aircraft?
More to the point: if you have an aircraft flying in a known pitch/power combination that is sustaining level flight and stable speed quite happily, why use approximations from the book in the first instance?
If the aircraft had been upset and at the same time airspeed became (or was already) unreliable then it is understandable, as it at least gets you back to a ball-park figure, but surely the crew were not so absent-minded as to have not made a mental note of the current pitch and power? They are, after all, supposed to be flying the aircraft?
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@oldchina: The problem is said aircraft was considered "impossible" to stall (no matter how crazy that idea actually is) prior to AF447. This has changed with stall awareness and recovery training now being mandated as a result.
Yes it is preposterous that any such suggestion would be made, but it is implied by the lack of training and the fact that FBW systems are infallible as far as Airbus and the regulators are concerned.
Yes it is preposterous that any such suggestion would be made, but it is implied by the lack of training and the fact that FBW systems are infallible as far as Airbus and the regulators are concerned.
Jcjeant mentioned that this situation is not new and that recommendations have been made - he also seemed to imply that the recommendations have not been heeded (though I'm personally not so sure). What is the case is that this is the first incident in a *long* time where it has happened at a major flag-carrier, and as such, anyone wishing to sweep it under the carpet is going to face an uphill struggle doing so. To the industry's credit, Airbus, Boeing and the EU and US regulators have jumped on this and have since put forward a major overhaul of training criteria as regards stall training, which is a step in the right direction, which hopefully will plug one hole in the cheese.
However, as an interested SLF I have to beseech the piloting community to press forward with this, using their organisation and the fact that they are one of the last remaining unionised and associated professional groups in the western world to explain to management in no uncertain terms that the rot has gone far deeper and needs to be cleaned up before we suffer another incident like this.
Speaking for myself, whatever I may feel about the causes - I don't care about blame. I don't care about the politics that will follow in the legal battle, where lawyers for all concerned parties will try to blame the other parties in an effort to minimise liability. I care about the system as a whole being made safer.
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How did AIRBUS avoid the installation of a Shaker/Pusher?
It was considered that the aircraft would prevent itself from stalling. The small detail omitted is that it only does this in Normal Law. Combined with the STALL audio warning (problem: it is silenced when the airspeed drops below 60 kts), this was considered sufficient protection.
Repeated for emphasis.
I will grant that a variety of certification decisions of similar weight (and posible lethal side effects) have been made over the years, but when you consider how pervasive shakers are, throughout the airline industry world wide, deliberately omitting them is a signal regulatory decision in a certification process. Not saying this is any sort of golden bullet, see Colgan, but another hole in the cheese? Likely. (But if it cuts out as the SW does, rendered useless in this case??? Not sure).
Of note in the causation chain analysis: regulating authority and manufacturer (and who else?) are the parties to this compromise, which saves cost (and possibly weight?) and reduces by a small amount system complexity.
Question: does anyone know what the test pilots involved in the A330 program thought of this decision, to omit the stick shakers?
There are a few lapels upon which I'd like to have been a fly, eh?
Nicely put.
I will grant that a variety of certification decisions of similar weight (and posible lethal side effects) have been made over the years, but when you consider how pervasive shakers are, throughout the airline industry world wide, deliberately omitting them is a signal regulatory decision in a certification process. Not saying this is any sort of golden bullet, see Colgan, but another hole in the cheese? Likely. (But if it cuts out as the SW does, rendered useless in this case??? Not sure).
Originally Posted by ECAMS
Q:
How did AIRBUS avoid the installation of a Shaker/Pusher?
A: This is why I made the comment I did regarding the aircraft being considered "un-stallable."
It was considered that the aircraft would prevent itself from stalling.
The small detail omitted is that it only does this in Normal Law.
Combined with the STALL audio warning (problem: it is silenced when the airspeed drops below 60 kts), this was considered sufficient protection.
How did AIRBUS avoid the installation of a Shaker/Pusher?
A: This is why I made the comment I did regarding the aircraft being considered "un-stallable."
It was considered that the aircraft would prevent itself from stalling.
The small detail omitted is that it only does this in Normal Law.
Combined with the STALL audio warning (problem: it is silenced when the airspeed drops below 60 kts), this was considered sufficient protection.
Question: does anyone know what the test pilots involved in the A330 program thought of this decision, to omit the stick shakers?
There are a few lapels upon which I'd like to have been a fly, eh?
Originally Posted by Dozy
Speaking for myself, whatever I may feel about the causes - I don't care about blame. I don't care about the politics that will follow in the legal battle, where lawyers for all concerned parties will try to blame the other parties in an effort to minimise liability. I care about the system as a whole being made safer.
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Mr. O. 'A horse of a different color', meaning: a different thing altogether. Responsibility is necessary, and entirely proper. It will be used to gauge the size and shape of each meatus in the cheese. Altogether proper, and to argue against it is to feign "JUSTICE". That means only the result matters, and politically wise is that.
You will have noticed my reference to "She did not, technically, STALL". Now that the passion has subsided, make me a bet that this comment was unnoticed by the (both) legal teams.
Airbus is currently attempting to suss a way to fold my comment into their bleatings. "It wasn't actually a STALL, so Shaker/Pusher are mooted......"
I would piss gramma's grave, were it only not so.....
You will have noticed my reference to "She did not, technically, STALL". Now that the passion has subsided, make me a bet that this comment was unnoticed by the (both) legal teams.
Airbus is currently attempting to suss a way to fold my comment into their bleatings. "It wasn't actually a STALL, so Shaker/Pusher are mooted......"
I would piss gramma's grave, were it only not so.....
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Hi,
I dunno ...
What I'm sure is that the test pilots involved in the A330 test program thought that an artificial horizon was mandatory
So .. it's an artificial horizon instrument in the A330
How the pilots AF447 (apparently) were not aware of this fact ? or used it in a discriminatory manner ( horizontal wings indication only )
Question: does anyone know what the test pilots involved in the A330 program thought of this decision, to omit the stick shakers?
What I'm sure is that the test pilots involved in the A330 test program thought that an artificial horizon was mandatory
So .. it's an artificial horizon instrument in the A330
How the pilots AF447 (apparently) were not aware of this fact ? or used it in a discriminatory manner ( horizontal wings indication only )
Last edited by jcjeant; 22nd Aug 2011 at 21:57.
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Question: does anyone know what the test pilots involved in the A330 program thought of this decision, to omit the stick shakers?
When the autopilot finally engaged, the aircraft started to ascend to 2000 ft. However, the aircraft rose too sharply and began losing speed. The speed decreased to 100 knots (120 mph; 190 km/h), but the minimum speed for controlling the aircraft is 118 knots.[5] The aircraft started to roll so the crew reduced power to the operating engine to reduce the thrust asymmetry; however, this made the problem worse and the aircraft pitched down by 15 degrees and shortly afterwards crashed into the ground.[1]