The danger of the F/O calling STOP before V1
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As mentioned, this subject has been srutinized closely and at length in these forums. A search of 'FO call STOP' brings a wealth of topics, if you take the time to peruse them!
Thread Starter
You have to allow people to learn before you can expect them to know.
A couple of accident reports that covered tyre burst events was given to the "students" to read the day before the sim trip.
The FCTM coverage of below and above 80 knots reject policy was discussed.
In the simulator the students were told that around 20 knots below V1 that they would get a tyre failure of the left outboard tyre and could expect a slight pull to the left and lots of airframe vibration.
It was a training exercise not a testing exercise and they knew it. If with all that preparation and knowledge of exactly what was going to happen, I believe that most people would accept the instructor could not do much more to help the students learn?
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The executive word STOP yelled by a 500 hour copilot would frighten the hell out of me. Thank goodness the company I flew with would not have a bar of that policy.
I was jump seating on a 737-200 taking off at night from a 5600 ft length runway on a Central Pacific atoll. The over-run area was a cliff less than 30 metres from the end of the runway. Max thrust used because we were runway length limited.
We did not know when it happened but both engine Pt2 inlet sensors were totally blocked by debris from dust from a nearby phosphate works. Remember the Potomac crash where ice blocked the Pt2 sensors and the 737 got airborne and hit a bridge and crashed into the Potomac River.
The crew of our aircraft set max EPR and although the equivalent N1 was tabulated we never noticed that both N1 were down by around 10 percent from expected. But the EPR needles and digital readout showed exactly 2.18 EPR as expected.
It was only when the realisation hit that with just a few runway lights to go, we were still 10 knots below V1 and no hope ever of aborting safely, that the captain realised the danger and slammed the thrust levers forward against the full power stop and rotated quickly 10 knots below VR. Later it was discovered the jet blast angle had blown part of the perimeter road back along the runway.
Without going into the why's and wherefore's of not spotting BOTH N1's being lower than tabulated, my fear while observing the last few seconds was the danger of the PF (the copilot) suddenly rejecting the take off of his own volition at about the same time we all realised the danger of the captain aborting for the same reason.
There is much more to this story as there always is, but any abort by either pilot under those specific circumstances would have been disaster as the 737 would have been smashed against the rocks that were the seawall.
In our case, both the captain and first officer were highly experienced. But the real risk would have been a cadet with a basic type rating and 250 total hours and as PF, calling STOP and aborting before the captain could prevent an irrevocable action.
The statistical chances of both engines simultaneously being effected by a dual Pt2 sensor blockage during a take off on a runway limited take off is minute - but it happened that dark night.
I was jump seating on a 737-200 taking off at night from a 5600 ft length runway on a Central Pacific atoll. The over-run area was a cliff less than 30 metres from the end of the runway. Max thrust used because we were runway length limited.
We did not know when it happened but both engine Pt2 inlet sensors were totally blocked by debris from dust from a nearby phosphate works. Remember the Potomac crash where ice blocked the Pt2 sensors and the 737 got airborne and hit a bridge and crashed into the Potomac River.
The crew of our aircraft set max EPR and although the equivalent N1 was tabulated we never noticed that both N1 were down by around 10 percent from expected. But the EPR needles and digital readout showed exactly 2.18 EPR as expected.
It was only when the realisation hit that with just a few runway lights to go, we were still 10 knots below V1 and no hope ever of aborting safely, that the captain realised the danger and slammed the thrust levers forward against the full power stop and rotated quickly 10 knots below VR. Later it was discovered the jet blast angle had blown part of the perimeter road back along the runway.
Without going into the why's and wherefore's of not spotting BOTH N1's being lower than tabulated, my fear while observing the last few seconds was the danger of the PF (the copilot) suddenly rejecting the take off of his own volition at about the same time we all realised the danger of the captain aborting for the same reason.
There is much more to this story as there always is, but any abort by either pilot under those specific circumstances would have been disaster as the 737 would have been smashed against the rocks that were the seawall.
In our case, both the captain and first officer were highly experienced. But the real risk would have been a cadet with a basic type rating and 250 total hours and as PF, calling STOP and aborting before the captain could prevent an irrevocable action.
The statistical chances of both engines simultaneously being effected by a dual Pt2 sensor blockage during a take off on a runway limited take off is minute - but it happened that dark night.
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If the FO can't call stop what is he doing there. Let's make it a single crew operation and make it easier for everyone. If your company training is so poor that a professional pilot can't make a Stop/Decision maybe there's a need for an overhaul in your trg dept.
The operator for whom I presently work requires anyone in the cockpit (Captain, First Officer, or FE) to call out the malfunction loud and clear. The captain makes the decision to reject the takeoff. There is no "stop" call. (In fact, I've never heard it used in any company for whom I've worked, or training I've undergone).
If the captain is performing the takeoff and elects to reject (in accordance with the prebriefed criteria for the takeoff), then the captain rejects. The flight engineer backs him up on the reverse and speed brake lever. The first officer notes the airspeed (for brake energy calculations later) and notifies the tower that the takeoff is being rejected.
If the first officer is performing the takeoff and the captain elects to reject, the captain takes the controls while announcing the reject. The flight engineer backs him up on the reverse and speed brake lever. The first officer notes the airspeed (for brake energy calculations later)and notifies the tower that the takeoff is being rejected.
If the captain is performing the takeoff and the captain elects not to reject, the captain continues flying the airplane. If an engine failure has occurred, the captain proceeds to fly the engine-out profile. As soon as practical, the captain will usually turn the airplane over to the first officer to fly, in order that the captain can work with the flight engineer in addressing the problem.
If the first officer is performing the takeoff and the captain elects not to reject, the first officer continues flying the airplane. If an engine failure has occurred, the first officer proceeds to fly the engine-out profile, as briefed.
When an abnormality occurrs on the runway, we either continue or reject the takeoff. There's no "reject" call, other than the captain announcing that he's rejecting the takeoff. Any malfunctions are called out loud and clear, but in general terms. When the engine fails close to V1, we don't care if it's #1 or #4; the gist of it will be apparent through the necessary footwork, so the call is simply "Engine Failure."
Generally the brief is conducted along the lines of "We will consider rejecting the takeoff for any problem under 80 knots. Between 80 knots and V1 we will reject only for engine fire, failure, or loss of directional control, an outward opening door, or anything which brings the ability of the airplane to fly into question."
Given that rejecting a takeoff, especially when heavy, can be one of the most dangerous acts one can attempt during the flight, the responsibility to make that call and take that action for us rests with the same person who assumes the ultimate responsibility for the airplane and the safe outcome of the flight; the PIC. The first officer does not instruct the captain to reject and the first officer does not make the call. The first officer calls out the malfunction, but the captain decides what to do about it. Much of the time, especially approaching V1, the decision will be to let the first officer fly it off, and then handle it in the air.
Originally Posted by SNS3Guppy
We will consider rejecting the takeoff for any problem under 80 knots. Between 80 knots and V1 we will reject only for engine fire, failure, or loss of directional control, an outward opening door, or anything which brings the ability of the airplane to fly into question.
In my current company the decision to reject lies only with the captain. Any failure will be announced, captain will decide and either call 'Reject' or 'Go' (and assume control in case of reject).
> 80kts we will only reject for: engine failure, ANY fire, aircraft unsafe/unable to fly or predictive windshear warning (not windshear caution).
In my previous company, where I was type rated, first officers were also trained to decide and perform a rejected takeoff. If F/O was the PF, he would be PF untill airplane stopped, thereafter change to Capt/F/O area's of responsibility. Worked fine that way and in my opinion prepares the pilot in a better way for his transition to the left seat.
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Interesting. Could you explain why you don't reject for a cargo fire warning, or cockpit full of smoke? But you will reject for an 'outward opening door' ?
You might have missed the crucial, all-encompassing...
or anything which brings the ability of the airplane to fly into question.
Ok. Could you then explain why to reject 20kts below V1 for an opening door? I personally think that you should not reject in this event, so I find it interesting to hear your thoughts about it.
The reject for an 'unsafe to fly' aircraft is just to cover anything unexpected and therefore I agree that it might be better to leave this decision with the captain.
The reject for an 'unsafe to fly' aircraft is just to cover anything unexpected and therefore I agree that it might be better to leave this decision with the captain.
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Reivilo...now you're back to square one...who decides what condition(s) make the A/C "unsafe to fly"?
Captain's decision, period...not some 250 hr "cadet"...
Captain's decision, period...not some 250 hr "cadet"...
Not true. I've flown a couple of different airplanes which included an FE (Flight Engineer).
but by including that qualifier---it totally destroys the timing and rhythm of my joke
I still think ideally other flight crew members call the failure and the captain shall decide the RTO---a seasoned professional FO will have no trouble with that,..if you upgrade then you'll get your chance to practice RTOs
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Ok. Could you then explain why to reject 20kts below V1 for an opening door? I personally think that you should not reject in this event, so I find it interesting to hear your thoughts about it.
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I should have been clearer judging by the above remark. Yes - the pre-flight briefing on the subject of tyre burst ramifications was discussed carefully.
A couple of accident reports that covered tyre burst events was given to the "students" to read the day before the sim trip.
The FCTM coverage of below and above 80 knots reject policy was discussed.
In the simulator the students were told that around 20 knots below V1 that they would get a tyre failure of the left outboard tyre and could expect a slight pull to the left and lots of airframe vibration.
It was a training exercise not a testing exercise and they knew it. If with all that preparation and knowledge of exactly what was going to happen, I believe that most people would accept the instructor could not do much more to help the students learn?
A couple of accident reports that covered tyre burst events was given to the "students" to read the day before the sim trip.
The FCTM coverage of below and above 80 knots reject policy was discussed.
In the simulator the students were told that around 20 knots below V1 that they would get a tyre failure of the left outboard tyre and could expect a slight pull to the left and lots of airframe vibration.
It was a training exercise not a testing exercise and they knew it. If with all that preparation and knowledge of exactly what was going to happen, I believe that most people would accept the instructor could not do much more to help the students learn?
My real concern would be the impact of them reading your comments on here as I'm pretty sure they would recognise the scenario. As a professional instructor I wouldn't feel it appropriate to post specifics on an open forum. But that might just be me being overly sensitive!
Reivilo: United Airlines, B747, ex Honolulu - forward cargo door opened then DETACHED in the climb. Many passengers in their seats sucked out of the aircraft, some going through the inboard engine. Subsequent two-engined approach completed with much skill by the crew despite severe control problems. Usually quoted on CRM courses.
Listen and learn from your elders!!
Listen and learn from your elders!!
Thanks Meikleour. I have ofcourse heard about this accident, but I was in the understanding that the aircraft was pressurized when the door opened in flight, which is why the passengers were sucked out. During takeoff the cabin is only slightly pressurized but the force wouldn't be strong enough to suck everything out, or would it?
Ofcourse I want to learn, thats why I ask a question! Whats wrong with that? Maybe you have misinterpreted my post where I initially ask my question and thereafter you start flaming on me, just because I'm not an 'experienced elderly' guy like you. I apologise for that and now I will bang my head on the table three times as a punishment.
Ofcourse I want to learn, thats why I ask a question! Whats wrong with that? Maybe you have misinterpreted my post where I initially ask my question and thereafter you start flaming on me, just because I'm not an 'experienced elderly' guy like you. I apologise for that and now I will bang my head on the table three times as a punishment.
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I'm assuming most of the contributers here fly for outfits with very junior F/O's. The F/O's in the company I work for average about 8000 hrs with many 1000's on heavy jets. If these guys are incapable of making such a simple judgment as when to reject then they should never get there commands anyway. After 13 yrs in the right seat of B737 or B744 are you going to wake up one day with a magical understanding of energy management.
Train your crews properly people. Allowing a PROFESSIONAL F/O to call the STOP is not reliquishing your command. On a long haul flight the Capt spends a 1/3 of it sleeping in the bunk whilst trusting his Snr F/O to make sound decisions in the event of ANY emergency.
I would like to see the stats on Stop/Go incidents and compare the two philosophies and see if there is any safety advantage of one over the other.
DH
Train your crews properly people. Allowing a PROFESSIONAL F/O to call the STOP is not reliquishing your command. On a long haul flight the Capt spends a 1/3 of it sleeping in the bunk whilst trusting his Snr F/O to make sound decisions in the event of ANY emergency.
I would like to see the stats on Stop/Go incidents and compare the two philosophies and see if there is any safety advantage of one over the other.
DH
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8000 hours, halve that and you will still have more total time than a Captain and FO combined for many low cost airlines.
Easyjet's policy once allowed the FO to reject. After a few unnecessary and very exciting RTO's they reverted to the manufacturers guidelines.
No matter how well you train someone you can't give them experience.
Easyjet's policy once allowed the FO to reject. After a few unnecessary and very exciting RTO's they reverted to the manufacturers guidelines.
No matter how well you train someone you can't give them experience.
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The big problem with tapping the Captain on the shoulder at V1-10kts and saying 'excuse me Sir, we have a cargo door open' is obvious.
Time, I think, to chuck in the BA 737 that aborted (V1=Vr) on an F/O's take-off when the Captain said 'Stop' instead of 'rotate'.
. That should get the righteous fired up here.............
Time, I think, to chuck in the BA 737 that aborted (V1=Vr) on an F/O's take-off when the Captain said 'Stop' instead of 'rotate'.
. That should get the righteous fired up here.............
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Time, I think, to chuck in the BA 737 that aborted (V1=Vr) on an F/O's take-off when the Captain said 'Stop' instead of 'rotate'
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Generally the brief is conducted along the lines of "We will consider rejecting the takeoff for any problem under 80 knots. Between 80 knots and V1 we will reject only for engine fire, failure, or loss of directional control, an outward opening door, or anything which brings the ability of the airplane to fly into question."
Most places in my experience say "We will stop for anything up to 80Kt".
Then they say that between 80Kt and V1 they will stop for a very short list of critical items.
Most people posting here seem to think that there is some timme for considering what is happening and making a considered decision as to stop or continue.
There isn't. That is why the list of items for which the aircraft will be stopped between 80Kt and V1 is very clear.
Let's think about the following - The Captain is pilot flying anbd at V1-10 the FO shouts "Engine" or perhaps "Engine problem" or perhaps "High EGT".
Does it really matter what they shout? Who is going to stop lookoing outside to check the engine indications?
I am sure that 80% would safely continue to look out side and stop the aircraft on the runway. The next 15% would get airbourne (or try to) with an engine failure well prior to V1 and the last 5% would look inside the "consider" what is happening and run off the side of the runway while accelerating!!
Think of it - you are flying the aircraft. You have a colleague who is qualified to be there on your right and who you have clearly brief what will cause the aircraft to be stopped between 80Kt and V1. provided that they shout loudly about a failure are you ever going to do anything other than stop (unless it isunsafe to do so)? and if so then would it be any different if they used "stop" rather than some possible list of words that you may not hear correctly?
This topic comes up again and again here and it is well worth reading other related topics here and elsewhere eg the one about Captains refusing to let the FO be PF on the required legs. If one does then one will see that there are quite a few people who clearly prefer to operate as single crew even when they type is required to operate multi crew.
Finally, I have to say that referring to a qualified and rated pilot as "a cadet" is simply going to cause problems again and again because people like that tend to be the ones that find;
1 The FO let's them sink before stepping in to save the day
2 The refueler always seems to take a bit longer when they see who the Captain is
3. The handling agent / dispatcher always takes some extra time before releasing the flight
4. The cabin crew leave the row zero passengers to starve and dehydrate