The executive word STOP yelled by a 500 hour copilot would frighten the hell out of me. Thank goodness the company I flew with would not have a bar of that policy.
I was jump seating on a 737-200 taking off at night from a 5600 ft length runway on a Central Pacific atoll. The over-run area was a cliff less than 30 metres from the end of the runway. Max thrust used because we were runway length limited.
We did not know when it happened but both engine Pt2 inlet sensors were totally blocked by debris from dust from a nearby phosphate works. Remember the Potomac crash where ice blocked the Pt2 sensors and the 737 got airborne and hit a bridge and crashed into the Potomac River.
The crew of our aircraft set max EPR and although the equivalent N1 was tabulated we never noticed that both N1 were down by around 10 percent from expected. But the EPR needles and digital readout showed exactly 2.18 EPR as expected.
It was only when the realisation hit that with just a few runway lights to go, we were still 10 knots below V1 and no hope ever of aborting safely, that the captain realised the danger and slammed the thrust levers forward against the full power stop and rotated quickly 10 knots below VR. Later it was discovered the jet blast angle had blown part of the perimeter road back along the runway.
Without going into the why's and wherefore's of not spotting BOTH N1's being lower than tabulated, my fear while observing the last few seconds was the danger of the PF (the copilot) suddenly rejecting the take off of his own volition at about the same time we all realised the danger of the captain aborting for the same reason.
There is much more to this story as there always is, but any abort by either pilot under those specific circumstances would have been disaster as the 737 would have been smashed against the rocks that were the seawall.
In our case, both the captain and first officer were highly experienced. But the real risk would have been a cadet with a basic type rating and 250 total hours and as PF, calling STOP and aborting before the captain could prevent an irrevocable action.
The statistical chances of both engines simultaneously being effected by a dual Pt2 sensor blockage during a take off on a runway limited take off is minute - but it happened that dark night.