AF 447 Search to resume
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gums, this is a 1992 airplane so presume technology on it is 1985-ish in nature. The cheap and accurate toys we have today were unobtanium back then.
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BJ-ENG, figure the tail section hits the water. Is it going to show the same ability to push into the water that the fuselage would? If not, what happens? The tail is pushed up relative to the fuselage. The nose of the VS can't easily go down. So the VS is pried loose from its mountings. The first thing it does is fly upwards, maybe a little forwards.
The actuator arm hints that as the VS came off the plane the rudder was off to one side at least somewhat. So the wind catches it and it's pushed backwards relative to the plane. The plane hits the water and doesn't stop its forward motion instantly. The VS flipped into the air will stop rather suddenly as it turns in the air and wind above the plane. I picture it flipping upwards, twisting like a playing card tossed into the air, and falling behind the plane by anything from a few feet to several dozen feet by the time it hits the water.
That would easily account for no dings on the VS, its unfortunate "nose job" at the front, and the particular damage to the mounts.
I don't see it "breaking off" from momentum or sideways pressure. I see it being pried off by the separation of the tail from the fuselage in a relative rotation upwards as the tail peals away from the pressure vessel rotating around a point a little aft of the VS's nose.
Edit: Of course, it's not as if I haven't been trying to explain this hear for the better part of two years now.... {^_-}
{^_^}
The actuator arm hints that as the VS came off the plane the rudder was off to one side at least somewhat. So the wind catches it and it's pushed backwards relative to the plane. The plane hits the water and doesn't stop its forward motion instantly. The VS flipped into the air will stop rather suddenly as it turns in the air and wind above the plane. I picture it flipping upwards, twisting like a playing card tossed into the air, and falling behind the plane by anything from a few feet to several dozen feet by the time it hits the water.
That would easily account for no dings on the VS, its unfortunate "nose job" at the front, and the particular damage to the mounts.
I don't see it "breaking off" from momentum or sideways pressure. I see it being pried off by the separation of the tail from the fuselage in a relative rotation upwards as the tail peals away from the pressure vessel rotating around a point a little aft of the VS's nose.
Edit: Of course, it's not as if I haven't been trying to explain this hear for the better part of two years now.... {^_-}
{^_^}
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ACLS65, if the tail was ever submerged any great distance, say on the bottom, it'd never come up. It's strength, as I understand it, is from its more or less honeycomb structure. The tremendous pressure deep underwater would mash the honeycomb and leave it looking like a ripply flat ghost of its former self.
Even at 100' the structure would begin to crack and take on water, a feature that would have shown in its attitude before it was picked up. And it would show as surface blemishes.
{^_^}
Even at 100' the structure would begin to crack and take on water, a feature that would have shown in its attitude before it was picked up. And it would show as surface blemishes.
{^_^}
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Chris Scott, did I miss something here? When did we learn the precise point of impact? That's more important than LKP. And it's beginning to sound to me like people are presuming the point of impact equals the LKP. BEA hinted that's not so with a verbal wave "less than 10 nm thataway." (Or the French equivalent.)
So we can't talk anything about drift.
{^_^}
So we can't talk anything about drift.
{^_^}
JD-EE,
I am NOT assuming that LKP and sea-level impact are necessarily even in close proximity. If some "people are presuming the point of impact equals the LKP", as you suggest, I am not among them.
Quote:
"So we can't talk anything about drift."
Quite: the only "drift" calculation I've posted is what I called the "29-hour voyage" of the fin-rudder assembly between June 6 & 7.
We still don't have a very good idea of the sea-bed impact position, and certainly not of the sea-level impact position. See wes wall's comment.
As far as I know, the only indication the BEA has given is in their Presentation at a Press Conference on 4 April 2011:
http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....4avril2011.pdf
... in the form of a small map on Page 8. This points a large, but sharp-headed arrow at a point just under 10 km NNE of the LKP, which point it refers to as the "Accident Site (in the area of the abyssal plain)".
This "accident site" is presumably their indication of the approximate position of the debris field.
If the BEA's arrow is intended to be taken literally, it seems odd that they don't simply publish the Lat/Long: anyone capable of sailing to the area would be well able to infer the position from that map. That's why I'm disinclined to take it at face value.
Chris
I am NOT assuming that LKP and sea-level impact are necessarily even in close proximity. If some "people are presuming the point of impact equals the LKP", as you suggest, I am not among them.
Quote:
"So we can't talk anything about drift."
Quite: the only "drift" calculation I've posted is what I called the "29-hour voyage" of the fin-rudder assembly between June 6 & 7.
We still don't have a very good idea of the sea-bed impact position, and certainly not of the sea-level impact position. See wes wall's comment.
As far as I know, the only indication the BEA has given is in their Presentation at a Press Conference on 4 April 2011:
http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....4avril2011.pdf
... in the form of a small map on Page 8. This points a large, but sharp-headed arrow at a point just under 10 km NNE of the LKP, which point it refers to as the "Accident Site (in the area of the abyssal plain)".
This "accident site" is presumably their indication of the approximate position of the debris field.
If the BEA's arrow is intended to be taken literally, it seems odd that they don't simply publish the Lat/Long: anyone capable of sailing to the area would be well able to infer the position from that map. That's why I'm disinclined to take it at face value.
Chris
This was my attempt to plot various things on google maps.
The centre aircraft icon is LKP. (The yellow circle behind it is the top of a yellow google maps marker). There is also an aircraft position at 2:00 I have estimated from BEA report, plus the estimated location of the rejected ADS-C.
The red zone around the LKP is my rough attempt to sketch Metron's "red" (most probable) zone from fig 33 of their report. I have marked the estimated northmost point with a purple pin to do that drawing.
The purple pins are the bounds of the circle of Metron's analysis area.
The red triangle is the first sighted location of the VS - June 7 2009 at 13h38.
The red cross is an APPROXIMATE wreckage location corresponding to the abyssal plain and the arrow in the BEA report. It is almost certainly not the actual location.
Body and debris locations taken from the phase 3 search zone working group report. I have not included all the bodies after the first few - it did not add much to the analysis.
Keep in mind:
fwiw, my take is that the VS and bodies started from the same position in the water and drifted at about the same rate and almost the same direction. They have diverged little after about 5 days. Hence VS on until impact.
The centre aircraft icon is LKP. (The yellow circle behind it is the top of a yellow google maps marker). There is also an aircraft position at 2:00 I have estimated from BEA report, plus the estimated location of the rejected ADS-C.
The red zone around the LKP is my rough attempt to sketch Metron's "red" (most probable) zone from fig 33 of their report. I have marked the estimated northmost point with a purple pin to do that drawing.
The purple pins are the bounds of the circle of Metron's analysis area.
The red triangle is the first sighted location of the VS - June 7 2009 at 13h38.
The red cross is an APPROXIMATE wreckage location corresponding to the abyssal plain and the arrow in the BEA report. It is almost certainly not the actual location.
Body and debris locations taken from the phase 3 search zone working group report. I have not included all the bodies after the first few - it did not add much to the analysis.
Keep in mind:
- the first bodies were found at June 6 2009 at 11h55
- Body E1 (sighted) June 7 2009 at 9h11
- Vertical fin (sighted) June 7 2009 at 13h38
fwiw, my take is that the VS and bodies started from the same position in the water and drifted at about the same rate and almost the same direction. They have diverged little after about 5 days. Hence VS on until impact.
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Chris Scott;
I don't think that getting into semantics about where and when the V/S was at any given time is going to help matters much at this time. My opinion on the published sighting position is (like some others I come across) that it has suffered from transcription errors. Using that assumption, I believe that the most likely sighting position was 3.41°N 30.62°W, and the recovered position was 3.47°N 30.68°W which is 305°T x 4.5NM from the earlier position. That gives a drift rate of 4.5 x 1852 = 8334m / (29 x 60 x 60) = 8cm/sec in little or no wind, so will equate closely to the current over the period. Is this plausible? Probably better than possibly.
LKP 2°58.8'N 30°35.4'W
V/S ...sighted June 6 @ 13h38 @ 3.61°N 30.62°W (Brazilian)
V/S recovered June 7 @ 18h35 @ 3.47°N 30.68°W (Brazilian)
V/S ...sighted June 6 @ 13h38 @ 3.61°N 30.62°W (Brazilian)
V/S recovered June 7 @ 18h35 @ 3.47°N 30.68°W (Brazilian)
mm43,
Oh dear, so you think the reported (sighting) posn of the VS on June 6 was 0.2deg latitude (12nm) north of where it actually was. I did wonder how accurate it might be, but certainly didn't suspect as big an error as 12nm.
Can't get the staff... 
You seem confident, so hope your transcription-error decode proves to be correct.
auraflyer,
No time to study your nice map tonight, but notice you report VS sighting as June 7. Should that be June 6? Also, you will now see mm43's reservation of its Latitude accuracy.
Oh dear, so you think the reported (sighting) posn of the VS on June 6 was 0.2deg latitude (12nm) north of where it actually was. I did wonder how accurate it might be, but certainly didn't suspect as big an error as 12nm.
Can't get the staff... You seem confident, so hope your transcription-error decode proves to be correct.
auraflyer,
No time to study your nice map tonight, but notice you report VS sighting as June 7. Should that be June 6? Also, you will now see mm43's reservation of its Latitude accuracy.
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I heard from someone close to inquiry that BEA have located the wrekage that should contain the recorders, and have also located the main passenger compartments, but main fusleage is broken into a few pieces. Pictures of this have been witheld for obvious reasons. So the recorders should be in Paris soon.
PJ2:
AA586 is not the only example of an aircraft loss after the VS was lost in flight. The B757 involved in the midair collision over Switzerland a few years ago had it's VS removed in the collision but was otherwise intact. The crew flew on for a while but ultimately lost control and crashed. In modern swept wing transport aircraft, yaw damping is provided through the rudder and directional stability by the vertical stabilizer. Loss of both would soon lead to uncontrollable roll/yaw oscillation, ie Dutch roll. The fact that the AF engines were found with the main wreckage would seem to indicate that they were with the aircraft at impact. If the VS and rudder had come off in flight, it might be expected that they would been found some distance away, as the kind of lateral forces which detached the AA586 engines would have occured in this case also.
AA586 is not the only example of an aircraft loss after the VS was lost in flight. The B757 involved in the midair collision over Switzerland a few years ago had it's VS removed in the collision but was otherwise intact. The crew flew on for a while but ultimately lost control and crashed. In modern swept wing transport aircraft, yaw damping is provided through the rudder and directional stability by the vertical stabilizer. Loss of both would soon lead to uncontrollable roll/yaw oscillation, ie Dutch roll. The fact that the AF engines were found with the main wreckage would seem to indicate that they were with the aircraft at impact. If the VS and rudder had come off in flight, it might be expected that they would been found some distance away, as the kind of lateral forces which detached the AA586 engines would have occured in this case also.
777fly;
Thanks...I obviously hadn't recalled the exact circumstances in that collision although I certainly recall the outfall.
For practical purposes the point is made, that a swept-wing transport will not survive the loss of the entire VS using the only remaining controls available to the crew, differential thrust and possibly very judicious and patient use of small bank angles, and this, to be sure, does not begin to address the problems created by the swift loss of all three hydraulic systems, (for which, it has been pointed out, ACARS messages would exist in some form).
No matter at which point in the descent from FL350 to the sea, any crew response that could maintain some semblance of controlled flight would require enormous discipline and concentration and some luck.
Maintaining controlled flight may be logically possible under such loss as is theorized, but I think, highly improbable, especially under the circumstances faced by the crew.
Re-focussing - How they got there is THE question that requires an answer because loss of airspeed does not, in and of itself, result in loss of control.
I think we are left with explaining how the aircraft went from stable M0.82 flight, through a loss of airspeed data, to a high-speed vertical impact with the sea, with the aircraft intact.
The commentary regarding the Ile de Sein's and the Phoenix Remora 6000's capabilities provides the best hope of finding out and short of that, the photographs and whatever is brought to the surface for traditional accident investigation techniques.
PJ2
Thanks...I obviously hadn't recalled the exact circumstances in that collision although I certainly recall the outfall.
For practical purposes the point is made, that a swept-wing transport will not survive the loss of the entire VS using the only remaining controls available to the crew, differential thrust and possibly very judicious and patient use of small bank angles, and this, to be sure, does not begin to address the problems created by the swift loss of all three hydraulic systems, (for which, it has been pointed out, ACARS messages would exist in some form).
No matter at which point in the descent from FL350 to the sea, any crew response that could maintain some semblance of controlled flight would require enormous discipline and concentration and some luck.
Maintaining controlled flight may be logically possible under such loss as is theorized, but I think, highly improbable, especially under the circumstances faced by the crew.
Re-focussing - How they got there is THE question that requires an answer because loss of airspeed does not, in and of itself, result in loss of control.
I think we are left with explaining how the aircraft went from stable M0.82 flight, through a loss of airspeed data, to a high-speed vertical impact with the sea, with the aircraft intact.
The commentary regarding the Ile de Sein's and the Phoenix Remora 6000's capabilities provides the best hope of finding out and short of that, the photographs and whatever is brought to the surface for traditional accident investigation techniques.
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 22nd Apr 2011 at 05:12. Reason: Removal of some comments
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Quoting the 2002 Überlingen mid-air collision WIKKI article regarding the DHL 757 that had lost the VS, 2002 Überlingen mid-air collision - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
777fly's comment is most appropriate.
This adds additional weight to the "AF447 VS was on at impact" explanation by BEA. Once we see some sort of chart of wreckage location on the sea floor, we will all know for sure.
It boggles my mind how some participants in this forum continue to seize on loss of the VS as the likely cause of the AF447 accident. Loss of the VS in-flight is probably the most discussed concept in this thread.
This single-mindedness is not an asset and detracts from other explorations.
Each engine ended up several hundred metres away from the main wreckage
"The fact that the AF engines were found with the main wreckage would seem to indicate that they were with the aircraft at impact. If the VS and rudder had come off in flight, it might be expected that they would been found some distance away, as the kind of lateral forces which detached the AA586 engines would have occured in this case also.
It boggles my mind how some participants in this forum continue to seize on loss of the VS as the likely cause of the AF447 accident. Loss of the VS in-flight is probably the most discussed concept in this thread.
This single-mindedness is not an asset and detracts from other explorations.
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Lets hope the recorders will be found. It will however be a real shame if the recorders are found to be inop as a result of exposure to pressure/seawater beyond the design spec.
Is it a all or nothing deal with the data on the recorders?
Is it a all or nothing deal with the data on the recorders?
ventus45...
Yes indeed. If we accept BEA's view of the likley impact sequence, that outcome is certainly in the area of "possible" as opposed to "unlikely."
Depends very much on whether they are lying (buried) within, or very close to, the rest of the debirs field.
I am optimistic (as are others I have spoken with) -- but certainly not confident.
Yes of course.
Could it be, that both recorders separated from their mounts, or more likely, that their mounts separated from the local strucure, such that the recorders sank to the ocean floor as small dense packages, and may by now have sunk into the mud ?
If so, what chance of locating them if they are not visible ?
Given the forces involved, what real confidence is there that the recorders were able to remain whole anyway ?
Could we be in a situation, where they are not able to be found, and even if they are, that they are themselves so disrupted by impact forces and subsequent pressure effects that no useful data is recoverable ?
Last edited by grizzled; 22nd Apr 2011 at 06:30.
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As fatal aircraft accidents go, AF447 was one of the more 'gentle' ones. There was no rock-like surface to break the recorder shells, only other aircraft structure. The pressure is a real concern as is the duration on the bottom.
It is very likely that the fuselage broke around the door opening areas judging from the floating wreckage recovered, thus the area forward of the aft pressure bulkhead probably no longer forms an enclosure.
Similarly, the lower skin aft of the rear pressure bulkhead was likely sheared as a result of hydrodynamic forces and uneven support of the skins in the area plus the removal of the "roof" of the compartment when the VS was torn away and the HS was almost certainly torn away too, so it is likely the recorders made an independent trip to the bottom.
The difficulty in locating the pingers suggests that they were buried in the sea bottom to some extent.
I expect that the recovery team will grab what is left of the tail and check it out only to find it missing its recorders. That is when wreckage distribution theory will come into play.
Once located, the recorders condition determines what will be necessary to get them functional. If they are still dry inside, the probability of data recovery is very high. If flooded, data recovery is still possible, but will probably require the manufacturer's assistance to have a chance of reading data.
I believe that the data resides on an array of static RAM chips of some type but feel free to correct me.
It is very likely that the fuselage broke around the door opening areas judging from the floating wreckage recovered, thus the area forward of the aft pressure bulkhead probably no longer forms an enclosure.
Similarly, the lower skin aft of the rear pressure bulkhead was likely sheared as a result of hydrodynamic forces and uneven support of the skins in the area plus the removal of the "roof" of the compartment when the VS was torn away and the HS was almost certainly torn away too, so it is likely the recorders made an independent trip to the bottom.
The difficulty in locating the pingers suggests that they were buried in the sea bottom to some extent.
I expect that the recovery team will grab what is left of the tail and check it out only to find it missing its recorders. That is when wreckage distribution theory will come into play.
Once located, the recorders condition determines what will be necessary to get them functional. If they are still dry inside, the probability of data recovery is very high. If flooded, data recovery is still possible, but will probably require the manufacturer's assistance to have a chance of reading data.
I believe that the data resides on an array of static RAM chips of some type but feel free to correct me.
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I find it interesting that of the 100,000 photos the BEA claims to have taken that they only chose to release less than a dozen.
Really, are there human remains in 99,988+ photos that therefore restrict disclosure?
Really... The recovered pieces and released photographs do not show the type of low level destruction of the Afriquiyah accident.
Really, are there human remains in 99,988+ photos that therefore restrict disclosure?
Really... The recovered pieces and released photographs do not show the type of low level destruction of the Afriquiyah accident.
Machinbird;
I would not want to criticize theories if they are developing and/or promising, but if someone believes something strongly, in this context there is the requirement for substantiation.
Determining that the VS was attached at impact takes the examination of this accident in one direction, and assuming the VS was lost at altitude takes it in another. That is why it has been a constant source of discussion between contributors.
If the problems with the VS-loss theory were addressed such that the evidence of the recovered wreckage and the photographs were accounted for, I don't think anyone would resist the notion.
However, a number of contributors have provided sufficient opportunity to demonstrate the validity of the theory against specific objections, and have found no response.
The idea isn't to shut down a path of thought but to test a line of thought against serious objections. That is the way investigations are done. The theory must make sense. If the evidence does not support a line of thinking, the thinking must change or it becomes irrelevant to the investigation.
I think using what we have and our imagination to consider how an aircraft cruising at M0.82, ended up in a high-velocity vertical fall, is the most important question to consider.
I believe that examining everything after 0135, (INTOL) is important. I think the fact that the crew did not respond to DAKAR's request for their TASIL estimate is significant.
I'm sure others here will have been in similar situations, but in the initial contact from VHF to HF, there is a routine process. For a few moments, waypoint passage is a busy time, recording passage on the flight plan, checking the track and distance for the next leg, confirming ETA for the next waypoint, observing/recording fuel, preparing (tuning) the HF for transmission, making contact with the HF, (dealing with the CPDLC log-on issue in this case), providing position and estimates again on HF and doing the SELCAL check and responding that the SELCAL checks, (or repeating the check if it doesn't work first time) are all routine procedures.
But after the initial contact, the crew didn't respond to three requests for a TASIL (the FIR Boundary) estimate from DAKAR, (and then DAKAR gave up!). I am wondering if the process was interrupted by something and if so, what?
I think things began to develop before the loss of airspeed, and were compounded by the loss of airspeed in a situation they were already wrestling with, (was the radar on and were they using it to best effectiveness?). These are the questions that I believe will help us understand what happened around 0210.
Clearly to those who have stuck with and read the thread, none of this is original. But it is an attempt to provide focus on what occurred at FL350 after INTOL.
PJ2
It boggles my mind how some participants in this forum continue to seize on loss of the VS as the likely cause of the AF447 accident.
Determining that the VS was attached at impact takes the examination of this accident in one direction, and assuming the VS was lost at altitude takes it in another. That is why it has been a constant source of discussion between contributors.
If the problems with the VS-loss theory were addressed such that the evidence of the recovered wreckage and the photographs were accounted for, I don't think anyone would resist the notion.
However, a number of contributors have provided sufficient opportunity to demonstrate the validity of the theory against specific objections, and have found no response.
The idea isn't to shut down a path of thought but to test a line of thought against serious objections. That is the way investigations are done. The theory must make sense. If the evidence does not support a line of thinking, the thinking must change or it becomes irrelevant to the investigation.
I think using what we have and our imagination to consider how an aircraft cruising at M0.82, ended up in a high-velocity vertical fall, is the most important question to consider.
I believe that examining everything after 0135, (INTOL) is important. I think the fact that the crew did not respond to DAKAR's request for their TASIL estimate is significant.
I'm sure others here will have been in similar situations, but in the initial contact from VHF to HF, there is a routine process. For a few moments, waypoint passage is a busy time, recording passage on the flight plan, checking the track and distance for the next leg, confirming ETA for the next waypoint, observing/recording fuel, preparing (tuning) the HF for transmission, making contact with the HF, (dealing with the CPDLC log-on issue in this case), providing position and estimates again on HF and doing the SELCAL check and responding that the SELCAL checks, (or repeating the check if it doesn't work first time) are all routine procedures.
But after the initial contact, the crew didn't respond to three requests for a TASIL (the FIR Boundary) estimate from DAKAR, (and then DAKAR gave up!). I am wondering if the process was interrupted by something and if so, what?
I think things began to develop before the loss of airspeed, and were compounded by the loss of airspeed in a situation they were already wrestling with, (was the radar on and were they using it to best effectiveness?). These are the questions that I believe will help us understand what happened around 0210.
Clearly to those who have stuck with and read the thread, none of this is original. But it is an attempt to provide focus on what occurred at FL350 after INTOL.
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 22nd Apr 2011 at 06:28. Reason: spelling
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It boggles my mind how some participants in this forum continue to seize on loss of the VS as the likely cause of the AF447 accident. Loss of the VS in-flight is probably the most discussed concept in this thread.
This single-mindedness is not an asset and detracts from other explorations.
This single-mindedness is not an asset and detracts from other explorations.
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Originally posted by PJ2 ...
I believe that examining everything after 0135, (INTOL) is important. I think the fact that the crew did not respond to DAKAR's request for their TASIL estimate is significant.
I believe that examining everything after 0135, (INTOL) is important. I think the fact that the crew did not respond to DAKAR's request for their TASIL estimate is significant.
The only time that DAKAR got directly involved in this flight is after after the a/c had passed INTOL and ATLANTICO passed them the a Virtual Flight Plan by AFTN when DAKAR advised they didn't have a Flight Plan for AF447. From memory I believe they had received it but the call-sign was entered into the system incorrectly, and as a result the ADS-C failed to allow the log-on due by 0200z.
DAKARs later involvement was "after the fact".
That ATLANTIO didn't follow-up on their 3 requests for a TASIL estimate by SELCALing the a/c has at this junction of the investigation not been questioned by the BEA, other than noting it as a matter of record. Neither did ATLANTICO attempt to contact the a/c at either SALPU or ORARO, waypoints for which times had been given by AF447.
