AF 447 Search to resume
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aguadalte,
The report is nowhere to be found on the BEA site, but PBL put a copy of it on his site :
Rapport Préliminaire A-330 Toulouse 1994
No known english version.
The report is nowhere to be found on the BEA site, but PBL put a copy of it on his site :
Rapport Préliminaire A-330 Toulouse 1994
No known english version.
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Thanks NeoFit.
I "new" the causes of that accident. My problem is to figure out (despite of being deviating from this thread's theme, for which I apologize) what was done by Airbus Industrie (as recommended by the BEA) to correct or at least to call the attention of the operators for that apparent "protections lost" during ALT*.
Regards,
V.F.
I "new" the causes of that accident. My problem is to figure out (despite of being deviating from this thread's theme, for which I apologize) what was done by Airbus Industrie (as recommended by the BEA) to correct or at least to call the attention of the operators for that apparent "protections lost" during ALT*.
Regards,
V.F.
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Only 2 facts:
2008, Airbus ACA story
AF447 - the Air Caraibes story and more on pitot tubes - Unusual Attitude
and october 2008 QT72
Aircrew Buzz: Qantas Flight QF72 Emergency Landing at Learmonth, Australia
Serious Injuries on a Qantas A330 on 7 October 2008
MEDIA RELEASE : 14 October 2008 - Qantas Airbus A330 accident Media Conference
(Notice: also same event for Australian B777).
Eight or nine (small) similar AF occurencies since 2008
What had be done?
This is a copy of:
Sam Juil 17, 2010 18:44
Easy!
2008, Airbus ACA story
AF447 - the Air Caraibes story and more on pitot tubes - Unusual Attitude
and october 2008 QT72
Aircrew Buzz: Qantas Flight QF72 Emergency Landing at Learmonth, Australia
Serious Injuries on a Qantas A330 on 7 October 2008
MEDIA RELEASE : 14 October 2008 - Qantas Airbus A330 accident Media Conference
(Notice: also same event for Australian B777).
Eight or nine (small) similar AF occurencies since 2008
What had be done?
This is a copy of:
Sam Juil 17, 2010 18:44
EASA AD No.: 2009-0012-E
EASA Form 111 Page 2/3
systems, EASA AD 2008-0203-E was issued to require, in case faulty Inertial
Reference (IR) is detected, to isolate both the IR and ADR by accomplishment of
a modified Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) operational procedure.
Since that AD was issued, it has been reported that the “OFF” light did not
illuminate in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons to OFF.
Investigation has determined that the ADIRU was indeed sometimes affected by
another failure condition.
To prevent such a failure, the operational procedure has been updated to
instruct the flight crew to de-energize the ADIRU if the “OFF” light is not
illuminated after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons to OFF. Consequently,
AD 2008-0225-E, which superseded AD 2008-0203-E, required accomplishment
of the updated AFM operational procedure.
Since this second AD was issued, a new in service event has been reported
highlighting that, in some failure cases, even though the “OFF” light illuminates in
the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons to OFF, the IR could keep
providing erroneous data to other systems.
In order to address all identified failure cases, de-energizing the affected ADIRU
must be done by setting the IR mode rotary selector to OFF. Consequently, this
AD, which supersedes AD 2008-0225-E, requires accomplishment of the
updated AFM operational procedure.
Effective Date: 19 January 2009
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):
Required as indicated:
1. From the effective date of this AD, apply the following operational procedure:
- NAV - IR 1 (2) (3) FAULT
Turn off the affected IR.
Turn off the corresponding ADR.
Set the affected IR mode rotary selector to OFF.
Use AIR DATA switching as appropriate.
Use ATT HDG switching as appropriate.
- NAV - IR 1+2 (2+3) (1+3) FAULT
Note: Flight controls are in alternate law. Refer to F/CTL – ALTN LAW
(chapter 4 of the AFM)
Turn off the affected IRs.
EASA Form 111 Page 2/3
systems, EASA AD 2008-0203-E was issued to require, in case faulty Inertial
Reference (IR) is detected, to isolate both the IR and ADR by accomplishment of
a modified Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) operational procedure.
Since that AD was issued, it has been reported that the “OFF” light did not
illuminate in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons to OFF.
Investigation has determined that the ADIRU was indeed sometimes affected by
another failure condition.
To prevent such a failure, the operational procedure has been updated to
instruct the flight crew to de-energize the ADIRU if the “OFF” light is not
illuminated after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons to OFF. Consequently,
AD 2008-0225-E, which superseded AD 2008-0203-E, required accomplishment
of the updated AFM operational procedure.
Since this second AD was issued, a new in service event has been reported
highlighting that, in some failure cases, even though the “OFF” light illuminates in
the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons to OFF, the IR could keep
providing erroneous data to other systems.
In order to address all identified failure cases, de-energizing the affected ADIRU
must be done by setting the IR mode rotary selector to OFF. Consequently, this
AD, which supersedes AD 2008-0225-E, requires accomplishment of the
updated AFM operational procedure.
Effective Date: 19 January 2009
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):
Required as indicated:
1. From the effective date of this AD, apply the following operational procedure:
- NAV - IR 1 (2) (3) FAULT
Turn off the affected IR.
Turn off the corresponding ADR.
Set the affected IR mode rotary selector to OFF.
Use AIR DATA switching as appropriate.
Use ATT HDG switching as appropriate.
- NAV - IR 1+2 (2+3) (1+3) FAULT
Note: Flight controls are in alternate law. Refer to F/CTL – ALTN LAW
(chapter 4 of the AFM)
Turn off the affected IRs.
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Airbus new back-up system ?
Last news:
Airbus adopts new back-up system - Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review
What do you think about?
Airbus adopts new back-up system - Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review
What do you think about?
Last edited by NeoFit; 17th Jul 2010 at 23:08. Reason: writting mistake
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!
Hi.
When we speak about the level flight of certain AC, I do not understand where is the problem with airspeed measurement in case of emergency situation (Fail of any airspeed measurement system). We know AC type, its flight physical model, weight, altitude, air density, all performance information, stall speed etc.. So why can we just monitor pitch in level flight and calculate actual airspeed?
When we speak about the level flight of certain AC, I do not understand where is the problem with airspeed measurement in case of emergency situation (Fail of any airspeed measurement system). We know AC type, its flight physical model, weight, altitude, air density, all performance information, stall speed etc.. So why can we just monitor pitch in level flight and calculate actual airspeed?
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When we speak about the level flight of certain AC, I do not understand where is the problem with airspeed measurement in case of emergency situation (Fail of any airspeed measurement system). We know AC type, its flight physical model, weight, altitude, air density, all performance information, stall speed etc.. So why can we just monitor pitch in level flight and calculate actual airspeed?
How about going back and read the thread? You might learn something.
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This accident may have prompted a minor gold rush amongst companies devising products to enable real-time streaming of flight data. This NY Times article has details:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/bu...2blackbox.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/bu...2blackbox.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/bu...2blackbox.html
I think W.E. Deming would call this tampering, or using a special cause to make a non productive corrective action by pretending it is a trend.
From the article:
Point: only airlines that fly routes that are similar to the one Air France 447 typically flew. Most overland domestic routes have zero need for this, so the expense could not be justified. Maybe there are better places to spend a dollar or two on improving flight safety ...
That last bit made me laugh. Companies will more likely encourage pilots NOT to activate this manually, due to the increased cost.
At what point is it appropriate to treat a manned aircraft as a UAV? That is what is being proposed here, at IMNATWIO (in my not all that well informed opinion) an unjustifiable cost.
Such equipment would not have prevented AF 447 from happening as it did, but it might have helped understand how those last few minutes played out. Without resorting to emotional argument, this thread has seen discussion of a myriad of other equipment, and systems, that are already equipped that allow an aircrew to avoid terrible weather.
From the discussion here, it appears that a core contributing cause of the mishap is flying into, or too near, really bad weather that you'd usually avoid.
The data stream capability isn't the piece of equipment that helps you avoid that.
From the article:
Good point.
Does anyone who regularly flies intercontinental routes think this capability is a good idea?
Elements of this was discussed some pages back, pro and con, in context of this mishap.
I think W.E. Deming would call this tampering, or using a special cause to make a non productive corrective action by pretending it is a trend.
From the article:
The hardware itself sells for around $50,000 to $70,000 per plane, compared with $10,000 to $20,000 for a conventional black box. But for airlines, he noted, “the real cost is not the system but the phone bill.”
The sheer volume of data contained in a plane’s two black boxes — the flight data recorder, which contains 25 hours of information on the plane’s position, speed, altitude and heading; and the cockpit voice recorder, which contains the final two hours of cockpit audio — requires enormous amounts of bandwidth to transmit.
The cost to send that data via satellite can be $3 to $5 a minute.
For major airlines with hundreds of planes in their fleets, real-time streaming of flight data from takeoff to landing would cost in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually, some industry executives estimate.
The sheer volume of data contained in a plane’s two black boxes — the flight data recorder, which contains 25 hours of information on the plane’s position, speed, altitude and heading; and the cockpit voice recorder, which contains the final two hours of cockpit audio — requires enormous amounts of bandwidth to transmit.
The cost to send that data via satellite can be $3 to $5 a minute.
For major airlines with hundreds of planes in their fleets, real-time streaming of flight data from takeoff to landing would cost in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually, some industry executives estimate.
But providers are seeking to reduce the expense by allowing the airline to define which information they wish to monitor and how frequently they want it transmitted during a flight. Both the AMS and Star Navigation systems are programmed to automatically switch to live streaming after an incident or anomaly is detected during flight, and pilots can also activate it manually.
At what point is it appropriate to treat a manned aircraft as a UAV? That is what is being proposed here, at IMNATWIO (in my not all that well informed opinion) an unjustifiable cost.
Such equipment would not have prevented AF 447 from happening as it did, but it might have helped understand how those last few minutes played out. Without resorting to emotional argument, this thread has seen discussion of a myriad of other equipment, and systems, that are already equipped that allow an aircrew to avoid terrible weather.
From the discussion here, it appears that a core contributing cause of the mishap is flying into, or too near, really bad weather that you'd usually avoid.
The data stream capability isn't the piece of equipment that helps you avoid that.
From the article:
Airlines, meanwhile, are cautious about absorbing significant new costs to address the very rare cases when a plane’s black boxes cannot be found.
...
11 cases in the past 35 years where flight data recorders were never recovered.
...
{cost} That is especially so in parts of the world where aircraft often are not even equipped with the most basic safety equipment. “If you had a dollar to spend on safety in certain developing countries, this would be the last thing you’d spend it on,” said Mr. Voss.
...
11 cases in the past 35 years where flight data recorders were never recovered.
...
{cost} That is especially so in parts of the world where aircraft often are not even equipped with the most basic safety equipment. “If you had a dollar to spend on safety in certain developing countries, this would be the last thing you’d spend it on,” said Mr. Voss.
Does anyone who regularly flies intercontinental routes think this capability is a good idea?
Elements of this was discussed some pages back, pro and con, in context of this mishap.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 21st Jul 2010 at 18:47.
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Farnborough has rolled round again, and the AF447 mishap has raised its head again in the form of, "We've got the newest, the best and the greatest solution to knowing everything about your aircraft, including its death throes and final position". Only problem is that the solution costs money and the infrastructure for implementing it doesn't currently exist.
Bear in mind that real-time data streaming of flight parameters doesn't make the aircraft any safer; it's what may be learned quickly from an incident that provides an insight into the safety or otherwise of systems employed in similar aircraft.
Reference was made by Lonewolf_50 to posts further back in this thread, so post #289 will be a good place to start. Therein is a link to another thread on the subject where some attempts were made to cost the implementation of real-time data streaming.
mm43
Bear in mind that real-time data streaming of flight parameters doesn't make the aircraft any safer; it's what may be learned quickly from an incident that provides an insight into the safety or otherwise of systems employed in similar aircraft.
Reference was made by Lonewolf_50 to posts further back in this thread, so post #289 will be a good place to start. Therein is a link to another thread on the subject where some attempts were made to cost the implementation of real-time data streaming.
mm43
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Hi,
AF447 Search ... that's the header and it's the point of this theatre..
The improvement must be on the device(s) who permit to detect where a plane (or the black boxes) are located after a crash .. and in particular when the crash occur in remote aera or at sea.
The actual black boxes record already enough parameters for understand the events at work in a crash.
Sending myriad of parameters by sattelite is not realistic or economically feasable.
AF447 Search ... that's the header and it's the point of this theatre..
The improvement must be on the device(s) who permit to detect where a plane (or the black boxes) are located after a crash .. and in particular when the crash occur in remote aera or at sea.
The actual black boxes record already enough parameters for understand the events at work in a crash.
Sending myriad of parameters by sattelite is not realistic or economically feasable.
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mm43, it might be interesting if Pew or somebody did a very extensive poll with a simple question about airliner safety, "Would you pay an extra $10 per ticket to put off the danger of a problem that happens once every 5 years but would not save your life?"
Nothing we can do now without the flight recorders will improve flight safety against AF447 type disasters until we spend noticeable money on every air travel ticket through the next AF447 type disaster. Have we reached the point we're talking about throwing good money after bad? Is continuing the search a wise expenditure of money? Are there other returns that can come from such a continuation beyond simply finding the plane's carcass and perhaps its flight recorders that makes a continued search worthwhile for its advancement of oceanography?
I surely hope there is. There's a part of me that really wants to figure out what happened. So far as I know God does not swat planes out of the air. But at this time that's precisely what this is beginning to look like. Heck, even finding one engine would tell us a lot we do not know at this instant. "Where did the plane meet the water?" It's a puzzle; and, I get my kicks out of solving real life puzzles.
I'm asking about the "worth" of continued searching simply to figure out how much more leverage the public is likely to have on BEA and AirBus to fund the continuation.
{^_^}
Nothing we can do now without the flight recorders will improve flight safety against AF447 type disasters until we spend noticeable money on every air travel ticket through the next AF447 type disaster. Have we reached the point we're talking about throwing good money after bad? Is continuing the search a wise expenditure of money? Are there other returns that can come from such a continuation beyond simply finding the plane's carcass and perhaps its flight recorders that makes a continued search worthwhile for its advancement of oceanography?
I surely hope there is. There's a part of me that really wants to figure out what happened. So far as I know God does not swat planes out of the air. But at this time that's precisely what this is beginning to look like. Heck, even finding one engine would tell us a lot we do not know at this instant. "Where did the plane meet the water?" It's a puzzle; and, I get my kicks out of solving real life puzzles.
I'm asking about the "worth" of continued searching simply to figure out how much more leverage the public is likely to have on BEA and AirBus to fund the continuation.
{^_^}
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Other options
Hi, SLF here, lurked for a long time and followed the accident since day one, but this is getting silly...
If the problem is finding a black box at x thousand meters underwater, the obvious approach is not to stream all data realtime over satcom, but to actually address the problem at hand.
The black box(es) could quite easily be given a gps antenna and a bit of intelligence to be able to derive that the current trajectory will lead to impact in seconds (100m altitude decision point?) and explosively detach from the airframe. You make them float and give them a radiolocator SOS beacon.
They could even then track their trajectory on the sea to help locate the remains on the seafloor.
If you want to make it an incremental upgrade, you make them duplicates of the original black boxes already installed on the plane, that can't be that much of an engineering challenge, surely.
In this case, planes were overflying in very short order, and vessels were onsite in 6 days, in the middle of the atlantic, so radiolocation would be a cinch.
One could say that this gets complicated over land as altitudes over mean sea level (MSL) obviously vary greatly, but there are few areas below MSL on land (they can be programmed) and over land it doesn't matter as the normal black boxes are usually located without issues, and the worlds oceans don't vary 100m from a standardised geoid AFAIK.
If you want to be uber modern, they could squirt the data to satellite after the fact, but I feel that that is overkill.
If there is a false alarm and the pilots miraculously recover the aircraft in those last 100m, they can relay a message to disregard the SOS and have it replaced upon landing.
Sorry, probably missed lots of obvious stuff, but felt compelled to post.
If the problem is finding a black box at x thousand meters underwater, the obvious approach is not to stream all data realtime over satcom, but to actually address the problem at hand.
The black box(es) could quite easily be given a gps antenna and a bit of intelligence to be able to derive that the current trajectory will lead to impact in seconds (100m altitude decision point?) and explosively detach from the airframe. You make them float and give them a radiolocator SOS beacon.
They could even then track their trajectory on the sea to help locate the remains on the seafloor.
If you want to make it an incremental upgrade, you make them duplicates of the original black boxes already installed on the plane, that can't be that much of an engineering challenge, surely.
In this case, planes were overflying in very short order, and vessels were onsite in 6 days, in the middle of the atlantic, so radiolocation would be a cinch.
One could say that this gets complicated over land as altitudes over mean sea level (MSL) obviously vary greatly, but there are few areas below MSL on land (they can be programmed) and over land it doesn't matter as the normal black boxes are usually located without issues, and the worlds oceans don't vary 100m from a standardised geoid AFAIK.
If you want to be uber modern, they could squirt the data to satellite after the fact, but I feel that that is overkill.
If there is a false alarm and the pilots miraculously recover the aircraft in those last 100m, they can relay a message to disregard the SOS and have it replaced upon landing.
Sorry, probably missed lots of obvious stuff, but felt compelled to post.
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Boxes that eject on impact and float were mentioned some way back, believe have a military existsence, not uncommon... but sorry, haven't the time to find the posts or the synapses to remember what acronym they went by..
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JD-EE wrote:-
I'm asking about the "worth" of continued searching simply to figure out how much more leverage the public is likely to have on BEA and AirBus to fund the continuation.
I'm asking about the "worth" of continued searching simply to figure out how much more leverage the public is likely to have on BEA and AirBus to fund the continuation.
From where I stand, the DFDR and CVR may well reveal something that could change the way in which certain air data is obtained, and likewise result in better algorithms to handle some pieces of missing data, while at the same time keeping the aircraft in stable flight. Money spent in acquiring knowledge, is far better spent than further expense (and ongoing costs) for real-time data transfer of flight parameters.
The Equatorial North Atlantic will yet get to reveal some more of its secrets, and ultimately the whereabouts of AF447. Meantime, its hurricane season and northern hemisphere vacation time. So in the autumn/fall .... ?
mm43
All the conjecture about better tracking systems aside, would't a simple detachable-on-impact EPIRB thingy do the job of informing where impact had occurred? These things are fitted on ships' liferafts, yachts, helicopters etc; surely fitting them to a vertical stabilizer shouldn't be an insurmountable challenge? Certainly less expensive than continuous data feed. If, as a result, the point of contact with earth or sea can be identified quickly, would that not obviate the need and expense of sweeping thousands of square miles in search of the recorders? Or am I being too naive?