AF 447 Search to resume
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A French article suggests BEA knows where to find the recorders and will retrieve them as their first priority:
Le Figaro - France : AF 447 : mission repêchage des boîtes noires
Le Figaro - France : AF 447 : mission repêchage des boîtes noires
Only if we're lucky, they may still be in their original location in the tail section, which now does seem to have been found and identified.
The recorders themselves are supposed to be able to sustain a 1300g impact, but I'm doubtful about the mounting racks being designed for the same forces.
If the recorders 'came adrift' at the impact, they may be anywhere, having made their own way to the bottom, and possibly buried in silt.
mm43;
Not at all, thank you for the correction. I have to re-read the two reports from time to time and wrote from memory. Sigh.
BOAC;
The BEA Reports discuss this in various parts.
Concerning comms between the two oceanic centres about the lack of comms from AF447, yes, the BEA report discusses the comms between DAKAR and SAL (Cape Verde) on P.35 of the 1rst Interim Report. After comms between SAL and DAKAR at 03:54 the report states that DAKAR would try to contact the flight.
In commenting on the lack of communications and the raising of alarms, given the vagaries of HF communications it is not that unusual for flights to sometimes be out of communication, missing one or even two position reports. Sometimes another aircraft relays position reports to the oceanic unit. The BEA Report describes on page 68 the difficulties with HF experienced by other aircraft, (AF459)
The report does not discuss any such relayed position reports or the attempts at same. Lufthansa 507 was, as is SOP, listening on 121.5 and reported hearing nothing from AF447.
SaturnV;
I am not a communications expert but again from experience, having seen incident/event messages and sent these kinds of messages for decades regarding aircraft snags and incidents etc, ACARS maintenance messages are usually broadcast throughout an airline's communications network, (using SITA addresses, I believe). The stream of messages at a major carrier is constant - I don't know what kind of message filtration is in place to highlight more urgent messages and don't want to assume anything; the ACARS doesn't send "GO/MEET/NO-GO" messages, it just sends the text associated with the fault. I believe this series of ACARS messages would likely have shown up as teletype messages on AF's Maintenance Central, (sorry, I don't know what "OOC" stands for but I'm assuming you're referring to AF Maintenance in Paris). Flight Watch is an established, legal airline responsibility for Flight Dispatch and Maintenance alike and I expect that the messages would have been handled as such and that the true import of such messages, in the moment of reception, may not have been fully apparent.
There is some "psychology" here behind a discussion of the processes. Airline work is the very definition of "routine". People see and think what they are expecting, out of daily experience, so the "out-of-the-ordinary" takes time to sink in.
The antithesis of this point is, one is not constantly on alert for every abnormality or event which is teletyped across the system to printers and screens.
While there is an incident-alerting system in place, this wasn't an "incident" at the time of the receipt of the messages. Realization of how serious something may be from reading a series of ACARS messages is not necessarily an immediate process. Some flags may go up in maintenance if one understood exactly what had occurred, but again, it wasn't flight operations who were reading these at 03:15 in the morning. As well, there would be minimal staff on duty in these areas.
These points are neither "excuses" nor "reasons". I'm attempting here to avoid some hindsight bias by putting some flesh on the early events and queries to see how these events may have been perceived by those involved. These queries are natural and obvious now, but may not have been so at the time of receipt of the ACARS messages. That said, there are some questions to ask about HF communications especially as it concerns DAKAR, ADS/CPDLC processes in place at the time (and the failure of at least two aircraft to be able to log on), and airline flight watch processes.
Not to belittle your comments, but there is a need to substitute ATLANTICO for DAKAR.
BOAC;
do we know if contact between the two oceanics about no 'comms' took place and whether Selcal and 123.45/121/5 was used?
Concerning comms between the two oceanic centres about the lack of comms from AF447, yes, the BEA report discusses the comms between DAKAR and SAL (Cape Verde) on P.35 of the 1rst Interim Report. After comms between SAL and DAKAR at 03:54 the report states that DAKAR would try to contact the flight.
In commenting on the lack of communications and the raising of alarms, given the vagaries of HF communications it is not that unusual for flights to sometimes be out of communication, missing one or even two position reports. Sometimes another aircraft relays position reports to the oceanic unit. The BEA Report describes on page 68 the difficulties with HF experienced by other aircraft, (AF459)
The report does not discuss any such relayed position reports or the attempts at same. Lufthansa 507 was, as is SOP, listening on 121.5 and reported hearing nothing from AF447.
SaturnV;
Perhaps I overlooked it, but I have yet to find any reference as to when AF OOC looked at the ACARS messages. These seem not to have raised any flags at AF OOC at the time.
There is some "psychology" here behind a discussion of the processes. Airline work is the very definition of "routine". People see and think what they are expecting, out of daily experience, so the "out-of-the-ordinary" takes time to sink in.
The antithesis of this point is, one is not constantly on alert for every abnormality or event which is teletyped across the system to printers and screens.
While there is an incident-alerting system in place, this wasn't an "incident" at the time of the receipt of the messages. Realization of how serious something may be from reading a series of ACARS messages is not necessarily an immediate process. Some flags may go up in maintenance if one understood exactly what had occurred, but again, it wasn't flight operations who were reading these at 03:15 in the morning. As well, there would be minimal staff on duty in these areas.
These points are neither "excuses" nor "reasons". I'm attempting here to avoid some hindsight bias by putting some flesh on the early events and queries to see how these events may have been perceived by those involved. These queries are natural and obvious now, but may not have been so at the time of receipt of the ACARS messages. That said, there are some questions to ask about HF communications especially as it concerns DAKAR, ADS/CPDLC processes in place at the time (and the failure of at least two aircraft to be able to log on), and airline flight watch processes.
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"Ile de Sein" - Recovery operation update
Ile de Sein departed DAKAR at 2011-04-22 1810z for the Recovery Operation Position (ROP).
Edit:: ETA ROP 2011-04-26 0830z
Edit:: ETA ROP 2011-04-26 0830z
Last edited by mm43; 22nd Apr 2011 at 19:37.
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Hi,
Those queries were obvious when the accident occured !
Air France plane that seems to have difficulties (at least they know that communications are interrupted with him) and no one thinks immediately seek if ACARS was submitted by the plane ... ?
Instead .. the management of Air France made statements to the press (Gourgeon by example) that are pure speculations ....
All was proved false when the ACARS were published (not the fact of AF but because a leak elsewhere)
Can we believe in so negligences from Air France??
IIRC, in the weeks following the accident, AF CEO explained to the press that AF Maintenance first looked at the ACARS messages when they began routine preparations for the arrival of the flight in Paris, IIRC about ETA-1hr
HN39, thanks. That meant they looked at them around 08h00, and apparently nobody thought to look at them earlier.
These queries are natural and obvious now, but may not have been so at the time of receipt of the ACARS messages
Air France plane that seems to have difficulties (at least they know that communications are interrupted with him) and no one thinks immediately seek if ACARS was submitted by the plane ... ?
Instead .. the management of Air France made statements to the press (Gourgeon by example) that are pure speculations ....
All was proved false when the ACARS were published (not the fact of AF but because a leak elsewhere)
Can we believe in so negligences from Air France??
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99,994 photos?
Some have wondered:
I think lomapaseo is correct about why only 6 photos were released (why would BEA release more?). But I wonder where the 100,000 number came from. I am not aware that BEA has said, nor has been quoted as saying, anything about the number of photos taken. I have seen one press article use this number, and that article was posted at #3735 (http://www.pprune.org/6404432-post3735.html) earlier in this thread. Does anyone have a reference to a BEA statement?
Actually, I proposed the 100,000 number, back in post #3163 (http://www.pprune.org/6357167-post3163.html), so it is possible that the author has simply been reading this thread. That number was a guess based on taking an image every few seconds, for several days, with several vehicles divided between imaging and sonar work. They spent more days at the site, following that post, so an estimate of 100,000 could be off by a factor of three or more, either higher or lower.
The important thing to remember, as I noted in post #3163, is that the pictures are likely taken on a grid survey over a large area extending beyond the sonar-identified debris field, and thus the vast majority probably show nothing but mud.
Really, are there human remains in 99,988+ photos that therefore restrict disclosure?
I have to agree with you. Something is not right here...
I have to agree with you. Something is not right here...
Actually, I proposed the 100,000 number, back in post #3163 (http://www.pprune.org/6357167-post3163.html), so it is possible that the author has simply been reading this thread. That number was a guess based on taking an image every few seconds, for several days, with several vehicles divided between imaging and sonar work. They spent more days at the site, following that post, so an estimate of 100,000 could be off by a factor of three or more, either higher or lower.
The important thing to remember, as I noted in post #3163, is that the pictures are likely taken on a grid survey over a large area extending beyond the sonar-identified debris field, and thus the vast majority probably show nothing but mud.
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Hi,
Post reread .. and can you reread mine 
Suppose IF
You are responsable of a plane (and so .. directly of all people aboard)
Someone came to you with a bad news:
We have lost contact with our plane.
What you will do ? by all means find what happened to the plane ...
You are the boss there .. so you know how all is working in your company
You know who contact .. you know all the technical stuff at your disposition for try to know what happened ..
Reminder: ACARS checked ONE HOUR before ETA !! (astonishing fact)
Instead .. you make some interview to the press .. and disseminate speculations
Are you the boss there ? or simply a spokesperson ?
From the first second communication from Air France with the press has been below any ... and they lost a lot of credit for their future communications ...
Who can be trusted after such behavior?
It is very easy to say that things were "obvious" after you know everything that happened. Discovering why things are the way the are is far more difficult when you dont' know.
Suppose IF
You are responsable of a plane (and so .. directly of all people aboard)
Someone came to you with a bad news:
We have lost contact with our plane.
What you will do ? by all means find what happened to the plane ...
You are the boss there .. so you know how all is working in your company
You know who contact .. you know all the technical stuff at your disposition for try to know what happened ..
Reminder: ACARS checked ONE HOUR before ETA !! (astonishing fact)
Instead .. you make some interview to the press .. and disseminate speculations
Are you the boss there ? or simply a spokesperson ?
From the first second communication from Air France with the press has been below any ... and they lost a lot of credit for their future communications ...
Who can be trusted after such behavior?
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What kind of organisation do you work for???
Not an astonishing fact at all, it's about the normal time you would start allocating resources to deal with 'incoming' maintenance issues.
And with an 'overdue' aircraft, 'maintenance' is not exactly the first department you start consulting, especially in a major airline organisation....
Not an astonishing fact at all, it's about the normal time you would start allocating resources to deal with 'incoming' maintenance issues.
And with an 'overdue' aircraft, 'maintenance' is not exactly the first department you start consulting, especially in a major airline organisation....
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Originally posted by Shadoko ...
... as the wreckage area on sea bed seems small, the wreckage at sea level just after the impact had to be small also. So how could it be ignored if the place was trully searched?
... as the wreckage area on sea bed seems small, the wreckage at sea level just after the impact had to be small also. So how could it be ignored if the place was trully searched?
I have no idea if some of the low level searches were done using radar, and even if they were, there could have been sufficient sea clutter to hide other targets. Were the flights always below the cloud base? I suspect not and broken strata-cumulus can hide quite a large area in a few seconds of obscurity.
As the surface debris field spread out with the passage of time, chances of an aerial sighting lessened, and as we now know, it was a passing Singaporean registered tanker - "Ursula" that made the first sighting, which I believe was of a body.
Please don't draw any direct conclusions as to how the floating debris got to where it was found. A straight line has got nothing to do with the route taken, and as I have previously mentioned, a chimpanzee given a pencil and told to draw a line between a couple of points would probably stand a better chance of getting it right.
Last edited by mm43; 22nd Apr 2011 at 21:26.
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PJ2,
I understand and appreciate that there is a continuing stream of ACARS messages from numerous flights being received at AF, which are then further distributed to various points in the AF network, e.g., destination airports.
I don't know AF procedures, but in this instance, AF OCC sent an ACARS message to AF447 after 04h00 requesting it contact a control center. Would the usual AF procedure be for the crew of the receiving aircraft to acknowledge receipt of such a message? If so, would not AF OCC then be looking for confirmation of message receipt, and if there were none, try to re-contact or go on heightened alert re: AF447?
As the hours continue to go by, when does anyone at AF OCC think to look to see whether there are relevant ACARS messages from AF 447?
One possible answer might be derived from interpolating a sequence of events -- relying on the sequence in the first BEA interim report.
A.) DAKAR at 10h45 clears the French Navy's Dassault Atlantique 2 to Cape Verde, because "This was a pre-positioning choice given the uncertainty about the location of the accident."
B.)
A possible interpretation of that sequence is that somebody between 10h45 and 13h00 looked at the ACARS message with the LKP sent at 02h10, and passed that information on to DAKAR. The interval between AF459 contacting AF OCC about AF447 not being in contact and the instruction to the Dassault to proceed to TASIL was about six hours.
________________
jcjeant, in this instance, there was no negligence on the part of AF OCC; if there had been survivors, and survivors were not rescued in time, then one would raise the question of negligence.
At 09h45 DAKAR called French Naval Aviation and said a plane was missing. From that time on, the response, from the French standpoint, was quite expeditious. We do not know when the Brazilian Air Force was contacted, nor when its airplane(s) first arrived in the search area. If I interpret the Naval Observatory's calculation correctly, sunrise on June 1 at 3N and 30.30W was 5:51 and sunset was 18:08. So about 2 1/2 hours of light for the Dassault if it remained in the search area the entire time.
The extent of daylight and the prevailing weather during the first day's search have not been described in any detail. The Drift Analysis group found the Brazilian search data to be sufficiently unreliable that it was not used in their calculations.
I understand and appreciate that there is a continuing stream of ACARS messages from numerous flights being received at AF, which are then further distributed to various points in the AF network, e.g., destination airports.
I don't know AF procedures, but in this instance, AF OCC sent an ACARS message to AF447 after 04h00 requesting it contact a control center. Would the usual AF procedure be for the crew of the receiving aircraft to acknowledge receipt of such a message? If so, would not AF OCC then be looking for confirmation of message receipt, and if there were none, try to re-contact or go on heightened alert re: AF447?
As the hours continue to go by, when does anyone at AF OCC think to look to see whether there are relevant ACARS messages from AF 447?
One possible answer might be derived from interpolating a sequence of events -- relying on the sequence in the first BEA interim report.
A.) DAKAR at 10h45 clears the French Navy's Dassault Atlantique 2 to Cape Verde, because "This was a pre-positioning choice given the uncertainty about the location of the accident."
B.)
Around 13 h 00, the crew of the Dassault Atlantique 2, en route to position at Cape Verde, received the instruction to proceed towards TASIL descending UN 873 airway.
________________
jcjeant, in this instance, there was no negligence on the part of AF OCC; if there had been survivors, and survivors were not rescued in time, then one would raise the question of negligence.
At 09h45 DAKAR called French Naval Aviation and said a plane was missing. From that time on, the response, from the French standpoint, was quite expeditious. We do not know when the Brazilian Air Force was contacted, nor when its airplane(s) first arrived in the search area. If I interpret the Naval Observatory's calculation correctly, sunrise on June 1 at 3N and 30.30W was 5:51 and sunset was 18:08. So about 2 1/2 hours of light for the Dassault if it remained in the search area the entire time.
The extent of daylight and the prevailing weather during the first day's search have not been described in any detail. The Drift Analysis group found the Brazilian search data to be sufficiently unreliable that it was not used in their calculations.
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HF ACARS
I know AF447 had VHF and SATCOM ACARS capability, but it sounds like A330's do or at least did have HF ACARS.
"The A330/A340 is equipped with a standardized ACARS system that can be used by any customer,
with allowance for each customer to easily introduce his own custom features to reflect his own needs.
These initial ACARS systems have been extended to offer worldwide coverage, even in mid-ocean and
sparsely inhabited areas, using the Inmarsat facilities and HF data link, and to cover not only company
communications but also ATC services, starting with predeparture and oceanic clearances.
On aircraft delivered since 1998, the ACARS unit has been replaced by the Air Traffic Services Unit
(ATSU), which is designed to also accommodate safety-related ATC functions using the Aeronautical
Telecommunications Network (ATN), offering the majority of ATC and other communication services now
using voice, and more importantly, offering profitable migration to the ATN. The ATSU is the first unit to
host software from a number of different vendors. The same ATSU is also used on the A320 family of aircraft."
http://www.davi.ws/avionics/TheAvion...ook_Cap_30.pdf
With Canaris which is ground station 17 for HF ACARS being about 1680nm away from the approximate crash site it might have provided a tertiary path for ACARS msgs.
In general HF ACARS seems sort of sporadically used in my area, but I have received some messages from as far as 4000nm. Has HF ACARS just gone out of fashion with the advent of SATCOM?
I know AF447 had VHF and SATCOM ACARS capability, but it sounds like A330's do or at least did have HF ACARS.
"The A330/A340 is equipped with a standardized ACARS system that can be used by any customer,
with allowance for each customer to easily introduce his own custom features to reflect his own needs.
These initial ACARS systems have been extended to offer worldwide coverage, even in mid-ocean and
sparsely inhabited areas, using the Inmarsat facilities and HF data link, and to cover not only company
communications but also ATC services, starting with predeparture and oceanic clearances.
On aircraft delivered since 1998, the ACARS unit has been replaced by the Air Traffic Services Unit
(ATSU), which is designed to also accommodate safety-related ATC functions using the Aeronautical
Telecommunications Network (ATN), offering the majority of ATC and other communication services now
using voice, and more importantly, offering profitable migration to the ATN. The ATSU is the first unit to
host software from a number of different vendors. The same ATSU is also used on the A320 family of aircraft."
http://www.davi.ws/avionics/TheAvion...ook_Cap_30.pdf
With Canaris which is ground station 17 for HF ACARS being about 1680nm away from the approximate crash site it might have provided a tertiary path for ACARS msgs.
In general HF ACARS seems sort of sporadically used in my area, but I have received some messages from as far as 4000nm. Has HF ACARS just gone out of fashion with the advent of SATCOM?
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Bear,
I am confused by your v/s posts
:
So which is it?
I suppose if one were to push this unit off the loading dock onto the concrete below, it would suffer significant damage. But, if you were to push it off the dock into the bay, it would probably be in pretty good shape. Now, wrap it into a cocoon (the fuselage) and drop it off the GW bridge and it would probably not suffer that much damage. If you review Post #s 2066, 3714 & 3729, they offer some possible explanations to this phenomenon.
As to the BEA, it would seem from their reports they have a team to help them in the investigation which includes the US NTSB. I am with lomapaseo on providing as much information as they have. The old saying "Damned if you do, damned if you don't" is at play here.
I am confused by your v/s posts
:
Originally posted by bearfoil
No one to my knowledge has held fast to any theory that suggests the VS was the cause of upset, or for that matter separated completely before impact. Damaged? Certainly
No one to my knowledge has held fast to any theory that suggests the VS was the cause of upset, or for that matter separated completely before impact. Damaged? Certainly
Originally posted by bearfoil
The fact that 447 was laterally rotating supports the loss of the Vertical Stabilizer, anent JD-EE's maple leaf (acer helix). This is not to say that 447 lost her fin at altitude, she may have lost it much lower, its loss perhaps initiating 447's lateral rotation.
The fact that 447 was laterally rotating supports the loss of the Vertical Stabilizer, anent JD-EE's maple leaf (acer helix). This is not to say that 447 lost her fin at altitude, she may have lost it much lower, its loss perhaps initiating 447's lateral rotation.
Originally posted by bearfoil
This has also to do with my admittedly stubborn conviction that the Vertical Stabilizer and Rudder were not on the fuselage at impact.
This has also to do with my admittedly stubborn conviction that the Vertical Stabilizer and Rudder were not on the fuselage at impact.
Originally posted by bearfoil
May I direct one's attention to the strut supporting the shelving (box) panel of the cabin structure in the excellent photo?? I'll repeat from a year ago, I have seen far greater damage to such a structure after one of these was dropped off a loading dock from two meters. Some thing is wrong with BEA's report?? Different airplane??
May I direct one's attention to the strut supporting the shelving (box) panel of the cabin structure in the excellent photo?? I'll repeat from a year ago, I have seen far greater damage to such a structure after one of these was dropped off a loading dock from two meters. Some thing is wrong with BEA's report?? Different airplane??
As to the BEA, it would seem from their reports they have a team to help them in the investigation which includes the US NTSB. I am with lomapaseo on providing as much information as they have. The old saying "Damned if you do, damned if you don't" is at play here.
Last edited by Turbine D; 22nd Apr 2011 at 22:52. Reason: spelling correction
SaturnV;
A crew receiving an ACARS message from company may or may not acknowledge, and a lack of acknowledgement at that time, would not necessarily be reason for concern. The unfolding process is, as you decribe, on pages 42 through 44 of the BEA Report. AF first began enquiries at 05 h 50 and it unfolded from there.
I don't know AF procedures, but in this instance, AF OCC sent an ACARS message to AF447 after 04h00 requesting it contact a control center. Would the usual AF procedure be for the crew of the receiving aircraft to acknowledge receipt of such a message? If so, would not AF OCC then be looking for confirmation of message receipt, and if there were none, try to re-contact or go on heightened alert re: AF447?
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PJ2, "The report does not discuss any such relayed position reports or the attempts at same. Lufthansa 507 was, as is SOP, listening on 121.5 and reported hearing nothing from AF447."
This is why some of us figure the problem began well before 02:10. Now, I am a communications oriented critter. I do not seriously expect a 121.5 call once the fit hit the shan. I do expect attempted communications with other planes to get Dakar informed that I'm about to enter their control space when Dakar failed to answer. I'd try the enroute plane to plane frequency and then 121.5MHz, repeatedly. It is apparent no such attempt was made or else a whole bunch of planes in the area had failed to follow proper communications protocols or had snoozing cockpit crews. The simplest answer to this dilemma is that the problem began, probably not long after 01:35 and finally brought the plane down.
My imagination fails me when I try to describe such a problem, however.
So I am left with the question, "Why was the plane radio silent from 01:35 onwards except for ACARS messages?"
This is why some of us figure the problem began well before 02:10. Now, I am a communications oriented critter. I do not seriously expect a 121.5 call once the fit hit the shan. I do expect attempted communications with other planes to get Dakar informed that I'm about to enter their control space when Dakar failed to answer. I'd try the enroute plane to plane frequency and then 121.5MHz, repeatedly. It is apparent no such attempt was made or else a whole bunch of planes in the area had failed to follow proper communications protocols or had snoozing cockpit crews. The simplest answer to this dilemma is that the problem began, probably not long after 01:35 and finally brought the plane down.
My imagination fails me when I try to describe such a problem, however.
So I am left with the question, "Why was the plane radio silent from 01:35 onwards except for ACARS messages?"
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auv-ee, I'd expect more time spent looking and less time snapping pictures of everything in sight (or site.) 100,000 pictures stored in a 10 bit HD raw format would be quite a lot of data. Now, I am aware that finding computers with 207 gigabytes of spare storage is easy these days if you purchase new they might have decided to save storage and only preserved the pictures that showed something interesting.
Even supposing that is 10,000 pictures the basic answer is, "6 is enough to prove we found it. Now we need to study it all without reporters getting in the way. We will feed you when it's dinnertime."
Even supposing that is 10,000 pictures the basic answer is, "6 is enough to prove we found it. Now we need to study it all without reporters getting in the way. We will feed you when it's dinnertime."
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jcjeant, the ACARS intent is to provide maintenance messages to airport facilities so that they can have necessary repair parts on hand to minimize the aircraft's time on the ground. Of COURSE they'd check it before the plane was due to arrive, and probably not a long time before it was due to arrive.
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Hi,
Methink this behaviour in the major airlines will change .. cause what happend to the AF447.
Remind that actually the investigators have at today only the ACARS and some debris for speculate about what happened and those seem's suddenly of great importance (read the 2 preliminary reports)
ACARS are no more only maintenace matter now.
BTW I never read yet some words in the BEA reports about a possible "stall" of AF447 ... but I read it sooo many time in Pprune
Hope those knowledge will be updated by the black boxes datas
And with an 'overdue' aircraft, 'maintenance' is not exactly the first department you start consulting, especially in a major airline organisation....
Remind that actually the investigators have at today only the ACARS and some debris for speculate about what happened and those seem's suddenly of great importance (read the 2 preliminary reports)
ACARS are no more only maintenace matter now.
BTW I never read yet some words in the BEA reports about a possible "stall" of AF447 ... but I read it sooo many time in Pprune
Hope those knowledge will be updated by the black boxes datas
Last edited by jcjeant; 22nd Apr 2011 at 23:37.
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Originally Posted by PJ2
mm43, for that matter the BEA has yet to discuss or release any transcripts of conversations between ATLANTICO and other flights on that track that night. IIRC, AF 447 was the only flight that did not diverge from the track on encountering the mesoscale convective complex.
Originally Posted by JD-EE
This is why some of us figure the problem began well before 02:10. Now, I am a communications oriented critter. I do not seriously expect a 121.5 call once the fit hit the shan. I do expect attempted communications with other planes to get Dakar informed that I'm about to enter their control space when Dakar failed to answer. I'd try the enroute plane to plane frequency and then 121.5MHz, repeatedly. It is apparent no such attempt was made or else a whole bunch of planes in the area had failed to follow proper communications protocols or had snoozing cockpit crews. The simplest answer to this dilemma is that the problem began, probably not long after 01:35 and finally brought the plane down.