Airbus technology defects
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You are correct, the GOL incident was the first 737NG hull loss. However, since this was the first hull loss in 8 years of 737NG operation, I suspect the 737NG rate will be as good or better than the 737-300/400/500. (Thanks for the reminder GCC)
340 has no deaths with a lower hull loss accident rate than the 744.
The 744 has had 3 hull loss accidents, China Airlines in 1993 in Hong Kong, Korean in 1996 at Seoul both hull losses on landing, no loss of life. Singapore in 2000 at Taipei on takeoff, 83 dead.
Only one 340 hull loss in service, the Air France landing at Toronto, no loss of life.
Two other 340 hull losses events maybe on the database you are looking at, one was during maintenance when a hydraulic pump overheated, the other on the tarmac in Colombo in a terrorist attack. Neither during operation, neither a hull loss accident.
The 744 has had 3 hull loss accidents, China Airlines in 1993 in Hong Kong, Korean in 1996 at Seoul both hull losses on landing, no loss of life. Singapore in 2000 at Taipei on takeoff, 83 dead.
Only one 340 hull loss in service, the Air France landing at Toronto, no loss of life.
Two other 340 hull losses events maybe on the database you are looking at, one was during maintenance when a hydraulic pump overheated, the other on the tarmac in Colombo in a terrorist attack. Neither during operation, neither a hull loss accident.
The 744 does not have a higher hull loss accident rate then the A340. As I stated earlier, the 744 hull loss rate is 0.75 hull losses per one million operations while the A340 is 0.92 hull losses per one million operation.
If you had read the link I provided, you would have seen these rates were calculated based on the 3 744 hull losses you described and the single Air France A340 overrun. The other A340 hull losses were not included since they did not take place during airline operations.
Statistically, the difference in these rates in not significant. Neither is the difference in rates between the A320 family and the 737-300/400/500 & 737NG. The rates do not support your supposition that FBW airliners are safer via virtue of their technology level.
Your aguments that Airbus FBW has no significant flaws needs to be made on the merits of the Airbus design, not via comparisons with other non-FBW types.
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There seems to be some confusion over the number of hull loss accidents and the rate of hull loss accidents.
The 744 does not have a higher hull loss accident rate then the A340. As I stated earlier, the 744 hull loss rate is 0.75 hull losses per one million operations while the A340 is 0.92 hull losses per one million operation.
The 744 does not have a higher hull loss accident rate then the A340. As I stated earlier, the 744 hull loss rate is 0.75 hull losses per one million operations while the A340 is 0.92 hull losses per one million operation.
An equally valid way to portray the same data would have been to compare :
The entire 340 series to the entire 747 series.
The entire 320 series to the entire 737 series
As they all share the same TCDS.
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http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf
First, look at page 11. Note that the First Generation of jet transports (DC-8, 707 etc) had a high accident rate at initial introduction that dropped after inservice experience was gained, but has now increased to the initial rate or greater.
There are many reasons for these rates. An important one in the early years is that pilots transitioning from props to jets didn't have a full appreciation of the differences between the two types and there was a lot of learning and training required that wasn't there initially. Other reasons were that the existing certification regulations and pilot-to-airplane interfaces were not as well developed as they are today.
The climbing rate in the later years is due to airframe age and the relegation of these early airplanes to lower tier operators in less developed parts of the world.
Note that the second generation jet transports (727,737-100/200. BAC-111) show the same type of trends at both ends of their service life, albeit at lower accident rate levels.
The current generation of airplanes (A318/319/320/321, 737-300/400/500, 737NG, 757, 767, A330, A340, 744 and 777) began operation with low accident rates that have been continued over their careers.
Also consider that airplanes on the same TCDS do not necessarily share the same certification basis or the same design features. Certification regulations do advance and not all of them are "grandfathered" into new derivatives of older airplanes. Likewise, economic and customer demanded features also show up on the newer models. In many cases, these features also make the newer airplanes more operator "friendly" and safer.
Therefore, airplanes shown on the same TCDS can vary widely in their design philosophy and features.
For these reasons, the linked report does not lump the 737-100/200 with the 737-300/400/500 or the 747-100/200/300/SP with the 747-400. Likewise, the A300-B2/B4 is not included with the A300-600.
Assuming you want to discuss a design's merits relative to other airplanes, it would seem to be more consistent to argue those merits relative to its contemporaries rather than ancestors of those contemporaries that were developed 20 to 30 years earlier. After all, some of the reasons a 737-300 has a better hull loss rate than a 737-200 are same reasons an A300-600 has a better hull loss rate than an A300.
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Clandestino, you did state something regarding ALPHA FLOOR but did not produce any answer to that question:
... and I think it's an important question.
GOOD, it's a good step !
At least, and at last, you're looking at something else that the official version.
... but you still don't seem to have the big picture regarding Habsheim and these following 18 years, and I don't blame you because it takes much longer than a few weeks to try and assimilate all these technical reports and judicial procedures, and I'm personally still working on that.
But if you go on with your reading, you will probably discover that SNPL or Roger position, during all these years, have been almost anything except, crystal clear ...
I name these two one because you did, but it could be applicable to many more ...
I can see only one guy who kept the same heading: Norbert Jacquet !
No wonder he's still the only one to pay the big price.
No wonder justice is still firmly after him, even with authorities pretending this man lost his mind ... !?
But let's go back to Roger's paper, which is one of the too few English written on Habsheim:
"-there cannot be traces of fire extinguishing products on the recorders boxes without traces of fire itself"
You quote a paragraph title but fail to mention the paragraph itself which develops the notion of fire by, smoke and/or soot.
... and looking at these pictures, isn't it surprising they were not able to identify any trace of smoke or soot on these recorders ???
photos from JC Boetsch site
You will find the answer in the Venet and Belotti initial report (but I don't think that one has been translated)
Ironically, I presume, you wrote that:
So I understand you don't seem aware that only ONE of these videos has been retained by the commission, even if there were many more available !?
And that "OFFICIAL VIDEO" is the one, the very first one on your link.
Now, I'd like you to watch carefully, I should say listen carefully, to that official video, and tell me what you can hear at the precise time 00:30 ?
Originally Posted by Confiture
And even if ALPHA FLOOR protection was available at that kind of altitude, at what kind of AOA the A/THR would have triggered TOGA ?
But let me introduce radically different point of view, put forward in report by Christian Roger, advisor in the defence of capt. Michel Asseline ...
At least, and at last, you're looking at something else that the official version.
So how is it possible that this guy retires after distinguished career in mil and civ aviation and no one ever notices that something is wrong with him? Since he's heavilly copy/pasting from Roger's report and pushing Roger's agenda as if it were his own, I hereby pronounce CONFiture the most suitable person to answer this question
But if you go on with your reading, you will probably discover that SNPL or Roger position, during all these years, have been almost anything except, crystal clear ...
I name these two one because you did, but it could be applicable to many more ...
I can see only one guy who kept the same heading: Norbert Jacquet !
No wonder he's still the only one to pay the big price.
No wonder justice is still firmly after him, even with authorities pretending this man lost his mind ... !?
But let's go back to Roger's paper, which is one of the too few English written on Habsheim:
"-there cannot be traces of fire extinguishing products on the recorders boxes without traces of fire itself"
You quote a paragraph title but fail to mention the paragraph itself which develops the notion of fire by, smoke and/or soot.
... and looking at these pictures, isn't it surprising they were not able to identify any trace of smoke or soot on these recorders ???
photos from JC Boetsch site
Ironically, I presume, you wrote that:
Videos taken on the day of accident were all forged too
And that "OFFICIAL VIDEO" is the one, the very first one on your link.
Now, I'd like you to watch carefully, I should say listen carefully, to that official video, and tell me what you can hear at the precise time 00:30 ?
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To suggest that this is not the case on the 737 and 747 is false. The fundamental systems and airframe philosophy has changed little for those types, the fundamentals remain the same, e.g. the overhead panel on the 737 has not changed since the 1960s, people are still turning off the hydraulics in flight when they mean the anti-ice 40 years later. The 737-300 retains 80% airframe spares commonality with the 737-200.
Even with this statement the grouping was skewed to suit Boeing, as the 747-300 entered service after the 757 and 767, and at about the same time as the A310. The 737-300, 757, 767, A300-600, A310 all entered service within a year or two of the 747-300.
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To share the same TCDS, they must have the same fundamental airframe and systems, they share the same fundamental design philosophy, otherwise certification authorities would demand full recertification.
To suggest that this is not the case on the 737 and 747 is false. The fundamental systems and airframe philosophy has changed little for those types, the fundamentals remain the same, e.g. the overhead panel on the 737 has not changed since the 1960s, people are still turning off the hydraulics in flight when they mean the anti-ice 40 years later. The 737-300 retains 80% airframe spares commonality with the 737-200.
The report does not say that at all, it just splits them up when they were introduced in service, it does not give a rational for doing so.
Even with this statement the grouping was skewed to suit Boeing, as the 747-300 entered service after the 757 and 767, and at about the same time as the A310. The 737-300, 757, 767, A300-600, A310 all entered service within a year or two of the 747-300.
To suggest that this is not the case on the 737 and 747 is false. The fundamental systems and airframe philosophy has changed little for those types, the fundamentals remain the same, e.g. the overhead panel on the 737 has not changed since the 1960s, people are still turning off the hydraulics in flight when they mean the anti-ice 40 years later. The 737-300 retains 80% airframe spares commonality with the 737-200.
The report does not say that at all, it just splits them up when they were introduced in service, it does not give a rational for doing so.
Even with this statement the grouping was skewed to suit Boeing, as the 747-300 entered service after the 757 and 767, and at about the same time as the A310. The 737-300, 757, 767, A300-600, A310 all entered service within a year or two of the 747-300.
The 757 and 767 introduced two crew operation with much more flight deck automation even though they entered service about the same time as the 747-300. The 747-300 flight deck was still a three crew operation and is essentially the same as the 747-100/200. The 747-400 flight deck introduced new levels of automation and allowed the airplane to go to a two crew flight deck. Note that this happened without requiring a new TCDS for the 747.
Note that the same distinction was made for the A300 versus the A300-600. The fundamental technical changes that went in to the revisions of this airplane that allowed it to go from a three crew to a two crew flight deck are recognized by the groupings.
In addition to airplane technical level, the groupings account for the operational environment changes that have taken place over time. Things like pilot skill sets and attributes and airway/airport infrastructure were far different in the mid-60's compared to the mid-80's and they have continued to advance to the present day.
The groupings are a fair attempt to represent the total environment present during the design and operation of the airplanes shown. While no set of groupings can be perfect, I doubt that Airbus would disagree with these or the statistical story they tell.
Last edited by Old Aero Guy; 30th Dec 2006 at 20:28.
Well done CONF iture! You have managed to drag down this thread into very irellevant details, upon which you insist as if they're of utmost importance. So:
Correct! All the pictures I have are only of 320x200 resolution, but there are more than 2000 of them, sequentially aranged and with soundtrack attached. They show flypast of A320 with 6 crew and 130 passengers onboard. Can you, or for that matter anyone PPRuNeing, defend this flypast as being executed safely, even prior hitting the trees? If so then we can proceed to discuss minor anomalies that might have happened, if not - and that's my point of view - any possible fault is irelevant in view of flypast that was done below reasonably safe level, below reasonably safe airspeed and with below reasonably safe thrust.
For the entertainment of those who think that previous paragraph is my attempt of evading CONF iture's well aimed questions, here are some answers to them. Still I insist that these answers, while correct as my knowledge allows, are absolutely irellevant to cause of Habsheim disaster or alleged Airbus technology defects.
Alpha floor on current A320 in CONF3 fires imediately below 14° AoA. By no means it's certain that it would save the airplane and also MA didn't disable autothrust, he merely disconnected it. However, it was noted that A320entered service with AF only six weeks before accident and already pilots were practicing flypasts atr speeds down to alpha floor - at RA greater than 100 ft that is. It is entirely possible that MA was unaware that flying at 30 ft would deprive him of alpha floor protection.
Regarding the absence of soot it's entirely concievable that black boxes were away of flames as tail section is largest unburnt part of airplane but it was drenched in foam by firemen as precaution. So no evidence of forgery here.
Radar track of low flying airplane is notoriously hard to obtain (did you know that radars used by ATC work only to the line of sight?) and it's irelevant in the view of FDR data, video footages and a couple of hundred witnesses and those gave much more precise account of airplane's final flightpath than any radar could.
With videos is same old story: some people claim that sound of spooling engines was engineered as engines were actally not spooling up. Sure but then what's kicking the dust moments before airplane contacted the trees if not engine exhausts? Or do you claim that it was photoshoped? And on the videos you can se airplane sinking into woods with no significant bank or yaw, so theory of one engine stalling goes out the window.
I was very disgusted after reading Roger's report. There was that distinguished pilot who put the weight of his authority behind some severly insensible notions in hope he would push them through. I might have overreacted in asking what was wrong with this guy during his active service as it's possible that his condition developed post retirement. Unlike his protege, Jacquet, he at least had the wits to indulge in conspiracy theorizing after being withdrawn from service use. You see, unlike medical, one's pension can not be taken away on mental health grounds.
For the entertainment of those who think that previous paragraph is my attempt of evading CONF iture's well aimed questions, here are some answers to them. Still I insist that these answers, while correct as my knowledge allows, are absolutely irellevant to cause of Habsheim disaster or alleged Airbus technology defects.
Alpha floor on current A320 in CONF3 fires imediately below 14° AoA. By no means it's certain that it would save the airplane and also MA didn't disable autothrust, he merely disconnected it. However, it was noted that A320entered service with AF only six weeks before accident and already pilots were practicing flypasts atr speeds down to alpha floor - at RA greater than 100 ft that is. It is entirely possible that MA was unaware that flying at 30 ft would deprive him of alpha floor protection.
Regarding the absence of soot it's entirely concievable that black boxes were away of flames as tail section is largest unburnt part of airplane but it was drenched in foam by firemen as precaution. So no evidence of forgery here.
Radar track of low flying airplane is notoriously hard to obtain (did you know that radars used by ATC work only to the line of sight?) and it's irelevant in the view of FDR data, video footages and a couple of hundred witnesses and those gave much more precise account of airplane's final flightpath than any radar could.
With videos is same old story: some people claim that sound of spooling engines was engineered as engines were actally not spooling up. Sure but then what's kicking the dust moments before airplane contacted the trees if not engine exhausts? Or do you claim that it was photoshoped? And on the videos you can se airplane sinking into woods with no significant bank or yaw, so theory of one engine stalling goes out the window.
I was very disgusted after reading Roger's report. There was that distinguished pilot who put the weight of his authority behind some severly insensible notions in hope he would push them through. I might have overreacted in asking what was wrong with this guy during his active service as it's possible that his condition developed post retirement. Unlike his protege, Jacquet, he at least had the wits to indulge in conspiracy theorizing after being withdrawn from service use. You see, unlike medical, one's pension can not be taken away on mental health grounds.
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I think that introduction of a new technology will always have its infancy problems... look at the introduction of the first jets... Same thing here with Airbus airplanes and the introduction of the Fly By Wire technology. Nowadays I think that most of the 'bugs' are fixed and this generation of airplane is very nice, enjoyable and safe to fly.
My point of view on the Habsheim crash is better described by the following FCOM 1.27.20 p3 paragraph:
"FLARE MODE: (...) as the aircraft descend through 30ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it to 2 degres nose down over a period of 8 seconds"
I am not going to discuss the good or the bad of doing flypasts in an airliner full of passenger... But look carefully at this FCOM paragraph and you will understand that this airplane was already in FLARE mode (DFDR data shows RA less than 30ft at some point) and introduced a pitch down moment exactly when the pilot needed the opposite. Pilot lack of knowledge? Airbus bad design? it is a mix of both who made this airplane crash.
Did Airbus change the logic of these modes after this crash? I have honestly no idea. But the latter Flight Controls designs on the A330 and A340 show lots of differrences compared to the initial A320 design. On the 330/340 no more FACs or ELACs but 3 PRIMs and 2 SECs... Most of the functions remaining the same (alpha prot / alpha floor / high speed prot etc.)
Flypasts at 20ft in the simulator will be worth trying... If I have a chance to do it, I will let you know.
Happy new year
BD
My point of view on the Habsheim crash is better described by the following FCOM 1.27.20 p3 paragraph:
"FLARE MODE: (...) as the aircraft descend through 30ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it to 2 degres nose down over a period of 8 seconds"
I am not going to discuss the good or the bad of doing flypasts in an airliner full of passenger... But look carefully at this FCOM paragraph and you will understand that this airplane was already in FLARE mode (DFDR data shows RA less than 30ft at some point) and introduced a pitch down moment exactly when the pilot needed the opposite. Pilot lack of knowledge? Airbus bad design? it is a mix of both who made this airplane crash.
Did Airbus change the logic of these modes after this crash? I have honestly no idea. But the latter Flight Controls designs on the A330 and A340 show lots of differrences compared to the initial A320 design. On the 330/340 no more FACs or ELACs but 3 PRIMs and 2 SECs... Most of the functions remaining the same (alpha prot / alpha floor / high speed prot etc.)
Flypasts at 20ft in the simulator will be worth trying... If I have a chance to do it, I will let you know.
Happy new year
BD
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The shrimp was on holidays.
John, Norbert Jacquet does not make a theory but he talks about facts, with documents (on his website). For example: the story of false airline pilot licenses or the different trials he won dealing with forgeries on the crashes reports. The documents he used for these trials are huge and we are unable to present all of them here, translated, but results have to be considerated: Norbert Jacquet won the trials.
Edifying facts, just like those which have already been presented here, are numerous but are not translated in English yet. We are working on a complete file in English, but it’s a tough job and we need time for a serious work. We will put these documents on line on a website that we are going to create. Dozen of pages have to be translated, and this only for his own book!
Meanwhile, here’s a few extracts of a long legal expert’s job (7 half days), carried out by two judicial experts (on this topic, Norbert Jacquet was called a funny guy, a crackpot, a paranoiac, and he was accused of many things):
( http://jacno.com/an13.htm ) Is it enough?
Norbert Jacquet said that just after the crash. In all the newspapers: http://jacno.com/an00.htm (“An abnormal limitation by the computer of the pilot’s action on the flight controls etc.” … “an order of the computers to land” etc.
Happy new year to all of you.
Edifying facts, just like those which have already been presented here, are numerous but are not translated in English yet. We are working on a complete file in English, but it’s a tough job and we need time for a serious work. We will put these documents on line on a website that we are going to create. Dozen of pages have to be translated, and this only for his own book!
Meanwhile, here’s a few extracts of a long legal expert’s job (7 half days), carried out by two judicial experts (on this topic, Norbert Jacquet was called a funny guy, a crackpot, a paranoiac, and he was accused of many things):
We examined Mr Norbert Jacquet on the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 11th of April 2000 at the prison of Epinal [France] … This examination did not reveal any pathology of his personality.
…
The tests did not reveal any trouble of his mental functioning nor paranoia structure of his personality.
…
Norbert Jacquet’s personality is normal. He integrated an established system of value. He knows the prohibitions and laws. He is fully able to respect them and is not inclined to infringe them.
…
His behaviour concerns a contextual and non pathological aspect.
…
[Recall of what Norbert had to go through] The fact that in such a situation his personality did not change shows us a good psychic balance.
…
Norbert Jacquet’s personality is deprived of pathology.
…
The tests did not reveal any trouble of his mental functioning nor paranoia structure of his personality.
…
Norbert Jacquet’s personality is normal. He integrated an established system of value. He knows the prohibitions and laws. He is fully able to respect them and is not inclined to infringe them.
…
His behaviour concerns a contextual and non pathological aspect.
…
[Recall of what Norbert had to go through] The fact that in such a situation his personality did not change shows us a good psychic balance.
…
Norbert Jacquet’s personality is deprived of pathology.
But look carefully at this FCOM paragraph and you will understand that this airplane was already in FLARE mode (DFDR data shows RA less than 30ft at some point) and introduced a pitch down moment exactly when the pilot needed the opposite. Pilot lack of knowledge? Airbus bad design? it is a mix of both who made this airplane crash.
Happy new year to all of you.
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My point of view on the Habsheim crash is better described by the following FCOM 1.27.20 p3 paragraph:
"FLARE MODE: (...) as the aircraft descend through 30ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it to 2 degres nose down over a period of 8 econds"
"FLARE MODE: (...) as the aircraft descend through 30ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it to 2 degres nose down over a period of 8 econds"
Selective quoting on your part, by leaving out the important bit in the (...) it paints a different story. Also left the bit out after the last sentence.
The aircraft adds a bias into the control system equivalent to pilot control input that would result nose attitude that is two degrees lower than what the attitude was when passing 50 over a period of 8 seconds.
It does not try and reduce the attitude to 2 degrees nose down over a period of 8.
A pilot can still get a 15 degree nose up in the flare even if passing 50ft the nose attitude was zero simply by pulling back on the control stick.
You have also mislead people by not also stating what happens when TOGA is selected as per FCOM 1.22.30.
I think you will find he was with the test pilots when it was certified, and had done low passes and low level alfa max before in a test aircraft at a more suitable location. Not with a bunch of passengers, fully briefed and prepared, and not over rising terrain with obstacles at the end.
The design is almost the same between them, some FAC functions went into the PRIMs, MLA was added, LAF removed, additional spoilers and actuators. Control systems gains were kept similar so that handling characteristics similar between the family.
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Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. You chaps from the "Old Country" have produced some crackers like the Bristol freighter or the Shorts Skyvan that they forgot to unpack from the container. You even turned a lovely DC-4 into an ugly Carvair. I thought the first 747 I spotted at Kai Tak on my way to report for duty on a Convair 880, was not a pretty sight. Don't worry, you'll get over it; the A380 looks great and will look even better when they lenghten it eventually like the DC-8.
Last edited by HotDog; 2nd Jan 2007 at 11:12.
Thanks for the laugh HotDog. 
But you're right, it is a stumpy looking aircraft. Length would improve its appearance (said the actress to the bishop) but that would bring its own problems ...... to an aircraft that already has plenty.
PS - While this corner of the world is now my adopted home I am, too, originally from south of the equator ...... but a long way from you!
But you're right, it is a stumpy looking aircraft. Length would improve its appearance (said the actress to the bishop) but that would bring its own problems ...... to an aircraft that already has plenty.
PS - While this corner of the world is now my adopted home I am, too, originally from south of the equator ...... but a long way from you!
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I wish you a Happy New Year "Daniel". Come back south again some day and we'll have a beer or two. Qantas should have their A380s by then. (InshAllah)
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The aircraft adds a bias into the control system equivalent to pilot control input that would result nose attitude that is two degrees lower than what the attitude was when passing 50 over a period of 8 seconds.
It does not try and reduce the attitude to 2 degrees nose down over a period of 8.
It does not try and reduce the attitude to 2 degrees nose down over a period of 8.
But I'm not an expert in English language ... you can guess, but if what you say is true, should not have they wrote:
"As the aircraft descends through 30ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it of 2 deg nose down over a period of 8 seconds"
... but I may be wrong on that one ... so let's say it's a question ?
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The missing bit that was not posted boeingdriverx in the (...) where he did not include all the text from the FCOM.
Originally Posted by Airbus FCOM 1.27.20
FLARE MODE
The flight mode changes to flare mode when the aircraft passes 50 ft RA as it descends to land.
The system memorises the attitude at 50 ft, and that attitude become the initial reference for pitch attitude control.
As the aircraft descends through 30 ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it to 2º nose down over a period of 8 seconds. This means it takes gentle nose-up action by the pilot to flare the aircraft.
The flight mode changes to flare mode when the aircraft passes 50 ft RA as it descends to land.
The system memorises the attitude at 50 ft, and that attitude become the initial reference for pitch attitude control.
As the aircraft descends through 30 ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it to 2º nose down over a period of 8 seconds. This means it takes gentle nose-up action by the pilot to flare the aircraft.
Taking one part of that out of context has a different meaning as boeingdriverx demonstrated.
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Zeke,
sorry
you write:"It is 2º nose down FROM the initial reference"
but airbus write: "reducing it to 2º nose down"
This two sentences are NOT logically the same, you are making an assumption. Your intepretation might be good or wrong. I think these sentences are quite ambiguous.
So don't be so sure of yourself when different interpretation are possible.
BD
sorry
you write:"It is 2º nose down FROM the initial reference"
but airbus write: "reducing it to 2º nose down"
This two sentences are NOT logically the same, you are making an assumption. Your intepretation might be good or wrong. I think these sentences are quite ambiguous.
So don't be so sure of yourself when different interpretation are possible.
BD
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The INTIAL REFERANCE is not the 0º pitch attitude on the PFD, it is the attitude at 50’.
This is exactly the same with your aircraft and manuals at Gulf Air. Feel free to speak to one of your airbus training captains for further clarification.
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Originally Posted by Clandestino
Can you, or for that matter anyone PPRuNeing, defend this flypast as being executed safely, even prior hitting the trees?
Absolutely not, and I don’t think anybody would argue on that.
But how responsible was it not to communicate to the pilots the following OEBs:
1- OEB 19/1: Engine acceleration deficiency at low altitude.
2- OEB 06/2: Baro-setting cross check.
Knowing that would have been a valuable input for MA not to go there !
Now instead of talking, let's practice a little exercise:
Link A (5 videos)
First video is known as the "Official video", the only one retained by the commission
Following 4 videos ... have been ignored by the commission
Link B (1 video)
That video is the same as the official one ... except for the soundtrack !
For the purpose of that exercise:
- crank up the volume
- take a timing between the yellow balloon … and engine spool up
Do the exercise on the official video from Link A
Do the same exercise on the video from Link B
And draw your own conclusion ...
In the doubt, compare with the remaining 4 videos from Link A and find out which video is the only one not to show the same timing for engine spool up.
Additional notes:
- Identify the differences of wording between official video from Link A and video from Link B.
- Note on official video from Link A the words “TRES BON” at time 0030
How can we ear: "TRES BON" ?
Where is it coming from ?
Who would dare saying "VERY GOOD" on the sight of a crashing aircraft ?
So, if the pilot is the only one at fault, and the airplane so clean ...
Why that need to modify the soundtrack !?
Join Date: Sep 2005
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Absolutely not, and I don’t think anybody would argue on that.
But how responsible was it not to communicate to the pilots the following OEBs:
1- OEB 19/1: Engine acceleration deficiency at low altitude.
2- OEB 06/2: Baro-setting cross check.
Knowing that would have been a valuable input for MA not to go there !
Now instead of talking, let's practice a little exercise:
Link A (5 videos)
First video is known as the "Official video", the only one retained by the commission
Following 4 videos ... have been ignored by the commission
Link B (1 video)
That video is the same as the official one ... except for the soundtrack !
For the purpose of that exercise:
- crank up the volume
- take a timing between the yellow balloon … and engine spool up
Do the exercise on the official video from Link A
Do the same exercise on the video from Link B
And draw your own conclusion ...
In the doubt, compare with the remaining 4 videos from Link A and find out which video is the only one not to show the same timing for engine spool up.
Additional notes:
- Identify the differences of wording between official video from Link A and video from Link B.
- Note on official video from Link A the words “TRES BON” at time 0030
How can we ear: "TRES BON" ?
Where is it coming from ?
Who would dare saying "VERY GOOD" on the sight of a crashing aircraft ?
So, if the pilot is the only one at fault, and the airplane so clean ...
Why that need to modify the soundtrack !?
But how responsible was it not to communicate to the pilots the following OEBs:
1- OEB 19/1: Engine acceleration deficiency at low altitude.
2- OEB 06/2: Baro-setting cross check.
Knowing that would have been a valuable input for MA not to go there !
Now instead of talking, let's practice a little exercise:
Link A (5 videos)
First video is known as the "Official video", the only one retained by the commission
Following 4 videos ... have been ignored by the commission
Link B (1 video)
That video is the same as the official one ... except for the soundtrack !
For the purpose of that exercise:
- crank up the volume
- take a timing between the yellow balloon … and engine spool up
Do the exercise on the official video from Link A
Do the same exercise on the video from Link B
And draw your own conclusion ...
In the doubt, compare with the remaining 4 videos from Link A and find out which video is the only one not to show the same timing for engine spool up.
Additional notes:
- Identify the differences of wording between official video from Link A and video from Link B.
- Note on official video from Link A the words “TRES BON” at time 0030
How can we ear: "TRES BON" ?
Where is it coming from ?
Who would dare saying "VERY GOOD" on the sight of a crashing aircraft ?
So, if the pilot is the only one at fault, and the airplane so clean ...
Why that need to modify the soundtrack !?
It is also clear that Billions were at stake at Airbus, the company's very survival was at stake, with Billions of government money invested. Were Airbus and the French government going to let an investigation blame the aircraft and possibly sink the whole company?
The soundtrack exercise leave no doubt. If one starts a timer at the moment the A-320 passes the hot air balloon to when the engine spool up is heard, there is a few seconds difference according to which version of the tape you listen to. The soundtrack was surely doctored, and one cannot do that without doctoring the flight data recorder to match the doctored soundtrack.
Does anyone know this story? http://www.historylink.org/essays/ou...fm?file_id=390
http://www.historylink.org/this_week...08_04_2005.cfm
http://www.flightsim.com/cgi/kds?$=m...rel/barrel.htm
http://www.vsocial.com/video/?d=4468
Although Tex Jonhston did this manoeuvre on orders from his superiors, he was reprimanded for doing it, and had he failed and survived, the blame would have been put squarely on his shoulders. The same thing was to happen in the A-320 affair, except that the Captain expected the engine to spool up when he called for it, not seconds later.