EASA Resilience
A short video presentation (with transcript) including Resilience via Simple / Complex Systems.
In https://thenewview.com.au - select Resources
This is a gentle guide arriving at Resilience towards the end, but importantly arguing the need for a change in thinking about safety management - regulators take note.
Copy of transcript - Simple vs Complex Thinking: Safety Science Essentials 1 – Introduction
https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/ms41m...wcsu5a3v6&dl=0
To revisit the referenced Rasmussen’s model - which again identifies the need to adjust to modern views of safety management (at least sections 1 and 2), see:
http://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/16252.pdf
In https://thenewview.com.au - select Resources
This is a gentle guide arriving at Resilience towards the end, but importantly arguing the need for a change in thinking about safety management - regulators take note.
Copy of transcript - Simple vs Complex Thinking: Safety Science Essentials 1 – Introduction
https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/ms41m...wcsu5a3v6&dl=0
To revisit the referenced Rasmussen’s model - which again identifies the need to adjust to modern views of safety management (at least sections 1 and 2), see:
http://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/16252.pdf
Thread Starter
Resilience, Risk Management
Although the title of the paper includes Resilience, it relates more to conventional deffinitions.
Yet there is value by presenting Resilience from a risk based view.
"The pursuit of resilience involves risk management."
"Resilience is not calculable. Unquantifiable, disputable, and disputed judgment will remain central to its pursuit."
http://john-adams.co.uk/wp-content/u...resilience.pdf
Yet there is value by presenting Resilience from a risk based view.
"The pursuit of resilience involves risk management."
- Judgement
- … 'uncertainty is qualified by probability'
- … 'on judgments that cannot be objectively validated'
"Resilience is not calculable. Unquantifiable, disputable, and disputed judgment will remain central to its pursuit."
http://john-adams.co.uk/wp-content/u...resilience.pdf
Resilience Risk Uncertainty
Part 1 of the ref below considers resilience from a more conventional definition. However, when read in combination with Risk, Uncertainty, and Decision Making, it provides a practical overview of safety activity.
See page 13, but the overall document has significant safety value.
" Resilience is in some ways the counter to vulnerability. It is defined as being shock-ready, and having the ability to resist, survive, adapt and/or even thrive … "
" This requires knowledge of the hazards, and having the skills needed to anticipate and cope with the demands and changing circumstances they may encounter. "
" There are risks we take (choosing an action in the view that the benefit outweighs possible harm), and there are risks we face (those we don’t choose but have to deal with). When facing risks we try to protect ourselves; when taking risks we look for advantage, but also need to prepare for possible failure … "
Whilst SMS is more about the protection from risk, Resilience is aligned with preparedness and managing the limitations of SMS, the unforeseen hazards and surprises, and incomprehensible events ( Shock - a sudden, disruptive event with an important and often negative impact on a system/s and its assets. Page 11, note systems view )
" risk - the effect of uncertainty on objectives. "
This view of Resilience aligns more with safety management (organisational and individual) than with the CRM training required by EASA.
Yet the second document covers the subjects in more depth it also has greater relevance to CRM. In particular: perceptions, heuristics and biases, judgement, and the influence of media on science or web based information, and of course forums like this one.
" A worldview is a particular philosophy, or collection of beliefs, about life and the universe that is held by an individual or a group. We use the term to indicate the overall perspective from which one sees and interprets the world. "
Ref: 'Making decisions in the face of uncertainty: Understanding risk'
https://www.apothecaries.org/wp-cont...isk_Part-1.pdf
https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/defau...-Nov-2016-.pdf
Part 3 of the series may not have been published - yet ?
See page 13, but the overall document has significant safety value.
" Resilience is in some ways the counter to vulnerability. It is defined as being shock-ready, and having the ability to resist, survive, adapt and/or even thrive … "
" This requires knowledge of the hazards, and having the skills needed to anticipate and cope with the demands and changing circumstances they may encounter. "
" There are risks we take (choosing an action in the view that the benefit outweighs possible harm), and there are risks we face (those we don’t choose but have to deal with). When facing risks we try to protect ourselves; when taking risks we look for advantage, but also need to prepare for possible failure … "
Whilst SMS is more about the protection from risk, Resilience is aligned with preparedness and managing the limitations of SMS, the unforeseen hazards and surprises, and incomprehensible events ( Shock - a sudden, disruptive event with an important and often negative impact on a system/s and its assets. Page 11, note systems view )
" risk - the effect of uncertainty on objectives. "
This view of Resilience aligns more with safety management (organisational and individual) than with the CRM training required by EASA.
Yet the second document covers the subjects in more depth it also has greater relevance to CRM. In particular: perceptions, heuristics and biases, judgement, and the influence of media on science or web based information, and of course forums like this one.
" A worldview is a particular philosophy, or collection of beliefs, about life and the universe that is held by an individual or a group. We use the term to indicate the overall perspective from which one sees and interprets the world. "
Ref: 'Making decisions in the face of uncertainty: Understanding risk'
https://www.apothecaries.org/wp-cont...isk_Part-1.pdf
https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/defau...-Nov-2016-.pdf
Part 3 of the series may not have been published - yet ?
Thread Starter
Anticipating this to be top shelf reading
The thesis -
How is anticipation, as part of system resilience, operationalised on the flight deck, and to what extent does the regulation facilitate it? answers the questions in this thread.
It has practical value throughout - Introduction, Findings, Discussion and Conclusion; then Resilience, CRM, Training. There might not be agreement about everything, but that is part of the issue.
This is 'the' document which should be sent to EASA - the problems with current regulation, work as imagined vs work as done.
https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?...ileOId=9140014
How is anticipation, as part of system resilience, operationalised on the flight deck, and to what extent does the regulation facilitate it? answers the questions in this thread.
It has practical value throughout - Introduction, Findings, Discussion and Conclusion; then Resilience, CRM, Training. There might not be agreement about everything, but that is part of the issue.
This is 'the' document which should be sent to EASA - the problems with current regulation, work as imagined vs work as done.
https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?...ileOId=9140014
'Thinking in Systems', (https://wtf.tw/ref/meadows.pdf from 'websites'), has a section on Resilience - page 76 onwards.
This relates key resilient aspects to feedback loops in systems.
It identifies the need to manage resilience, implying there is intrinsic resilience to start with, although we may not have identified the factors as such.
Part one provides the foundations for systems thinking.
Part two relates aspects of human behaviour, e.g rationality page 105.
A bullet-point summary for 'systems' - page 188 onwards.
This relates key resilient aspects to feedback loops in systems.
It identifies the need to manage resilience, implying there is intrinsic resilience to start with, although we may not have identified the factors as such.
Part one provides the foundations for systems thinking.
Part two relates aspects of human behaviour, e.g rationality page 105.
A bullet-point summary for 'systems' - page 188 onwards.
Resilience Engineering and Safety-II
This post might be better presented as a poll; if so, mods (JT) please help.
The document (33 slides) - https://speakerdeck.com/stevenshorro...ii-in-practice asks, …
“What are your experiences of the key challenges and opportunities for Resilience Engineering and Safety-II as a practitioner?”
The collated views of the 'practitioners' (slide11) are listed below:-
Given the discussion in this thread, how do front line operators agree or otherwise with these findings ?
Any differences between regulatory authorities; EASA, FAA, Other ?
-
The document (33 slides) - https://speakerdeck.com/stevenshorro...ii-in-practice asks, …
“What are your experiences of the key challenges and opportunities for Resilience Engineering and Safety-II as a practitioner?”
The collated views of the 'practitioners' (slide11) are listed below:-
Given the discussion in this thread, how do front line operators agree or otherwise with these findings ?
Any differences between regulatory authorities; EASA, FAA, Other ?
-
- The term ‘resilience’ is often seen as an individual trait
- There is limited understanding of the concepts of RE and S-II
- Theoretical writings aren’t always helpful
- Resilience Engineering and Safety-II
- The practical application of RE and S-II is opaque or difficult
- There is a lack of evidence of effectiveness
- The dominant paradigm, collective mindset or common focus is a barrier
- There are entrenched and conflicting legacy approaches
- The need is not evident or the value is unclear
- There is a lack of resources (competency, time, money)
- RE and S-II ideas are understood, appreciated and talked about
- RE and S-II offer a better explanation of the world
- Practical opportunities to learn and move toward a better understanding of work
- (Few) Opportunities for usable and practical methods
- (Few) Opportunities to develop expertise in RE and S-II
A short article which argues that resilience is natural; at least for the human contribution (sharp and blunt ends), to system resilience.
'It’s pretty evident that safety thinking has to evolve and cope with an ever more complex environment. But survival in challenging environments is what humans evolved to do best.'
'So let’s stop arguing. Resilience is natural, it’s essential. We’ve always had it – let’s use it intelligently.'
The missing aspect is how; the 'how-to' use resilience involving thinking, using our brain, improving the way we think about safety in operations, but this might assume that we are allowed to think in a controlling, SOP dominated safety culture.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
Slides from a related presentation ('Think', slide 19):-
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
'It’s pretty evident that safety thinking has to evolve and cope with an ever more complex environment. But survival in challenging environments is what humans evolved to do best.'
'So let’s stop arguing. Resilience is natural, it’s essential. We’ve always had it – let’s use it intelligently.'
The missing aspect is how; the 'how-to' use resilience involving thinking, using our brain, improving the way we think about safety in operations, but this might assume that we are allowed to think in a controlling, SOP dominated safety culture.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
Slides from a related presentation ('Think', slide 19):-
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
Learning within the unknowable
'Rethinking The Fifth Discipline'; R. L. Flood
A book about 'Resilience', but doesn't uses the word.
About individual and organisational safety, but not like any other.
A book about Systems Thinking, where the sub title better describes it value;
'Learning within the unknowable'
Download from: https://epdf.tips/rethinking-the-fif...nknowable.html
- or
https://epdf.tips/search/Rethinking+...rt+Louis+Flood
Part 1 reviews Senge's book 'The Fifth Discipline', and briefly introduces eminent historical views of Systems (Systemic) Thinking - complexity, but with sufficient explanation to more than satisfy a cursory view.
Part 2 provides comprehensive presentation of many human related safety issues. Aspects of Resilience, HF, Airmanship, are embedded in the book without identification, thus provide a satisfying challenge to collate the components, which irrespective of individual viewpoint are all there.
An opportunity to change our thinking, to learn within the 'unknowable'.
Author's reflections:
"I was taught that concluding a book on ‘management and organisation’ normally is not very difficult. The task is to tie up, round off, and crystallise the argument. The book is reduced in this way to an island of thought on which the reader, if convinced, may build their future.
With systemic thinking, conversely, comes an ocean of ideas that is a medium for many currents of thought that give rise to endless tides of appreciation. It is a way of thinking that sets out to erode islands of thought and certainly cannot be reduced to one. So, I am unable to offer you a conclusion as such. Instead, I urge you to see the image on the front cover of this book. And I urge you to listen to the echoes and re-echoes passing between the covers of this book. Then you will see and hear, again and again, that:
A book about 'Resilience', but doesn't uses the word.
About individual and organisational safety, but not like any other.
A book about Systems Thinking, where the sub title better describes it value;
'Learning within the unknowable'
Download from: https://epdf.tips/rethinking-the-fif...nknowable.html
- or
https://epdf.tips/search/Rethinking+...rt+Louis+Flood
Part 1 reviews Senge's book 'The Fifth Discipline', and briefly introduces eminent historical views of Systems (Systemic) Thinking - complexity, but with sufficient explanation to more than satisfy a cursory view.
Part 2 provides comprehensive presentation of many human related safety issues. Aspects of Resilience, HF, Airmanship, are embedded in the book without identification, thus provide a satisfying challenge to collate the components, which irrespective of individual viewpoint are all there.
An opportunity to change our thinking, to learn within the 'unknowable'.
Author's reflections:
"I was taught that concluding a book on ‘management and organisation’ normally is not very difficult. The task is to tie up, round off, and crystallise the argument. The book is reduced in this way to an island of thought on which the reader, if convinced, may build their future.
With systemic thinking, conversely, comes an ocean of ideas that is a medium for many currents of thought that give rise to endless tides of appreciation. It is a way of thinking that sets out to erode islands of thought and certainly cannot be reduced to one. So, I am unable to offer you a conclusion as such. Instead, I urge you to see the image on the front cover of this book. And I urge you to listen to the echoes and re-echoes passing between the covers of this book. Then you will see and hear, again and again, that:
- We will not struggle to manage over things – we will manage within the unmanageable.
- We will not battle to organise the totality – we will organise within the unorganisable
- We will not simply know things – but we will know of the unknowable.
Thread Starter
" In terms of resilience, the current EASA regulation on Crew Resource Management (CRM) appears somewhat vague and has a flavour of a compromise and reductionism.
While it outlines the "what," it falls short in explaining the "how."
It presents resilience as an individual's property, without receiving support from human factors and system safety research.
The airline training manager's perspective is heavily influenced by compliance with the regulation, shaping how instructors in the organization perceive resilience.
As a result, there is no clear and consistent definition of resilience among the individual instructors."
Quote from -
https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?...ileOId=9140014
How do these views, the discussion and findings, in this thesis correlate with Pprune operators experience; a wider international section of the industry ?
Also see: 'Safety, Leaders, and Learning. A Practical Guide to HOP'
How to Implement …
https://www.norskindustri.no/hms-og-...-guide-to-hop/
and Learning;
https://alwayssafe.no/en/
While it outlines the "what," it falls short in explaining the "how."
It presents resilience as an individual's property, without receiving support from human factors and system safety research.
The airline training manager's perspective is heavily influenced by compliance with the regulation, shaping how instructors in the organization perceive resilience.
As a result, there is no clear and consistent definition of resilience among the individual instructors."
Quote from -
https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?...ileOId=9140014
How do these views, the discussion and findings, in this thesis correlate with Pprune operators experience; a wider international section of the industry ?
Also see: 'Safety, Leaders, and Learning. A Practical Guide to HOP'
How to Implement …
https://www.norskindustri.no/hms-og-...-guide-to-hop/
and Learning;
https://alwayssafe.no/en/
Thread Starter
Resilience in the fog
Not classic 'Resilience' … , but the subject is embedded in the link; as is CRM, Systems Thinking, foresight, uncertainty, and much more.
"Knowing how to think empowers you far beyond those who know only what to think."
… this helps ensure that we are resilient, flexible and adaptable and that we can take advantage of new advances in time to make a difference.
"Our ability to prepare, to anticipate and to be agile in the face of rapid change means we can manage risk by mitigating the impact we have on each other and our environment. Ultimately, saving and improving lives."
… a willingness to embrace uncertainty, failure and the future through their culture and values are more likely to be resilient and adaptable. If we prepare well for the future, we improve and enhance the present too.
'Unfogging the Future'
https://assets.publishing.service.go...NE_VERSION.pdf
Don't miss the 'Extra Bites' references and tool kits
"Knowing how to think empowers you far beyond those who know only what to think."
… this helps ensure that we are resilient, flexible and adaptable and that we can take advantage of new advances in time to make a difference.
"Our ability to prepare, to anticipate and to be agile in the face of rapid change means we can manage risk by mitigating the impact we have on each other and our environment. Ultimately, saving and improving lives."
… a willingness to embrace uncertainty, failure and the future through their culture and values are more likely to be resilient and adaptable. If we prepare well for the future, we improve and enhance the present too.
'Unfogging the Future'
https://assets.publishing.service.go...NE_VERSION.pdf
Don't miss the 'Extra Bites' references and tool kits
Thread Starter
Fantasy Planning: Safety Management
The title of this paper might not be an eye-catching, attention grabbing headline requiring action, but this text could be one of the most valuable contributions to safety management in modern times.
Resilience emerges at the end, almost as it had to be mentioned; however in context, the paper seeks to enhance resilience. Similarly it relates to High Reliability, and the need to understand how work is done.
A very thoughtful and thought provoking paper, which should be read and reviewed more than once; complexity evolves, risk changes, thus continually revisit the views of risk, less we use fantasy planning.
'Fantasy Planning'; Hutchinson, Dekker, Rae
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...of-systems.pdf
(select join researchgate for free)
From some of the references:
'No Safety in Numbers: Persistence of Biases and Their Effects on Team Risk Perception and Team Decision Making.'
Because individuals can have cognitive biases that lower their perceptions of decision risk, some suggest that teams, not individuals, should make decisions. Prior research, however, has not explored whether a team’s risk perception is affected by information-processing biases that are similar to the cognitive biases that individuals exhibit. This study examines whether three biases—the law of small numbers bias, illusion of control, and overconfidence—influence perception of risk of a first move at the team and individual levels. It was found that the law of small numbers and illusion of control decreased the risk perception at both levels and that the law of small numbers had a significantly greater effect on team risk perception than on individual risk perception. In contrast, the effect of overconfidence was not significant at any level.
'Examining the asymptote in safety progress: A literature review'
https://safety177496371.wordpress.com/2021/07/05/examining-the-asymptote-in-safety-progress-a-literature-review
Many industries are confronted by plateauing safety performance as measured by the absence of negative events, particularly lower-consequence incidents or injuries. At the same time, these industries are sometimes surprised by large fatal accidents that seem to have no connection with their understanding of the risks they faced; or with how they were measuring safety. This article reviews the safety literature to examine how both these surprises and the asymptote are linked to the very structures and practices organizations have in place to manage safety. The article finds that safety practices associated with compliance, control and quantification could be partly responsible. These can create a sense of invulnerability through safety performance close to zero; organizational resources can get deflected into unproductive or counterproductive initiatives; obsolete practices for keeping human performance within a pre-specified bandwidth are sustained; and accountability relationships can encourage suppression of the 'bad news' necessary to learn and improve.
http://sidneydekker.stackedsite.com/...Pitzer2016.pdf
'Safety Management in a World Beyond Simplification'
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/safet...aign=share_via
Resilience emerges at the end, almost as it had to be mentioned; however in context, the paper seeks to enhance resilience. Similarly it relates to High Reliability, and the need to understand how work is done.
A very thoughtful and thought provoking paper, which should be read and reviewed more than once; complexity evolves, risk changes, thus continually revisit the views of risk, less we use fantasy planning.
'Fantasy Planning'; Hutchinson, Dekker, Rae
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...of-systems.pdf
(select join researchgate for free)
From some of the references:
'No Safety in Numbers: Persistence of Biases and Their Effects on Team Risk Perception and Team Decision Making.'
Because individuals can have cognitive biases that lower their perceptions of decision risk, some suggest that teams, not individuals, should make decisions. Prior research, however, has not explored whether a team’s risk perception is affected by information-processing biases that are similar to the cognitive biases that individuals exhibit. This study examines whether three biases—the law of small numbers bias, illusion of control, and overconfidence—influence perception of risk of a first move at the team and individual levels. It was found that the law of small numbers and illusion of control decreased the risk perception at both levels and that the law of small numbers had a significantly greater effect on team risk perception than on individual risk perception. In contrast, the effect of overconfidence was not significant at any level.
'Examining the asymptote in safety progress: A literature review'
https://safety177496371.wordpress.com/2021/07/05/examining-the-asymptote-in-safety-progress-a-literature-review
Many industries are confronted by plateauing safety performance as measured by the absence of negative events, particularly lower-consequence incidents or injuries. At the same time, these industries are sometimes surprised by large fatal accidents that seem to have no connection with their understanding of the risks they faced; or with how they were measuring safety. This article reviews the safety literature to examine how both these surprises and the asymptote are linked to the very structures and practices organizations have in place to manage safety. The article finds that safety practices associated with compliance, control and quantification could be partly responsible. These can create a sense of invulnerability through safety performance close to zero; organizational resources can get deflected into unproductive or counterproductive initiatives; obsolete practices for keeping human performance within a pre-specified bandwidth are sustained; and accountability relationships can encourage suppression of the 'bad news' necessary to learn and improve.
http://sidneydekker.stackedsite.com/...Pitzer2016.pdf
'Safety Management in a World Beyond Simplification'
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/safet...aign=share_via
I would be very interested to know how these seemingly abstract and predominantly academic concepts can be conveyed to the average airline pilot. I must hasten to add that the average airline pilot generally has an intelligent brain that has to hold quite a bit of technical and operational information on a routine basis. I speak as a current instructor active within EBT and after asking crews to define resilience there is unlikely to be consensus. Unfortunately we are human beings, not robots and it appears that this highly theoretical way of thinking is actually a condition that is built into humans naturally; ie we all have a certain amount of resilience in built that increases with experience (not just flying) and exposure to events, simulated or real. I am most certainly not a Luddite and as I am supposed to deliver EBT I have a vested interest in knowing definitions and how to deliver training effectively but I am not sure what we are trying to achieve. Resilience did not save AF447 but an understanding of aerodynamics and stall recovery procedures particularly at high altitude might have.
Moderator
Perhaps you might follow Centaurus's path (among others). John has collected a voluminous quantity of useful reports etc., over the years. It is his practice to distribute copies to students for reading information. Obviously, not all students bother reading them but, for those who do, there be some benefits.
'It works in practice, but not in theory'
A major problem with resilience depends on how it is defined; this is where training discussion starts from - as questioned in post #1.
The EASA view, and other individual training initiatives consider Resilience as something the human will have, thus should be trained. As a continuing evolution of individual HF, team CRM, and thence resilient human performance for uncertain, complex situations.
Alternatively most of the academic views consider Resilience as a capacity of a system.
The distinction is identified by the term Resilience Engineering - how to construct a safety management system for a complex and uncertain future. This requires a change in safety thinking, revised views of safety management, new vs old view of safety, SI and SII, which as yet is not happening, and something where regulators have to lead - adapt their thoughts about safety management.
Arguably, individual and team training is approaching a limit of effectiveness; flatlining safety statistics, difficulty in measuring results based on failure in a safe industry - fewer accidents. Further training, if at all, has to evolve from how to avoid failing, to how to succeed in unforeseeable situations. This might focus on aspects of individual surprise and risk management, not seeking to change behaviour, but manage it; also consider how natural human resilence can complement a system as an adaptive component.
The need of a new paradigm for safety management (Resilience Engineering) is well represented in several papers, but again arguably, not yet adapted possible because of the current high level of safety, no need to change - but we should not have to wait for the surprising events - proactive safety management.
AF 447 discussions are a good example of the differing viewpoints.
- Errant human behaviour, old safety, SI, more training, … (a confusing view of personal resilience)
- A systems view; how-come the previous 20 or so events did not result in an accident, even with some similar human behaviour initially. What was learnt about human performance from these events?
The conclusion was that the ADS design in rare situations was not as assumed by certification, and thus required to be changed. The focus was technical.
Alternatively a joint tech, human, situational system view might have provided better interim safety intervention; crews did not respond as assumed by the checklist, but did recover, changed activity. e.g. simulator training for unreliable airspeed flight actions, vs the awareness of do nothing - read the checklist and reassess the situation (not economic use of a simulator).
The EASA view, and other individual training initiatives consider Resilience as something the human will have, thus should be trained. As a continuing evolution of individual HF, team CRM, and thence resilient human performance for uncertain, complex situations.
Alternatively most of the academic views consider Resilience as a capacity of a system.
The distinction is identified by the term Resilience Engineering - how to construct a safety management system for a complex and uncertain future. This requires a change in safety thinking, revised views of safety management, new vs old view of safety, SI and SII, which as yet is not happening, and something where regulators have to lead - adapt their thoughts about safety management.
Arguably, individual and team training is approaching a limit of effectiveness; flatlining safety statistics, difficulty in measuring results based on failure in a safe industry - fewer accidents. Further training, if at all, has to evolve from how to avoid failing, to how to succeed in unforeseeable situations. This might focus on aspects of individual surprise and risk management, not seeking to change behaviour, but manage it; also consider how natural human resilence can complement a system as an adaptive component.
The need of a new paradigm for safety management (Resilience Engineering) is well represented in several papers, but again arguably, not yet adapted possible because of the current high level of safety, no need to change - but we should not have to wait for the surprising events - proactive safety management.
AF 447 discussions are a good example of the differing viewpoints.
- Errant human behaviour, old safety, SI, more training, … (a confusing view of personal resilience)
- A systems view; how-come the previous 20 or so events did not result in an accident, even with some similar human behaviour initially. What was learnt about human performance from these events?
The conclusion was that the ADS design in rare situations was not as assumed by certification, and thus required to be changed. The focus was technical.
Alternatively a joint tech, human, situational system view might have provided better interim safety intervention; crews did not respond as assumed by the checklist, but did recover, changed activity. e.g. simulator training for unreliable airspeed flight actions, vs the awareness of do nothing - read the checklist and reassess the situation (not economic use of a simulator).
Last edited by alf5071h; 18th Mar 2024 at 14:05. Reason: Sp
Thread Starter
This thread has been and continues to be an education; adding knowledge and improving understanding.
Searching for definitions can distract from the need for action in a changing world.
Instead of separating the human from the system (# 35), consider concentric systems (Russian dolls).
Individuals as a system (HF), groups, teams, crews a larger system (CRM), then these within organisations (SMS), all within an industry - Resilience.
EASA has chosen to consider Resilience by starting with CRM, as an aspect of individual or team behaviour; this is of little value as CRM is already taught. Furthermore, Resilience at the HF/CRM level could be detrimental unless the higher levels have previously accepted the concept, i.e. an operator engages with Safety II (SI + SII), but the regulator retains a Safety I mindset.
There is need of Resilience in SMS because of increasing complexity; this should be applied at organisational level it would be better supported if regulators first adopted the concept in their activities.
It is not necessary for the individuals / teams ('inner dolls') within the larger system to apply the academic views, use them as supporting information.
The safety benefit from Resilience must be understood and applied in all safety management systems; without this, then much of what the lower levels do to improve safety has little benefit and adds confusion.
The need is for adaptive safety leadership suitable for the future world; EASA may have misunderstood the concept or misused it in starting with CRM; first look at safety regulation.
Searching for definitions can distract from the need for action in a changing world.
Instead of separating the human from the system (# 35), consider concentric systems (Russian dolls).
Individuals as a system (HF), groups, teams, crews a larger system (CRM), then these within organisations (SMS), all within an industry - Resilience.
EASA has chosen to consider Resilience by starting with CRM, as an aspect of individual or team behaviour; this is of little value as CRM is already taught. Furthermore, Resilience at the HF/CRM level could be detrimental unless the higher levels have previously accepted the concept, i.e. an operator engages with Safety II (SI + SII), but the regulator retains a Safety I mindset.
There is need of Resilience in SMS because of increasing complexity; this should be applied at organisational level it would be better supported if regulators first adopted the concept in their activities.
It is not necessary for the individuals / teams ('inner dolls') within the larger system to apply the academic views, use them as supporting information.
The safety benefit from Resilience must be understood and applied in all safety management systems; without this, then much of what the lower levels do to improve safety has little benefit and adds confusion.
The need is for adaptive safety leadership suitable for the future world; EASA may have misunderstood the concept or misused it in starting with CRM; first look at safety regulation.
Last edited by PEI_3721; 25th Mar 2024 at 14:15. Reason: Clarity
