EASA Resilience

[PEI_3721]

This thread has been and continues to be an education; adding knowledge and improving understanding.
Searching for definitions can distract from the need for action in a changing world.

Instead of separating the human from the system (# 35), consider concentric systems (Russian dolls).
Individuals as a system (HF), groups, teams, crews a larger system (CRM), then these within organisations (SMS), all within an industry - Resilience.

EASA has chosen to consider Resilience by starting with CRM, as an aspect of individual or team behaviour; this is of little value as CRM is already taught. Furthermore, Resilience at the HF/CRM level could be detrimental unless the higher levels have previously accepted the concept, i.e. an operator engages with Safety II (SI + SII), but the regulator retains a Safety I mindset.

There is need of Resilience in SMS because of increasing complexity; this should be applied at organisational level it would be better supported if regulators first adopted the concept in their activities.

It is not necessary for the individuals / teams ('inner dolls') within the larger system to apply the academic views, use them as supporting information.

The safety benefit from Resilience must be understood and applied in all safety management systems; without this, then much of what the lower levels do to improve safety has little benefit and adds confusion.
The need is for adaptive safety leadership suitable for the future world; EASA may have misunderstood the concept or misused it in starting with CRM; first look at safety regulation.