criss

Franzl - even if PIC expected barometric readouts, then after 100 and below he would anyway have been in an "area" mandating a go around - so he couldn't have expected it later on.

Most unfortunately the entire crew probably wondered too, as there were no SOPs, and CRM (briefing) was non-existent.

Also, you try to paint it as "sh*t happens", if I understand you correctly. But since Jan 2008, Polish Air Force had 4 fatal accidents claiming lifes of around 130 people, all in perfectly flyable a/c, all due to same reasons - lack of training, bad procedures (which were being broken anyway), bad airmanship, etc. Additionaly to that other incidents - belly landing, or exposing C130 to excessive g's during approach in Afghanistan, due to incorrect maneuvers, resulting in it not flying any more. So the causes are systematic, not simply "something went wrong this time".

RockShock

Sorry to get between expets discussing, a mere amateur here (Polish expat).

Just wanted to point out that while the MAK report was published in English, the Polish list of remarks was not translated (it was a mistake by Polish gvmnt not to do it themselves - now all the international public opinion has is the MAK version...)
Those remarks have quite a few important questions regarding the ATC actions, namely that ATC was confirming that the a/c was on glidescope until the aircraft was below the runway threshold altitude

So for sure we have a crew that busted the minima on approach, but also it seems (this should be visible from the ATC records that Polish side is going to release) that they were reconfirmed by the ATC that they are on correct g/s all the way until when it was already too late to recover...
Surely it won't take the blame out of the crew completely, but nonetheless the MAK report is so blatantly ignoring any possible mistakes/issues on Russian side it's simply unbelievable. I find it hard to think that all the holes in the cheese were lining up on the Polish side of the border...

RetiredF4

No, not at all. You describe the reasons (crew and leadership) correctly.

I disagree on the motives like busting minimums intentionally or a general in the cockpit making all people nervous. They busted the minimums, but they didnīt plan on it. They got way behind the aircraft due to lack of training, knowledge and CRM. They went through the minimums in a paralyzed state of mind not knowing what to do. They didnīt expect to be down at the minimum that early.
They even planned the go around in automatics, against rules and regs, because they didnīt know better.
We could assume they didnt understand the autopilot at all; the first reaction to decrease the descent rate or to level of was in vain, the appropriate disconnect switcht was not used and the applied pitch force was not enough to disconnect the pitch axis and the craft continued on downward. The second try (again without using the disconnect switch) and final action was so agressive, that the aircraft would have stalled later on even when they would have cleared the terrain.

If you ammend the statement as follows

"sh*t happens..... if you try to do things beyond your capability and run out of luck"

then we are in line.

The roll of ATC is not a glorious one, but the crew missed to ask for the available Radar-NDB approach and hence for the proper assistance. They didnīt state their kind of approach at all.

That the report lies its weight on the polish shortcomings and tries to screen the own shortfalls (calibration of glideslope, resulting glidepath information, approach lighting, acceptance of inproper procedures on the side of the approaching aircraft like not stating the type of approach...) is nothing to wonder about. That is the political side of the story.

franzl

vovachan

the fact they flew on autopilot almost into the tree is proof positive that whoever was flying this plane was thinking happy thoughts that he was still up there on the glideslope, much higher than than he actually was.

dvv

RockShock, a Russian translation of the Polish remarks is widely available. Here's a copy of it: http://avia.servebeer.com/tu-154m_10...%ba%d0%b5).pdf.

criss

Just one thing to remember Franzl - if it was in fact a case of busting minima intentionally, it wouldn't have been the first time, they even referred to doing the same in Gdansk (EPGD). Casa did the same btw. But we'll most likely never know whether it was intentional or not. I agree with your other points - despite all the claims about them being elite etc, they were not properly trained, and not particularly experienced either. They had no simulator training, they taught themselves or learned from each other, and they learned from outdated manuals (LOT's Tu-154 manual from 1994 was mentioned - but PLF101 was a completely different a/c in terms of avionics). It's a real pity, cause I'm sure they all wanted to be good aviators and were passionate about it, but Polish military simply didn't provide them with tools to achieve that.

Rockshock - as stated already, they were in fact on "glide" (or within limits) all the time they were receiving such an information from ATC. Last "on glide" info was some 40 seconds before the crash, before the dive occured. You can't point to a moment were ATC said "on glide" when they in fact weren't. And ATC tried to send them around after that. Anyway, there are solid reasons to believe the crew didn't listen to all of it anyway.

Most of the Polish remarks are irrelevant, and are futile attempts to say "you shouldn't have let us crash our a/c!". I've read a good, even if ironic, comment at a Polish website today - "it's not the tower that crashed, it was the a/c" - while ATC maybe haven't done everything possible to prevent it (that's debatable), it would be difficult to prove they did something important that caused it.

Alice025

Thanks all for answering re General Blasik; I am sorry I have asked at all
:o(

RetiredF4

Where does this information come from? Do you have a reference?

Do you refer to the part of talking prior approach to smolensk, where the PIC is asked wether he had done it before?

Meaning what? Busting minimums intentionaly or doing an approach in bad weather below minimum and landing out of it?

franzl

Alice025

old Smolensk blog is back (and spring drawings from there are even used in the Polish commentary to the MAK report, AML's). They are discussing the Polish commentary, so got it somewhere.

criss

Yes, that's the bit - but it's not a secret here that PLF's made some APPs in Gdansk in the past with weather below minima - mind you though Gdansk has ILS and familiar terrain. Regarding Casa, it's in the respective report.

I'm not sure I understand your differentiation between busting the minima intentionally and doing an approach in wx below minima and landing - unless you mean that actual wx turned out to be better than minima.

janeczku

The final report (page 12) seems to imply that the aircraft was supposed to do a radar+2NDB approach (shouldnt it read PAR+2NDB?). If it has not been discussed already, could anyone shed lights how such a procedure is supposed to be done?

If it was indeed an ATC guided NDB approach, doesnt that imply a direct responsibility of the ground personal for wrongly reporting the position of the aircraft in relation to the glidepath?

THX

criss

Read before posting.

RetiredF4

I just tell, how we did it and how it is probably still done.

Commencing an approach to an airfield with weather below published minima without the intention to land for practice is a procedure you should be familiar with. Its flown down to the minimum followed by a missed approach procedure. Commercial aviation probably does not do any practice approaches except in the simulator, military jets do practice them.

The same procedure is used for a trial approach. The difference is the intention to land out of it, if the runway environment is in sight prior or at the minimum and landing can be assured. We got our landing clearance something like ......... "you are cleared for approach, and cleared for landing if runway in sight, if not, follow published missed approach procedure". Reaching the minimum, you either called "field in sight, landing" or "missed approach". There is no intention allowed to drop below the minimum in order to get sight of the field.

Busting the minima intentionally = commencing approach and continuing intentionally through the pubblished minima without runway environment in sight in order to get the field in sight and land anyway.

Inflight visibility, which is a slant range visibility, i found out often to be better than reported visibility, which is mostly RVR. Once happened that i could see the strobelights from one mile, landed safely and was nearly lost on the ground.

So the procedure itself is sound and does not cause any special danger or risk if executed in a professional mannor.

franzl

Alice025

So, it appears?, they either became undecided, for several seconds, that period between the readings of 100 and down to 60 metres (when an attempt was done to go away, only the automatics were un-switched, and the effort applied to out-force automatic was too weak - so it returned them back on course) - or were morally ready to bust the minima, a little below the 100, thinking that the ground control would not allow descend even to 100 metres again, when they go away from 100 metres, without seeing the runway, in the first attempt.

RegDep

Could somebody familiar with the facts briefly describe (only the facts, not the discussion/dispute), for the benefit of this thread, what was (if anything) on those ATC tapes that were supposed to be published by the Poles on Jan 14th. Facts of interest: From where/whom were they obtained, and what did they contain?

Thanks
Reg

Ptkay

Busting the minima or not is one side of the story.

But absolutely unacceptable was continuing the approach in
a non stabilized, wrong glide-slope.

There should have been calls for go-around much earlier.

The sinking rate was 8m/s instead of 4m/s,
the engines were running 40% instead of prescribed >75%.
All against any SOP.

This should have rung the alarm bells not few seconds, but a minute
before the impact.

Poor airmanship at its best.

Error, after error, after error...

NigelOnDraft

Not really...

The report attempts to desribe the "margin of error" for saying "on glidepath"... we are not talking an ILS needle here, but a "blob" on a screen. If you read the report, you will see references to blob being above the centre of, but still "touching" the, glide slope, and when that is/is not acceptable to describe as "on glide". Clearly open to some interpretation.

However, for much of the approach the aircraft was above the glide, and transitioned low late on due to high V/S - IIRC. The only way an incorrect glideslope call can endanger the aircraft is grossly low v obstacles in the approach path. It is still the pilots' responsibility to go around at minima.

In that the undershoot here was below the airfield, any "error" in calling the glidepath seems irrelevant to the accident. It might have made the visual transition more difficult, but again irrelevant here - there could not have been a visual transition in that weather.

At best there might have been some technical errors on the part of ATC, but they seem to have had zero causal effect on the accident - IMHO

NoD

NigelOnDraft

RetiredF4In the civil world, at least where I work, to prevent people "pushing their luck", we have approach bans.

These mean without the RVR minima being established prior to 1000' / FAF, you cannot continue the approach e.g. if you require 550m RVR for a CAT 1 ILS, and the last info from ATC is 400m, you are breaking the law to continue below 1000'. If below 1000' and it then falls, you can continue.

The only way to play that system is when you get a "satisfactory" RVR to then fail to ask for any more... not only poor practice, but you'll probably get scuppered when it is read out to you unrequested at 1500'!

NoD

NB Cloudbase is not subject to the same restriction.

BOAC

- a totally unknown procedure in all my military and civil time! We actually (in both) called that 'a normal approach'

Kulverstukas

RegDep, as I understand, Poles concentrated on "extra occupants in the ATC tower" and key poit for them is that this "extra occupant" has mobile phone conversation with Moscow (so why Poles insist on geting tapes of ALL, incl. mobile, phone calls for this day). Look at 145 and 148 pages of report (in english). There are parts of conversation between ATC team but not whole.