zbychus

"SadPole, you are the True Pole by the heart"

Let's be serious here and no offence, but SadPole shows the point of view, where he tries everything to put a guilt on the dead polish president. I was not and would never be his supporter, however there's no evidence and even now no presumptive evidence he ordered to land, moreover we have a better picture that the decision they were waiting for was about to choose an alternative airport. Stating that he was even in the cockpit is such a speculation that proves SadPole is just the same as J.Kaczynski and his people but on the opposite side. Nothing but speculation. Yes, shame on you.

Here's my short overview of this accident and I am open to receive your feedback.

On the decision process both parties simply failed. It's quite clear that both had the power to stop the attempt to even approach Smolensk. The information was on both sides and they just lacked the imagination. Both operators, PIC and ATC clearly knew the landing in such conditions is a mission impossible while the PIC could imagine it, ATC saw it when IL-76 was trying to land. The pilot of JAK shares the responsibility as he was on the spot too. The polish side obviously did not want to "disappoint" the Head, while the Russians did not want to have a diplomatic scandal (no press in the World would care about the minima, etc). What is interesting here is the fact they mutually without prior agreement came to the same conclusion - to make an approach and go around at 100m. It seemed "mutually" the best solution to solve the problem (impossibility to land for PIC, avoiding a scandal by showing the pilots the weather is really bad). This deduction is based on the transcript from the cockpit and ATC. The PIC says, "There are no conditions to land, please ask for the decision" and shortly after he adds "I will go down to 100m, but it will probably not help". Nobody was forcing him to make such a statement. It was a conforming decision, he tried somehow to assure his superior he will do everything he can (descend to 100m and go around). So the plane approached Smolensk with the same idea in both minds - descend and get out. The pressure was there, in the cockpit and in the ATC, no doubt about it.

On the operation level as it was GCA approach, both parties failed as well. The pilot was relying on RA while the ATC provided several times the wrong guidance (on course, on glide path) As the intension was not to allow to land at first place as it was nearly impossible, they did not care so much about the course (80m to the left) and glide path (few times above, one slightly beneath). Do not say, ATC did not fail. This was Ground Control Approach (2ndb+par) and the information ATC is providing is crucial. The PIC relays on it. True that he did not read back his altitude, but he was not asked for it either. 10s break between ATC commands is a serious negligence but I am not an expert in the Russian military procedures. Its clear ATC was not competent to guide in such poor meteorically conditions and I do not blame them. We all know this approach should not happen at the first place. For me the mystery is the action that PIC did. My guess is he tried to level off instead of full GA and the evidence for it as I have written in my previous posts is the increase of N1 at the 100m. As he was only 20m HAA this action was not sufficient to avoid the hit. He just hesitated with GA, sad as in the aviation the seconds are eternity.

gstaniak

Alice, AFAIR it's two different Polish teams, working on CVR and FDR records copied from the originals some time back in May 2010 or so (minister Miller, head of the Polish comittee investigating the crash, brought them to Poland himself). From what I remember was said at that time, one copy was then analyzed by a legal research institution in Krakow, and another by a police lab in Warsaw (one for the sake of the crash investigation, the other for the prosection proceedings). I don't know whether they've exchanged data and produced single versions of the transcripts or not.

NigelOnDraft

Vector of a/c speed tends to point at terrain sometimes, it's sort of the point of "landing"!

A/C speed and configuration were essentially correct for landing.

The only "useful" warning the TAWS could give, in this approach type, would have been a "Sink Rate" type warning. It did trigger, but not audibly since it was overridden by the "Pull Up".

As I said before, I may be wrong. But it seems the TAWS behaved exactly as our EGPWS systems did when inadvertently flown to airfields not in the database.. and when not inhibited.

Alice025

Sorry, mixed up things. Thank you, Kulverstukas and gstaniak for correcting/explaining. Now yes, I remember, the transcripts were published in summer and by Poland, against MAK desires, and are/were back then intermediate. And now these new phrases that appeared are given by Poland as well, an update to the summer edition.
So, two Polish teams are working on them, got it.

Bandures

It wasn't. In case of GCA ATC clearly say it, like he did for IL-76.

ATC Watcher

zbychus
I do not think so either.definitively not in the sense of a PAR or an SRA APP as described by ICAO , ( no GCA in civil operations , only PAR and SRA)

We seem to have determined moons ago ( facts from the repport and other sources) that this flight was an international flight operating Civil (ICAO) rules , not a military flight operating under Russian military ATC rules , right ?.

A PAR App would be a very specific phraseology starting with the words : This is a PAR APP for runway xx in case of Go around proceeed xxxx, commence descent now and do not acknoledge further transmissions , etc.. followed instructions every 5 sec , and words like " check decision height " etc.. .
For an SRA APP phraseology would include words like " Service Terminated at XX Km from touchdown, Obstacle clearance xx m, check your minimas " etc.
Nothing of that sort here.
My interpretation ( correct me if I am wrong) is that it was a NDB APP monitored by Radar, not a PAR or an SRA APP.

Hence the decision to abandon APP at DH and Go around was PIC , not ATC.

But except for your last paragraph, I tend to agree with your "short overview" in your post.

Flying-Corporal

May be I am missing something...

1. The safety of the flight, including the decision to begin an approach and to land lies with the crew, not the ATC. Airlines have their own minimums, certified by the FAA or the equivalent agency, and it's based on many things such a/c equipment, pilot training to name a few. Controllers probably don't have that info especially if there are hundreds of airlines with the mixed fleet operating in and out of the airport. Nor can they deny landing to someone because of that.

2. The precision to stay on the glideslope and the localizer lies with the crew, NOT the ATC.

3. The primary responsibility of the Air Traffic Control is a/c separation. PERIOD! And that's only in the in controlled airspace. They don't have to and sometimes don't have the ability to separate IFR and VFR traffic simply because they don't talk (and control) VFR a/c. They might not even have have a radar equipment (e.g. South America) and in that case rely on position reports only.

4. ATC have to make airline crews aware of the current weather conditions at the airport, including rwy conditions, notams, etc. They did do that.

IMHO, ATC did everything they were supposed to do. When the crew decides to attempt an instrument approach with conditions BELOW landing minimums and then willingly descends BELOW the Decision Height, then you can only scratch you head and wonder.

It is an easy sell to blame the ATC for the ignorant flying public who thinks that Controllers fly airplanes. That's what Polish side is trying to do.

Alice025

I read an idea similar to zbychus's one in another forum.
But different parts of it were expressed by different people.
One said it looks to him a cat and mouse game, both pilot and ATC in parallel thinking landing is a no-go and out of the question, but noone willing to say the first "No". Leaving it to the other party to make the move. That ATC has figured out the Polish pilot's difficulty, and that's why allowed him this show "drive", that he'll be able to demonstrate to his superiors that the fog at 100 metres is for real and that he had done all that can be done in such a situation.
At that, note, by the ATC transcripts of all comms' - tel, radio, microphone in the room - no pressure was exerted on the ATC.
Neither by anyone on the pilot, according to the talks in the plane.
The understanding of the situation was simply in the air. No words needed.

The other man in a Russian site (aviation) expressed an opinion that both sides knew landing is out of the question that's why were lax on the procedures, thinking plus/minus a bit does not matter when one doesn't plan to land in the first place.
But that man has also added that , in his view, the Commander suddenly showed up behind pilots' back - said nothing - but the pilot felt like a school-kid, thinking whether the commander understood from the procedures that he has no intention to land at all, that this will only be a drive by to satisfy the audiences, or did he not, and whether the commander is of the same mind, or what, - and this caused his delay and undecisiveness in the last stage.

Alice025

Still, the amount of effort that controller took, phoning up and low, trying to prove fog is for real, somebody who has the authority - phone that plane on board! tell them to not even go here! it is truly remarkable - and is not part of controller's duties, as I understand. And no one seemed to believe him, as there was an excellent forecast, visibility digressed from 4,000 metres to 200 - within 1 hr! the way someone they called said "but the Polish Yak has landed you say? meaning - What do you mean here that you can't land them?
The way the controllers phoned up and low to find a spare airport for the plane, to be able to tell them, if/when they come over. Not part of controller's duty either, one would think. The spare airports are stated in the pilot's flight charts, from the very beginning.
But it seems the controller had an inner feeling, that it's better he knows himself and definitely - as, for example, the pilot voiced out to him later "Minsk and Vitebsk". Of which one DID NOT WORK on that day - at all!
Vitebsk is only Monday-Friday, due to low demand. And that was a Saturday!

As Russian blog says Defence marshals are not the same as they used to be before ;o) Smaller calibre, to take responsibility on themselves when it is needed. "If it were Zhukov :o) of the war times - he wouldn't hesitate a sec to say his NO - and nevermind what any aviation civil or whatever rules or politicians say!" :;o)))))))

mikkojuha

ATC Watcher: """""I do not think so either.definitively not in the sense of a PAR or an SRA APP as described by ICAO , ( no GCA in civil operations , only PAR and SRA)

We seem to have determined moons ago ( facts from the repport and other sources) that this flight was an international flight operating Civil (ICAO) rules , not a military flight operating under Russian military ATC rules , right ?.""""""""""""""


Precisely so. The communication between ATC and pilot is is very specific. I have done some PAR approaches. It is very paractical and precise if executed as intended and could have saved the day in this case. This APP had nothing to do with PAR APP.

b8361811

Folks, see these clips for how a (albeit western) PAR approach looks/sounds like:

YouTube - PAR Approach ETNN

YouTube - PAR Approach Tulln-Langenlebarn

RetiredF4, I guess you did many like these (probably with a bit higher speed) in your active time, did you?

rogatol

According to the guys from the Russian mil.ATC: normal sensitivity of such radar near MM is next to none, while the radar they were using was 30yo, rusty and very infrequently used. Definitely it was not supposed to be a significant reference in an improvised CATIII approach.

ATC Watcher

Alice025, I understand what you are trying to say, but International (civil) ATC procedures and Low visibility Operations abide to strict rules . There is no room for " feelings " to be expressed and there is also no telephone number to call aircraft when they are not on your own VHF frequency .

Let me try to explain what would (could) be the normal process, in normal International operations.

What the controller could have say on first call was : Visibility 200m in Fog what are your minimas and your intentions ?
The answer would have been from the Pilot : xx meters and XX airfield.

Trying to perform an NDB APP on these conditions ( to verify weather conditions ) is perfectly normal and done everywhere in the world. No controller can prevent this and so far no problem.

A briefing in the cockpit then established who does what, including " Decision height is XXX meters, in case go around, we climb to xx meters on xxx heading until etc..

The controller , having here access to some kind of Precision App radar (PAR) can monitors height and course during the temptative APP and advise . These are not "orders" or instructions as we call those, which are very phraseology-specific, but information. When passing Decision height (DH) if runway (lights) are not in sight, pilot goes around., if he sees them he lands . Pilot decision to do so , not Controller.

After go around , and safe above Minimum Safe Altitude , the decision of what to do next ( hold , or divert to another airport ) depends primarily on fuel on board remaining and the weather forecast.
The selection of Diversion airport is NOT an ATC decision but only that of the Pilot, or their Operations (base) . Selecting an airport which is closed by Notam can be a problem but they had selected another alternate, which was open. So no issue there , (only to show that someone in Polish OPS planning did not read Notams before making the Flight plan ) Not good but happens to everyone once in a while, even in large airlines .

So if this had been done a unhappy President would have landed in Minsk and everyone else on board would probably still be alive today.

Under Military operations the procedures are different, but they did not apply here. That is unfortunately what the " Polish side" is apparently trying to mix up in the mind of its population , probably to try to divert the "blame" of this preventable tragedy towards the Russian side.

His dudeness

That sums the whole thing up. PIC means PIC. Rules are rules. Going below minima THAT far, trying a NDB approach with 200m is... just plain stupid. And that decision rested with the PIC, no matter who was in the cockpit or the rear.

I would understand (not saying one should do it) an approach attempt in maybe 100m-200m less visibility than required, as transmissiometers and observers might be a tad off the mark and fog often isnīt solid... but under these conditions? You go to your minima IF you feel you need to prove a point and then you pull up and divert. If you`re really smart you donīt try it at all and proceed to the altn, using the remaining flight time to organize ground transport.

liider

One important aspect concerning alternate airports Minsk and Vitebsk is that both of them are not in Russia, but in Belarus, and president Kachinsky was never a friend of president Lukashenko (neither are other European presidents). So diverting there could never be a good political decision. As seen from the transcript, Smolensk ATCs didn't expect the plane to divert there, they offered one of Moscow airports in their conversations. And as far as Vitebsk airport was closed that day, it seems that the Polish side really never expected that the flight could be diverted there, they were in the flight plan just because something had to be there...

Azrael229

To be honest it they could have as well flown back to Warsaw, it wouldn't make much difference as the ceremony wouldn't happen in any case with any alternative. If the whole trip was managed correctly they should probably do just that, fly back to EPWA (or one of the military airfields closer to border - I know they often used Deblin), refuel and wait for the fog to clear. It's not a long flight to Smolensk.

RetiredF4

As i was Instructor- and Checkpilot for the wing, i did a really lot of those in all WX conditions out of the backseat and the frontseat. We used to go to the worst WX for those checkrides to get most training out of it.

A better example of PAR is this flight-sim-video

Good summary of ATC stuff!

Two points i wish to refresh: There are two different approaches to understand the busting of the minimums:

1. Doing it intentionaly to get the field insight and land.

2. Doing it because of false altitude information (RA from NAV, wrong setup 760 of PF BA, no CRM) followed by incorrect go around procedure in automode. Which means, they had the intention to go around at the Decision altitude of 100 meters, but flew the glidepath down with automode, controlling glidepath with the descent wheel (or whatever it is called) on the account of the wrong radar altitude / PF-BA. Therefore a drop well below glidepath and also a drop below decision altitude happened and was not recognized until too late. The last mentioned points can be found in the MAC report. The CVR the mentioned intention to go around at the minimum and go to the alternate favors this version as well and opposes version Nr. 1.

The role of ATCis to be judged differntly, depending on the above mentioned possible busting reasons.

Generally ATC did not cause the accident, and if the first option applies, there would have been no way to prevent it. You canīt prevent a pilot from flying intentionally into the ground and killing himself and his load of souls.

It looks different in option two. If the crew was unaware of their mistakes and schortcomings concerning altitude above Rwy elevation, ATC did nothing in time to inform the crew about the oncoming problems. The information of ATC did quite the contrary. It gave the aircrew the impression, that they had been on glidepath and on course all the time. So why look in the cockpit and crosscheck instruments, when the information of the NAV, the baro altitude of the PF and the information from ATC draws a picture of "everything is ok".
First abnormal information from ATC was the "101horizon" call, when the Radar-Altitude had decreased already to 45 meters.

The aircraft started 100 meters high on glidepath, the descent rate therefore was nearly double, the speed was fast, it dropped way below glidepath and then below decision altitude and acording to ATC everything looks normal until 45 meters above ground.

That does not fit. If informations are given, they have to be on the spot. The used Radar was not out of order, it was used and few days before checked servicable. If they would have requested an PAR-NDB, they probably would have got it like the Il 76 before. So the only excuse there is, that the crew did not request the PAR and therefore they didnīt get one, therefore ATC is of the hook.

But they could have prevented it or at least they could have taken actions to prevent it, but there are none until 45 meters above ground and therefore too late.

What actions schould ATC have done?
If informations for glidepath are given in an terminology like in an PAR ("on glidepath, on course"), it has to be precise to the possibilities of the system.

- A one hundred meter deviation at glidepath entry shows on the glidepath overlay. Would the crew had been informed about, the next information would be something like "back on glidepath" and therfore a hint for the crew to change descent rate / glideangle.
- Closer in a drop below the glidepath can be observed as well, a information to the crew would have alerted them.
- Range and Glidepath position define the point, where the Go around should take place, a call "approaching minimum, call field in sight or goaround" could have alerted the crew again.

- a perfect controller has a feeling for the timeline and can judge the approach speed of an aircraft, in this case being higher than normal. Our guys used to challenge us if we came in with higher speeds when doing an approach with simulated engine failure and therfore 20 kts higher approach speed than normal.

There is the question wether the controller on the scope really was that good. He might have had a lot of expierience, but did he had enough training in the days before the accident? The equipment plays some role in a PAR approach, but the most decisive element concerning quality for reading and interpreting a non digital radar screen is the human behind the screen. How much PARīs did he give in the last days, month, in the last year and under which WX conditions and for which kind of aircraft? Our controllers had to prove their currency again and again, they had WX- minimas as we did. After leave and therefore out of training, they had not been allowed to control a flight in minimum WX conditions. They first had to get current again in good WX.

As it turned out, ATC was calling out informations which didnīt help the crew at all, those informations might have even been misleading. Therfore my statement, they didnt cause it, but they could have prevented it.

Now comes the MAC report, which states that the glidepath was something off, but within tolerances. And it works with the assumption that the crew has been forced to land and intentionally busted the minimum descent altitude on behalf of general Blasik or other authorities. There is no prove at all that this happened, and therefore it is a very unusual statement in an accident report.

But it is a good approach to screen the deficiencies of ATC and the shortcomings of the place smolensk itself.

RockShock

SadPole Wrt this part of the transcript:

The MAK read this part and it was in their report as 'Wkurzy sie' (He'll be pissed off). However, due to the Polish commision and labs reading of the tape, the words said were actually 'Chmurzy sie! (note the only slight difference in pronounciation). FYI, 'chmurzy sie' means 'it's getting cloudy' and I think it fits a bit better to the logic of the dialog led at that time indeed. However, listening to this part I cannot tell what's really being said - but for sure you need to take into account both possibilities.

Dream Land

Why beat the small details to death, no one but the PIC is at fault here, this is no mystery.

gstaniak

... because they should be well aware that this kind of approach procedure only makes sense when they report back their altitude? I just cannot imagine them not knowing that in an RSL approach they can expect a margin error of 100 m with respect to altitude. And they knew how old and imprecise the aerodrome equipment was.

What about the expected trajectory? This is a page from the manual of Tu-154M:

http://picasaweb.google.com/gstaniak...21296326863154

For the vertical speed of 8 m/s, couldn't ATC have expected them to go a bit lower still before the go-around?