Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread
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Ptkay wrote:
Respectfully, I have to disagree. This whole mess has very little to do with Polish aviation traditions, qualities of Poles as pilots, or anything like that, but everything with completely worthless politicians who made a mess of things. Yes, pilots are probably at fault for what happened with that flight. But, their mistakes happened long before that flight, when they allowed themselves:
At the end of the day, karma is a b***tch and when one screws around with logic and sense, the rewards are soon to follow.
"Based on the information we have, the picture is very grim and sad,
bringing to the daylight the properties of the Polish pilots,
which are very desired in the war time, but of no use,
or dangerous in the peace time..."
bringing to the daylight the properties of the Polish pilots,
which are very desired in the war time, but of no use,
or dangerous in the peace time..."
- Be micromanaged by politicians over where how they should land their planes
- Be under "training" program where (among other things) some stupid politico would make political decisions on the subject of Tu-154 pilots NOT training on Tu-154 simulators.
- Be under "procedural" regime where the same politico would make a decision to not ask for Russian military navigator, even though the crew clearly did not have a trained navigator that was up to the task and wanted a Russian navigator to be there. (Russians taking their time switching over to western procedures is another story, but not our business to interfere with).
- End up being used in a stupid dog and pony show, where it was "political message" and not safety and sense that dictated procedures. I (obviously) understand significance of Katyn history, but imagine if someone wanted, for example, to make a big ceremony in the US over plight of US's Native Americans and demanded to land at some US Air Force base only because it was closest to some Native American cemetery or battleground and when allowed to do so, refused to play by the US Air Force rules. Because such setup almost guaranteed anything that say ATCs do to be seen as possible political provocation, it really was a very, very bad idea from the start. Russians should also grow some balls in the matter and simply state that Russian Military Airports are not the greatest places for dog and pony shows with foreign dignitaries. It would not hurt anyone to fly to nearest civilian international airport and drive from there.
At the end of the day, karma is a b***tch and when one screws around with logic and sense, the rewards are soon to follow.
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RegDep,
Interesting report that you linked, given the mix up on the weather data given out in pre-flight - enroute update.
Likewise, PLF 101 was never briefed on the early morning fog that was forecasted to last only a few hours - Then the crew was hit with the reality of fog.
If PLF 101 had been briefed on the weather and forecasts, the decision (since many are stating there was no PAR at Smolensk North) to try an approach with poor visibilities, could have been easily avoided by delying the flight by two hours.
If that had occured, then this thread would not exist.
Interesting report that you linked, given the mix up on the weather data given out in pre-flight - enroute update.
Likewise, PLF 101 was never briefed on the early morning fog that was forecasted to last only a few hours - Then the crew was hit with the reality of fog.
If PLF 101 had been briefed on the weather and forecasts, the decision (since many are stating there was no PAR at Smolensk North) to try an approach with poor visibilities, could have been easily avoided by delying the flight by two hours.
If that had occured, then this thread would not exist.
Going back to the comments on the CVR of 'the worst thing is, there is a hole there..". Is it possible that what was meant was "there could have been a hole in the cloud, therefore (radiation) fog would have formed" i.e. beneath the hole. This would obviously be the worst case as then landing would be impossible. However, if so, the comment was meant conditionally, not as an expression of knowing that there was low ground before the runway edge. Perhaps SadPole can help here.
The implication of this is that the crew were possibly not aware of the dip in the terrain. They may have assumed the terrain was flat. My next conjecture is that the handling pilot switched mentally at some point to reacting to the RA readouts of altitude. This is the only reason I can think of for the descent below zero feet QFE, which occured before CFIT. It also explains the steep descent continuing just before this. There appears to be no indication that any of the crew (falsely) thought they had sighted the runway, which is the only other reason I can think of for deliberately going that low. The RA / Baro readings being similar at the marker would only have reinforced the pilot/crew's incorrect mental image of flat terrain under them. This, coupled with the pilot knowing the RA to be more precise, and the frequent misunderstanding that more precise implies more accurate, would have mentally predisposed him to switching to listening to the RA readouts.
The steep descent continuing is a key point I think, especially the two consecutive "100" calls. I don't think anyone is checking the aircraft attitude on instruments on this point, either AI or rate of descent. I reckon the handling pilot is peering into the visual murk, looking for the runway, and the others are glued to altimeters various. There's no good visual horizon, so he's just "chasing the altimeter needle" with pitch corrections while he searches for the landing which is going to keep his job for him. The problem is, he's chasing a RA needle over variable terrain.
As to the reason for the pilot making the switch, high stress frequently leads to partial deafness as anyone who's done any air combat knows, so he could have just stopped listening to the non-standard voice (the General). Or, as I say, he could have deliberately switched to RA readout calls, knowing them to be more precise, and thinking they were more accurate due to the false premise of flat terrain.
I think ATC was not being listened to about their glideslope calls - the flightpath corrections seem to synchronise with the internal altitude calls.
That's my take on it anyway.
The key questions are: did they know about the dip in the terrain?
Does my theory explain the physical evidence?
Is there anything anyone knows about that goes against this theory?
We'll never really know, of course.
Now for the polemic bit...
The lessons appear obvious - don't pressure professionals with VIP's timetables. Also, if you are very pushy and someone's job depends on your decisions, then you are going to end up with people who always do what you say, despite what their professional judgement might tell them. Michael Jackson's doctor and Princess Diana's chauffeur come to mind.
To my way of thinking, the Polish President effectively committed suicide here.
The implication of this is that the crew were possibly not aware of the dip in the terrain. They may have assumed the terrain was flat. My next conjecture is that the handling pilot switched mentally at some point to reacting to the RA readouts of altitude. This is the only reason I can think of for the descent below zero feet QFE, which occured before CFIT. It also explains the steep descent continuing just before this. There appears to be no indication that any of the crew (falsely) thought they had sighted the runway, which is the only other reason I can think of for deliberately going that low. The RA / Baro readings being similar at the marker would only have reinforced the pilot/crew's incorrect mental image of flat terrain under them. This, coupled with the pilot knowing the RA to be more precise, and the frequent misunderstanding that more precise implies more accurate, would have mentally predisposed him to switching to listening to the RA readouts.
The steep descent continuing is a key point I think, especially the two consecutive "100" calls. I don't think anyone is checking the aircraft attitude on instruments on this point, either AI or rate of descent. I reckon the handling pilot is peering into the visual murk, looking for the runway, and the others are glued to altimeters various. There's no good visual horizon, so he's just "chasing the altimeter needle" with pitch corrections while he searches for the landing which is going to keep his job for him. The problem is, he's chasing a RA needle over variable terrain.
As to the reason for the pilot making the switch, high stress frequently leads to partial deafness as anyone who's done any air combat knows, so he could have just stopped listening to the non-standard voice (the General). Or, as I say, he could have deliberately switched to RA readout calls, knowing them to be more precise, and thinking they were more accurate due to the false premise of flat terrain.
I think ATC was not being listened to about their glideslope calls - the flightpath corrections seem to synchronise with the internal altitude calls.
That's my take on it anyway.
The key questions are: did they know about the dip in the terrain?
Does my theory explain the physical evidence?
Is there anything anyone knows about that goes against this theory?
We'll never really know, of course.
Now for the polemic bit...
The lessons appear obvious - don't pressure professionals with VIP's timetables. Also, if you are very pushy and someone's job depends on your decisions, then you are going to end up with people who always do what you say, despite what their professional judgement might tell them. Michael Jackson's doctor and Princess Diana's chauffeur come to mind.
To my way of thinking, the Polish President effectively committed suicide here.
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at ab 10:31 don't remember exactly the Nav. said "distance to axis 5 km"
they were still "building the box" don't know the equiv. in English, say doing routine ? flights in a square above the aerodrome.
so they are up there, their 10 km count down hasn't began yet?
anyway this distance to - can be ? - runway axis - they knew themselves. from inside the plane. without any ground controller saying anything. Could be the distance to runway when they were flying by the side of it.
q-n how did they know? was runway location fed into some systems on board, which gave them the distance to it. Who fed it in, what were they using for orientation.
Could it be they have been orienting by the same thing later on? Trusting that system data re their position all along? An addit. confusing factor - or did it actually work well and was may be neglected.
they were still "building the box" don't know the equiv. in English, say doing routine ? flights in a square above the aerodrome.
so they are up there, their 10 km count down hasn't began yet?
anyway this distance to - can be ? - runway axis - they knew themselves. from inside the plane. without any ground controller saying anything. Could be the distance to runway when they were flying by the side of it.
q-n how did they know? was runway location fed into some systems on board, which gave them the distance to it. Who fed it in, what were they using for orientation.
Could it be they have been orienting by the same thing later on? Trusting that system data re their position all along? An addit. confusing factor - or did it actually work well and was may be neglected.
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in pre-interesting times talk there were also some times mentioned feet and other times - meters. but from the talks it seems they settled on all of it being meters in future. so this must be alright, and not contributing in any way.
another note controller did double his numbers in Russian in English once. to make sure they got it. because I think they tended to say Thank you instead of repeating numbers or the info they've got.
I don't think this influenced any thing either, but overall the chap in the control was not a total goner :o) rather doubt he could chat in English with them, but with numbers he could, when needed.
another note controller did double his numbers in Russian in English once. to make sure they got it. because I think they tended to say Thank you instead of repeating numbers or the info they've got.
I don't think this influenced any thing either, but overall the chap in the control was not a total goner :o) rather doubt he could chat in English with them, but with numbers he could, when needed.
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as a matter of fact - this could be these mysterious "difficulties with numbers" that were mentioned in the (supposedly) interview with the controler. It's his idea why they were quiet (to his taste) and must be simply his thought - that has nothing in common with actual pilot's Russian language skills. (which were good all say)
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Now, BOAC.
You wrote you never told your height to the ground on those kinds of approaches, and you wonder why anyone would.
I questioned a pilot again, re why would he.
I didn't understand why but it can be I simply don't understand anything.
It seems to be their natural habit, the mode of operation pilot-ground tandem.
The fact of life is they do tell it.
They just see life this way :o), may be.
The example given was 1 km visibility and lower edge of the clouds being 100 meters from the ground. 100 meters space, in other words, when one passes through the clouds and then things become visible and he's got those 100 left down to the ground.
The complex preparatory stages in this weather demanded some tricky flying (IM amateur opinion :o) done before). Getting to the point 52 km away from the aerodrome and at 4,800 height.
From this dot proceeding to the next dot, lower, at crane 30 degrees and speed 550 km/hr. When approx. there (by flying time) to tell the ground control one's height - and as a return courtesy ground control responds with the plane's distance to aerodrome.
Desirably, the distance set for the second dot. Also at that time ground control tells the plane by what amount of degrees to turn and towards what side to finally get on the landing course and that's where ground control allows the descend.
"The moment he allows you let out the wheels and the flaps, slide down at an angle of 12 degrees and at vertical speed of 30m/s proceed to the next dot to be at 2,000m height. In this mode the ground control periodically hinted me where to fly to get on the landing course and I was simply telling him my height in response because to talk ab anything else there was no time:o)
Being 30 km away finally I could breathe out, decrease vertical speed twice and the slope angle to 8 degrees, go quietly but this is still too far from the aerodrome and the control still doesn't see my track of lowering so to his directions where to fly I simply respond with my height without any pleasantries simply name the number.
In the next stage the initiative in conducting radio-talk is passed over to the pilot.
While before the control saw my deviation from course and was giving me commands to which I was responding with my height (which meant "I understood you thanks a million" :o)
- then in the next stage the ground keeps quiet unless I tell him my height (which means I want to know my distance and deviations from course what they are.)
Getting oriented by my distance I could correct my vertical speed to the point of entering the glideslope.
From this point - to the Far Beacon the controller already saw me not only by course but in regard my glideslope and, in general, could do without me naming my height - but the quickest way to find out my distance for me was still to name my height - as an echo controller immediately names my distance and side deviation in meters.
I think if instead of barking my height I was pronouncing Dear Controller give me please my distance to runway edge and side deviation if possible"
- it wouldn't work out exactly well :o)
From Far Beacon to runway I didn't name my height usually but if I had doubts re my position I could and controller echoed with distance.
Sure I had a system to tell me distance and side deviation but it was not always showing exactly and I had to control the system by something. For the ground knowing height is important as they usually have over 10 landing at once and have to know who on what height is."
You wrote you never told your height to the ground on those kinds of approaches, and you wonder why anyone would.
I questioned a pilot again, re why would he.
I didn't understand why but it can be I simply don't understand anything.
It seems to be their natural habit, the mode of operation pilot-ground tandem.
The fact of life is they do tell it.
They just see life this way :o), may be.
The example given was 1 km visibility and lower edge of the clouds being 100 meters from the ground. 100 meters space, in other words, when one passes through the clouds and then things become visible and he's got those 100 left down to the ground.
The complex preparatory stages in this weather demanded some tricky flying (IM amateur opinion :o) done before). Getting to the point 52 km away from the aerodrome and at 4,800 height.
From this dot proceeding to the next dot, lower, at crane 30 degrees and speed 550 km/hr. When approx. there (by flying time) to tell the ground control one's height - and as a return courtesy ground control responds with the plane's distance to aerodrome.
Desirably, the distance set for the second dot. Also at that time ground control tells the plane by what amount of degrees to turn and towards what side to finally get on the landing course and that's where ground control allows the descend.
"The moment he allows you let out the wheels and the flaps, slide down at an angle of 12 degrees and at vertical speed of 30m/s proceed to the next dot to be at 2,000m height. In this mode the ground control periodically hinted me where to fly to get on the landing course and I was simply telling him my height in response because to talk ab anything else there was no time:o)
Being 30 km away finally I could breathe out, decrease vertical speed twice and the slope angle to 8 degrees, go quietly but this is still too far from the aerodrome and the control still doesn't see my track of lowering so to his directions where to fly I simply respond with my height without any pleasantries simply name the number.
In the next stage the initiative in conducting radio-talk is passed over to the pilot.
While before the control saw my deviation from course and was giving me commands to which I was responding with my height (which meant "I understood you thanks a million" :o)
- then in the next stage the ground keeps quiet unless I tell him my height (which means I want to know my distance and deviations from course what they are.)
Getting oriented by my distance I could correct my vertical speed to the point of entering the glideslope.
From this point - to the Far Beacon the controller already saw me not only by course but in regard my glideslope and, in general, could do without me naming my height - but the quickest way to find out my distance for me was still to name my height - as an echo controller immediately names my distance and side deviation in meters.
I think if instead of barking my height I was pronouncing Dear Controller give me please my distance to runway edge and side deviation if possible"
- it wouldn't work out exactly well :o)
From Far Beacon to runway I didn't name my height usually but if I had doubts re my position I could and controller echoed with distance.
Sure I had a system to tell me distance and side deviation but it was not always showing exactly and I had to control the system by something. For the ground knowing height is important as they usually have over 10 landing at once and have to know who on what height is."
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They new about the ground
Fox3WheresMyBanana, they knew this airport quite well.
Captain Protasiuk were landing there many times, last but one landing was 3 days prior to the crash (he was the FO on the plane with Polish Prime Minister). I don't know, however, who was the navigator on that flight.
Details here:
2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Captain Protasiuk were landing there many times, last but one landing was 3 days prior to the crash (he was the FO on the plane with Polish Prime Minister). I don't know, however, who was the navigator on that flight.
Details here:
2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Whilst they landed at Smolensk 3 days prior to the accident, is it known that they approached and landed on the runway direction 26 ?
If they landed on 08 then the approach may well have been over flat terrain for the last 10 seconds?
Is it recorded anywhere which runway direction was used for this visit?
If they landed on 08 then the approach may well have been over flat terrain for the last 10 seconds?
Is it recorded anywhere which runway direction was used for this visit?
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This unfortunate claim has been causing a lot of confusion among non-pilots at least:
I took time to go thru some hundred or so Russian IAC and other charts, nothing like that with markings like in that one from Smolensk-Severnyj someone was lucky to find somewhere earlier. It is still unknown which type of IAC-chart the PLF 101 crew was carrying with them, if any...
just as BOAC said it:
…. they knew this airport quite well.
Captain Protasiuk were landing there many times, last but one landing was 3 days prior to the crash (he was the FO on the plane with Polish Prime Minister). I don't know, however, who was the navigator on that flight.
Captain Protasiuk were landing there many times, last but one landing was 3 days prior to the crash (he was the FO on the plane with Polish Prime Minister). I don't know, however, who was the navigator on that flight.
just as BOAC said it:
I still cannot see why ATC is really involved here - even more so if there was no PAR equipment. If I had been that crew, and I had no specific instructions on "you have to do this and that" in my Ops Manual, I would have flown the 2xNDB approach exactly as any other - as they are meant to be flown, without any 'radar' input. Planned and flown my own glidepath, checked my own heights (baro), and probably ignored all protestation from anyone outside the cockpit in view of my cargo - OR requested a PAR.
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Fake S - covered much earlier either in this thread or previous - 08.
Alice - I fear the language barrier is too high. I did not really understand your reply.
Alice - I fear the language barrier is too high. I did not really understand your reply.
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grizzled, thank you, and for your patience with me, mostly :o)
Boac, I've just got a book fr one of our bloggers here "30 seconds to impact" which will greatly improve my terminology and wording (I think I hope) :o)
Boac, I've just got a book fr one of our bloggers here "30 seconds to impact" which will greatly improve my terminology and wording (I think I hope) :o)
Thanks for the details everybody.
Still looks like the PF is chasing the glidepath with his pitch corrections using the RA calls - so I conjecture that the switch to listening to RA was subconscious.
There seems to be no valid comments from anyone on the flights deck about pitch attitude or rate of descent, so I don't think these are being monitored.
The crucial bit is 08:40:42. I think the PF makes a small correction having heard "100" twice, and now thinks he's level. The further call of "100" 6 seconds later confirms this in his mind. In the stress of trying to find the runway, he's forgotten about the dip. These six seconds make the approach unrecoverable.
It's a credible scenario and explains the path of the aircraft. The detailed graphic #506 is really good at helping to recognise this, thanks janeczku.
Let's also bear in mind that whilst the PF may have originally known about the dip, did the General, or the Nav, who are the one's making the altitude calls?
Still looks like the PF is chasing the glidepath with his pitch corrections using the RA calls - so I conjecture that the switch to listening to RA was subconscious.
There seems to be no valid comments from anyone on the flights deck about pitch attitude or rate of descent, so I don't think these are being monitored.
The crucial bit is 08:40:42. I think the PF makes a small correction having heard "100" twice, and now thinks he's level. The further call of "100" 6 seconds later confirms this in his mind. In the stress of trying to find the runway, he's forgotten about the dip. These six seconds make the approach unrecoverable.
It's a credible scenario and explains the path of the aircraft. The detailed graphic #506 is really good at helping to recognise this, thanks janeczku.
Let's also bear in mind that whilst the PF may have originally known about the dip, did the General, or the Nav, who are the one's making the altitude calls?
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Fox3
Your analysis is sound, and particularly so when read in conjunction with the graphic at #506. It brings together elements which several posters have been developing in the last week or so and presents a feasible scenario.
However, as is often the case in raises a new question !
If the General was indeed reading and calling the QFE based Baro alt, why did he not express alarm (to put it mildly!!!) as the baro-alt continued to wind down relentlessly towards zero in those 6 seconds of steady 100m RA?
At the time of the go around call from the 2P the baro-alt must have been reading 20m and falling.
It is odd that there is nothing on the CVR to indicate the fact that the General must have been horrified at what he was reading and would surely have been expected to have made some exclamation???
Unless he was distracted....was he too looking out for lights in those critical few seconds for example?
Your analysis is sound, and particularly so when read in conjunction with the graphic at #506. It brings together elements which several posters have been developing in the last week or so and presents a feasible scenario.
However, as is often the case in raises a new question !
If the General was indeed reading and calling the QFE based Baro alt, why did he not express alarm (to put it mildly!!!) as the baro-alt continued to wind down relentlessly towards zero in those 6 seconds of steady 100m RA?
At the time of the go around call from the 2P the baro-alt must have been reading 20m and falling.
It is odd that there is nothing on the CVR to indicate the fact that the General must have been horrified at what he was reading and would surely have been expected to have made some exclamation???
Unless he was distracted....was he too looking out for lights in those critical few seconds for example?
He probably had his eyes outside looking for any kind of visual clues, which is a natural behavior. Remember, he was no part of the crew and had no task to do.
Whatever he called out before, it was not his duty to do it, and looking at it after the desasterous result he shouldn´t have said anything anyway.
That is one of the problems in this case, the PIC got informations from Nav, from General, from ATC and TAWS. Now, when we look at it with lots of time, it looks as if 2 thirds of the information received was wrong or handled wrong and at the most critical time, approaching the minimum all information thinned out except TAWS, which probably was judged not usable anyway.
franzl
Whatever he called out before, it was not his duty to do it, and looking at it after the desasterous result he shouldn´t have said anything anyway.
That is one of the problems in this case, the PIC got informations from Nav, from General, from ATC and TAWS. Now, when we look at it with lots of time, it looks as if 2 thirds of the information received was wrong or handled wrong and at the most critical time, approaching the minimum all information thinned out except TAWS, which probably was judged not usable anyway.
franzl
General Blasik is (sensibly) making calls at approx 10 second intervals (he probably skipped 08:40:12 because of the ATC call). Those six seconds were between his scheduled calls. Or, he's calling increments of 50m, and they hadn't reached 50m in the six seconds. It wasn't his job to call DH. Having been in several 'on limit' approaches, I think it is best just to keep providing the raw info and let the Captain make the decisions. Or as RetiredF4 says, passing DH he could have switched to helping to look for the runway. Or he could have not called DH because the Captain would probably have taken this as an effective command to go around without the runway in sight, and the General probably had his job on the line with this approach also. Given another few hours, we could all come up with more alternatives. My gut feeling is that RetiredF4 is right.
I must say that I don't think ATC should have been calling "on glideslope" without the data. I recall RAF PAR/no glideslope approaches having calls like "4 miles, on centreline, should be passing 1000 feet", which is a lot easier to absorb.
I must say that I don't think ATC should have been calling "on glideslope" without the data. I recall RAF PAR/no glideslope approaches having calls like "4 miles, on centreline, should be passing 1000 feet", which is a lot easier to absorb.
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Originally Posted by Fox3
I recall RAF PAR/no glideslope approaches having calls like "4 miles, on centreline, should be passing 1000 feet", which is a lot easier to absorb.
NO height is read back, or GIVEN by ATC during a PAR, just 'On', below' or 'above' glidepath. A/c is silent, controller talks continuously, and I think it was a break of 5 seconds in transmission = go-round.
BOAC...
Sorry but you're wrong on that last post (re PAR v/s SRA). As a result 'tis you who may be confusing some folks.
The RAF (and indeed the USAF, RCAF, RAAF, etc) often practised "No Glideslope" PAR approaches -- exactly as described by Fox3WMB. The intent was of course to simulate the scenario wherein the vertical portion of the PAR system (glideslope) is unserviceable. The practise paid off well for both PAR controllers and pilots, as I personally know of more than one occasion when the PAR glideslope info was U/S or unavailable when PAR was the only available approach aid.
grizz
Sorry but you're wrong on that last post (re PAR v/s SRA). As a result 'tis you who may be confusing some folks.
The RAF (and indeed the USAF, RCAF, RAAF, etc) often practised "No Glideslope" PAR approaches -- exactly as described by Fox3WMB. The intent was of course to simulate the scenario wherein the vertical portion of the PAR system (glideslope) is unserviceable. The practise paid off well for both PAR controllers and pilots, as I personally know of more than one occasion when the PAR glideslope info was U/S or unavailable when PAR was the only available approach aid.
grizz
There is another aspect we might want to consider. If they were following the NDB profile then the procedure ends at the MM (“Near Beacon”), and the height is 70m at the NDB. (Chart posted by Criss on previous thread) To ensure they were at the correct height to give them the best chance of a landing it is likely they would want to descend early rather then risk being too high. The Go-around appears to have been called at about 80m but of course RA not baro QFE. Coincidence ? Maybe.
Did they know in advance of the limits passed to them by ATC - 100m ? Perhaps they had always planned to fly the approach to the end of the procedure, i.e 70m and they just decided to ignore the 100m DH. Certainly there is no evidence from the CVR of an attempt to comply or even an acknowledgement of limits at the 100m call.
And at the 100m point, the first TAWS “Pull Up” was not actioned. In western civil flying that’s a mandatory immediate go-around. Apparently not in the Polish AF.
A visual acquisition attempt must be a possibility,with everyone looking out and taking no account of the high descent rate close to the ground. But what did they expect to see in visibility of 400m (200m if they had heard the last report from the Yak40) and cloud base of ~50m when they were still almost 2km from the runway? Some sort of “sucker gap” over the valley due to orographic effects maybe ?
Did they know in advance of the limits passed to them by ATC - 100m ? Perhaps they had always planned to fly the approach to the end of the procedure, i.e 70m and they just decided to ignore the 100m DH. Certainly there is no evidence from the CVR of an attempt to comply or even an acknowledgement of limits at the 100m call.
And at the 100m point, the first TAWS “Pull Up” was not actioned. In western civil flying that’s a mandatory immediate go-around. Apparently not in the Polish AF.
A visual acquisition attempt must be a possibility,with everyone looking out and taking no account of the high descent rate close to the ground. But what did they expect to see in visibility of 400m (200m if they had heard the last report from the Yak40) and cloud base of ~50m when they were still almost 2km from the runway? Some sort of “sucker gap” over the valley due to orographic effects maybe ?
Last edited by Tagron; 16th Jun 2010 at 21:58. Reason: Spelling
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Discussion of Smolensk-Severnyj equipment in use
Borrowing somebodys recent text from other forum, pardon this rather primitive translation (use of mixed EN & RU abbreviations is problematic):
What he is trying to say? Both RSBN and accompanying precision APP-system PRMG no longer in use. Radar + 2xNDB also not existing, 2xNDB will be left. In some Severnyj photos can be seen two types of radars, as well as RSBN and some other equipment, some 300 m north of runway. PAR operation from such a ground antenna location may well be in suspect.
РМС ("Radiomayachnaya landing system") means KGS, ILS, PRMG and other precision systems. PAR in Russian is abbreviated ПРЛ but not so often used. Would like to underline that combination РСП+ОСП (looks like: PAR+2xNDB) is not what we are used to in our so called Western culture.
Have been working at 3 airfields. A dozen located in our region are without ПРЛ option (in civil aerodromes. ПРЛ has not been in use for 10 years). And there are none. In this forum, around pages 1300-1400 there was airport Severnyj scheme. In the corner is clearly marked: ОСП, ОСП+РСП, РМС. Since then РСБН and ПРМГ have been dismantled meaning that РМС approach no longer exists. Actually РСП+ОСП does not materialize either. Left will be ОСП meaning БПРМ and ДПРМ so, what if they are not considered on 1500 existing forum pages? Diagrams and calculations are based on these.
РМС ("Radiomayachnaya landing system") means KGS, ILS, PRMG and other precision systems. PAR in Russian is abbreviated ПРЛ but not so often used. Would like to underline that combination РСП+ОСП (looks like: PAR+2xNDB) is not what we are used to in our so called Western culture.
Last edited by vakakaaa; 16th Jun 2010 at 20:53.