Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread
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@BOAC
Have a look at my graphic or check out the CVR
10:39:49,9 ATC: Approaching outer marker, on course and path, distance 6.
10:39:50,2 [Beep sound, F 845Hz. Outer marker]
10:39:52,2 A: Outer
10:39:57,1 A: 400 meters.
That is, 7 seconds after after crossing the outer marker, they were still at 400 meters, while the FAF was at 300m. Then again, maybe the approach plate (from 2005) we all are referring to is not the one valid at that day???
Another thing:
I am pretty convinced now, that they actually initiated the GA after it was called by the 2nd Pilot at 80m height.
This is from the TU-154M FM and shows that at a sinkspeed of around 7 m/s the loss of height due to inertia when leveling out is around 40m.
That matches my drawing quite nicely, cause after the GA call, the A/C had lost the corresponding 40m down to the lowest level of its flight curve before gaining height again.
Where is the evidence for their being 100m high at the OM?
Where is the evidence for 6.8m/sec?
Where is the evidence for 6.8m/sec?
10:39:49,9 ATC: Approaching outer marker, on course and path, distance 6.
10:39:50,2 [Beep sound, F 845Hz. Outer marker]
10:39:52,2 A: Outer
10:39:57,1 A: 400 meters.
That is, 7 seconds after after crossing the outer marker, they were still at 400 meters, while the FAF was at 300m. Then again, maybe the approach plate (from 2005) we all are referring to is not the one valid at that day???
Another thing:
I am pretty convinced now, that they actually initiated the GA after it was called by the 2nd Pilot at 80m height.
This is from the TU-154M FM and shows that at a sinkspeed of around 7 m/s the loss of height due to inertia when leveling out is around 40m.
That matches my drawing quite nicely, cause after the GA call, the A/C had lost the corresponding 40m down to the lowest level of its flight curve before gaining height again.
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janeczu - an interesting theory. Can you tell me what the apparent glidepath angle of the aircraft (red) is in degrees and what the green 'normal' is? In the west, a 'normal' mil approach tends to be 2.5 deg
Still absolutely no indication of a g/a reaction on the CVR to match your theory. PF appears 'silent'.
Are you sure the '400' was a baro reading?
Still absolutely no indication of a g/a reaction on the CVR to match your theory. PF appears 'silent'.
Are you sure the '400' was a baro reading?
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He (janeczku) is right and pretty much everyone agrees they were descending way too fast (for whatever reason).
The normal (green) path angle is tg-1 (300/6100) = 2.8 deg
The path they took is (at the very least) tg-1 (400/5000) = 4.6 deg
It does not even matter much if the 400 m alt reading at 10:39:59 is barometric or radio as the ravine is not starting yet. I said "at the very least", because at the outer marker they clearly were above 400 meters.
Which is why the "new crew" in Poland (that is the young guys from the 36th regiment plus the brother of the dead president) scream that it is all Russian ATCs fault because he was giving them the "on course, on path" readings. At the same time, the "old crew", which is the older guys who were trained in Russia say it is pilots' fault because they were using radio altimeter, autopilot way below 100 meters limit that is called for by the Tu flight manual, had no simulator training, etc.
Which leads to the question (as everyone here already asked) why was the ATC giving them these confirmations. The ATC claims in the interview his radar equipment gave him no independent verification of the altitude, which means that his "on path" confirmations were either complete BS or were based entirely on the altitude reports he was getting (for a time being) from the plane. If this is what indeed was going on, then RA altitude received as barometric altitude could indeed lead to "on course, on path" confirmations. He did complain from early on that the crew was not reporting altitude to him often enough and possibly had "problems with numbers".
And that pretty much is where this matter stands as of now.
The normal (green) path angle is tg-1 (300/6100) = 2.8 deg
The path they took is (at the very least) tg-1 (400/5000) = 4.6 deg
It does not even matter much if the 400 m alt reading at 10:39:59 is barometric or radio as the ravine is not starting yet. I said "at the very least", because at the outer marker they clearly were above 400 meters.
Which is why the "new crew" in Poland (that is the young guys from the 36th regiment plus the brother of the dead president) scream that it is all Russian ATCs fault because he was giving them the "on course, on path" readings. At the same time, the "old crew", which is the older guys who were trained in Russia say it is pilots' fault because they were using radio altimeter, autopilot way below 100 meters limit that is called for by the Tu flight manual, had no simulator training, etc.
Which leads to the question (as everyone here already asked) why was the ATC giving them these confirmations. The ATC claims in the interview his radar equipment gave him no independent verification of the altitude, which means that his "on path" confirmations were either complete BS or were based entirely on the altitude reports he was getting (for a time being) from the plane. If this is what indeed was going on, then RA altitude received as barometric altitude could indeed lead to "on course, on path" confirmations. He did complain from early on that the crew was not reporting altitude to him often enough and possibly had "problems with numbers".
And that pretty much is where this matter stands as of now.
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One more thing.
The 2nd pilot's remarks he knows of the ravine (10:30:45 Worst is that there is a hole there and fog showed up). Then he says that TAWS will be enough as long as Zietas (the navigator) enters something [introduces corrections]
After that they no longer discuss the issue which means that pilot and 2nd pilot might also be completely unaware of dealing with uncorected RA readings, possibly because they are shy of talking too much in presence of the Air Force general, busy trying to spot the earth, etc. The navigator was the LEAST experienced person there with some 30!!!! hours only on that equipment.
The 2nd pilot's remarks he knows of the ravine (10:30:45 Worst is that there is a hole there and fog showed up). Then he says that TAWS will be enough as long as Zietas (the navigator) enters something [introduces corrections]
After that they no longer discuss the issue which means that pilot and 2nd pilot might also be completely unaware of dealing with uncorected RA readings, possibly because they are shy of talking too much in presence of the Air Force general, busy trying to spot the earth, etc. The navigator was the LEAST experienced person there with some 30!!!! hours only on that equipment.
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FD
(the un-real)
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SadPole - I think you are reading things into the CVR transcript that are conjecture (unless the Polish version has more?).
It matters greatly whether the readings were radalt or baro - that would decide whether they were 'high' or not.
"were based entirely on the altitude reports he was getting (for a time being) from the plane." - of which he appears to have had NONE during the approach?
There is no indication that anyone knew of the valley. I would suggest that "there is a hole there and fog showed up" refers to the airfield? As for the TAWS comment - what on earth does that mean? Then TAWS is ignored completely!
As to who is 'responsible' - there should be only one Captain - he or she is 'responsible'. ATC do not, as yet, fly the aircraft. The 'old school' are correct. It would appear the crew were ill-prepared for the airport.
FD - didn't quite understand "hence there is no reason to give any sort of approach clearance to pilot, it rest with ATC." - if it does 'rest', why was descent not 'commanded'? Do you read "distance 10, entering glideslope" (10:39:09) as the descent instruction? Do you think the crew realised this? Would you? In my part of the world we expect "commence descent now for an x degree glidepath".
The question remains, if those glide angles are correct - why fly them? I still think they had seen a bit of ground or some visual cue - maybe lights - in the valley (downslope cloud clearance with the easterly wind?) and were diving for it, unaware of the rising ground ahead..
It matters greatly whether the readings were radalt or baro - that would decide whether they were 'high' or not.
"were based entirely on the altitude reports he was getting (for a time being) from the plane." - of which he appears to have had NONE during the approach?
There is no indication that anyone knew of the valley. I would suggest that "there is a hole there and fog showed up" refers to the airfield? As for the TAWS comment - what on earth does that mean? Then TAWS is ignored completely!
As to who is 'responsible' - there should be only one Captain - he or she is 'responsible'. ATC do not, as yet, fly the aircraft. The 'old school' are correct. It would appear the crew were ill-prepared for the airport.
FD - didn't quite understand "hence there is no reason to give any sort of approach clearance to pilot, it rest with ATC." - if it does 'rest', why was descent not 'commanded'? Do you read "distance 10, entering glideslope" (10:39:09) as the descent instruction? Do you think the crew realised this? Would you? In my part of the world we expect "commence descent now for an x degree glidepath".
The question remains, if those glide angles are correct - why fly them? I still think they had seen a bit of ground or some visual cue - maybe lights - in the valley (downslope cloud clearance with the easterly wind?) and were diving for it, unaware of the rising ground ahead..
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BOAC
ATC do not, as yet, fly the aircraft
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To BOAC & janeczku
I never disagreed with you and am EXTREMELY critical of those who try to blame the ATC. (I thought I made it clear again and again).
I have a "slight" advantage of being fluent in 3 languages used, so I read the MAK transcripts as leaked to the press and do not have to rely on someone else's translations. This is critical because it is very easy to mistranslate things and even MAK people who prepared the transcript made many errors, most significant of them being translating ATC command "10:39:40 pasadka dopolniatelno" which they wrongly translated into Polish as "additional landing" instead of as "conditional landing/approach" which led to all sorts of nonsensical speculations.
As to discussion of the ravine, the exact statement in Polish is "Najgorsze tam jest, ze jest dziura, tam sa chmury, i wyszla mgla". The worst thing there is, that there is a hole there, clouds are there, and fog appeared." The repeat of "tam/there" makes it unlikely that the hole being talked about is some hole in the cloud. They are too far to see anything like that and it did not come up in any conversation with anybody on the ground. Also, if there was a "hole in the cloud" there, it would be a good thing, not the "worst thing" would it?
As to what exactly do they mean when they talk about navigator tinkering with TAWS 20 seconds after talking about that "hole" thing, we can only guess.
But, janeczku theory is correct in a sense that for that Tu-154 to get to be on that tree cutting path, they had to enter the goaround mode when the 2nd pilot commands it at 10:40:51. The autopilot is not disengaged up until 6 seconds later. Something must have been leveling the plane before that because they were pretty much following the ground when they started cutting the trees (that was 10 seconds after the goaround command).
If they thought they were given baro-like altitudes thus thinking they were on non-excessive angle path, there was absolutely no reason to panic at 10:40:51, because with the non-excessive descend rate and 100 m above runway, they had plenty of room to execute goaround on autopilot. Meaning, if pilot and 2nd pilot were under impression that they were being given barometric altitudes, they did everything by the book. They descended to DH, could not spot runway, and so executed the goaround.
As I said the navigator, undeniably, is at this point the weakest link, and here is why. Up until 1 year ago, Russians REQUIRED that every flight like that (except to large civilian international airports) had a Russian navigator on board (which they called lider/leader). He was the guy responsible for knowing all there was to know about the destination and responsible for all communication with ATC. The requirement was formally removed, but the 36 Regiment kept requesting the Russian "leaders". The politicians said "no" and some completely inexperienced guy was the navigator. And there could not be any navigators experienced in flying to Russian military airports because they never done it before without a Russian navigator onboard.
It all fits.
I never disagreed with you and am EXTREMELY critical of those who try to blame the ATC. (I thought I made it clear again and again).
I have a "slight" advantage of being fluent in 3 languages used, so I read the MAK transcripts as leaked to the press and do not have to rely on someone else's translations. This is critical because it is very easy to mistranslate things and even MAK people who prepared the transcript made many errors, most significant of them being translating ATC command "10:39:40 pasadka dopolniatelno" which they wrongly translated into Polish as "additional landing" instead of as "conditional landing/approach" which led to all sorts of nonsensical speculations.
As to discussion of the ravine, the exact statement in Polish is "Najgorsze tam jest, ze jest dziura, tam sa chmury, i wyszla mgla". The worst thing there is, that there is a hole there, clouds are there, and fog appeared." The repeat of "tam/there" makes it unlikely that the hole being talked about is some hole in the cloud. They are too far to see anything like that and it did not come up in any conversation with anybody on the ground. Also, if there was a "hole in the cloud" there, it would be a good thing, not the "worst thing" would it?
As to what exactly do they mean when they talk about navigator tinkering with TAWS 20 seconds after talking about that "hole" thing, we can only guess.
But, janeczku theory is correct in a sense that for that Tu-154 to get to be on that tree cutting path, they had to enter the goaround mode when the 2nd pilot commands it at 10:40:51. The autopilot is not disengaged up until 6 seconds later. Something must have been leveling the plane before that because they were pretty much following the ground when they started cutting the trees (that was 10 seconds after the goaround command).
If they thought they were given baro-like altitudes thus thinking they were on non-excessive angle path, there was absolutely no reason to panic at 10:40:51, because with the non-excessive descend rate and 100 m above runway, they had plenty of room to execute goaround on autopilot. Meaning, if pilot and 2nd pilot were under impression that they were being given barometric altitudes, they did everything by the book. They descended to DH, could not spot runway, and so executed the goaround.
As I said the navigator, undeniably, is at this point the weakest link, and here is why. Up until 1 year ago, Russians REQUIRED that every flight like that (except to large civilian international airports) had a Russian navigator on board (which they called lider/leader). He was the guy responsible for knowing all there was to know about the destination and responsible for all communication with ATC. The requirement was formally removed, but the 36 Regiment kept requesting the Russian "leaders". The politicians said "no" and some completely inexperienced guy was the navigator. And there could not be any navigators experienced in flying to Russian military airports because they never done it before without a Russian navigator onboard.
It all fits.
Only half a speed-brake
Further understanding can be obtained in Armavia report and Perm (737 with TL split). As far as I understand, these procedures are applicable and valid for both mil and civilian CIS registered operators, wheras for foreign (such as Armavia, our my employer) the ATC shall adhere to common ICAO workshare. Beyond Moscow, which is fairly decent, it rarely works 100%.
As I noted before, the controller most probably had the tools, training, and proficiency to stop the crash from occuring while the military crew had been familiar with the concept. Sadly he may had correctly adopted the non-MIL/non-CIS procedures which left crew unprotected from their own errors. Another man's shoes I fright to ever wear.
Unlike for military (?) and domestic CIS ops, the ATC had no active role for this approach and hence any of their actions on the day couldn't have attributed to the tragedy. Those with MIL/CIS domestic background only and not familiar with ICAO standard PIC-to-ATS relationship will logically see and try to address ATC failures, I understand that. I also believe such view is incorrect.
FD (the un-real)
Note: I did not study the actual Smolensk instrument approach procedure, ATC unit equipment, nor the instrument capabilities installed on the doomed Tu154; none of my observations from CIS ops is by any way factually connected to the accident.
Last edited by FlightDetent; 15th Jun 2010 at 12:44. Reason: few more thoughts
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Perm
To complete my post#503, here is the MAK Perm English report from AAIB's website http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources..._Report_en.pdf
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@BOAC
In that particular case it doesnt matter if the 400m call was from baro- or radaraltimeter. As you can see from the drawing, at the horizontal position the A/C was at that moment, the ground level was about the same as the RWY (+- 10m), so baro or radar should have given arround the same reading.
In that particular case it doesnt matter if the 400m call was from baro- or radaraltimeter. As you can see from the drawing, at the horizontal position the A/C was at that moment, the ground level was about the same as the RWY (+- 10m), so baro or radar should have given arround the same reading.
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Critical piece of the puzzle. Interview with the ATC
Äèñïåò÷åð ðàññêàçàë î ïðè÷èíàõ êðóøåíèÿ Òó-154 : LIFE | NEWS
This is what I base my guesses on. Maybe I should have traslated more of it.
- And we had information that he was invited to land in other cities.
- Why they decide such a thing?
They began to curse, or may actively insisted andt you could not change his mind?
- What's next?
He said that he would go aound one more time and go to the alternate aerodrome, right?
- The rest as they say.
Can not tell you more.
- But what happened next?
They ceased to communicate?
- No, why?
He communicated for a while.
- How do I know?
Because they are not fluent in Russian.
Someone posted here some quotes from some MAK reports that suggested that the ATC did have equipment that allowed him to monitor the altitude of the landing craft. He says, he didn't.
This is what I base my guesses on. Maybe I should have traslated more of it.
- And we had information that he was invited to land in other cities.
- Это я ему тоже предлагал.
- I also suggested that. - А почему он отказался?
- And why did he refuse? - У него спросить надо было.
- You would have to ask him. - Почему они приняли такое решение?
- Why they decide such a thing?
Они стали ругаться или, может, активно настаивали на своем, что вы не смогли его переубедить?
They began to curse, or may actively insisted andt you could not change his mind?
- Таково было решение командира экипажа.
- This was a decision the commander. - Что дальше?
- What's next?
Он сказал, что уйдет еще на один круг и пойдет на запасной аэродром, так?
He said that he would go aound one more time and go to the alternate aerodrome, right?
- Нет, он сказал, что если не сядет, то уйдет на запасной аэродром.
- No, he said that if unable to land, he goes to the alternate. - А ваши действия какие дальше были?
- And were your further actions? - Дальше все как говорилось.
- The rest as they say.
Не могу вам больше говорить.
Can not tell you more.
- Но что было дальше?
- But what happened next?
Они ушли со связи?
They ceased to communicate?
- Нет, почему?
- No, why?
Он долго находился на связи.
He communicated for a while.
- Что они говорили?
- What were they talking about? - Какие команды я давал - они сначала информировали, потом перестали давать какую-либо информацию...
- Whatevever commands I gave - they were first acknowledged, and then ceased to be ... - Они перестали слушать ваши команды?
- They stopped to listen to your commands? - Они должны давать квитанцию, а они ее не давали.
- They must give reports, but they did not do it. - А что за квитанция?
- What reports? - Данные о высоте при заходе на посадку.
- Data on altitude during the landing approach. - Они даже не давали вам информацию о высоте самолета?
- They did not even give you information about the altitude of the plane? - Да.
- No, they did not. - А какова опасность того, что они вам квитанцию не давали?
- And what is the risk when they do not give you these reports? - С экипажем ведется радиообмен, по радиообмену они должны давать квитанцию.
- Using equipment for radio [landing] guaidance, the crew relying on radio-guidance they must give reports. - Ну а почему они не дали эту квитанцию?
- Well, why didn't they give these reports? - Ну а я откуда знаю?
- How do I know?
Потому что они русский плохо знают.
Because they are not fluent in Russian.
- А что, никого среди экипажа не было русскоязычных?
- Well, there was nobody among the crew who could speak Russian? - Были русскоязычные, но для них цифры - это довольно-таки тяжело.
- There were Russian-speaking, but their numbers - it was difficult for them. - Значит, вы не обладали никакой информацией об их высоте?
- So you did not have any information about their altitude? - Не обладал.
- Did not. Someone posted here some quotes from some MAK reports that suggested that the ATC did have equipment that allowed him to monitor the altitude of the landing craft. He says, he didn't.
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After reading the interview (you should all do it) with that "old fox" from polish 36th Special Air Transport Regiment, i am about to rethink my view on things: I mean, everyone is trying to make a point as to what approach procedure was carried out here, drawing conclusions from the CVR. But do draw a legitimate conclusion, you would have to positivly assume that the crew actually managed things according to procedure. I more and more dought that, thinking that they just lost their way some time during flight, due to the circumstances descriped in that interview.
What struck me:
What struck me:
What surprised you most in the Smolensk disaster?
Col. Stephen Gruszczyk: That no one is talking about how badly this flight of the presidential machine was actually organized. A flight crew must know before take-off what to do if conditions do not allow landing. The crew and the delegation didnt even know what to do in case of no possible landing until they learned about fog in smolensk during flight. This of course causes a lot of stress, your high rank passangers get angry due to the sudden change of plan and that again puts pressure and stress on the crew. Thats why such things are done before-hand.
How do you evaluate this particular crew of the Tu-154?
They had an incredibly small amount of hours, there is nothing to dwell on it. But above all, the teamwork of the crew was really bad.
It just can't be, that the weather is bad and no earlier than in the air, they decide who is doing what. In aviation it should be the opposite: Everything is already provided for in the procedures before the start.
Another thing: Poor knowledge of the russian language. It is clear, that for the whole crew it means stress, when you don't understand something that the ATC tells you or are not sure of it. On board of a Tupolew its always the navigator who is doing communications with ATC from start to landing. But here, the navigator did the comms in english just until Smolensk ATC and then he switched with the PIC who then communicated with Smolensk tower. This was a fundamental violation of procedure, because in the Tupolew the PIC has to deal only with piloting: he can not be responsible for everything that needs to done on the plane.
One more thing: The transcript clearly shows that the crew had no permission to land. Of course, they probably thought the other way: Because they didnt know what the russian words "Pasadku dapalnitielno" mean. It doesnt mean "landing additional". It means "conditional landing", will say: "Come around, but you get permission to land later". In this particular approach the permission would be received when reaching the decision height.
In Russia, many other things are different: Height is given in meters, not feet, the distance in kilometers, not miles, wind power in meters per second, and not in ITD, etc. The instruments are calibrated according to Western procedures and the crew has to convert everything in their head. This summs up to the difficulty and stress.
Why did the TU-154M crash?
In my opinion, the crew began to look for the ground while descending below the decision height. Normally the principle is the following: If at 100 meters I do not see the ground, i fly away. End of story. Have a look: Here is the flight manual of Tu-154 aircraft. It is written here, that at an airport with only two NDB beacons the minimum requirement is a vertical visibility of 120 m and 1800 m horizontally.
I suspect, that this badly attuned crew began watching for ground and stopped looking at the instruments. And by doing that, they probably lost too much speed, and consequently altitude. In such a situation the procedure should normally be this: The PIC is piloting the plane and watching out for ground, while the second Pilot only observes the instruments, giving the height and distance from the RWY. And what do we see here? The only one reading out instruments is the navigator who should actually just deal with communications! And even the general, who wasn't even supposed to sit in there is reading out some instrument! And what about distance from RWY? No one ever called that even once!
Well, and - like everyone assumes by now - this navigator is somehow gravitated towards the radar-altimeter instead of the bario-altimeter. I can't exclude, that for this unexperienced navigator, reading the radar-altimeter somehow just seemed more convenient for him to do.
The Russian Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) said in their preliminary report that the crew had been put together in the last minute and this might have had an affect on the disaster.
Well this is not surprising, since there was only one and a half crew at disposition. The rest of the flight personal decided to do a much better paid
duty in civil aviation!
One more thing: During my service, the regiment flew to Moscow once a year to train on the simulator. This training has been abandoned by the same defense minister who died in the crash. You know what they were doing instead of simulator training? They are training emergency situations "dry". While standing on the airfield! Thats how you are supposed to train engine cut-off in some phase of the flight???
Col. Stephen Gruszczyk: That no one is talking about how badly this flight of the presidential machine was actually organized. A flight crew must know before take-off what to do if conditions do not allow landing. The crew and the delegation didnt even know what to do in case of no possible landing until they learned about fog in smolensk during flight. This of course causes a lot of stress, your high rank passangers get angry due to the sudden change of plan and that again puts pressure and stress on the crew. Thats why such things are done before-hand.
How do you evaluate this particular crew of the Tu-154?
They had an incredibly small amount of hours, there is nothing to dwell on it. But above all, the teamwork of the crew was really bad.
It just can't be, that the weather is bad and no earlier than in the air, they decide who is doing what. In aviation it should be the opposite: Everything is already provided for in the procedures before the start.
Another thing: Poor knowledge of the russian language. It is clear, that for the whole crew it means stress, when you don't understand something that the ATC tells you or are not sure of it. On board of a Tupolew its always the navigator who is doing communications with ATC from start to landing. But here, the navigator did the comms in english just until Smolensk ATC and then he switched with the PIC who then communicated with Smolensk tower. This was a fundamental violation of procedure, because in the Tupolew the PIC has to deal only with piloting: he can not be responsible for everything that needs to done on the plane.
One more thing: The transcript clearly shows that the crew had no permission to land. Of course, they probably thought the other way: Because they didnt know what the russian words "Pasadku dapalnitielno" mean. It doesnt mean "landing additional". It means "conditional landing", will say: "Come around, but you get permission to land later". In this particular approach the permission would be received when reaching the decision height.
In Russia, many other things are different: Height is given in meters, not feet, the distance in kilometers, not miles, wind power in meters per second, and not in ITD, etc. The instruments are calibrated according to Western procedures and the crew has to convert everything in their head. This summs up to the difficulty and stress.
Why did the TU-154M crash?
In my opinion, the crew began to look for the ground while descending below the decision height. Normally the principle is the following: If at 100 meters I do not see the ground, i fly away. End of story. Have a look: Here is the flight manual of Tu-154 aircraft. It is written here, that at an airport with only two NDB beacons the minimum requirement is a vertical visibility of 120 m and 1800 m horizontally.
I suspect, that this badly attuned crew began watching for ground and stopped looking at the instruments. And by doing that, they probably lost too much speed, and consequently altitude. In such a situation the procedure should normally be this: The PIC is piloting the plane and watching out for ground, while the second Pilot only observes the instruments, giving the height and distance from the RWY. And what do we see here? The only one reading out instruments is the navigator who should actually just deal with communications! And even the general, who wasn't even supposed to sit in there is reading out some instrument! And what about distance from RWY? No one ever called that even once!
Well, and - like everyone assumes by now - this navigator is somehow gravitated towards the radar-altimeter instead of the bario-altimeter. I can't exclude, that for this unexperienced navigator, reading the radar-altimeter somehow just seemed more convenient for him to do.
The Russian Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) said in their preliminary report that the crew had been put together in the last minute and this might have had an affect on the disaster.
Well this is not surprising, since there was only one and a half crew at disposition. The rest of the flight personal decided to do a much better paid
duty in civil aviation!
One more thing: During my service, the regiment flew to Moscow once a year to train on the simulator. This training has been abandoned by the same defense minister who died in the crash. You know what they were doing instead of simulator training? They are training emergency situations "dry". While standing on the airfield! Thats how you are supposed to train engine cut-off in some phase of the flight???
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"Did not" - In which case it must be asked why did he issue the 'go-round' commands? Did he 'guess' the height of the a/c? There are so many fingers in this pie, guesses, possible flight paths, this and that, mis-translations, conspiracy theories it is impossible to separate truth from fiction.
I still cannot see why ATC is really involved here - even more so if there was no PAR equipment. If I had been that crew, and I had no specific instructions on "you have to do this and that" in my Ops Manual, I would have flown the 2xNDB approach exactly as any other - as they are meant to be flown, without any 'radar' input. Planned and flown my own glidepath, checked my own heights (baro), and probably ignored all protestation from anyone outside the cockpit in view of my cargo - OR requested a PAR.
I still cannot see why ATC is really involved here - even more so if there was no PAR equipment. If I had been that crew, and I had no specific instructions on "you have to do this and that" in my Ops Manual, I would have flown the 2xNDB approach exactly as any other - as they are meant to be flown, without any 'radar' input. Planned and flown my own glidepath, checked my own heights (baro), and probably ignored all protestation from anyone outside the cockpit in view of my cargo - OR requested a PAR.
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@BOAC
The clues for it are in the transcript.
It appears the ATC issues the horizon and go-around commands after they disappear from his (ASR-like????) radar screen due to being close to or below runway level. He also requests that they turn their landing lights on to which the captain replies that they are already on. Why would ATC do that unless he was trying to spot them visually at a totally different altitude and could not?
The key to the puzzle is the navigator stupidly reading the radio altitude. It could not possibly do anyone any good, especially with the pilot not only being occupied with trying to spot the ground but also talking to the ATC. So, they (the pilots) were either not thinking about that ravine and/or assumed that they were being given barometric altitude until the first tree sent them a different message, which would answer why they do and say very little until the first tree says "hello".
At RA 100 meters, the 2nd pilot even reassures everyone: "everything normal/all within norms" after TAWS screams 4 warnings. Soon afterwards, at RA 80 m he commands goaround.
It appears the ATC issues the horizon and go-around commands after they disappear from his (ASR-like????) radar screen due to being close to or below runway level. He also requests that they turn their landing lights on to which the captain replies that they are already on. Why would ATC do that unless he was trying to spot them visually at a totally different altitude and could not?
The key to the puzzle is the navigator stupidly reading the radio altitude. It could not possibly do anyone any good, especially with the pilot not only being occupied with trying to spot the ground but also talking to the ATC. So, they (the pilots) were either not thinking about that ravine and/or assumed that they were being given barometric altitude until the first tree sent them a different message, which would answer why they do and say very little until the first tree says "hello".
At RA 100 meters, the 2nd pilot even reassures everyone: "everything normal/all within norms" after TAWS screams 4 warnings. Soon afterwards, at RA 80 m he commands goaround.
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I'm continuing to follow this thread....
Lets summarise some discussions :-
* The ATC controller in his "interviews" clearly states he was not given altitude reports when requested - the CVR totally agrees with this.
* He must not have had altitude info on the equipment therefore - so it was NOT a PAR/GCA - BUT have the Russians actually confirmed this was the case?
* As it appears it was NOT a PAR then why on earth did the controller more than once say "on path on slope" when he clearly had absolutely no clue (without altitude info) this was the case?
* Furthermore, why did he call "horizon"? As far as he was concerned it was a normal NDB approach to DH. What prompted him to call horizon ? Did he or a colleague actually catch sight of the aircraft (or its lights) through the fog, low down about to impact? If so, why not mention this in the interview?
* I concur, the theory that the PF saw something on the ground to cause them to descend below DH fits very well with the outcome. It does however seem inconceivable that given the tension in the cockpit there is nothing on the CVR to validate this. A call of "look! there it is ", "OK I've got lights " or "there you are" or such like would surely have been made ??
They descended below DH too far for a GA to save them from impact with the tree - Why? We will never fully know.
Lets summarise some discussions :-
* The ATC controller in his "interviews" clearly states he was not given altitude reports when requested - the CVR totally agrees with this.
* He must not have had altitude info on the equipment therefore - so it was NOT a PAR/GCA - BUT have the Russians actually confirmed this was the case?
* As it appears it was NOT a PAR then why on earth did the controller more than once say "on path on slope" when he clearly had absolutely no clue (without altitude info) this was the case?
* Furthermore, why did he call "horizon"? As far as he was concerned it was a normal NDB approach to DH. What prompted him to call horizon ? Did he or a colleague actually catch sight of the aircraft (or its lights) through the fog, low down about to impact? If so, why not mention this in the interview?
* I concur, the theory that the PF saw something on the ground to cause them to descend below DH fits very well with the outcome. It does however seem inconceivable that given the tension in the cockpit there is nothing on the CVR to validate this. A call of "look! there it is ", "OK I've got lights " or "there you are" or such like would surely have been made ??
They descended below DH too far for a GA to save them from impact with the tree - Why? We will never fully know.
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I agree all your points except
- well, for me it raises more questions than it answers!
FD - to pick up on your #501 - leaving aside any peculiar Eastern bloc 'ways', that Perm approach is more than capable of being flown without DME or radar, exactly the same way thousands of pilots have flown millions of such approaches. I would wager that our 'Ace of the Base' would also be more than happy to demonstrate a 'dive and drive' on that one. The whole point of the outbound timing is so that when you establish +/-5 on the i/b track you CAN descend to MDA. No need for any distance measuring equipment, just a stopwatch.
Originally Posted by SadPole
The clues for it are in the transcript.
FD - to pick up on your #501 - leaving aside any peculiar Eastern bloc 'ways', that Perm approach is more than capable of being flown without DME or radar, exactly the same way thousands of pilots have flown millions of such approaches. I would wager that our 'Ace of the Base' would also be more than happy to demonstrate a 'dive and drive' on that one. The whole point of the outbound timing is so that when you establish +/-5 on the i/b track you CAN descend to MDA. No need for any distance measuring equipment, just a stopwatch.
After several months of following this thread, it has been a delight to see that the perseverance of some posters has resulted in the thread evolving into a reasoned and interesting discussion of the facts as we know them.
So I say special thanks to those who worked so hard early on, and have been so patient in educating the rest of us. (Alice stands out of course in this regard, as does Ptkay and several others).
SadPole's recent contributions (especially, IMHO, his/her summary in post #514) are most perceptive and insightful.
Thanks,
grizz
So I say special thanks to those who worked so hard early on, and have been so patient in educating the rest of us. (Alice stands out of course in this regard, as does Ptkay and several others).
SadPole's recent contributions (especially, IMHO, his/her summary in post #514) are most perceptive and insightful.
Thanks,
grizz
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grizzled,
thanks for the kind words.
Recently, I just prefer to lurk a little until really
new and solid facts emerge.
Based on the information we have, the picture is very grim and sad,
bringing to the daylight the properties of the Polish pilots,
which are very desired in the war time, but of no use,
or dangerous in the peace time...
thanks for the kind words.
Recently, I just prefer to lurk a little until really
new and solid facts emerge.
Based on the information we have, the picture is very grim and sad,
bringing to the daylight the properties of the Polish pilots,
which are very desired in the war time, but of no use,
or dangerous in the peace time...