SLFinAZ

Nothing less ,nothing more,and that is my opinon

Sums it all up nicely, all you need to do is consider the source and file in the appropriate circular receptical

Tagron

The essential piece of information that we lack is any clear idea of the crew’s plan for the approach, in particular how they expected to control their vertical profile. We don’t know what they expected from ATC and whether that expectation was realistic.

If we start from the basis that they intended to fly a properly conducted instrument approach and not just a plunge at the ground just short of the runway, then the likely components of the approach would be PAR, NDB and FMS, either individually or in conjunction. There are questions surrounding each component.

PAR - Did they anticipate, erroneously, a western style PAR, and for that reason believed that glidepath control would be provided for them. So they had not planned their own final descent profile, then suddenly found things were not as expected (ATC - on glidepath but they were not) and had to make rushed corrections ?

NDB - If they were flying the NDB procedure surely they should have taken great care to cross both the NDBs at the correct procedural height? But it appears they crossed the Outer Marker/Far Beacon some 100m too high, then adopted a high rate of descent that was clearly going to bring them to the MM/Near Beacon too low if not corrected.

FMS It is highly probable from the description of the avionic fit (Post #368) a very accurate FMS approach including GPS updating could have been constructed. If this facility had been used they could have had the benefit of a continual display of distance to the threshold, ( or the NDBs or whatever other waypoints they chose to enter) and by comparing distance with height a very steady glidepath could have been achieved. Or there could have been some kind of VNAV profile on their navigation displays ?

In asking these questions I am taking the approach analysis, based on the 400m call, posted by Janeckzu (#398 ) as valid.

The overall question is, to what extent was this an approach that went wrong, and to what extent was it a reckless breaking of limits. Was it a combination of the two ?

And what do we make of this exchange on the CVR transcript that is evidently part of the pre-landing checklist:

1009.55.2 - Procedure
1009.57.4 - Unknown yet

Alice025

Type of approach was not defined when discussed in the cabin, and by all looks - not established later on either.


10:39:40.8 10:39:43.8 /Control/ Landing additionally 120 - 3 meters
This "posadka dopolnitel'no" /landing (to be) (agreed) additionally (wind) (towards) 120 - 3 meters (per second)
looks kind of undisputable, in the Russian forum quarters, "landing to be agreed additionally" they say in military aerodromes is a normal command though I don't know how often used. But someone heard it and not one someone. It seems.

Exactness of what is seen on controller's screen is passionately discussed currently in the Smolensk forum. Advantages of drawing the glideslope right on the screen by a pen Vs drawing it on the protective outer plastic, Vs keeping a film over it where the correct glideslope is marked and comparing against it, which angles it changes and does it, depending from what side the controller looks at the screen, and all that. I don't understand it but 2 things I understand - there seem to be 2 screens, one showing the controller the glideslope, the other - the course.

210thars

SadPole,

Given the Russians have stated that the CVR was damaged, it is not known what else was said.

Now it is being reported that the weather observations while they being automated, came from the civilian airport, 10km from Smolensk North.

What is the difference in field elevation between the two?

And as you pointed to the delay, but it is not known why there was a delay or why the president's crew was not briefed on fog.

According to the Smolensk blog, there was fog forecasted. But it was never briefed in the pre-filght to the president's crew.

This fact is an error directly placed on dispatch and those who briefed the crew on the weather.

Next, the Jak-40 crew in an article stated that the radio signal may have been disrupted.

Disrupted radio signal led to Smolensk tragedy? - Warsaw Business Journal - Online Portal - wbj.pl

I found the comments on the Jak-40 (while on the ground at the runway) crew on being able to see the Russian Il-76 veer left interesting.

Knowing that you can see the aircraft from the ground makes me question the visibility and ceiling height at the time when the Russian IL-76 was making its two approaches.

Then in the transcripts of the CVR you have the following:

Tu-154B Views: Console ? FlightGear.ru
There is not enough data yet to say this was pilot error.

dukof

Something seems completely overlooked here..

The best analysis available so far indicates an almost linear descent from 4km to first impact at about 1.1km. Even if giving ATC the privilage to chose any fixed angle as the glideslope, still only one of the points (4km, 3km and 2km) may have been actually "on glideslope", with one high or low, and at least one completely out of tolerance.

However even more interesting I find the time differences here. Looking at the CVR transcript, we can see the following:

39:50.2 00.0 Outer marker (6.1km)
40:13.5 +23.5 ATC: 4..
40:26.6 +13.1 ATC: 3..
40:38.7 +12.1 ATC: 2..
40:56.0 +17.3 Inner marker (1.1km)

Sec/km, from outer to inner marker:
11.75
11.75
13.1
12.1 So far an average of 12.2 sec/km
19.2 7.0 sec/km extra. Or 158%. (From 2km to inner marker 1.1km)

To burn up this amount of time in 900m would simply be impossible. It did not happen. What does this mean? Clearly the calls of 4km, 3km and 2km were given by ATCO several seconds too early. Or in distance.. about 400-600m too early.

It is hence possible that the crew were evaluating their heights rather correctly, in respect to the distance from runway they were given. When the last "100" was called by navigator (or automatic?) , they would then believe that they were almost out of the ravine.. Hence pretty much on glideslope. The "100" was called at 1750m, but if they were "feeling the time", or in other way using it for navigational plot, from ATC notified "2km", then they would believe they were around 1150-1250m. Hence in perfect position for their height, and at a point where RA should have been off my no more than 15-20m. So they would believe they were at 80-85m, but they were actually at 50m. Or similarly, when at 1600m, they could believe they were at 1000m, past the ravine completely. While they were actually just over the bottom of it.



As for the ATC radar display. Assuming they had no LCD but rather the most simple available, the flight path would look something like this, with the black line drawn by operator as a help line for the minimum acceptable height:



While I'm not a conspiracy theorist, I can't avoid to make the objective realization, that it must be extremely simple, both in technology and practice, to fix this equipment to show an imaginary "on slope" aircraft path/signal at the time of this incident, with the ATCO completely unaware. But that is useless to discuss, as no evidence may ever confirm it. So, assuming the display showed what is indicated, I can't really see how he can call "on glideslope".

RetiredF4

Nice summary. Now let me add a few thoughts to the point of "reckless breaking of limits", also out of a military perspective.

Military pilots take risks, they have to, its their job in war and they have to get accustomed to this task in peacetime. They train for it to be most proficient in that task, when the bad times come.

But military pilots are no sensless and careless zialots taking any kind of risks without having planned it and found them managable. Search the complete transscript of the CVR (at least what is available) from take-off till crash and search it for any kind of symptoms concerning planning of reckless behavior, you will come up with nothing. For those guys it was a normal flight with deteriorating weather. Lets do one approach, when we see the runway its a landing, when not it will be the go for the alternate. The president will not like it but w.t.f. That´s the bottom line, nothing less, nothing more.

Now to the question concerning the weather and if an approach in those conditions was really an option or only an unnecessary risk.
As mentioned before, the crew and their highest ranking officer didn´t see any risk in the approach. They had the training for it, the captain probably had done such kind of approaches with worse equipped aircraft before. Pilots all over the world do approaches in bad WX conditions and dont crash. There was no inherent danger in commencing such an approach beyond doing flying at all.

Also the planning of the flight to Smolensk with the given WX-Info is normal and legal. Fog can develop in relative short time, once landed in VMC on my homefield, the touchdownzone in sunshine and from midfield on it was thickest fog. It can go away as fast as it came, especially if we talk about fog in the morning time. Therefore there was also no reason to turn around when fog was reported after Takeoff. As long as there is enough gas to land at the alternate, everything is in the green.

Let me mention my thoughts concerning pressure from the general in the cockpit. I think there was none. I´ve flown with generals myself (as instructor pilot), there is only one commanding authority in the cockpit, and a general having flown himself will respect this. Thed reason him being in the cockpit might just be due to the fact, that he liked the company of an aircrew more than the company of the presidential entourage. The CVR gives no hint at all on any kind of pressure.

Imho it was a standard thing for the crew, do the approach, land or go to the alternate. And it looked all normal normal till few seconds before the crash. Whatever the reason for the desaster was, they did not catch it until it was too late.

franzl

BOAC

I repeat - there is NO indication on the transcript that a 'PAR' was in progress - forget it! By PAR I mean Precision Approach Radar, which is a western term. If the Eastern bloc uses some other system, please do not refer to it as a PAR because it will just confuse.- all the images posters have displayed show an absolutely standard 2-screen PAR display, as used all over the west since post-war days. IF that was what was there that morning, it was a 'western' style 'PAR' which requires a continuous R/T stream from ATC to work. None of that. In the west that 'talk-down' would normally cease at a range equivalent to a glidepath height of 100m unless a specific request had been made to continue 'to touchdown'. None of that.

As to all these imaginary profiles I keep seeing, I can see no evidence for any of them. No-one knows EXACTLY where the a/c was at which height from the 500m 'platform' until impact, execpt that it APPEARS to have been on the glidepath until 2km according to the ATC PAR .

Regardless of weather inaccuracy, IN THE WEST (and I assume in Poland under EUOPS) the approach could not have been continued legally beyond around 300m unless visual. Any 'inaccurate' forecast would nor affect what the weather actually was. Forget that theory too.

Something caused the PF to descend below DH, not ATC, not the met forecast. We do not appear to have the full CVR transcript. This is all guesswork.

ARRAKIS

I explained this earlier. ATC distance redouts are around 5 seconds too early, which means when ATC gives 2 km, 101 was at that moment around 2,4 km point.

Arrakis

dukof

BOAC,
Instead of discussing the details of the analysis, you just wipe them off with no attention to what you would believe is inaccurate. There are obviously inaccuracies, but also those can be estimated. I'm a mechanical engineer and have loads of experience of working with uncertainties and error-estimation of data. No data is ever perfect, but you don't need perfection to make conclusions.

You don't even have to look at the profile. Just look at the transcript. How do you explain that the average time per km is 12.2 sec from 6km to 2km, and 19.2 sec from 2km to 1.1km?

It's a totally simple observation based on confirmed data, which leaves a big question mark. And it could very well have impacted the outcome of the events, as I suggested.

ARRAKIS,
..and the reason for it is ? (Forgive me for not remembering your explanation)

BOAC

.and the reason, dukof, is that if you take ATC out of the accident as I believe they were, it matters not what 'groundspeed' you have computed from whichever 'theory'.

The simple fact remains - fly the a/c below a safe height for the met conditions, and especially into a valley, and you will probably crash.

If someone can produce ANY evidence that ATC were controlling the azimuth and glidepath of the a/c then I will listen to 'inaccurate ranges'. Otherwise it is really irrelevant. Range does not actually matter on a 'PAR' to that extent anyway. Even with a (non-precision) 'ASR' approach, that sort of range 'error' would only cause a height error of around 20m and the DH would probably have been much higher in the first place.

From what I see on the transcript you all need to get into your heads that the only ones 'controlling' the glidepath angle were in the cockpit..

dukof

The analysis of this chart is done by a member on the smolensk forum. And the speed estimates here are not important, they make no particular significance/impact to the plotted path. The main points of reference are the inner and outer marker signals, and the navigator height readings. All from the CVR transcript. These alone will give about an identical picture anyway.

RetiredF4

Now tell me if you wish, that we use the russian term in kyrillic writing for equipment and procedures used in conection with approach procedures whatever they are?

There is no doubt about, that the russian equivalent of equipment and procedures to the western PAR and PAR Approach is existing. There is also no doubt about it that on a military base it will not necessarily be according to ICAO standards. Even in europe on military bases the handling of such procedures are not identical in detail. Also the values of decision heights are dependent on the local enviroment and the equipment used and might be from (200 feet = 60 meters) up to higher values.

Also the talkdown has its local differences, at some places it will be continuos until touchdown if you not tell them to stop talking, and at other places you have to request it.

Whether the equipment was available in Smolensk and to what extent it ws used to assist in which kind of approach is still not known. We should ask ourself why this is still not known.

I cant find a sense in claiming the term PAR being a protected word for one version of western PAR approach, neglecting that even there are differences in the conduct of the procedures between military and civil as well as local, and that similar procedures exist in other countries.

If you argue in such a strict mannor concerning the PAR, do the same concerning the NDB approach or any other possible approach. And you will have a hard time to explain the communication with ATC sticking as close to western rules as you do with the PAR equivalent. The whole communication with ATC is nothing compared to what we would be used in the west, being it military or civil. There would be no glidepath information from ATC on a non precision approach in the west, and also no sense in range information.



franzl

SadPole

Very Long 4 pages. (In Polish) Buttons 1,2,3,4 at the bottom. Pretty much all questions that were discussed here at PPRUNE are answered as far as that pilot is concerned.

http://wyborcza.pl/1,97863,8004393,Katastrofa_smolenska__Nie_mieli_zgody_na_lad owanie.html

I will copy the machine translations of the most important points, while correcting some of the obvious machine translation screwups:

Smolensk disaster. They had no permission to land

Col. Stephen Gruszczyk, former pilot 36th Special Air Transport Regiment *

last modified 2010-06-11 18:13

From start to 3 thousand. meters and landing on the level of 3 thousand. meters to the ground pilots cabin must be clean, quiet. There is no right for anyone to be there outside the crew.


Organizer flight [in this case, Chancellery of the President], the 36th command Regiment commander, and above all pre-flight crew must know what to do at the destination airport if conditions do not allow the landing. Will we return to Warsaw - you can take the appropriate amount of fuel. Do you fly to the alternate where the services will be waiting for the delegation. Such a plan should exist especially in the case of a flight with the President and the delegation, which are waiting - as in Katyn - hundreds of people. It can be allowed that the crew flies without any consultation and frantically decides what to do.


I say this from my own experience of service in the 36th Pułku. Regiment. Even in LOT Airline one calls to the coordinator and asks where to fly, because at the destination airport weather prevents landing: whether to the alternate or to any other, where you can provide passengers with accommodation and transport.

On April 10 that it was not the case because the transcript shows that only during the flight they were trying to determine how to act.


This verbal agreements or on paper?

No need to write them down. But all should know exactly what will happen - including the most important passenger, in order for him not to worry – in case the weather prevents landing. I am not talking about the delay of departure, although in this case, it is very important 36 Sopecial Air Regiment proposed takoff at 6.30, Chancellery of the President postponed the departure time to 7,00, the plane took off about 7.27, because, inter alia, Lech Kaczynski and Maria were late]. At this point they should have already signaled: OK, we will get there, though perhaps not in time. We may even delay the departure by two hours, the weather will improve and we will start. After all, it's no problem to move the ceremony for two or three hours [the weather in Smolensk actually improved]. And here what happened? Nothing.

Do you remember a similar critical situation?

- Of course. Pressures such as: "You have to go there and land." But everything was done before the flight, not during the flight.

Once upon a time I flew senior military commanders after the conference in Warsaw - the same as that CASA, which crashed into Mirosławiec in January 2008. On board was, among others, chief of the Air Force. I flew to Wroclaw, and then to Poznan. At Ławica [weather] conditions did not allow landings. Before the flight the commander of the regiment and the Air Force chief were told about the situation. Commanding officer says, "you fly to Wroclaw, where you'll see what the conditions will be in Poznan." I landed in Wroclaw, I went to the meteo office to find out about the weather. There, they say that that it got even worse. I went back to the machine and say to General: "Because of the conditions we cannot fly." Of course, in such situations, the main passenger behaves rather calmly. But the colonels ... As they began to threaten me: "You will see, we find a way to get to you ..". I say again: "There are no conditions [for flying], I do not fly." They got off, cars were provided for them and they drove away.

I quickly returned to Warsaw, I reported to the commander, also reported the threats. And he, he was calm, takes it upon himself. The way it should be. Well, we are alive.

BOAC

- it is not 'protected' it is just that probably 95% of those using this forum associate the three letter expression with a known western approach system. Perhaps better to use the original 'Ground Controlled Approach [GCA] (with glidepath guidance)'?

Not one person (including you - and I wonder how many Eastern Bloc 'GCA's you flew in your Phantom?) has so far has managed to explain how one of those is flown in Russia.

Not one person here has produced ANY evidence that a 'GCA' was in progress

so why are we talking about it?

Your last sentence has confused me - are you telling me that in the Eastern bloc there is? That 'Eastern' NPA's are all flown with radar monitoring? This would be useful and relevant information.

SadPole

How do you evaluate this particular crew of the Tu-154, April 10?

Exactly ... They had incredibly small flying times, there is nothing to dwell on it [the captain had 455 hours as the first Tupolev pilot, co-pilot - 506 hours on Tupolev, navigator barely 60 hours on Tupolev, and techniques for on-board - 330]. But above all, teamwork of the crew. It can not be that weather conditions are difficult, and only aboard the aircraft it is determined, who has what to do. In aviation it is the opposite - it is already provided in the procedures before the start.


Well, gentlemen ...The transcript shows that the crew had no permission to land. Because the crew did not know what it meant, the Russian command "Pasadku dapałnitielno" [Conditional Approach]. It is not - as translated literally - "additional landing", but "conditional landing." So: begin approach, but get permission to land later.

We flew to the USSR for many years, and knew this very well. After descending to the so-called decision height [in this case it was 100 meters, the crew must then see the earth, if you do not see it, stop the descent and fly away], when everything is in order, the controller should issue the command: "Pasadku razrieszaju" [Begining landing]. It is the permission for the landing, the crew must confirm that the words "Pasadku razrieszili" [Acknowledge][Began landing], ie the controller gave permission for landing and the crew understood. It's like a "good day", "goodbye."

SadPole

Why Tu-154 crashed?

In my opinion, the crew began to look for the ground and descended below the decision height. And here the rule is simple: if the 100 meters I do not see the ground, I fly away. End of story. Please, here is the book for use in the Tu-154 flight. And it clearly says that in the event such as the airport in Smolensk, where the aircraft flight guidance beacons are only two [only provide distance from the runway], the minimum requirement is a vertical visibility of 120 m and 1800 m horizontally. Even if the airport in Smolensk provided for the Tu-154 100 and 1000 meters, it's always these higher, which is safer to [visibility of April 10 was 50, and 200-400 m].

I suspect that in Smolensk badly organized crew began to look for the earth - except perhaps the navigator, who sits low - and stopped to look at the instruments, And you can imagine different things, forexample, that they lowered speed too much.

In such a situation it should have been captain maintained and watching the plane land, and co-pilot looks only at the instruments, giving the height and distance to the airport. And here the altitude was reported by the navigator, who should deal with communications. And they did not talk at all about distance, the altitude alone does not tell the pilot much.

And – as everything indicated – the were flying one the radio altimeter showing the actual distance from the earth, and should use the barometric altimeter showing the height above sea level. I can not exclude that, for the inexperienced navigator reading of the radio altimeter was simply more convenient.

And almost to the last seconds the autopilot was switched on. And it should be switched off at the height of the decision, in the worst case of 70 m. At the airport, such as the one in Smolensk, the landing needs to be conducted manually.

So why the autopilot was switched on?

I think the crew wanted to simplify the landing. Autopilot is holding a course, you can adjust the speed of descent. The pilots were probably preoccupied with looking for land, and also the captain handled the communications with the tower. And they were under stress, because the landing conditions were terrible.

SadPole

The ATC work from Smolensk, was correct?

First of all, you can not close the airport because of fog, only if it is technically defficient. Because what, I go for the landing, just as the conditions improved temporarily, and the controller says he closes the airport? Second, in the Smolensk military planes land often, so ATCs are experienced. Thirdly, from the transcripts I can guess that the airport has just a normal radar. [Area] Surveillance radar, and not so called "precision approach", because then commands from the tower would be different. The controller only aids the crew during landing, and does not direct it.

But is it too late, at about 60 m, the inspector shouted: "Horizon" to the crew stopped to descend?

The problem is not this command, but that the crew descended below decision height, which they should never do [the navigator reads the amount of up to 20 m].

Perhaps the aircraft with the most important people in the country should not land on the airport as primitive as in Smolensk, but the closest one with the automatic guidance system, the ILS? Even in Bryansk and Vitebsk, where it is approximately two hours by car to the KatynForest?

Good question. We are too much accustomed to fly to Smolensk.

dukof

Why "everyone" keep having such a hard time to accept or understand that the "101 Horizon" call was made at an altitude relative to runway of between 0-10m ??

It can be seen in this chart:
http://img813.imageshack.us/img813/8...tprofile02.gif

Or in this one, if you prefer a pure time-line base reference:
Black line shows navigator height readouts, where the last from 100 to 20 is likely automatic.

RetiredF4

You love twisting words. It could be read out of your posts, but not out of mine. It might be that way, but i dont know. Do you? Does anybody?
There was glidepath and range information on the approach. And glidepath and range information is common with PAR or if you like GCA approaches in west and in east.

I haven´t flown any approach farther east than Erhac (malatya, turky), so i dont know how it is done there. I didn´t claim to know either and unfortunately like you mention nobody could explain it out of own expierience or with solid reference.
Therefore i neither favor it nor do i disqualify (like you, on what facts?) the possibility of such a procedure being used or misunderstood as being used. I´m open to a lot of options and causes until proved otherwise. And to bring it to the point, your arguments dont´t prove it otherwise, not that i can see it.

You have your mind up, the crew did a willing descent to the ground, case closed. That is ok with me, its your thinking, but not mine. I like to look behind the front. Its not a matter of guilt (ATC versus crew), its a matter of recognizing the whole story and preventing it from happening again (not that i could do that).

So it is legit to think outside your box, until the truth is being published.

franzl

SadPole

dukof

I have to admit, I cannot find anything wrong with your distance calculations. It forces me to rethink the whole thing.

As to the comments of the interviewed pilot, they are relevant only because he is a guy who flew the Tu-154s into Russia far more than any of the crew of the unlucky flight.

The matter has gotten highly political as there is a struggle within all of Poland between the "new crew" in politics and the army, largely inexperienced in anything but "politically correct" because they are not "contaminated" by the Russian training and the far more experienced "old crew" who (often justifiably) see the new crew as idiots.

I suppose, I might have allowed myself to be dragged into it, even though I spent 20 years in the west while the old and new crews were battling each other in Poland. Still, I see the "new crew" as idiots because they have no clue about what is going on in the world and therefore push us into completely unrealistic foreign policy.