Originally Posted by
BOAC
why was descent not 'commanded'? Do you read "distance 10, entering glideslope" (10:39:09) as the descent instruction? Do you think the crew realised this? Would you? In my part of the world we expect "commence descent now for an x degree glidepath".
We'd answered that before, you called it Polish cheese. Nowhere did I attempt to describe the Smolensk situation or draw suggestions, please accept my apologies if I had fooled you to think otherwise. My sole aim was to provide and observer's viewpoint on CIS procedures so that others may develop more informed conclusions.
Further understanding can be obtained in Armavia report and Perm (737 with TL split). As far as I understand, these procedures are applicable and valid for both mil and civilian CIS registered operators, wheras for foreign (such as Armavia, our my employer) the ATC shall adhere to common ICAO workshare. Beyond Moscow, which is fairly decent, it rarely works 100%.
As I noted before, the controller most probably had the tools, training, and proficiency to stop the crash from occuring while the military crew had been familiar with the concept. Sadly he may had
correctly adopted the non-MIL/non-CIS procedures which left crew unprotected from their own errors. Another man's shoes I fright to ever wear.
Unlike for military (?) and domestic CIS ops, the ATC had no active role for this approach and hence any of their actions on the day couldn't have attributed to the tragedy. Those with MIL/CIS domestic background only and not familiar with ICAO standard PIC-to-ATS relationship will logically see and try to address ATC failures, I understand that. I also believe such view is incorrect.
FD (the un-real)
Note: I did not study the actual Smolensk instrument approach procedure, ATC unit equipment, nor the instrument capabilities installed on the doomed Tu154; none of my observations from CIS ops is by any way factually connected to the accident.