Ptkay

Alice, I am afraid, there couldn't be any good cooperation and trust
between ATC and pilots, because from the very beginning the pilot
knew, he will be trying to land, but was lying to the ATC, that he won't.

The other problem was, that normally, in a Russian crew AFAIK it would be the
navigator (shturman) who would be talking to the tower, and the pilot
would be just flying, not talking.

As you noticed, from the moment they contacted Smoleńsk tower the
navigator asked: "Are we going to talk Russian?", when the PIC answered "yes"
he also took over all the communication with the ATC from navigator.
So, from this point of view, we can assume the navigator couldn't speak Russian,
on the other hand the PIC was too busy with other activities to read back the altitudes.
In this respect the ATC was correct in his assumption:
"They probably didn't know Russian language."
The navigator obviously didn't, the only communication he did before
was in English.

You can ask your colleagues on the forum, who in the crew is
normally reading back to the ATC? I know it just from hearing.

threemiles

From the transscript the PF is the FO, as the CPT is talking to ATC. The FO was also the one commanding "go around" after hearing 80. He may have been surprised why 80 comes so quickly after 100. The navigator seems to count down the RH numbers. Concerning from the transcript is how little interaction, briefing, readback and coordination there is between the crew members. Nobody says "I have control".

criss

PF was CPT.

Alice025

Captain Protasiuk spoke with contrloller Plusnin.
Forgot who exclusively spoke with Yak on the ground. Was it 2nd pilot or navigator?

To the neighbour forum it seems they used different frequencies, and each kept to their own. One for captain to speak with the ground control, another frequency I think was used by the nav. to speak with the Yak.
_______
Various radio lovers say it's unlikely that at some point there was a hole/interruption in which controller and captain couldn't communicate, because one was above and the other under him in the ravine.
That the frequency Capt.-Controller used is known by radio-lovers for excellently bending round the curves on the ground and getting down into various holes. Just to note their comms would go un-interrupted, the whole route, in spite of the plane's position below the runway.
It's 130 smth. They say 400 smth is bad, for comms in tricky terrain, but that 130 smth is perfect.

Alice025

There was another observation, that of 500+ messages in total in the record the public got access now to - 100+ messages are marked "unrecognisable".
As per conditions on May 2nd.

Compare with MAK statement on May 19th "we have completed deciphering, additionally using some spec. equipment, and now the record deciphering is done over with".

However the public was given access to the "Version 1 of the Variant 1" (stamp across every page), and dated May 2nd.

How many more are still kept non-disclosed.
Polish media interviews say 20 people from Poland flew over to Moscow in May to tell the voices. Surely they figured out some. Plus the "special equipment" applied for noise filtering and all. I think real amount of "unrecognisable" stands far less than 100+ , since May 19th.

threemiles

Why do we need an investigation then?

You simply do not fly a low visibility approach with expected go-around and talk to ATC at the same time.

Kulverstukas

Alice, with Yak 044 spoke 2P on common freq 123,45

criss

Really? You also don't start approach in such conditions - yet they did.

It's not just me saying CPT was PF. And if you read CVR you'll know why he was speaking (up to a point) - because he spoke Russian better than the navigator, and because he took over the communications from F/O who was asked to speak on 123.45.

Alice025

Someone says when button for go-away in automated regime is activated, there is a beep in the cabin "at the frequency 220Htz".
As such a beep is missing in the transcript, unlike other beeps, either it was not recorded, or they didn't activate automated go-away or the button wasn't functional.

Ptkay

This is a very interesting information.

BOAC

Out of interest, why are you all focussing on an 'automatic go-round' and absence of ' a beep in the cabin ' - no, it is not interesting at all. There is no indication of any attempt at all to actually go-round that I can see in any of the transcripts. The autopilot and autothrottle were both disconnected at 10:40:56-58.

Good job you lot are not doing the investigation

I repeat:
There is no sign of a 'PAR' being flown, no, not even a 'Russian' one!

Ptkay

BOAC:
I agree with you completely.

It was the ATC trying to do his "job as usual", but not the pilots.

I am tending more and more to the conclusion, it was a "scud run"
that went wrong.

They discuss it at 10:19:43 2p "...I had it once, I had it once.." "...we landed..."
"...in Gdansk..."

Thay might have been used to such "scud runs" even on CAT I ILS in GDA,
the President was flying there very often for weekend,
and, again they had to land by all means, not to spoil the day...

But in EPGD the situation on 29 approach is opposite to Smoleńsk,
there is a hill, not a ravine.
http://www.ais.pata.pl/aip/EP_AD_2_EPGD_2-1-1_en.php

They got away with it every time, because the RH was bigger then the QFE height.

Just my 0,02$ worth,...

Alice025

"The autopilot and autothrottle were both disconnected at 10:40:56-58.

Good job you lot are not doing the investigation "

Boac, with the 2nd statement I absolutely agree thank God, but back to autopilot and autothrottle disconnected. As much as is available in the transcript, what's your view - that until this "auto" part was disconnected (MAK doesn't say who did it and how did it happen)(just that it took place 4 and 5 sec before the plane hit the birch and lost the wing) - do you think they flew on full auto-piloting, not applying anything from themselves, from Far Beacon to this "4 and 5 seconds respectively" dis-connection point? Like, was it full autopiloting, after they set the angle and thus the direction, and pressure and runway into the system?


I am trying to think; suppose they didn't snatch at any ? piloting regime handles, the wheel, whatever. If they continued to touch nothing. Would that auto-piloting system bring them to the runway?

Alice025

Could they have possibly "fed" the previous route to runway from Far Beacon, into their mysterious system (after re-wamp, a hybrid of Russian and Western things), from the flight on the 7th of May, and simply, may be, activated it?

Ptkay

They probably flew in a simple AP mode, entering just rate of descent and heading.
(VM - vertical mode, HM - horizontal mode.) And AT (auto-throttle) of course.
During the MAK presentation they said VM was set to 4m/s, then changed to 8m/s.

So they "did nothing" in terms of touching main controls (yoke, throttle, pedals)
but they were flying "with their thumb", just turning the knobs on the AP.

At 60-50m they could heve entered the 0m/s to level off and "scud run" to the threshold.

This is very probable.

Until they saw the ground and trees and pulled the horn and firewalled the throttle.
This automatically disconnected the AP in all 3 modes.
These were the signals.
No, I don't think so.
This is not so easy.
You can enter the route to the FMS, and it gives then "orders" to the
original AP, but in this case I am pretty sure, it was impossible,
and they did it in a different way.

Unfortunately.

Tagron

Alice, I think it is quite possible that this could be part of the picture. I know nothing of Tu154 avionics or autopilot systems but in a western standard Flight Management System (FMS) there are likely to be LNAV final approach tracks to individual runways. These can be part of the data base or they can be loaded into the system manually. The FMS position may be constantly updated by GPS and hence may be considered to be extremely accurate. Of course the coordinates of individual waypoints must be correct otherwise errors will occur.

The autopilot can be coupled to the LNAV track and in theory will take the aircraft to the runway position. However this facility of itself does not constitute an approved approach method, certainly not for low visibility.

At Smolensk my understanding is that the only promulgated approach procedures are NDB and PAR. Pilots will want to use the lowest available approved minima for their approach in poor visibility and PAR will give them that. It is quite possible the flight was actually navigating the final approach course by LNAV and because it was very accurate there was no need for interventions by ATC with heading changes, hence the apparent lack of input from the PAR controller.

Then at the end of the approved PAR procedure, they were theoretically visual but in practice in 200m visibility they could see nothing useful ahead but by leaving the autopilot coupled to the LNAV they believed it would take them to the runway. And, I hasten to add.this is more speculation, because I don't know if the Tu154 was so equipped.

Ptkay

At 10:30:01 navigator set the magnetic heading in HN in autopilot to 2-5-9,
when preparing it for operation. They were still in the pattern there.
I don't think they used LNAV.

Alice025

Tagron, you are not alone, I mean nobody (who blogs could get hold of :o) were able to say what this particular TU154M re-furbished can do and what it can't. Westerners know their side of equipment, Russians know their side of equipment, how those auto-piloting systems from 2 worlds were clipped together, that is, to which effects, practically, in details - is a mystery.
When it beeps, for example, being switched-re-switched mode to mode. To be able to tell from beeps in the record (or their absence) - at least - to get some orientation.
Can an automated go-away be exercised (seems to be prohibited by ordinary TU154) (not M) manual without ILS.

Then - one thing something is prohibited, another thing is when it is doubled "anti-fool-proof" type in equipment. That is, one presses presses buttons - nothing happens. Or does it work anyway, just "not recommended".

SINGAPURCANAC

When I was reading the transcript for the first time (Russian version of it) for me it sounds like "something" rather than full radar service.
we may only guess what is the reason for such "behavioral" both by crew and ATCO, but it still remains that ATC system at Smolensk military airport or in Russian military system are responsible.
as someone said ATCO must initiate go -around if no answer by crew about height(that it is very logic,because it is safety net,ATC knows heights at some relevant positions,so when crew confirms that height everything is OK. So,excellent procedures,if we compare it with ICAO procedures it correspondents with verifying MODE C procedures )

Needles to say that atco gave few instructions, without reaction to ask for correct read back .It is not rule it sounds like bad practice.
I will be very grateful if someone put on those pages Russian military book when PAR procedures is described.
I may bet that also must be in some context next things:
-radar identification
-radar service
-responsibility during PAR approaches and during providing radar service
- termination of radar service
- rules relating to phraseology and read back procedures
-initiation of go around
- decision height and ATCOs procedures when a/c approaching DH without declaring "Full ground contact" .......

and so on...

Since I believe that all those procedures are very close to civil ICAO procedures(just different names) 40% of mistake goes to russian military ATC system.

IF ATC SYSTEM WORKS PROPERLY THERE IS NO CFIT UNDER RADAR SERVICE!
i said proper system ,to avoid misunderstanding.....

Alice025

Singaporecanac, I suppose the military books aren't in the internet, otherwise someone would have given a link at Smolensk blog a hundred times already :o)

It's back to discussion what was the deal for that trip btw Poland and Russia. As most folks suspect it is by "special agreement", which might contain what Russia provides to Poland, what Poland provides in terms of I don't know, there was a visa check up point improvised in the open field :o), of all things, out of the blue Customs' point organised, mobile, for a day, it's not a aerodrome "by the book". So what ground control does and what plane does - doesn't exactly fall under mode of comms that'll be specified for a Russian military aerodrome, or for a normal civil aviation int'l rules.
For one thing - Polish military plane is not military for the Russian military controller (as the crew does not report to Russian Air Force commander, being not part of the local defence system). Simply, an alien, from beyond the system.
Peaceful alien, for the ground control.
All Smolensk aerodrome people in the knowing seem to have signed up for not bla-bla until the end of the investigation. You can't get out of them anything. What is the status of military system controller, by the way, who out-lived his military unit that was re-located, and was left behind (many of them) to service one-off flights. Is he in the (military) service now, for a sec? Even that is unknown.
With the rules, applied to that flight - simply a legal puzzle, until documents are released re how it was all organised, in the first place, between the two countries.

Anyway I am sure if Russia in that special agreement promised an acting and able flight controller, up to his duties - he ought to have been exactly that, and doing his work well, and equipped with things as agreed for the flight management, in this I agree with you absolutely.