Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by Ptkay
Such procedure, used for many years before, would have prevented this accident
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: Europe
Posts: 483
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
To change the subject:
Is this possible, that the interface between the FMS and the
standard Tupolev AP was simple signal passing the rate of climb/descent
values, like the pilot would do with the wheel?
Is it possible that they entered the glide path manually to the FMS,
then turned it on and let it do the job?
I am just trying to find any excuse for the PF.
It seems to be sure, that the AP was receiving changing RoC/D inputs
in the last phase of the flight.
But were these manual inputs by the PF, or the "orders" from the FMS.
I know several FMS systems communicating with the AP over certain protocol,
I am really not sure, if there was any such protocol between American FMS
and Russian AP.
By the end of the day it was "one of a kind" installation, hardly certified
as such combination, effectively making 101 and 102 Tupolev an "experimental".
Is this possible, that the interface between the FMS and the
standard Tupolev AP was simple signal passing the rate of climb/descent
values, like the pilot would do with the wheel?
Is it possible that they entered the glide path manually to the FMS,
then turned it on and let it do the job?
I am just trying to find any excuse for the PF.
It seems to be sure, that the AP was receiving changing RoC/D inputs
in the last phase of the flight.
But were these manual inputs by the PF, or the "orders" from the FMS.
I know several FMS systems communicating with the AP over certain protocol,
I am really not sure, if there was any such protocol between American FMS
and Russian AP.
By the end of the day it was "one of a kind" installation, hardly certified
as such combination, effectively making 101 and 102 Tupolev an "experimental".
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: Moscow, Russia
Posts: 1,011
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ptkay, there was not ONE cause of accident, but a lot of holes in the cheese, as always. Same as in Spanair case it was NOT a SOLE circuit breaker, which sent MD-82 off the runway...
Ptkay, I was aghast at the idea of deliberately scud running a Tu154 when you first mentioned it on the previous thread. But now as I read it this view may be representative of a substantial body of opinion in Poland, because it is reputed crews from this unit had employed this technique before.
I always thought the purpose of a Scud Run was to operate below a very low cloudbase but with reasonable visibility enabling flight by visual reference. In this particular case, the crew surely knew that the 200m visibility reported by the Yak40 crew would not just not permit adequate visual reference. Not so much a scud run, more a blunder through dense fog. However, for simplicity I will continue to refer to a Scud Run.
Reading the full CVR transcript I see no evidence of a plan to do a scud run, though of course there are omissions in the text. All the CVR evidence seems to point to an acceptance they would fly the approach to DH, go around then divert. Presumably by doing this they could demonstrate to their VIPs that they had done their best, the weather conditions were impossible, and they could not be accused of cowardice through choosing not to make the approach.
So did they fly the approach with that intention and then around DH the commander made an instantaneous decision to perform the scud run, perhaps influenced by some sign of a gap in the cloud, a false visual acquisition ?
Or was there another agenda, for example emphasising the weather difficulties so that when they landed successfully it would be seen as an even greater tribute to their skills ? And the crew knew all along that the commander would fly a “scud run” and therefore did no need to discuss it? Perhaps we will never know the answer.
But whatever the rationale, the method deserves further examination. . Let us assume the accuracy of the data we have so far. At about 100m, they increased the descent rate to 8m/s, which equates to 1600ft/min in ICAO units. As the autopilot was engaged they must have selected this (or something close to it) as a VS mode descent rate. And that VS would have resulted in ground contact in just 12 seconds (assuming flat terrain) unless they broke the descent rate very rapidly. With the autopilot still engaged they could only have achieved this by quickly dialling the VS back to zero. If there was any attempt to judge altitude and hence progress of the critical reduction in descent rate it can only have been through RA ground closure rate, not visual clues. It would require a massive amount of confidence in the performance of the autopilot in VS mode.
Who would consider this a safe method of operating a medium jet transport, even in clear air ?
On this analysis the primary error of breaking minima was compounded by an extremely dangerous handling procedure. Was this the performance of one individual pilot or was there a belief in the unit that this was an acceptable way to operate, in other words an institutional failure?
I always thought the purpose of a Scud Run was to operate below a very low cloudbase but with reasonable visibility enabling flight by visual reference. In this particular case, the crew surely knew that the 200m visibility reported by the Yak40 crew would not just not permit adequate visual reference. Not so much a scud run, more a blunder through dense fog. However, for simplicity I will continue to refer to a Scud Run.
Reading the full CVR transcript I see no evidence of a plan to do a scud run, though of course there are omissions in the text. All the CVR evidence seems to point to an acceptance they would fly the approach to DH, go around then divert. Presumably by doing this they could demonstrate to their VIPs that they had done their best, the weather conditions were impossible, and they could not be accused of cowardice through choosing not to make the approach.
So did they fly the approach with that intention and then around DH the commander made an instantaneous decision to perform the scud run, perhaps influenced by some sign of a gap in the cloud, a false visual acquisition ?
Or was there another agenda, for example emphasising the weather difficulties so that when they landed successfully it would be seen as an even greater tribute to their skills ? And the crew knew all along that the commander would fly a “scud run” and therefore did no need to discuss it? Perhaps we will never know the answer.
But whatever the rationale, the method deserves further examination. . Let us assume the accuracy of the data we have so far. At about 100m, they increased the descent rate to 8m/s, which equates to 1600ft/min in ICAO units. As the autopilot was engaged they must have selected this (or something close to it) as a VS mode descent rate. And that VS would have resulted in ground contact in just 12 seconds (assuming flat terrain) unless they broke the descent rate very rapidly. With the autopilot still engaged they could only have achieved this by quickly dialling the VS back to zero. If there was any attempt to judge altitude and hence progress of the critical reduction in descent rate it can only have been through RA ground closure rate, not visual clues. It would require a massive amount of confidence in the performance of the autopilot in VS mode.
Who would consider this a safe method of operating a medium jet transport, even in clear air ?
On this analysis the primary error of breaking minima was compounded by an extremely dangerous handling procedure. Was this the performance of one individual pilot or was there a belief in the unit that this was an acceptable way to operate, in other words an institutional failure?
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: Europe
Posts: 483
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Was this the performance of one individual pilot or was there a belief in the unit that this was an acceptable way to operate, in other words an institutional failure?
It looks more and more like an "institutional failure".
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: St. Petersburg
Posts: 270
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Now, Criss, I object. It's these three weeks as the shed has been painted anew. Complete up-grade of the paint incl. the door knobs it seems as Amelin posted new photos. After all the international fame and attention. As well as the out-house and the dog kennel at the Far Beacon.
:o))))))))))))))
:o))))))))))))))
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: Earth
Posts: 8
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
But maybe the Russian navigator would have been reading the barometric, not radio height?
And would have known about the terrain profile?
And would have known about the terrain profile?
Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: Germany
Posts: 44
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
To reconstruct the landing approach of TU-154M:
By taking into consideration the NDB signals and the altitude readouts of navigator (RA) and 5th person (BA), the flightpath looks like pictured below. As you can see there is no "scud diving" (which made never sense to me: this was the presidential A/C with 100 people on board!) .
Instead, we can see a very controlled approach with a steady sinkrate of around 6.7 m/s. Probably manually programmed into AP - there was no DMA or VOR.
Conclusion:
1. They missed the required approach altitude of 300m over the outer-marker (they were still at 400m 7 seconds after the beacon signal)
2. They miscalculated the sinkrate that would bring them to runway treshold.
3. They werent alarmed by the altimeter readout of same 100m within a 8 seconds time interval.
4. Zero error is company, three's a crowd.
Result: First CFIT in history of TAWS equipped passenger A/C.
- We can not rely on the recorded ATC Announcements considering the question on what glideslope they were. Russian authorities deny until this day that there was any PAR equipment installed on the airodrome. So there was no precision radar equipment to allow the ATC to know the exact glideslope of the A/C.
- I have now doubts what so ever that the navigator and the 5th person (General Blasik) were reading out different Altimeter instruments as soon as passing the outer marker. That would be the radio-altimeter for the navigator (everyone agrees he must have used it after 100m) and General Blasik was reading the bario-altimeter.Everything else doesnt make sense.
- The recorded signals of the outer and inner marker (NDB) allow us to align a time scale to the terrain profile (of course we have to asume a relative constant speed over ground).
- When leveling out of sinkflight, the TU-154M has a intertia loss of height of around 40 m at a sinkrate of 7 m/s before gaining height again. Its written in the TU-154M FM
Taken this into account, i have no doubt that they activated the Go-Around mode of the AP shortly after the second pilot issued the command:Due to the inertia they lost another 40m, touched the 1st obstacle and then were already gaining height, just not enough to make it over the ascending terrain.10:40:50 2P: We are leaving!
Instead, we can see a very controlled approach with a steady sinkrate of around 6.7 m/s. Probably manually programmed into AP - there was no DMA or VOR.
Conclusion:
1. They missed the required approach altitude of 300m over the outer-marker (they were still at 400m 7 seconds after the beacon signal)
2. They miscalculated the sinkrate that would bring them to runway treshold.
3. They werent alarmed by the altimeter readout of same 100m within a 8 seconds time interval.
4. Zero error is company, three's a crowd.
Result: First CFIT in history of TAWS equipped passenger A/C.
Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: Earth
Posts: 7
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
10:10:13 [Navigator] Fuel
10:10:14 [2nd Pilot] Approximately 11 tonnes for landing.
(..)
10:18:22 [Unidentified] How much fuel do we have?
10:18:24 [2nd Pilot] We have approximately 13- 12,5 tonnes.
(..)
10:23:47 [ATC] Polish Foxtrot 1-0-1, remaining fuel, how much fuel do you have?
10:23:55 [Capitan] 11 tonnes remaining.
(..)
10:33:23 [Unrecognized] Fuel.
10:33:25 [Flight Engineer] Currently we have 12 tonnes.
Why so erratic fuel readings?
Link to transcript:
https://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?...WMjdnY3c&hl=en
Google Docs.
10:10:14 [2nd Pilot] Approximately 11 tonnes for landing.
(..)
10:18:22 [Unidentified] How much fuel do we have?
10:18:24 [2nd Pilot] We have approximately 13- 12,5 tonnes.
(..)
10:23:47 [ATC] Polish Foxtrot 1-0-1, remaining fuel, how much fuel do you have?
10:23:55 [Capitan] 11 tonnes remaining.
(..)
10:33:23 [Unrecognized] Fuel.
10:33:25 [Flight Engineer] Currently we have 12 tonnes.
Why so erratic fuel readings?
Link to transcript:
https://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?...WMjdnY3c&hl=en
Google Docs.
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: Europe
Posts: 483
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yak 40 landing before Tu also ignored ATC and landed in spite of go-around order
More here:
Kontroler: Jak 40 nas zignorowa? - Polska - Informacje - portal TVN24.pl - 08.06.2010
Google T?umacz
Russian controllers ordered Yak 40, who landed in Smolensk just before the presidential machine, interrupting the approach to landing. However, the plane ignored the command. Pilot says that it is not heard - learned TVN24. In turn, according to the Polish pilots, presidential Tupolev had final approval for landing in Smolensk.
So again :...it looks more and more like an "institutional failure".
More here:
Kontroler: Jak 40 nas zignorowa? - Polska - Informacje - portal TVN24.pl - 08.06.2010
Google T?umacz
Russian controllers ordered Yak 40, who landed in Smolensk just before the presidential machine, interrupting the approach to landing. However, the plane ignored the command. Pilot says that it is not heard - learned TVN24. In turn, according to the Polish pilots, presidential Tupolev had final approval for landing in Smolensk.
So again :...it looks more and more like an "institutional failure".
Last edited by Ptkay; 8th Jun 2010 at 07:55.
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: St. Petersburg
Posts: 270
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Can be there is a record from inside the shed, re what the controller was saying and to who. Tape-recorders plain and simple after all were invented long time ago.
Can be there is a back-record of the controller monitor, but this is less likely, there were lots of youtube video-s showing these screens how they work, and it's all in real time there. But I don't know.
However, the investigation commitee did extract something out of the shed, to check controller's in-put. Not the screen itself, one would think, as many flights followed after the crash. And still are arriving, like Russian patriarch was due to fly over in June beg. Hardly they have a spare set, surely the only one. But something they did extract - so what, if not the records of some sort.
__________
Overall it seems to me it was a bad morning for controller, he must have calculated his chances, by the Polish plane time arrival, as 1 out of 3, on that foggy morning. Yak - yes (somehow), 2 IL approaches - cut off at 100, locals say they heard IL wooshing right up above them, the ones who have garages and dacha-s by the runway. So they aborted landing quite low, not somewhere high up. So , from the controller poin of view (psychological side), all suddenly want to land and land onto his shed and all are disobedient in that morning.
Can be there is a back-record of the controller monitor, but this is less likely, there were lots of youtube video-s showing these screens how they work, and it's all in real time there. But I don't know.
However, the investigation commitee did extract something out of the shed, to check controller's in-put. Not the screen itself, one would think, as many flights followed after the crash. And still are arriving, like Russian patriarch was due to fly over in June beg. Hardly they have a spare set, surely the only one. But something they did extract - so what, if not the records of some sort.
__________
Overall it seems to me it was a bad morning for controller, he must have calculated his chances, by the Polish plane time arrival, as 1 out of 3, on that foggy morning. Yak - yes (somehow), 2 IL approaches - cut off at 100, locals say they heard IL wooshing right up above them, the ones who have garages and dacha-s by the runway. So they aborted landing quite low, not somewhere high up. So , from the controller poin of view (psychological side), all suddenly want to land and land onto his shed and all are disobedient in that morning.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Europe
Posts: 24
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Let us assume the accuracy of the data we have so far. At about 100m, they increased the descent rate to 8m/s, which equates to 1600ft/min in ICAO units. As the autopilot was engaged they must have selected this (or something close to it) as a VS mode descent rate.
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: Europe
Posts: 483
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
New MAK update, June 8th 2010:
Information about the progress of the Technical Commission IAC
to investigate the crash of the Tu-154M N 101
Technical Committee IAC performed the following work.
In addition, a general evaluation of the actions of the flight crew of Tu-154M № 101 of the Republic of Poland to the landing in cooperation with the pilots, who have great experience in flight operations and a significant time on the tupe.
Flying estimate is based on the analysis:
- Record flight parameters derived from transcripts of the FDR;
- Records of conversations of the crew in the cockpit and controllers of air traffic control services;
- Materials from flight subcommittee.
Experts who participated in flight evaluation:
- Honored Test Pilot of the Russian Federation, the test flight pilot - - MM Gromov Research Institute.
- Honored Military Pilot of the USSR, Commander in Chief of Russian Air Force for eight years, has mastered more than 20 types of aircraft, including Tu-22M2 and Tu-160;
- Instructor pilot Tu-154 from Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, have each logged on aircraft more than 19000 hours, including the time on the Tu-154 - 14000 - 8000 hours and access to mission-critical operations;
- Specialists in the field of psychological research in aviation, Honored Scientist, MD, professor of psychology.
Analysis of the recorded materials were completed by the company Universal Avionics Systems Corporation (UASC) on the study of information systems on-board collision avoidance with the ground (TAWS - Terrain Avoidance Warning System) and on-board computers (FMS UNS-1D), installed on an aircraft.
The study, which began on May 4, 2010 in Laboratory Research Center UASC in Redmond (USA, pcs. Washington, DC), determined that the equipment used in flight on April 10th this year was properly functioning and provided the crew and aircraft systems with the necessary information.
Analysis of the content preserved in memory, communications and service information has confirmed the findings based on the information from FDR, and helped to clarify the procedure used by the crew, navigational calculations and the trajectory of the plane.
It looks like they have the full GPS ground track of the aircraft from the FMS.
Interesting, when the conclusions will be published.
Source: Untitled Page
Information about the progress of the Technical Commission IAC
to investigate the crash of the Tu-154M N 101
Technical Committee IAC performed the following work.
In addition, a general evaluation of the actions of the flight crew of Tu-154M № 101 of the Republic of Poland to the landing in cooperation with the pilots, who have great experience in flight operations and a significant time on the tupe.
Flying estimate is based on the analysis:
- Record flight parameters derived from transcripts of the FDR;
- Records of conversations of the crew in the cockpit and controllers of air traffic control services;
- Materials from flight subcommittee.
Experts who participated in flight evaluation:
- Honored Test Pilot of the Russian Federation, the test flight pilot - - MM Gromov Research Institute.
- Honored Military Pilot of the USSR, Commander in Chief of Russian Air Force for eight years, has mastered more than 20 types of aircraft, including Tu-22M2 and Tu-160;
- Instructor pilot Tu-154 from Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, have each logged on aircraft more than 19000 hours, including the time on the Tu-154 - 14000 - 8000 hours and access to mission-critical operations;
- Specialists in the field of psychological research in aviation, Honored Scientist, MD, professor of psychology.
Analysis of the recorded materials were completed by the company Universal Avionics Systems Corporation (UASC) on the study of information systems on-board collision avoidance with the ground (TAWS - Terrain Avoidance Warning System) and on-board computers (FMS UNS-1D), installed on an aircraft.
The study, which began on May 4, 2010 in Laboratory Research Center UASC in Redmond (USA, pcs. Washington, DC), determined that the equipment used in flight on April 10th this year was properly functioning and provided the crew and aircraft systems with the necessary information.
Analysis of the content preserved in memory, communications and service information has confirmed the findings based on the information from FDR, and helped to clarify the procedure used by the crew, navigational calculations and the trajectory of the plane.
It looks like they have the full GPS ground track of the aircraft from the FMS.
Interesting, when the conclusions will be published.
Source: Untitled Page
Last edited by Ptkay; 8th Jun 2010 at 12:16. Reason: Source added.
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: Europe
Posts: 483
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
And one more:
Information about the progress of the Technical Commission IAC
to investigate the crash of the Tu-154M N 101
June 8 this year Ombudsman to investigate the Republic of Poland and a group of Polish civilian and military experts returned to Moscow and resumed work in the Interstate Aviation Committee.
Ombudsman to investigate the Republic of Poland and his adviser confirmed the absolute identity of a verbatim copy of a version number № 1 TRANSCRIPTION talks crew of TU-154 n / a 101 that crashed 04/10/2010, with landing at an airfield Smolensk "North". (Sound Recorder MARS-BM), transferred to the Polish side May 31, 2010, copy signed by the Polish Air Force colonel Bartosz Stroinski along with other representatives of Polish side.
Research is ongoing analysis of phonograms recording in the cockpit, recorded sound recorder emergency, in order to identify unidentified voices.
Studies are conducted together with experts from the organization, specializing phonoscopic-phonograph expertise and research. Qualifications of Experts confirmed by certificates of the State Institutions of the Russian Federal Center of Forensic under the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.
Works on comparative audio-linguistic and phonetics-spectral analysis of two sentences previously unidentified human voice, non-member crew, and audio sample of possible speech rights provided by the Polish side.
Found (identified), the second specific person, not a member of the crew, which has voice and speech, phrases which are recorded by CVR and are given in the transcription of the conversations.
Source: Untitled Page
Information about the progress of the Technical Commission IAC
to investigate the crash of the Tu-154M N 101
June 8 this year Ombudsman to investigate the Republic of Poland and a group of Polish civilian and military experts returned to Moscow and resumed work in the Interstate Aviation Committee.
Ombudsman to investigate the Republic of Poland and his adviser confirmed the absolute identity of a verbatim copy of a version number № 1 TRANSCRIPTION talks crew of TU-154 n / a 101 that crashed 04/10/2010, with landing at an airfield Smolensk "North". (Sound Recorder MARS-BM), transferred to the Polish side May 31, 2010, copy signed by the Polish Air Force colonel Bartosz Stroinski along with other representatives of Polish side.
Research is ongoing analysis of phonograms recording in the cockpit, recorded sound recorder emergency, in order to identify unidentified voices.
Studies are conducted together with experts from the organization, specializing phonoscopic-phonograph expertise and research. Qualifications of Experts confirmed by certificates of the State Institutions of the Russian Federal Center of Forensic under the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.
Works on comparative audio-linguistic and phonetics-spectral analysis of two sentences previously unidentified human voice, non-member crew, and audio sample of possible speech rights provided by the Polish side.
Found (identified), the second specific person, not a member of the crew, which has voice and speech, phrases which are recorded by CVR and are given in the transcription of the conversations.
Source: Untitled Page
Last edited by Ptkay; 8th Jun 2010 at 12:17. Reason: Sorce added.
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: Europe
Posts: 483
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No VS mode can be selected. Instead, it can only keep a certain constant angle of nose up or nose down attitude meaning that the pilot should constantly control the rate of descent by re-adjusting that "up-down" knob.
The left side says: course, left-right, the right side says: pitch, up-down