I repeat:
There is no sign of a 'PAR' being flown, no, not even a 'Russian' one!
When I was reading the transcript for the first time (Russian version of it) for me it sounds like "something" rather than full radar service.
we may only guess what is the reason for such "behavioral" both by crew and ATCO, but it still remains that ATC system at Smolensk military airport or in Russian military system are responsible.
as someone said ATCO
must initiate go -around if no answer by crew about height(that it is very logic,because it is safety net,ATC knows heights at some relevant positions,so when crew confirms that height everything is OK. So,excellent procedures,if we compare it with ICAO procedures it correspondents with verifying MODE C procedures )
Needles to say that atco gave few instructions, without reaction to ask for correct read back .It is not rule it sounds like bad practice.
I will be very grateful if someone put on those pages Russian military book when PAR procedures is described.
I may bet that also must be in some context next things:
-radar identification
-radar service
-responsibility during PAR approaches and during providing radar service
- termination of radar service
- rules relating to phraseology and read back procedures
-initiation of go around
- decision height and ATCOs procedures when a/c approaching DH without declaring "Full ground contact" .......
and so on...
Since I believe that all those procedures are very close to civil ICAO procedures(just different names) 40% of mistake goes to russian military ATC system.
IF ATC SYSTEM WORKS PROPERLY THERE IS NO CFIT UNDER RADAR SERVICE!
i said proper system ,to avoid misunderstanding.....