Engine Failure after V1

[john_tullamarine]

Most of the posts here are playing with the one idea .. risk assessment and mitigation.

Book figures are based on a range of assumptions which may vary somewhat from the real world situation on the day.

If the takeoff is not limiting or near limiting, then the crew have real world options, most of which are not documented for their assessment.

In general, history suggests that to continue offers a better chance of a successful outcome than does stopping... but there will be specific instances where a "non-standard" option will be deemed better by the Monday morning quarterbacks .. that's the nature of the real world.

The question which the captain always should reflect upon is "what option gives me the highest likelihood that I will have a satisfactory outcome ?" .. and, more often than not .. that is to follow generally accepted standardised and practised procedures.

As I have been guilty of claiming before .. there are NO guarantees .... only probabilities and risk mitigating approaches to the management of problems.

[Fright Level]

Surely on a long runway, min V1=Vr and in that situation in my company we omit the V1 call, simply call rotate. As there has been no V1 call, would it not be P1's discretion to land ahead?

[411A]

Some years ago, an SV 737 had an engine fire indication just at Vr, (actual engine fire as I recall).
The Captain lowered the nosewheel, closed the throttles and stopped on the runway. As this was at Doha (15,000 feet long), not a problem.

The Captain was criticized rather severely by the 737 fleet manager for not continuing the takeoff, however the VP flt ops (somewhat older, and certainly wiser) suggested that, in his opinion, the Captain excercised good judgement, and indeed that is why the company pays him the big bucks.

Further comments from the fleet manager were not entertained, forthwith.

[lomapaseo]

however the VP flt ops (somewhat older, and certainly wiser) suggested that, in his opinion, the Captain excercised good judgement, and indeed that is why the company pays him the big bucks

That story reminds me of the post incident investigation interview that I was part of that was conducted with a Sr VP of Operations, following a near accident.

During the interview I had posed a question to this chief about the Capts decision process and was basically told that the captain is the captain.

As far as I was concerned that was sufficient for me to conclude that we had found the weak link in the causal findings and it was the Sr VP of Operations, and not the Captain.

[411A]

Indeed lomapaseo, the Captain is the Captain (Commander), and is employed as such because, in the companies judgement (and regulatory approval), he has the qualifications.
Have found over the years (many years actually) that a few First Officers really don't appreciate these facts...but then again, that is their problem.

The Captain is ultimately responsible...as in, the buck stops there.
Companies that appreciate these ideas, have always been rather well run, in my experience.

[lomapaseo]

411A you missed the point again, but you got your point across for the 100th time.

[kansasw]

In response to ejector seat's question

"Has anyone considered what would have happened if the AF concorde which crashed in July 2000 had rejected the take off (even though post V1) instead of trying to pull her into the air while still short of V2?

"I've not seen any discussion of the exact distance remaining and their chances of coming to a full stop, but I find it hard to avoid a gut feeling that perhaps there might have been a few survivors if they'd aborted. Hindsight is everything, but once it left the ground the outcome was guaranteed, surely..."

I am but a simple SLF without pretense to aviation expertise; nonetheless--A) I am sure the question has been considered; B) as I remember reports following the event, the plane is loaded with 100 tons or tonnes take your choice of fuel on takeoff, and the fuel alone accounts for a large fraction of the total weight of the outfit, and once it gets up toward takeoff speed, stopping on the runway or a little beyond is simply not an option, there is simply no capability on the aircraft with any combination of brakes, reverse thrust, or whatever, to undo the momentum and stop the thing on the ground within runway/overrun limits. IE once up to speed with that plane, you are committed to lifting off and sorting out the problems in the air, and any attempt to stop is a guaranteed fireball.

If anyone would care to explain to me how to put quoted passages in the little box in smaller type, as I see in other posts, I would be grateful.

[lomapaseo]

If anyone would care to explain to me how to put quoted passages in the little box in smaller type, as I see in other posts, I would be grateful.

I could tell you but then I would have to break all your fingers

Just type the word "quote" inside those square looking brackets on your keyboard being sure to include a "/" character before the quote in the ending bracket.

It should look like this when you're finished

(quote) kjgkk hjjlkhlk jhll (/quote)

only be sure to use the square looking brackets instead of the parenthesis

[G5wannabe]

Very interesting post as I am still in the single pilot mode transversing into the CRM mode and lacking formal CRM training in the sim...several responses come to mind while reading:

1.) From reading post accidents and conducting informal studies in accidents and from reading the experts books, NTSB, FAA, Dr. So-So, etc, Is that whenever the crew conducted a pre-departure or pre-landing brief everyone was one the same page which accounted for a higher probability of whatever happened that everyone was able to call home afterwards...lateral thinking or following the SOP's rail. Our SOP states in bold type that "this is a written guideline and the Captain should exercise due diligence and common sense in the maters of safety." When we used up 2500' (?-wx, etc.) and fly at 95kts (never could see that 97kts on my side)V1/Vr are basically the same. When we fly out of a 5000' rwy we know that if there is a bang @ V1/Vr we'd pray the wing doesn't melt before we land. When flying out of KAMA (13,502’) we'd have 10,000 left there really is no need for discussion unless (…stir…stir…) we are no climbing through 1000‘AGL and reaching 160 kts.

2.) The AF accident~ (Did anybody watch the special on the Discovery Channel several weeks ago titled something like "Concorde: Accident in the making"?) If I remember they used roughly the same length of RWY as Amarillo, TX. I have no idea as I didn't take notes but IMHO what their V1 was that day only that it was faster than mine…probably at cruise. They ate up a lot more runway, in a lot less time, than we do on our worst day. The program also mentioned, as the reports that they also had a blown left main tire and but what they (the official report) didn’t mention prior to the tire causing the fire was the left main strut assembly was falling apart so the plane during was veering to the left of centerline prior to the fire. Basically due to the center piece falling off (?), the asphalt took the rubber off the tire causing the blow-out, causing the fire. From the pilots point of view, putting myself in their shoes, while trying to keep the airplane from waiting to go left; I would have seen a rather large company B747, waiting to cross my rwy getting bigger by the half/second out my window. From the pictures on TV the skid/burn marks on the runway clearly show a track going to the grass, to the left side of runway. Hence the Capt pulled the nose at V1, diverting a double plane accident on the airfield, because he sure couldn’t keep the plane on the runway centerline. Once the Concorde was air born no more veering to the left BUT if he kept it on the runway I’d image he would have hit the B747 just forward on the wing after going through the grass.

Comparing my King Air to the Concorde is like apples to oranges, I just know this that I don’t know or have enough experience to argue with a captain, in a crisis situation if he departed (laterally) from the OPS. I agree with 411A…The captain is the boss. I trust the OPS to be written by the individual(s) who has blown tires, lost engine cowlings at FL310 and experienced more than I have first hand. Not just read about like I have and personally I really should follow the OPS whenever possible. As far as Air France is concerned, if the tire blew, didn’t cause a fire, I don’t think they would have been able to successfully land the airplane with a missing left main gear assembly and the outcome would have still been less than satisfactory for the Concorde. The shape of the other tires can only be specualted but I'd summerize that they where pretty beat up.

Thanks for the education…

An embarrased armchair Capt.

[Captain Stable]

Iomapaseo - rest assured that your point did not go unmissed among other readers!

[calypso]

I know this is a bit of a digression but I have finally bitten and must reply to 411A. I apologise for hijacking the topic.

A pilot I know was called one night for an ambulance flight. The flight was to a non IFR airport to pick up an organ for a transplant. Upon arrival to the airfield the FO asked about the destination weather, the captain (also the chief pilot) replied that it wasn't brilliant but lets go (in fact the WX was below catI). They departed in haste (well it was an ambulance flight afterall). After a short 30 minutes flight they arrived at the destination aerodrome and sure enough the visibility was around 400m. As there was no published IFR approach the Capt. said that he will do a GPS approach of his own design (I have done this many times before....) on short final the AC hit a pylon and after several bounces came to rest inverted on top of a house (fortunately empty at the time). The Capt. died instantly, the Fo hanged inverted from his harness for 3 hours in the dark awaiting help, immersed in the smell of flowing Kerosene (he survived but he lost a leg). Reading his recollection of events I don't recall reading that he was comforted by knowing that the buck had stopped with the Capt..

I pray that if I ever show one hundredth of such foolishness there is somebody there to stop me. Yet with you 411A I Know it is a waste of time.

I feel better now. My apologies.

V1, ah yes...

[foundation digger]

What an astonishing collection of posts.

V1 has nothing to do with sops.

V1 is a cetification requirement.

All public transport aircraft will be able to demonstrate performance in accordance with certification requirements, regardless of age.

Older aircraft do not perform as well but that is taken into account.

A certification module should be part of the professional licence and would help pilots understand background.

No failure i have ever had has been fully covered by check lists and sops, experience and common sense are essential components in arriving at the correct decision.

All crew members must be involved (if Possible)

[411A]

calypso,

And your point is...?

Suggest your friend should have gone sick when rostered with the Captain, as surely the (your friends) decision process was not impared before the flight...

Takes two to tango. One to lead, the other to follow.
A very few folks have strange ideas, and most companies have found out about these few.
Some however have super seniority, and are indeed difficult to get rid of...but are found out eventually, dead or alive.

Hopefully the latter.

Got the picture?

[alf5071h]

One of the themes in this thread is that crew make conscious decisions and judgments about go/no go after V1.

A captain ‘rejected’ a take off at V2+10 and 50ft after lift off. His description of the event was that the aircraft vibrated so severely that he thought that it would not continue to fly. The circumstances were far beyond anything that he had experienced before, had been trained for, or could ever envisage.

The landing straight ahead on a long runway was uneventful, except for the ‘explosively’ damaged tyre that had caused the event.
However, in discussions following the incident debrief, it was indicated that if the take off had been on a short or ‘emotive’ runway (LCY) then his decision would have been to continue to fly.

Thus how does the length of runway affect a judgment as to the aircraft’s fitness for continued flight? Is this a conscious evaluation of the relative risks, or an unconscious reaction to the prospect of a higher risk?

Whatever the reasons, this Captain and others (and I hope you the readers) are now aware that severe events beyond any of your previous experiences can occur at takeoff. Some further experience can be gained by training in the simulator and relating such events as this.

I cannot recall any RTO accident where rejecting after V1, that the aircraft was not fit for continued flight; even the HS 748 at Stansted. Thus the balance of risk (carefully thought-out before flight) is that for those unconscious decisions above V1 it is safer to fly. SOPs and training instill appropriate actions, but they are also required for judgment situations.

Good background reading is in the FAA/Boeing Takeoff Safety Training Aid.

Risk figures for rejected take off; extracts from TSTA:-
33% of accidents occurred on runways that were wet or contaminated.
58% of accidents were initiated at speeds in excess of V1.
75% of accidents still had full takeoff power available.
76% of accidents did not involve engines.

[BOAC]

alf -

I cannot recall any RTO accident where rejecting after V1, that the aircraft was not fit for continued flight; even the HS 748 at Stansted.

It might be of interest to you to talk to the guy concerned in that one. He was ADAMANT that the inspectors thought the wing would have quit before re-landing. The fire was EXTREMELY intense, and with this 748, near the main spar. I accept that we are into 20/20 hindsight here, but time was not on his side there.

PM me for further if you wish.

[alatriste]

Very interesying replies regarding this topic. As general rule all SOP call for a go decision when engine failure or any mafunction is recognized at or after V1. That is right, but we -as commanders- have the last choice.
You can still comply with the general rule when increasing V1 to Vr in certain conditions.
If you are taking off from a long runway, where you are well below the runway limited weight (RLW), you can check the corresponding V1 for this RLW and compare your actual Vr for your ATOW, if this Vr speed is much lower than V1 for RLW, you can very confidently equal your actual V1 to Vr. Take off is rejected while on ground. It is just a non balanced take off.
As far as this is briefied prior to take off, I think this procedure is much safer than going airbone with an engine failure, with 7.000 feet of tarmac remaining, just to be back on earth 10 minutes later.

[FJJP]

In a 4-jet, I once rejected just beyond V1 - a large flock of birds crossed the nose and impacted on both sides of the ac. Birds had gone down 2 of the engines, one on each side. We rolled gently down the runway, allowing the brakes to cool before clearing the runway onto the taxyway at the end. The t/o was obstacle limited, which was the V1 we were using. There was no requirement to calculate the range of V1s.

Beaing in mind what happened to the E3 in Alaska, where the ac hit birds on t/o and the crew continued as per SOP and subsequently crashed, maybe the V1 range should be calculated as an aid to the captains decision-making process.

Having said all that, there is no substitute for experience and thinking about the 'what if?' scenario, discussed and practised in the simulator before strapping the flying machine to one's butt.

[lomapaseo]

Beaing in mind what happened to the E3 in Alaska, where the ac hit birds on t/o and the crew continued as per SOP and subsequently crashed, maybe the V1 range should be calculated as an aid to the captains decision-making process.

I'm not sure how this incident ties in to the thread subject.

According to the CVR these guys were long long past V1 and at Vr when they struck the birds.

[trytofly]

Always an interesting subject and one I have discussed many times with other pilots. I haven't read all of the posts on this thread, and so mine may be a repeat.

I have been flying since 1980, and professionaly since 1989. I have in that time read or heard of stories that seem to support all arguements, both ways. Of all these the AF Concorde incident has been the most influential.

I have always questioned the V1 philosophy. I believe it is as dated as the whole performance package that a professional pilot is expected to study and digest. It is born from aviation of a wholly different technology, cabability and knowledge, and is now one of the few areas that remains so engulfed in tradition no one of influence seems prepared to challenge.

Along with this it ( performance ) is made so incredibly complicated that most do not understand it anyway.( though many think they do ).

However, I do believe that V1 ( or at least the principle behind it ) should remain for pilot info. but that the decision to go or stop be left to the pilot in charge on the day. What was going through the minds of those French pilots as they rotated a fiercely burning, underpowered, slow flying, out of control ( etc ) aircraft into completely unknown territory. God bless them.

History shows that both stopping and going after V1 has saved and killed. Let the pilot make the decision. (Until then..do as you are told............ or explain later if you're still around to do so.)

There may be no right or wrong...which is what makes this an emotive subject.

Best of luck. ( and there lies a clue )

[jc2354]

Weren't the accidents at JFK of a PeoplExpress 747 and TWA L1011, all due to rejected take-off after V1?