Very interesting post as I am still in the single pilot mode transversing into the CRM mode and lacking formal CRM training in the sim...several responses come to mind while reading:
1.) From reading post accidents and conducting informal studies in accidents and from reading the experts books, NTSB, FAA, Dr. So-So, etc, Is that whenever the crew conducted a pre-departure or pre-landing brief everyone was one the same page which accounted for a higher probability of whatever happened that everyone was able to call home afterwards...lateral thinking or following the SOP's rail. Our SOP states in bold type that "this is a written guideline and the Captain should exercise due diligence and common sense in the maters of safety." When we used up 2500' (?-wx, etc.) and fly at 95kts (never could see that 97kts on my side)V1/Vr are basically the same. When we fly out of a 5000' rwy we know that if there is a bang @ V1/Vr we'd pray the wing doesn't melt before we land. When flying out of KAMA (13,502’) we'd have 10,000 left there really is no need for discussion unless (…stir…stir…) we are no climbing through 1000‘AGL and reaching 160 kts.
2.) The AF accident~ (Did anybody watch the special on the Discovery Channel several weeks ago titled something like "Concorde: Accident in the making"?) If I remember they used roughly the same length of RWY as Amarillo, TX. I have no idea as I didn't take notes but IMHO what their V1 was that day only that it was faster than mine…probably at cruise. They ate up a lot more runway, in a lot less time, than we do on our worst day. The program also mentioned, as the reports that they also had a blown left main tire and but what they (the official report) didn’t mention prior to the tire causing the fire was the left main strut assembly was falling apart so the plane during was veering to the left of centerline prior to the fire. Basically due to the center piece falling off (?), the asphalt took the rubber off the tire causing the blow-out, causing the fire. From the pilots point of view, putting myself in their shoes, while trying to keep the airplane from waiting to go left; I would have seen a rather large company B747, waiting to cross my rwy getting bigger by the half/second out my window. From the pictures on TV the skid/burn marks on the runway clearly show a track going to the grass, to the left side of runway. Hence the Capt pulled the nose at V1, diverting a double plane accident on the airfield, because he sure couldn’t keep the plane on the runway centerline. Once the Concorde was air born no more veering to the left BUT if he kept it on the runway I’d image he would have hit the B747 just forward on the wing after going through the grass.
Comparing my King Air to the Concorde is like apples to oranges, I just know this that I don’t know or have enough experience to argue with a captain, in a crisis situation if he departed (laterally) from the OPS. I agree with 411A…The captain is the boss. I trust the OPS to be written by the individual(s) who has blown tires, lost engine cowlings at FL310 and experienced more than I have first hand. Not just read about like I have and personally I really should follow the OPS whenever possible. As far as Air France is concerned, if the tire blew, didn’t cause a fire, I don’t think they would have been able to successfully land the airplane with a missing left main gear assembly and the outcome would have still been less than satisfactory for the Concorde. The shape of the other tires can only be specualted but I'd summerize that they where pretty beat up.
Thanks for the education…
An embarrased armchair Capt.