One of the themes in this thread is that crew make conscious decisions and judgments about go/no go after V1.
A captain ‘rejected’ a take off at V2+10 and 50ft after lift off. His description of the event was that the aircraft vibrated so severely that he thought that it would not continue to fly. The circumstances were far beyond anything that he had experienced before, had been trained for, or could ever envisage.
The landing straight ahead on a long runway was uneventful, except for the ‘explosively’ damaged tyre that had caused the event.
However, in discussions following the incident debrief, it was indicated that if the take off had been on a short or ‘emotive’ runway (LCY) then his decision would have been to continue to fly.
Thus how does the length of runway affect a judgment as to the aircraft’s fitness for continued flight? Is this a conscious evaluation of the relative risks, or an unconscious reaction to the prospect of a higher risk?
Whatever the reasons, this Captain and others (and I hope you the readers) are now aware that severe events beyond any of your previous experiences can occur at takeoff. Some further experience can be gained by training in the simulator and relating such events as this.
I cannot recall any RTO accident where rejecting after V1, that the aircraft was not fit for continued flight; even the HS 748 at Stansted. Thus the balance of risk (carefully thought-out before flight) is that for those unconscious decisions above V1 it is safer to fly. SOPs and training instill appropriate actions, but they are also required for judgment situations.
Good background reading is in the FAA/Boeing Takeoff Safety Training Aid.
Risk figures for rejected take off; extracts from TSTA:-
33% of accidents occurred on runways that were wet or contaminated.
58% of accidents were initiated at speeds in excess of V1.
75% of accidents still had full takeoff power available.
76% of accidents did not involve engines.