PPRuNe Forums - Russian B737 Crash at Kazan.

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- - Russian B737 Crash at Kazan. (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/527997-russian-b737-crash-kazan.html)

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Here's one which pitched up 44 degrees with IAS reducing to 82 knots as the pitch reduced to 33 degrees. How close did that come to the Kazan accident?

Not good but the difference is this crew recovered the aircraft from an extreme situation - until we get all the facts about Kazan it's impossible to know what and why happened - have they found the CVR yet?

Old King Coal, thank you for your very good advice :ok:

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Originally Posted by MountainSnake

Absolutely. TO/GA pitch up tendency is counteracted by the "fbw" system on an A320.

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Originally Posted by Doves

And as far as I know she has an automatic pitch trim too...
But...

...there is always pilot to override whatever FCS does and pitch down until contact with Black Sea, Persian Gulf or Libyan Desert.

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Originally Posted by fireflybob

have they found the CVR yet?

Already answered on this very thread.

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Originally Posted by pulse1

How close did that come to the Kazan accident?

Eight degrees but the causes and mechanism of the occurrences are fairly different.

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Already answered on this very thread.

Thanks Clandestino - I feel suitably chastised

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How close did that come to the Kazan accident?

Not as close as this one:

REPORT ON THE serious incident to icelandair BOEING 757

in which aircraft attitude pitch during a go-around went from +21 to -49.

I bet this is a template for what happened here in Kazan.

These Icelandair pilots only recovered because they had sufficient altitude but they recovered real low - about 300 ft AGL. The aircraft was pulled out of service and underwent complete C-check and full inspection for damage, passengers were terrified and they were positive they would die.

fireflybob
http://www.pprune.org/8163703-post175.html
Your
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/875.pdf
Was
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...9%20G-THOF.pdf
And now is no longer available
'Vuolsi così colà dove si puote ciò che si vuole e più non dimandare'
'There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamed of in your philosophy.'
To Clandestino
I didn't mean absolutely to criticize your beloved plastic plane.
I was indeed praising her

I know little credence can be put on media reports but this makes interesting reading:-

Kazan

Quote:

Plane crash in Russia: commander of Boeing had no go-around experience

The commander of a Boeing-737 flight that crashed in Kazan killing all 50 people on board had probably never previously made a go-around maneuver in a real flight, Aksan Giniyatullin, General Director of Tatarstan Airlines, told reporters on Tuesday.

"Probably not," he said when asked whether the pilot had had any previous go-around experience.

The pilot-in-command had 1,000 hours of night flights, he said.

The company complies with all pilot training requirements, Giniiyatullin said.

The crew of the Boeing-737 that crashed in Kazan on November 17 had been properly trained, Aksan Giniyatullin, General Director of Tatarstan Airlines, told a press conference.

"The pilot-in-command had 2,500 hours of flight and the second pilot had 1,900 hours," he said.
Read more: Tape from crashed Boeing's cockpit voice recorder found - IAC - News - Russia - The Voice of Russia: News, Breaking news, Politics, Economics, Business, Russia, International current events, Expert opinion, podcasts, Video

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Plane crash in Russia: commander of Boeing had no go-around experience

This is a very old piece of news and I believe was mentioned before in this thread.
But apart from that like everything from Russia this piece of info is suspect. What does it mean? He had no experience in a real aircraft or he never even performed it in a sim session? I suspect there may be some pilots who never performed a go-around in real life (in a transport aircraft) but have done it hundreds of time in a training session. Really, the way this info is presented is almost meaningless.

olasek, I agree but the experience level of the Captain, if correct, is minimal to say the least compared to my part of the world.

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"The pilot-in-command had 2,500 hours of flight and the second pilot had 1,900 hours," he said.

2500 ??????? Not only he never did a go around as he didn`t experienced a lot more things to give him enough airmanship to be a Captain.

I know it is legal , but upgrading someone with 2500 is criminal in my opinion.I`m saying 2500 because it what he had at the time of the accident , but he might well be upgrade with a lot less than that.

In Asia we have first officers who only fly as PNF, and one day are moved up. They become Captains with 150 landings in their lives and 2700 TT.

It`s really scary !!!

I'm not sure that TT is a great indicator of airmanship, in fact i know it isn't.

Having flown with 5K TT and 20K TT Captains I can say that I have seen a wide variety of abilities and skills not time commensurate. Sometimes the 5K guy is far more on the ball.

Certainly training is a far better quantifiable quality, many accidents equating to pilot error seem to me directly related to the underlying training given (or lack thereof)., gaps that only show during non-normal situations when suddenly everything falls apart like clockwork.

Thanks to Fireflybob for the link to the interesting article from The Voice of Russia...

It mentions that the US is to send a team of experts to help Russian investigation of the Boeing 737 crash. Would these be US government AAIB investigators, or experts from the Boeing Company?

Also, with the rather low hours of experience quoted for the aircrew involved, would ex pat crews be hired by Russian airlines? I know that airline jobs in the west are still pretty scarce; imagine you would have to be rather desperate to sign up with Tartarstan, if indeed it survives this event.

Has anyone already considered that the initial upset could've been resultant of malfunctioning PCU's due deicing fluid?

I'm particularly referring to this in light of the recently published Norwegian PRELIMINARY REPORT ON SERIOUS AIRCRAFT INCIDENT report into LN-DYM dated 19-11-2013

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Prior to the flight in question the aircraft had been parked outdoors for three days at low temperatures. A snow layer of approximately 25 cm had accumulated on the fuselage, and in order to remove the snow, the aircraft was de-iced using type I 30-60 % glycol de-icing fluid. A total of 1,807 liters of warm water and 1,136 liters of type I glycol was used during de-icing. The company that carried out the de-icing has informed that their personnel was experienced and adhered to standard procedures for de-icing. The temperature at the airport during de-icing was -17 °C.
LN-DYM had a normal take-off, climb, en-route flight and initial descent. NAX5630 was established on a straight-in ILS approach to runway 34 in Kittilä with configuration: Flaps 5, gear up, autopilot channel A in use, Auto Thrust engaged and established on localizer. When the aircraft was about to enter the glide path at an altitude of approximately 3,250 ft, the elevator/stabilizer trim started actuating for approximately 12 seconds. The trim moved towards Nose Up. As a consequence of the elevation of the nose of the aircraft and the ensuing loss of airspeed, the aircraft Auto Thrust System initiated full engine power. The high engine thrust contributed to a further elevation of the aircraft’s nose followed by rapidly decreasing airspeed. When the aircraft nose position rose above +20° both pilots started pushing with full force on the control column. The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) shows that the pilots used a combined force of 207 lbs in their attempt to take the aircraft out of the ascending path. The aircraft was at this time in clouds. The nose position eventually reached +38.5° and the airspeed dropped to 118 kt (TAS) before the nose position slowly started to decrease again. While control was being regained, the aircraft’s Stick Shaker and Stall Warning actuated for four seconds. Calculations afterwards show that the stall at 1G for the given configuration is 121 kt. The reason why the aircraft still didn’t stall was that the load on the wings was somewhat less than 1G. During the first phase, while the aircraft’s nose went up unintentionally, no attempt was made to disengage the aircraft’s autopilot, Auto Thrust System or to actuate the stabilizer trim towards Nose Down manually. One or more of these measures would have improved the situation.

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As a part of the examination of whether de-icing fluid can ingress into the Tail Cone Compartment in the direction of the total of four input arms of the PCUs on LN-DYM, the AIBN performed extensive simulated de-icing from different angles on the aircraft’s horizontal stabilizer and elevator. The examination showed that at times even quite considerable amount of fluid ingress into the compartment. Under certain circumstances it is possible that the input arms may be exposed to fluid which in turn freezes solid and blocks the PCU input arms. Aircraft manufacturer Boeing was not aware that significant amounts of fluid could ingress into the compartment in question before the AIBN’s examination revealed this.
In view of the above, the AIBN has further conducted similar tests on another B737-800 Next Generation (NG) and a B737-300 Classic. The examinations showed that there had been ingress in the Tail Cone Compartments of all the aircraft and that this therefore is an issue concerning not only LN-DYM, but any B737.
In a cold chamber test rig, aircraft manufacturer Boeing applied de-icing fluid onto a Power Control Unit and was able to simulate a comparable blocking of a PCU through de-icing fluid freezing solid on the input arms, thereby preventing them from having the freedom of movement that is necessary.
Furthermore, the AIBN has conducted additional tests to determine the significance of different horizontal stabilizer trim positions for fluid ingress. The current procedure (published by Boeing and adopted by the airline) prescribes that the trim should be set in full forward position during de-icing. The AIBN’s examination showed that by changing the trim position to the middle position (the one used during take-off), fluid ingress was reduced.
In view of the AIBN’s examinations, Boeing in October 2013 altered procedures in the Boeing 737 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) so that application of de-icing fluid should be carried out at an angle from the front and not from the side. Boeing also introduced new procedures into the Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) prescribing that all B737 operators during de-icing should set the stabilizer trim to take-off position.

Russian B737 Crash at Kazan.

As far as I know you have to be a Russian national (resident) to be able to be part of the flight crew.

So that is part of the reason for flight crew shortage.

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It mentions that the US is to send a team of experts to help Russian investigation of the Boeing 737 crash. Would these be US government AAIB investigators, or experts from the Boeing Company?

Short answer: Both.

Unless the country in question forbids it, it is SOP for the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) to be involved in the investigation of any accident involving a US built airliner. Likewise, the manufacturer will send accident investigators that can also bring in Subject Mater Experts (SME) to assist as needed.
However the investigation will be headed by the local Russian accident investigation agency - the NTSB and Boeing reps are just there to assist.

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Unless the country in question forbids it, it is SOP for the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) to be involved in the investigation of any accident involving a US built airliner.

The rights of the state of manufacture, state of registry and the state where the operator is domiciled to participate in all aspects of the investigation is stipulated in ICAO Annex 13.

What would be the ramifications for Russia ( or any ICAO member state in this situation) if they did not allow the manufacturers investigators in?
Would their ICAO membership be at risk? Would there be any real consequences? I don't know much about these things.

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What would be the ramifications for Russia ( or any ICAO member state in this situation) if they did not allow the manufacturers investigators in?

It's hard to see that happening. As per my previous post, Boeing won't be participating independently, they will form part of the NTSB's delegation, representing the state interest of the USA.

Yeah I agree. But still.....what would be the consequences in your opinion?
Just a bit of political huffing and puffing?

The accident happened in Russia to a locally registered aircraft.
It is their sole responsibility, they are free to ask anyone or nobody for help as they see fit.

It is normal practice for the aircraft and engine manufacturers and the original certification authority to offer their assistance if required.

Sometimes the causes are clear and no help is needed. Their call.

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The accident happened in Russia to a locally registered aircraft.

Very few western-built airliners operating with Russian airlines are actually registered there. This one wasn't either.