Not necessarily, you would have to prove that, it is not going to be easy to demonstrate that your 'new system' (not the 'current system') is actually safer. Also the more stuff you put in like the more you risk pilot's complacency and reliance on automation unless you want to completely remove pilots from the cockpit.

Denti: Wrt: Err, yes & no, wherein what you've stated is not exactly how it works (and being that the two-engine go-around in the B737 is one of the most balls'd up manoeuvres, I hope you won't mind if we dot the I's and cross the T's on the matter?!)

A single press of the TOGA button will command an N1 that would provide a reduced level of thrust for a go-around, but only on the assumption that the pilots then move the thrust levers to match the demanded N1 (that is unless they're doing a dual-channel approach with a functional Autothrottle; or unless they're utilising the 'Autothrottle ARM mode' ?).

On that latter point, some airlines allow (and / or require) their pilots to fly an approach using the 'Autothrottle ARM mode' (a procedure which is also sometimes referred to as 'Speed Off' mode) and wherein, to cut a long story short, the principle behind that 'Autothrottle ARM mode' is that, the pilot can move the thrust levers at will with the Autothrottle in 'ARM' but, on the press of a TOGA button, the Autothrottle will re-activate and automatically advance the thrust levers to the relevant N1 thrust position (the demanded amount of N1 being based upon whether it was either one or two presses of the TOGA button... and / or also inject some thrust if the speed generally gets too low during the approach), BUT... and this is an important 'BUT'... that 'Autothrottle ARM mode' procedure is not recommended by Boeing (see also the Boeing B737 NG FCTM: Autothrottle ARM Mode; and there was also an FCOM Notice of Errata Bulletin about it too... though for the life of me I can't seem to locate it?!).

And, fwiw, amongst some of the other reasons that Boeing don't recommend the use of the 'Autothrottle ARM mode', is because the Autothrottle can come in too aggressively, i.e. when the TOGA button is pressed (especially relevant if it is re-activated when close to the ground, i.e. thus risking of a tail strike... which apparently has happened, so Boeing say), and that an Autothrottle malfunction (particularly a failure to advance the thrust levers) when the TOGA button is pressed would see a FD demand a pitch increase but without a corresponding increase in thrust (i.e. if the pilots were relying on the Autothrottle to move the thrust levers?!).

Needless to say, with a single-channel approach and / or manually flown approach (with both assuming that the Autothrottle is fully switched off), a click of the TOGA button will not advance the thrust levers automatically, but it will command the N1 bugs to an appropriate thrust demand... a demand which the pilot(s) can then match via manually moving of the thrust levers, and which will then attempt to give the desired rate of climb that you describe, based upon the number of TOGA button presses (as you describe).

Would be interesting to know the reason for the initial G/A.

Without going into details: absolutely not. Two 320s and a 330 were lost in similar manner.

Neither you know enough Russian to realize what you and Agaricus Bisporus have speculated about runs against the FDR readout.

They spoke to tower, not 'maintenance'.

Say It; Do it; See It.
 

Here's an aid memoir (for the PF) for the vital actions of a go-around in a B737:

• Say It = "Go Around, Flap 15"
• Do It = Push thrust levers up, and pitch to the go-around attitude.
• See It = The FMA had better say 'TOGA' (which proves that you've pressed the TOGA button), the thrust mode says 'GA' (ditto) and the thrust position matches the demanded N1.

Now follow the FD and if above 400 ft AGL ask for a roll mode, and when above AccelAlt (and if the ASI is above white bug), ask for "Flap 5" and keep on accelerating (by moving the flap lever) until the flaps are 'Up' and / or Altitude Acquire occurs (at which point the MCP speed window will open... requiring you to then set the your airspeed bug yourself). Now engage autopilot & auto-throttle.

Nb. If, prior to Altitude Acquire, you touch anything on the MCP (aside from a roll mode) you will then cause the TOGA mode to cancel (watch your FMA), and the MCP speed window will then open up (at the airspeed that you are doing at that precise moment, and the ASI bug will move to that same speed) and the ASI bug is then yours to set.

You'll note that I don't mention the landing gear because, on two engines, there's usually so much power available that - even leaving the gear down - it will not effect proceedings all that much... just so long as the PF remembers to do those basic items listed above!

And that's all there is to it - simple & safe - Say It; Do It; See It !

flash 8 brings up the question: what was the reason for the original go around?

The conversation presented in a previous post with graphic presentation of the ultimate dive, including all usual strong language, reminded me of the Polish President's crash into a Russian airfield. In that case the advice given by the tower was unfortunate; informing the Polish pilots that they were on track. Yes, perhaps, but trees got in the way.

Is it still the custom in Russia that the controller tells the pilot what to do?
Is it the practice in the US for the tower to order a pilot to go around?

Yes, it can happen, for example if tower spots that runway is still occupied or there is some other impediment to safe landing. Pilots are also capable of declaring go-around for their own reasons.

IIRC the EVA 77W flight to SFO was ordered to go around when found to be LOW on final.

Or was it only a suggestion?

Very similar incident happened with Transaero B737 in April 2010 in Krasnoyarsk. Going around - pitch up to 45 degrees - speed dropping almost to 0 - banking 80 degrees right - rapid descent/fall from 4000 ft and stabilized at 400 ft after getting visual reference.

However, though this incident was discussed on public forums and most of B737 Russian pilots know about this incident, it has never been officially investigated and no official info ever appeared.

I am really mystified here. What I'm hearing is that you punch a button that brings on sudden power that results in tricky pitch changes at low altitude.

So how did people do it in a 737-200 in the 1960s? I never remember reading about GA screw-ups until lately. Even the ones with a happy ending must be awful for the passengers.

I mean, what do you do? Level off, gear up, gradually put on power and reduce flaps - how hard can it be??

Desitter, it's not a "sudden power" increase, it's quite smooth and the pitch trims changes are not "tricky" to a competent pilot.

Ref 737-200 which I also flew - pilots were used to doing a lot more manual flying then. These GA incidents are further evidence of pilots diminution in handling skills due increased use of automation.

To a competent and well practised pilot the GA should be a routine manoeuvre.

@Old King Coal,

of course i was answering, and my reply must be read in regards to the original thing i commented on:

And of course, the 737 does exactly that if one wants it. Flying manually the issue is a moot point as thrust is used manually and one can easily use less than full GA thrust as long as obstacles are not an issue.

Of course i do have a certain mental bias from flying the 737 for around 13 years now using the ARM feature and flying every ILS dual channel until the automatics are switched off, both provide better go around control and make life in that particular case quite easy. Interestingly enough the outfit i fly for does both for the last 30 years now without any problem or incident.

All in all a go around is quite a benign thing in the 737 if flown right, but apparently training in many companies is only done to the bare regulatory minimum and that can be a bad thing if the last two engine go around was flown years back during initial type rating.

Perhaps pilots have too many options these days.

Harking back to the B737-200 we knew that ALL Go Arounds had to be manually flown also with no autothrottle (well on all the ones I flew) and a very basic flight director. Flying a manual Go Around was all part and parcel of the job.

Now we have the option for Auto Go Around (a la Cat 2/3 and both autopilots engaged), manually flown Go Around but with Autothrottle (with variation in one click/two click etc), manually flown Go Around with manual throttle or even auto go around with manual throttle - all with a more "sophisticated" Flight Director.

So maybe pilots are faced with choice overload?

A totally manual Go Around with no Flight Director (raw data) is from a handling point of view quite simple - power up to circa 90% (but don't look at N1 guages since a) correct thrust lever movement should be known and b) PNF should set accurately, simultaneously selecting 15 deg NU and trimming as we go - obviously we need to configure etc but fundamentally this is all we need to do to get the a/c climbing away from the ground safely.

Am assuming all engines operative of course.

Perhaps this....

Pilots Rely Too Much on Automation, Panel Says - WSJ.com

Scary for us passengers to think that pilots may not be able to do a Go Around in a perfectly working airplane or land visually with competence in good weather. That it could even be a problem.

Due to man/machine interface, fatigue and other factors.

Incidents are still few in view of how many flights were landed visually and how many Go Arounds are done. But one likes to think that Go Arounds and landing visually are as easy as getting the milk out of the fridge and pouring it into a bowl for pilots.

I think , as mentioned previously by others, that new complexities and choices of arming this, dis-arming that. Proceeding on half auto or full manual or full auto makes things unnecessarily complex at critical times and leads to mistakes being made.

Complexity kills. Keeping it Simple should be the rule, because it works.

Absolutely. TO/GA pitch up tendency is counteracted by the "fbw" system on an A320.

And as far as I know she has an automatic pitch trim too...
But...

You don't need an airliner to get into trouble with frost or ice on the wings. Not sure what the relevance is to this crash?

Here's one which pitched up 44 degrees with IAS reducing to 82 knots as the pitch reduced to 33 degrees. How close did that come to the Kazan accident?

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/875.pdf