756 = 757/767

It can be, but it doesn't have to be. If we fly a autoflight ILS it is always dual channel and therefore the go around is flown by the autopilot. Of course one could argue that it is initiated manually by manually pressing the TOGA switches. Automatic go around while nice is not the main reason for dual channel approaches though, it is a fix for some very nasty aileron hardovers flown by one faulty autopilot on one of our early classics, dual channel approaches will prevent that.

However, if already in manual flight that is of course a moot point, still not a difficult procedure if the training department does now how to do its job.

Trim
 

I'd suspect an out of trim condition during G/A. G/A-Thrust might lead to STAB-Trim ending up full-nose-down (esp since flaps extended, trim moves quickly), which may lead to this type of "descend" when Thrust is reduced during "level-off" after the G/A due to the resulting nose-down moment. Difficult to solve without applying thrust.... Happend before.

G/As
 

Our Training Dept has recently been putting out internationally collated info about the high number of mis-handled GA's.
Its all very well saying its a basic manouvre, but it is one I do for real, on average, once a year. Often there is the 'startle factor' where a perfectly normal day turns into an unexpected flurry of action during an unexpected GA.
Added to that the Boeing can be a bit of a handful if the GA is not executed well.
Terrible video to watch, thoughts to the crew,pax etc.

OKG
I'll give you my most sincere congratulations. You are really good at beating around the bush.
Let me ask you a question: are you a professional pilot or a lawyer?
You claim that they had dual autopilots engaged in ILS Approach Mode.
The first exception that comes to my mind is that given the windy conditions that was not the best option.
I have perhaps some other objection that better demolish your thesis, but before formulating them, I have to study more about what you say and the current conditions of efficiency of the airport.
As to the position of the stabilizer in the various phases of flight, I encourage you to check your stab trim ind which while during cruise is close to zero, and it could only be like that for drag reasons, while during the approach, in landing configuration, at the correct speed it is very much ANU.
Regards

As already mentioned, 3 years ago none of the guys in the cockpit was a pilot - one was a Tu 154 navigator and the other a Tu 154 Flight engineer.

Where do you think they could have manual flying skills, if they actually started to fly at the age of 45?

@Mountainbear

I'll put my money on the following tape:

PNF: Where are we supposed to go now?
PF: Dunno. Did you program the go around into the computer?
PNF: No. Did you?
PF: No. Cuss word. Where is the expletive map?
(sound of rummaging around)
PNF: BTW, we are on autopilot right?
PF: Cuss word!
PNF: Cuss word!
PF: Cuss word!

tape ends

Cut and paste from MAK statement on Avherald:

On Nov 19th 2013 the MAK reported that first read outs of the flight data recorder revealed that the crew did not follow the standard approach profile, went around due to considering the approach as unstable (attitude not within stable approach parameters), the engine thrust levers were moved to TOGA and the autopilot disconnected, the aircraft was under manual control for the remainder of the flight. While the engines accelerated to near takeoff thrust, the flaps were reduced from 30 to 15 degrees, the gear was retracted and the aircraft pitched up to about 25 degrees nose up, the indicated airspeed began to decay. Only after the airspeed had decreased from about 150 KIAS to 125 KIAS the crew began to issue control inputs to counter the nose up, the climb was stopped while the nose was lowered by control inputs. The aircraft reached a maximum height of 700 meters (2300 feet and began to rapidly descend until the aircraft impacted ground at a nose down attitude of 75 degrees at a speed of 450 kph (242 knots) about 20 seconds after reaching the maximum height of 700 meters. The engines were operating nominally until impact, the flight data recorders did not reveal any system malfunction. The cockpit voice recorder was not found inside its container, the assembly is missing and a search is under way.

I am not sure of my facts here but I doubt if the 400 ft wind back of the stabiliser trim on a dual autopilot ILS is to specifically aid the go-around as such. The application of high thrust at the initiation of the go-around produces a strong pitch up. You don't need additional back trim which has already occurred at 400 ft on a dual channel approach.

Interestingly in the simulator at least, a single channel autopilot autoland does a quite smooth touchdown. On single channel the 400 ft wind back of the stabiliser trim does not occur. Again from observations in the simulator a well executed (in other words, safe) manual go-around on all engines in IMC in the 737 varies greatly with pilot skill and competence. Some really botch it up while other pilots know exactly what they are doing.

What does sometimes happen on a go-around in IMC and which has caused grief in the simulator, is inadvertent premature flap retraction by the PNF without being asked. The PF is busy flying on instruments and not keeping a close eye on monitoring the flap position indicator. For example the PNF selecting Flap 1 inadvertently rather than flap 15 at the instant of power application on an all engines GA.

Now pitch up to 15-25 degrees caused by the strong nose up trim change with underslung engines at high power, and couple that with some pilots blind adherence to the flight director needles instead of proper cross reference to airspeed, attitude, altimeter and IVSI. Believe me with an incompetent instrument pilot it doesn't take long for things to rapidly get out of hand.
I have seen that happen countless times during simulator training to the point of stick shaker application. When that happens an incompetent pilot can make grossly over-controlled pitch down movements in fright and next minute the aircraft is seriously diving. It is all to do with lack of instrument flying skill in manual IMC flight. Surprisingly common. Thank goodness for flight simulators:ok:

Interesting comment in ampclamp's linked article above:

Aksan Giniyatullin, chief executive officers of Tatarstan airlines, which operated the jet, told a news conference: "The lead pilot had never made a second landing attempt under real flight conditions."

I'm not sure that 9 out of 10 successes is any better than 0 out of 1. The idea is to train for 10 out of 10 (or some such) in a simulator before trying out under real flight conditions.

Let's see what the investigation turns up in this regard

Don't know who told you that one but you can certainly leave the autopilot on for a go-around on the 757 and all later Boeing models. It is the recommended procedure for a low-vis missed autoflight approach in my experience.

Doves: that statement alone shows in inherent lack of understanding of the B737.

Aside from considerations for it being 'windy', as you put it, on the matter of using a dual-channel approach mode (i.e. both autopilots engaged). There is nothing to stop one from using that mode (see: Boeing FCOM1 / Amplified Procedures / Landing Procedure ILS) even if ones intention might ultimately be to make 'manual landing' (i.e. to disconnect the autopilot(s) at some point during the approach) but wherein (prior to an autopilot disconnect) one then has the facility for an auto-pilot flown go-around (which one does not with a single-channel approach) and / or, putting it in simple terms, just because one engages both autopilots does not mean that one will necessarily be letting the autopilot(s) do the landing, but if one then elects to initiate a go-around (by disconnecting the autopilot and flying it yourself) and doing so when below 400ft Rad Alt, you can expect the said same (dual-)autopilots to have wound in nose-up stabiliser, and which you'd better be ready for when the autopilots relinquish control to the yolk.

A quote from the МАК site (boeing 737-500 investigation): Sorry for my lame English (especially when it comes to aviation terms), but it should be pretty clear that they were using only one of the autopilots during the approach, or else how would disengaging one of them put the aircraft into manual flight mode?

I understand almost nothing about aviation, but I am Russian. The МАК site says that "one of the autopilots that was used during approach was disengaged and the rest of the flight was being carried manually" (задействованный в процессе захода на посадку один из двух автопилотов, был отключён и дальнейший полёт осуществлялся в ручном режиме). So why all the talk about dual autopilots?

Reuters reporting Pilot pushed the steering column...
 

From airwise.com..

Russian Crash Pilot Pushed Plane Into Nosedive

The pilot of an airliner that crashed near the Russian city of Kazan killing 50 people had pushed the steering column to pitch it into a nosedive, crash investigators said on Tuesday, citing data recorder analysis.
The Interstate Aviation Committee, which oversees civil aviation in the former Soviet Union, offered no explanation why the pilot of the Boeing 737 might have performed the maneuver, at a height of 700 meters, after aborting a first attempt to land.
Aksan Giniyatullin, chief executive of Tatarstan Airlines which operated the jet, told a news conference: "The lead pilot had never made a second landing attempt under real flight conditions."
Video of the crash showed the aircraft, approaching Kazan in the region of Tatarstan on a flight from Moscow, plummeting headlong into the tarmac and exploding.
"After a speed decrease from 150 to 125 knots (144 mph) the crew started maneuvering activities with the steering column to put the plane into a nose-down pitch, which resulted in the end of altitude gain and the start of descent," the committee said in a statement.
Both engines were running and no malfunctions were detected by the flight data recorder. The tape from the voice recorder could not be recovered at the crash site, the committee said.
RUSSIAN SAFETY RECORD
Sunday's crash raised new concerns about Russia's poor safety record as it prepares to host the Winter Olympics in the southern city of Sochi in February.
Russia and the Soviet republics combined have one of the world's worst air traffic safety records, with a total accident rate almost three times the world average in 2011, according to the International Air Transport Association.
"I know lots of people who don't fly with these small airlines in Russia anymore, they're scared..." said Leila Sibgatullina, who came to place flowers at the site of the crash.
"This kind of thing just shouldn't be happening. What a tragedy."
Mourners paid respects at a makeshift memorial set up at the gate to the runway. Candles burned around a table piled with red and white flowers and teddy bears.
The son of the president of the oil-rich province of Tatarstan and the regional head of the FSB intelligence service were named among those killed. The dead also included two foreigners, a Briton and a Ukrainian.
The committee said investigators were studying the level of crew training and technical condition of the jet among other aspects.
An independent aviation expert who did not want to be named suggested the decline in speed might itself have caused the plane to stall and nosedive.
"The abrupt transition from ascent to descent can signify that the crew, possibly, failed to keep track of the speed decrease, which resulted in the jet losing controllability and falling," he said.
(Reuters)

about the dual ch autopilot and nose up trim


since the plane didn't go below 400', why even mention it?

Don't fly any other airline in Russia except for Aeroflot, Transaero and S7 and you will be fine.

Huge lack of pilots in Russia is causing these "backwater" operators to turn to "converting" flight engineers and navigators. Their training will consist of going up in a light aircraft and the instructor signing them off saying "You guys are pretty much pilots you already know all this basic stuff"

These "pilots" cocked up a go around, then failed to save a recoverable aircraft and not only killed themselves but took 50 innocent lives with them.

Pushing TOGA on the 737 with a single AP engaged automatically disengages it and you're into a hand flown go around. Equally, a single push of TOGA will not give you full beans GA thrust, but reduced thrust that will give you around 1000-2000ft fpm roc to avoid this kind of situation, and the FMA will reflect that, indicating GA not N1. You have to push TOGA twice to get full GA N1.

As for the NU stab trim, I thought it was part of the fail passive protections - ie if the autopilot chucks it at 100ft the aircraft will tend to pitch up and away from the ground?