Boeing at X-Roads?
You're begging the question here with your assumption that Boeing is an aviation company. Boeing is a sophisticated liquidation operation and has been since their last two new aircraft were cancelled.
Boeing will keep making its 1967 model refrigerators with refrigerator manufacturing processes until they don't make money any longer. At some point they will sell their defense business (or give it away, as it makes a huge negative profit, so now might be good) and will give away their share of the space business (a huge mismatch at this point). Then Boeing the cash cow will have no more milk to give and will be given a captive bolt stun and skinned for cheap leather and ground up for utility meat. I give it 10-15 years but their orders may dry up faster than that.
This is what they are doing. They are stripping Boeing for parts as surely as any Gordon Gekko in the 1980s, slowly and much more competently, but still as inevitably as someone on warfarin with a stomach ulcer. Believe them when you see them doing it and telling you they are doing it.
You folks with Boeing pensions, don't plan to have them in 10 years, or less. Call your lawyers now.
Boeing will keep making its 1967 model refrigerators with refrigerator manufacturing processes until they don't make money any longer. At some point they will sell their defense business (or give it away, as it makes a huge negative profit, so now might be good) and will give away their share of the space business (a huge mismatch at this point). Then Boeing the cash cow will have no more milk to give and will be given a captive bolt stun and skinned for cheap leather and ground up for utility meat. I give it 10-15 years but their orders may dry up faster than that.
This is what they are doing. They are stripping Boeing for parts as surely as any Gordon Gekko in the 1980s, slowly and much more competently, but still as inevitably as someone on warfarin with a stomach ulcer. Believe them when you see them doing it and telling you they are doing it.
You folks with Boeing pensions, don't plan to have them in 10 years, or less. Call your lawyers now.
@remi +1
There are still some very good companies, but some managers of other companies no longer concentrate on making a 'thing' and having pride in making the best 'thing' they can; instead they concentrate on making money.
In doing so, the 'thing' - be that an airliner or a lawnmower or a service - is made progressively cheaper and cheaper, and by cheaper and cheaper workers, (by which I mean the workers are treated and paid more cheaply).
In their millionaire's club, someone came up with this wheeze - why bother with all the effort and complication of research and design to improve the 'thing' and make a better 'thing', when you can take huge amounts of money out of the company and put it into your own bank account or pension ? Doing it that way, you will have a personal fortune in 5 or 10 years instead of 30 or 40 years.
e,g, a bonus of hundreds of thousands (or millions) paid to the CEO, so there is not now the money to support a staff canteen, which gets closed, and we all have to make our own sandwiches every day to bring to work.
I have been made redundant twice from long, and very long, lived and successful airlines that became insolvent because they had been mismanaged and asset stripped in recent years. Airlines that previously had had very good reputations, high standards and good customer relationships. Both gone owing to bad management.
There are still some very good companies. Boeing was fantastic, once upon a time. But look at them now. What happened ?
There are still some very good companies, but some managers of other companies no longer concentrate on making a 'thing' and having pride in making the best 'thing' they can; instead they concentrate on making money.
In doing so, the 'thing' - be that an airliner or a lawnmower or a service - is made progressively cheaper and cheaper, and by cheaper and cheaper workers, (by which I mean the workers are treated and paid more cheaply).
In their millionaire's club, someone came up with this wheeze - why bother with all the effort and complication of research and design to improve the 'thing' and make a better 'thing', when you can take huge amounts of money out of the company and put it into your own bank account or pension ? Doing it that way, you will have a personal fortune in 5 or 10 years instead of 30 or 40 years.
e,g, a bonus of hundreds of thousands (or millions) paid to the CEO, so there is not now the money to support a staff canteen, which gets closed, and we all have to make our own sandwiches every day to bring to work.
I have been made redundant twice from long, and very long, lived and successful airlines that became insolvent because they had been mismanaged and asset stripped in recent years. Airlines that previously had had very good reputations, high standards and good customer relationships. Both gone owing to bad management.
There are still some very good companies. Boeing was fantastic, once upon a time. But look at them now. What happened ?
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100% agree with the statement on the B777. I used to work with this aircraft on the ground and in 6.5 years of operation on a daily flight to our Station we did not have a single aircraft related AOG. Remarkable. Also agree that Boeing risk letting COMAC in. The future duopoly maybe Airbus and Comac on the commercial side. Another 737 Max crash (regardless of cause) will seal it's fate forever. Had the DC10 operated in today's social media environment it too would have failed in all likelihood.
100% agree with the statement on the B777. I used to work with this aircraft on the ground and in 6.5 years of operation on a daily flight to our Station we did not have a single aircraft related AOG. Remarkable. Also agree that Boeing risk letting COMAC in. The future duopoly maybe Airbus and Comac on the commercial side. Another 737 Max crash (regardless of cause) will seal it's fate forever. Had the DC10 operated in today's social media environment it too would have failed in all likelihood.
As far as putting Western engines on Chinese fuselages goes, that will continue to be just fine.
I'm confident someone in America can design world beating airliners. Boeing can't anymore though. Will the US exit the airliner business? If Boeing management has its way, yes, it will.
@remi +1
There are still some very good companies, but some managers of other companies no longer concentrate on making a 'thing' and having pride in making the best 'thing' they can; instead they concentrate on making money.
In doing so, the 'thing' - be that an airliner or a lawnmower or a service - is made progressively cheaper and cheaper, and by cheaper and cheaper workers, (by which I mean the workers are treated and paid more cheaply).
In their millionaire's club, someone came up with this wheeze - why bother with all the effort and complication of research and design to improve the 'thing' and make a better 'thing', when you can take huge amounts of money out of the company and put it into your own bank account or pension ? Doing it that way, you will have a personal fortune in 5 or 10 years instead of 30 or 40 years.
.......
There are still some very good companies, but some managers of other companies no longer concentrate on making a 'thing' and having pride in making the best 'thing' they can; instead they concentrate on making money.
In doing so, the 'thing' - be that an airliner or a lawnmower or a service - is made progressively cheaper and cheaper, and by cheaper and cheaper workers, (by which I mean the workers are treated and paid more cheaply).
In their millionaire's club, someone came up with this wheeze - why bother with all the effort and complication of research and design to improve the 'thing' and make a better 'thing', when you can take huge amounts of money out of the company and put it into your own bank account or pension ? Doing it that way, you will have a personal fortune in 5 or 10 years instead of 30 or 40 years.
.......
Boeing's management is now rent-seeking with the 737, as it seems unlikely/impossible that there will be any further significant improvements to the aircraft, nor any new midsize design. The goal is to milk the 737 until people are only buying Airbus, then do likewise with 777 and 787.
Paxing All Over The World
Unfortunately, across the last 30+ years - this is what numerous corporates have done. This is not just in the USA as the UK has followed slavishly behind. I was working for an American Merchant Bank in the late 80s, on a visit to HQ I was told about Outsourcing. I did not like it and could not have imagined where it was going. It was certainly evidence of the top of the slope.
Making directors pay dependent on company profits must have seemed like a good idea at the time ... if only they had put a ten year hold on their bonus. Keep their funds in escrow until the results have played out completely.
Making directors pay dependent on company profits must have seemed like a good idea at the time ... if only they had put a ten year hold on their bonus. Keep their funds in escrow until the results have played out completely.
This is what happened, infamously, with Martin Skreli, "pharma bro." He and his fellow commercial pirates found unique assets (orphaned drugs with a sole manufacturer) and engaged in as much rent-seeking as possible and nothing else.
Boeing's management is now rent-seeking with the 737, as it seems unlikely/impossible that there will be any further significant improvements to the aircraft, nor any new midsize design. The goal is to milk the 737 until people are only buying Airbus, then do likewise with 777 and 787.
Boeing's management is now rent-seeking with the 737, as it seems unlikely/impossible that there will be any further significant improvements to the aircraft, nor any new midsize design. The goal is to milk the 737 until people are only buying Airbus, then do likewise with 777 and 787.
Its what happens when a company becomes too large to fail. Do you think that the U.S. will let its only major civil airline manufacturer go down? I wonder if you could rule out Chapter 10 at some stage though? The paradox is that if you run a company solely for shareholders the shareholders (ot at least the long term one, there's the rub) the shareholders can end up loosing out.
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Its what happens when a company becomes too large to fail. Do you think that the U.S. will let its only major civil airline manufacturer go down? I wonder if you could rule out Chapter 10 at some stage though? The paradox is that if you run a company solely for shareholders the shareholders (ot at least the long term one, there's the rub) the shareholders can end up loosing out.
Permitting/requiring the FAA to engage in rigorous regulation and enforcement, and giving it the requisite resources would go a long way, but half the members of Congress represent a political tendency that hates and resists government regulation and is dedicated to limiting expenditures. And investors/shareholders who live for quarterly earnings would likely rebel violently if cash flow and/or growth were substantially limited.
BTW, Chapter 10 went away a long time ago. The elements that survive are incorporated into Chapter 11.
A Credibility Gap
Boeing have a credibility gap between them and their investors, them and the FAA, and Government.
This in part, appears to a result of a complacent belief in past excellence and world leadership, and being commercially too big to fail in a leading world economy. They forgot that safety risks can match any commercial risk, and that grandfather rights don't rule just because you wrote the rule.
Similar features are appearing amongst the other participants; the FAA's worldwide credibility, and in some aspects of government - political strategies. The 'me first', my company, my country, may fail to appreciate that these views can also result in me-first-over-the-cliff in a rapidly changing world.
( This issue is by no means unique to the US, but as yet not apparent, or significant in other countries / industries; a time delay or active mitigation? )
The specific 737 Max issues relate to a misjudgement in recognising and adapting to change, blinkered by past success - both Boeing and FAA. The belief that past standards would be sufficient for an old design in a new worldly context, except that change has been rapid and with significant impact due to technology and safety advances. And change continues.
Boeing and FAA have not kept pace with changes requiring higher standards. Perhaps hindered by lack of government support, but now all parties face the problem of how to catchup in a situation where the pace of change continues to accelerate. More importantly, and in parallel, the challenge to restore credibility.
A new aircraft type is not a solution, just a small contribution to wider national issues.
There may not be a unique solution; first understand the current situation and the context of change, not expecting to control safety via regulation or quality inspection, which are both after-the-fact reactive strategies.
An uncertain future requires a new way of thinking, proactive; but what that might be has yet to emerge - fit for purpose.
At least recognising worldly aviation trends and being prepared for further change, and not to forget that we will be surprised by the uncertain future; the new normal.
This in part, appears to a result of a complacent belief in past excellence and world leadership, and being commercially too big to fail in a leading world economy. They forgot that safety risks can match any commercial risk, and that grandfather rights don't rule just because you wrote the rule.
Similar features are appearing amongst the other participants; the FAA's worldwide credibility, and in some aspects of government - political strategies. The 'me first', my company, my country, may fail to appreciate that these views can also result in me-first-over-the-cliff in a rapidly changing world.
( This issue is by no means unique to the US, but as yet not apparent, or significant in other countries / industries; a time delay or active mitigation? )
The specific 737 Max issues relate to a misjudgement in recognising and adapting to change, blinkered by past success - both Boeing and FAA. The belief that past standards would be sufficient for an old design in a new worldly context, except that change has been rapid and with significant impact due to technology and safety advances. And change continues.
Boeing and FAA have not kept pace with changes requiring higher standards. Perhaps hindered by lack of government support, but now all parties face the problem of how to catchup in a situation where the pace of change continues to accelerate. More importantly, and in parallel, the challenge to restore credibility.
A new aircraft type is not a solution, just a small contribution to wider national issues.
There may not be a unique solution; first understand the current situation and the context of change, not expecting to control safety via regulation or quality inspection, which are both after-the-fact reactive strategies.
An uncertain future requires a new way of thinking, proactive; but what that might be has yet to emerge - fit for purpose.
At least recognising worldly aviation trends and being prepared for further change, and not to forget that we will be surprised by the uncertain future; the new normal.
The damage done by Boeing is not confined to the US. Transport Canada accepted the MAX certification date provided by Boeing under a FAA - TC bilateral certification agreement. They felt they were badly burned and then very unimpressed when Boeing fought hard to kill a requirement that was to require an easy way to cancel an MCAS generated spurious stick shaker activation. The Canadian airline WestJet has ordered the MAX 10 but TC is not going to rubber stamp the certification of this variant. It is going to get a very close look by the TC aircraft certification folks, and I don't think they are going like what they find when they start digging.
Its what happens when a company becomes too large to fail. Do you think that the U.S. will let its only major civil airline manufacturer go down? I wonder if you could rule out Chapter 10 at some stage though? The paradox is that if you run a company solely for shareholders the shareholders (ot at least the long term one, there's the rub) the shareholders can end up loosing out.
There are no meaningful new aircraft in the queue. Even the 787-3 was axed. They're going with what they have until it won't sell profitably any longer.
Boeing tanked in 2019 and seems to be struggling to break even since. I don't see what they are going to do to grow again, especially given this most recent fiasco, and the lack of any new aircraft anywhere in the pipeline.
The US government can't fix a company that is unprepared to manufacture desirable products in the future.
I don't know what can be done but I think spinning off or selling their defense business is probably inevitable. The US government will probably encourage that as the company continues to bleed money and demonstrate ongoing quality issues and other signs of ill health.
The damage done by Boeing is not confined to the US. Transport Canada accepted the MAX certification date provided by Boeing under a FAA - TC bilateral certification agreement. They felt they were badly burned and then very unimpressed when Boeing fought hard to kill a requirement that was to require an easy way to cancel an MCAS generated spurious stick shaker activation. The Canadian airline WestJet has ordered the MAX 10 but TC is not going to rubber stamp the certification of this variant. It is going to get a very close look by the TC aircraft certification folks, and I don't think they are going like what they find when they start digging.
Does Boeing still have an EICAS waiver for the max 7 and 10? One wonders if FAA will revisit this given that the certification schedules have probably incurred at least another 6-12 month delay. The last waiver was supposed to expire in September 2023 and idk what has happened since.
The quality control issues must be solvable? More staff and time and less pressure. The strategy adjustment might be trickier but wouldn't their big investors be responsible for strategy and senior management?
If I had to guess right now I'd give the MAX 10 even odds of never being sold.
Does Boeing still have an EICAS waiver for the max 7 and 10? One wonders if FAA will revisit this given that the certification schedules have probably incurred at least another 6-12 month delay. The last waiver was supposed to expire in September 2023 and idk what has happened since.
Does Boeing still have an EICAS waiver for the max 7 and 10? One wonders if FAA will revisit this given that the certification schedules have probably incurred at least another 6-12 month delay. The last waiver was supposed to expire in September 2023 and idk what has happened since.
The 777X is essentially a new aircraft - very, very little is being carried over from the legacy 777 other than the fuselage diameter (even the fuselage structure is being changed to increase the interior diameter - should make the 10 across seating in steerage a little more tolerable). The 787-3 was dropped because it wasn't selling. As I've outlined before, 'shrinks' don't often work because you're still carrying a lot of extra weight and drag you don't need - so I don't hold that against them. The 777-300ER was a game changer, can the 777X pull off the same? Many of the delays in the 777X program have little to do with program itself - much of it was due to the diversion of resources to solve the MAX crisis as well as the MAX and 787 production issues - and don't forget COVID.
The real question is what will Boeing do when the 777X is certified and in-service. Back in the early 2000's, we joked that Boeing was turning into 'derivatives are us' - all Condit and Stonecypher were interested in was soaking the existing line for all it was worth - no investment in new products. It was a big breakthrough when the 787 was launched (I'd like to think that the Boeing engineer's strike in 2000 had something to do with that - upper management discovered to their dismay that engineering really was essential to the business). Unfortunately they used the MacDac model for the 787 development and that turned the program into a massive
-up. Will they be willing to make the needed investment in a new program to replace the 737 with a proper new aircraft, or will it revert back to the 'derivatives are us' mode?
The newly built composite wing center at Everett seems to indicate they had plans to build a lot more big CFRP wings recently? Wasn't this a "new era" investment?
Congress extended the EICAS waiver for the MAX 10 (and I presume the 7 but I've not paid attention to that).
The 777X is essentially a new aircraft - very, very little is being carried over from the legacy 777 other than the fuselage diameter (even the fuselage structure is being changed to increase the interior diameter - should make the 10 across seating in steerage a little more tolerable). The 787-3 was dropped because it wasn't selling. As I've outlined before, 'shrinks' don't often work because you're still carrying a lot of extra weight and drag you don't need - so I don't hold that against them. The 777-300ER was a game changer, can the 777X pull off the same? Many of the delays in the 777X program have little to do with program itself - much of it was due to the diversion of resources to solve the MAX crisis as well as the MAX and 787 production issues - and don't forget COVID.
The real question is what will Boeing do when the 777X is certified and in-service. Back in the early 2000's, we joked that Boeing was turning into 'derivatives are us' - all Condit and Stonecypher were interested in was soaking the existing line for all it was worth - no investment in new products. It was a big breakthrough when the 787 was launched (I'd like to think that the Boeing engineer's strike in 2000 had something to do with that - upper management discovered to their dismay that engineering really was essential to the business). Unfortunately they used the MacDac model for the 787 development and that turned the program into a massive-up. Will they be willing to make the needed investment in a new program to replace the 737 with a proper new aircraft, or will it revert back to the 'derivatives are us' mode?
The 777X is essentially a new aircraft - very, very little is being carried over from the legacy 777 other than the fuselage diameter (even the fuselage structure is being changed to increase the interior diameter - should make the 10 across seating in steerage a little more tolerable). The 787-3 was dropped because it wasn't selling. As I've outlined before, 'shrinks' don't often work because you're still carrying a lot of extra weight and drag you don't need - so I don't hold that against them. The 777-300ER was a game changer, can the 777X pull off the same? Many of the delays in the 777X program have little to do with program itself - much of it was due to the diversion of resources to solve the MAX crisis as well as the MAX and 787 production issues - and don't forget COVID.
The real question is what will Boeing do when the 777X is certified and in-service. Back in the early 2000's, we joked that Boeing was turning into 'derivatives are us' - all Condit and Stonecypher were interested in was soaking the existing line for all it was worth - no investment in new products. It was a big breakthrough when the 787 was launched (I'd like to think that the Boeing engineer's strike in 2000 had something to do with that - upper management discovered to their dismay that engineering really was essential to the business). Unfortunately they used the MacDac model for the 787 development and that turned the program into a massive
-up. Will they be willing to make the needed investment in a new program to replace the 737 with a proper new aircraft, or will it revert back to the 'derivatives are us' mode?I feel like wings could be stretched or un-stretched to a couple different sizes depending on the airframe, but certification might be onerous. Then again, given Boeing's reluctance to publicize changes that should cause more involved certification, maybe they could have different size wings without telling anyone.
The 737 is dead ended unless someone can figure out a way to mount the next engines, which will presumably have even larger fans, above the wings. Horizontal stab probably won't like that though. If it were possible to have longer gear and an actual gear bay with a door, that would have happened by the time of the NG. Basically I think the 737 is obsolescent and EoL soon. All hail Airbus and tiny overhead bins.
All this is and has been giving me stomach aches since the McDonnell Douglas fiasco. My father was a Boeing engineer back in the 60's; we moved to Huntsville for the space program and I eventually returned to Seattle for most of my grown life. To see what has transpired and to see all the warning signs that were ignored just pains me.
I was hired by Boeing at one point but turned down the job when my employer made me a better offer (I actually received a Christmas bonus check not having worked a day, which I returned; I still have a copy); this was a great company with great employees who cared about what they were doing. I hope but doubt they can recover - management needs to lose their golden parachutes and be fired but that ain't gonna happen.
The move of corporate to Chicago then to Washington says it all. They'd be wise IMHO to return to Everett, beg forgiveness and rediscover their roots. Too bad that won't happen.
I was hired by Boeing at one point but turned down the job when my employer made me a better offer (I actually received a Christmas bonus check not having worked a day, which I returned; I still have a copy); this was a great company with great employees who cared about what they were doing. I hope but doubt they can recover - management needs to lose their golden parachutes and be fired but that ain't gonna happen.
The move of corporate to Chicago then to Washington says it all. They'd be wise IMHO to return to Everett, beg forgiveness and rediscover their roots. Too bad that won't happen.
All this is and has been giving me stomach aches since the McDonnell Douglas fiasco. My father was a Boeing engineer back in the 60's; we moved to Huntsville for the space program and I eventually returned to Seattle for most of my grown life. To see what has transpired and to see all the warning signs that were ignored just pains me.
I was hired by Boeing at one point but turned down the job when my employer made me a better offer (I actually received a Christmas bonus check not having worked a day, which I returned; I still have a copy); this was a great company with great employees who cared about what they were doing. I hope but doubt they can recover - management needs to lose their golden parachutes and be fired but that ain't gonna happen.
The move of corporate to Chicago then to Washington says it all. They'd be wise IMHO to return to Everett, beg forgiveness and rediscover their roots. Too bad that won't happen.
I was hired by Boeing at one point but turned down the job when my employer made me a better offer (I actually received a Christmas bonus check not having worked a day, which I returned; I still have a copy); this was a great company with great employees who cared about what they were doing. I hope but doubt they can recover - management needs to lose their golden parachutes and be fired but that ain't gonna happen.
The move of corporate to Chicago then to Washington says it all. They'd be wise IMHO to return to Everett, beg forgiveness and rediscover their roots. Too bad that won't happen.
As a civil aviation designer, well, they designed a widebody with a variety of single points of very plausible failure, some of which did, and a successor with a tiny empennage that required the highest landing speed of any subsonic commercial aircraft along with no way to determine whether you landed or bounced. They never got the complete commercial aviation mindset. However, I think most people would agree that generally the DC-9 series was a good and highly reliable performer as long as you greased the jack screws and didn't chuck too much wing ice into the engines. DC-10 not so much. The KC-10 had a pretty good record, though, I think?
I haven't read much about the rationale for the merger in a couple decades. It seems like McAir and Boeing fused well on some programs e.g. Longbow and Chinook, possibly because manufacturing stayed put and so did most of the personnel. But Boeing's new(ish) military programs have been disastrous.
I don't understand why this particular hybrid cross had to be created though. The principle of hybrid vigor has been completely inverted into hybrid weakness. You thought you were getting the Borg "best of all worlds" and oh hey that went the other way.
Is there some reason that the 717 wasn't chosen for a lightweight fuselage redesign? At least it seems plausible that it could be re-engined with "big ol' fans." If there was a whole fuselage redesign it could also get an oval cabin. Idk, the possibility of that is probably utterly dead for 20 years though.
......I haven't read much about the rationale for the merger in a couple decades. It seems like McAir and Boeing fused well on some programs e.g. Longbow and Chinook, possibly because manufacturing stayed put and so did most of the personnel. But Boeing's new(ish) military programs have been disastrous......
I don't understand why this particular hybrid cross had to be created though. The principle of hybrid vigor has been completely inverted into hybrid weakness. You thought you were getting the Borg "best of all worlds" and oh hey that went the other way.
Short version, if the link can't be read: Clinton's Defense Dept. invited the heads of the aerospace defense contractors to a dinner in 1993, where it was strongly suggested that the end of the Cold War ("Peace Dividend") would require a leaner industry (and fewer CEO salaries). Resulting rapidly in the combinations of Northrop & Grumman, Boeing & Rockwell (and then MD), and Lockheed & Martin.
Combined with the fact that the B/MD merger was partly a stock swap - leaving McDonnell's Stonecipher and John McDonnell as the largest shareholders in the combine, even though technically Boeing was buying McDonnell. MD's bean-counters outplayed Boeing's engineers - not for the last time.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archi...-c3c087cdebc6/