WIZZ AIR Skiathos vid
LOW APPROACH
In my experience ( 12000 hours on RAF heavies ) - it is all too easy to get too low before touchdown when landing on very short runways .( ie Gibraltar)
Contributing factors could include:
Fear of overrunning - particularly if the overrun terrain is severe ie water or a cliff!
No PAPIs
No approach lighting ( over the sea )
Visual illusions - black hole / slope
Tailwinds
Lack of faith in ODM landing performance figures
No reverse thrust available
ETC ETC
Small fast jets ( with a 2 1/2 deg GP )regularly touch down on or near the piano keys!
Large ac should aim for the 50ft point to allow the main wheels a good safety clearance.
Whilst it is obvious that you should never risk landing short - ie Vulcan crash in Malta - it it is not good to end up high and hot and risk going off the end- ie Prince of Wales landing his BAe 146!
In an ideal world runways should be longer with better visual cues and airlines should encourage pilots to Go Around if in doubt !
With lots of dodgy airfields around the world it is only due to the pilots skills that there are not more incidents/accidents!
To overly criticise the pilots in this case( showboating !! ) is disingenuous !!
In my experience ( 12000 hours on RAF heavies ) - it is all too easy to get too low before touchdown when landing on very short runways .( ie Gibraltar)
Contributing factors could include:
Fear of overrunning - particularly if the overrun terrain is severe ie water or a cliff!
No PAPIs
No approach lighting ( over the sea )
Visual illusions - black hole / slope
Tailwinds
Lack of faith in ODM landing performance figures
No reverse thrust available
ETC ETC
Small fast jets ( with a 2 1/2 deg GP )regularly touch down on or near the piano keys!
Large ac should aim for the 50ft point to allow the main wheels a good safety clearance.
Whilst it is obvious that you should never risk landing short - ie Vulcan crash in Malta - it it is not good to end up high and hot and risk going off the end- ie Prince of Wales landing his BAe 146!
In an ideal world runways should be longer with better visual cues and airlines should encourage pilots to Go Around if in doubt !
With lots of dodgy airfields around the world it is only due to the pilots skills that there are not more incidents/accidents!
To overly criticise the pilots in this case( showboating !! ) is disingenuous !!
Last edited by mahogany bob; 11th Aug 2022 at 16:17. Reason: Typo
Only half a speed-brake
14,5 / 0.0531 (@3.04°) = 273 meters past the THR and that is not the case probably due to upslope. Relevant AIP attached.
To my understanding, the close-in obstacles would be the reason for displacing the threshold. Aiming shorter is not the critical problem, I think, coming in shallow would be.
This seems to be what got the pinkies undesired fame for being low, per the YT headline. Does anyone notice there is a marked upward correction about 100 yards over the sea?
The touchdown itself looks past the pianos which is not the case for AirItaly and the BA ship, both hard to unsee. Whizz gents pulled out in time.
To my understanding, the close-in obstacles would be the reason for displacing the threshold. Aiming shorter is not the critical problem, I think, coming in shallow would be.
This seems to be what got the pinkies undesired fame for being low, per the YT headline. Does anyone notice there is a marked upward correction about 100 yards over the sea?
The touchdown itself looks past the pianos which is not the case for AirItaly and the BA ship, both hard to unsee. Whizz gents pulled out in time.
At least one company I know of has an approach for both runways at JSI coded into the fmc database. If you reach the 1600 ft DA and have the runway in sight it gives guidance don to the threshold so the approach can be flown all the way down with VNAV guidance. If you’re not visual at 1600 ft you go around, obviously.
If one company can do it, why not others ?
If one company can do it, why not others ?
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There is a basic instrument approach and there are PAPI's at JSI. They are clearly visible and were working well last time I flew there. This shit show occurred on a day that was clearly CAVOK in every meaning of the word. This Condor crew seem to know their stuff. No dramatics, just a well executed approach and landing. You don't need to be an astronaut. https://youtu.be/5Jw88SpuajQ
However to the guys stating that it is "normal" to basically scrap the fence in Skiathos: no it is not. If you think it is you should re-examine your attitude to flying.
You have plenty of room in your dispatch calculations on a dry runway, and this calculation does not consider the upslope (which obviously helps).
If you want to land slightly "early", fly slightly steeper - this also gives you a better chance of not floating, which is the most important thing.
Condor above show how it is done, landed early and firm, with margin of error with regards to the fence. Absolutely no need to creep in low.
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At least one company I know of has an approach for both runways at JSI coded into the fmc database. If you reach the 1600 ft DA and have the runway in sight it gives guidance don to the threshold so the approach can be flown all the way down with VNAV guidance. If you’re not visual at 1600 ft you go around, obviously.
If one company can do it, why not others ?
If one company can do it, why not others ?
But they are not designed to bring you over the threshold and into the touchdown zone. The last 200ft are always basic flying: fly your aim point in a smooth and stable way. We are pilots after all, aren't we?
Flown such approaches myself. They are great to bring you in "slot", meaning properly vertically and laterally aligned with the very short final. It is especially helpful on difficult circlings with prescribed tracks.
But they are not designed to bring you over the threshold and into the touchdown zone. The last 200ft are always basic flying: fly your aim point in a smooth and stable way. We are pilots after all, aren't we?
But they are not designed to bring you over the threshold and into the touchdown zone. The last 200ft are always basic flying: fly your aim point in a smooth and stable way. We are pilots after all, aren't we?
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Just a passenger here but can I ask what happens to that sort of approach with late evening flights? I see the last flight into JSI is at 21.45. I assume darkness adds another layer of 'risk'?
At EGJJ, most of the Airbus operators can vacate Ray 08 at D; mind you it’s not as balmy in Jersey (present UK heat wave excepted)
For a land short , fatalities are foreseeable unless clean living, tough fuselages and luck comes to play, as in the Fokker 50 at the Mog. US Bangla went off piste in a slightly different fashion, didn't end well but was great for memes. No operator, regulator or airport authority will be able to state that they were unaware of the risk. in calling in the crew for a debrief, if that is punitive in nature, it would add to the culpability in due course. Knowingly placing the crew in harms way along with 160+ pax, starts to add up.
If the crew are evidently having problems that impact the safety of the flights outcome & that outcome has a reasonably foreseeable probability of loss of life bystanders, then the requirements of all operators and airports and regulators is quite clear. Whether they do anything about it is simply a point of evidence in the case when they have a bad day and the vultures start coming out of the woodwork.
The crews inherent desire to achieve the task enables risky practices to continue, we are enablers of moral bankruptcy of the airlines, the regulators and the airport authorities. We make the stupid and risky conditions work and that permits those responsible to get away with their intent, which is to systemically disregard their own SMM's.
An objection on the grounds of employment is a poor choice. Airlines are profit focused, regulators intent used to be clear but is now totally lost in confusion, and the airports want the flights. If your employer is conducting arson for hire, objecting to the arson and what that does to employment is hard to argue. Perhaps the employer gets to focus on fixing things instead.
ICAO pushed the SMM wheelbarrow, knowingly disregarding catastrophic outcomes doesn't seem to make for a safety program, it is more like a night out in Vegas.
This airport is just one of many, but they all suffer from the inertia that the only consequences are the crew being dragged to an office for tea 'n bikkies. The day is yet young and stuff happens when we ignore obvious hints.
P.S. There is no relief under any SMM risk matrix that says, well its just too hard so we keep on doing it. Might work for a firing squad, but the compliant SMM response is to stop the exposure. [END OF STORY]. If there is a high risk of a catastrophic outcome and it cannot be mitigated to a low risk or minor consequence, the mandatory requirement per the ICAO Ch 5 is to cease that activity. See Figures 5-2, 5-3, 5-4 below. Same in flight test... how that plays out downwind of the smoke and body bags is an interesting question. These figures and hazard management exist in every version of the ICAO Doc 9859 AN/474.
5.3.3 Safety risks assessed as initially falling in the intolerable region are unacceptable under any
circumstances. The probability and/or severity of the consequences of the hazards are of such a magnitude, and the
damaging potential of the hazard poses such a threat to the viability of the organization, that immediate mitigation action
is required. Generally speaking, two alternatives are available to the organization to bring the safety risks to the tolerable
or acceptable regions:
a) allocate resources to reduce the exposure to, and/or the magnitude of, the damaging potential of the
consequences of the hazards; or
b) if mitigation is not possible, cancel the operation.
circumstances. The probability and/or severity of the consequences of the hazards are of such a magnitude, and the
damaging potential of the hazard poses such a threat to the viability of the organization, that immediate mitigation action
is required. Generally speaking, two alternatives are available to the organization to bring the safety risks to the tolerable
or acceptable regions:
a) allocate resources to reduce the exposure to, and/or the magnitude of, the damaging potential of the
consequences of the hazards; or
b) if mitigation is not possible, cancel the operation.
5.6.3 Second, the safety risk index obtained from the safety risk assessment matrix must then be exported to a safety risk tolerability matrix that describes the tolerability criteria. The criterion for a safety risk assessed as 4B is,
according to the tolerability table in Figure 5-5, “unacceptable under the existing circumstances”. In this case, the safety
risk falls in the intolerable region of the inverted triangle. The safety risk of the consequences of the hazard is
unacceptable. The organization must:
a) allocate resources to reduce the exposure to the consequences of the hazards;
b) allocate resources to reduce the magnitude or the damaging potential of the consequences of the
hazards; or
c) cancel the operation if mitigation is not possible.
according to the tolerability table in Figure 5-5, “unacceptable under the existing circumstances”. In this case, the safety
risk falls in the intolerable region of the inverted triangle. The safety risk of the consequences of the hazard is
unacceptable. The organization must:
a) allocate resources to reduce the exposure to the consequences of the hazards;
b) allocate resources to reduce the magnitude or the damaging potential of the consequences of the
hazards; or
c) cancel the operation if mitigation is not possible.
These are from 9859 Rev 2, Rev 3 brought in some prettier graphics that continue on Rev 4. Curiously, ICAO considered that the matter should migrate from Chapter 5 to Chapter 2... may be they thought it was kind of important.
Last edited by fdr; 12th Aug 2022 at 06:47.
I’ve landed there six times in the last three months, all night landings. In good visibility, if anything, it’s easier than in daylight, as the PAPIS are clearly visible from further out. You fly a three degree path, on the PAPIS ( I use the FPV as an additional help ). Below 1600 feet it’s a visual approach, so you’re referencing instruments and outside, and I’m sure that if you had VNAV guidance you’d be scanning that too, you wouldn’t be eyes inside only. You stay on the three degree slope all the way down, and you land halfway along the touch down zone.
I’ve been going there since 2010, always in 737 variants, not an Airbus, but I’ve never felt any desire, or need, day or night, to get low on the approach like those guys did. It’s a sloping runway, and the NDB approach is offset, but it’s not that hard. You’ve done the performance, if the sums have worked you land where your SOPs tell you to. If you can’t, generally if the runway is wet, you take fuel to hold at Scopoles VOR until it dries out, or you divert. It’s only dangerous if you make it dangerous.
I’ve been going there since 2010, always in 737 variants, not an Airbus, but I’ve never felt any desire, or need, day or night, to get low on the approach like those guys did. It’s a sloping runway, and the NDB approach is offset, but it’s not that hard. You’ve done the performance, if the sums have worked you land where your SOPs tell you to. If you can’t, generally if the runway is wet, you take fuel to hold at Scopoles VOR until it dries out, or you divert. It’s only dangerous if you make it dangerous.
I’ve landed there six times in the last three months, all night landings. In good visibility, if anything, it’s easier than in daylight, as the PAPIS are clearly visible from further out. You fly a three degree path, on the PAPIS ( I use the FPV as an additional help ). Below 1600 feet it’s a visual approach, so you’re referencing instruments and outside, and I’m sure that if you had VNAV guidance you’d be scanning that too, you wouldn’t be eyes inside only. You stay on the three degree slope all the way down, and you land halfway along the touch down zone.
I’ve been going there since 2010, always in 737 variants, not an Airbus, but I’ve never felt any desire, or need, day or night, to get low on the approach like those guys did. It’s a sloping runway, and the NDB approach is offset, but it’s not that hard. You’ve done the performance, if the sums have worked you land where your SOPs tell you to. If you can’t, generally if the runway is wet, you take fuel to hold at Scopoles VOR until it dries out, or you divert. It’s only dangerous if you make it dangerous.
I’ve been going there since 2010, always in 737 variants, not an Airbus, but I’ve never felt any desire, or need, day or night, to get low on the approach like those guys did. It’s a sloping runway, and the NDB approach is offset, but it’s not that hard. You’ve done the performance, if the sums have worked you land where your SOPs tell you to. If you can’t, generally if the runway is wet, you take fuel to hold at Scopoles VOR until it dries out, or you divert. It’s only dangerous if you make it dangerous.
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What's the point of pushing it at all like it was the Maldives or Tahiti? It's just another greek island in the immediate vicinity of the mainland (4 km) served by dozens of ferries each day. Let those do the job instead of packed 321s blowing away the cart of the milkman.
Just the FPA achieved for the last 6 nm of the approach, from approx 2000'.
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Sim training for Skiathos by some airlines (mine included) is stupid. They focus on max cross wind landings rather than line/length. You are more likely to crash because of landing too short than not being able to brake in time at the end.
Last edited by Confusious; 12th Aug 2022 at 10:38.
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I’ve landed there six times in the last three months, all night landings. In good visibility, if anything, it’s easier than in daylight, as the PAPIS are clearly visible from further out. You fly a three degree path, on the PAPIS ( I use the FPV as an additional help ). Below 1600 feet it’s a visual approach, so you’re referencing instruments and outside, and I’m sure that if you had VNAV guidance you’d be scanning that too, you wouldn’t be eyes inside only. You stay on the three degree slope all the way down, and you land halfway along the touch down zone.
I’ve been going there since 2010, always in 737 variants, not an Airbus, but I’ve never felt any desire, or need, day or night, to get low on the approach like those guys did. It’s a sloping runway, and the NDB approach is offset, but it’s not that hard. You’ve done the performance, if the sums have worked you land where your SOPs tell you to. If you can’t, generally if the runway is wet, you take fuel to hold at Scopoles VOR until it dries out, or you divert. It’s only dangerous if you make it dangerous.
I’ve been going there since 2010, always in 737 variants, not an Airbus, but I’ve never felt any desire, or need, day or night, to get low on the approach like those guys did. It’s a sloping runway, and the NDB approach is offset, but it’s not that hard. You’ve done the performance, if the sums have worked you land where your SOPs tell you to. If you can’t, generally if the runway is wet, you take fuel to hold at Scopoles VOR until it dries out, or you divert. It’s only dangerous if you make it dangerous.
Reading the brief is mandatory for all CAT C training/sign offs. You obviously showed competency in all areas, but if you feel that you would like more emphasis on short field techniques then tell the instructor next time you're in the sim. Or why not speak to someone from training management? I'm sure that they would appreciate constructive feedback.
… what bounds normal
#90 relates to a mechanistic safety management system, fast approaching its limit with improving operational safety and fewer events. The ‘outcome = future’ basis is unsuitable for human related events due to mis-representing human activity as a number, and then placing the variable human in a categorising box.
According to common analysis, these events were safe as judged by outcome; however risk is evident and related to TCH, but a higher 6 deg 50 ft TCH is not without risk - consider the big picture.
An important factor is what the crew knew (# 38, knowledge, understanding, learning).
Was the approach planned (low) - company policy, training, local practice.
Planned (low), but not as expected - normal pilot variability; or planned (3 deg) and not as expected.
Influencing factors - upslope illusion (# 41, 42), understanding (belief, trust) of landing performance, subconscious bias (pax comfort), standard procedures on non standard runway (special conditions required) unfamiliarity with landing-performance limited operations - the ‘actual’ min distance margins vs those normally achieved.
The day / night observation is interesting - follow the PAPI; why not by day?
Discussion on RNAV is disturbing (or are these head down, armchair, computer views).
A lovely clear day, great scenery, enjoy the view, add experience in locating and using PAPI, visually judging approach path - knowledge, understanding, learning; and debrief - the good, not so good, and the interesting - differences, ambiguities, thoughts and judgements - why, and learn.
The balance of the professionally based arguments, indicates that operations at this airport are safe, but the eye catching, perspective biasing videos of normal varibility are turned into news.
Look, think, check for complacency; how many good landings vs a few videos; or is normal variability in landing on this runway not as imagined by the safety experts - those who set the safety limits in the first instance.
If not as imagined, then look at the videos, FDR, adjust WAI to relate to WAD, and revise safety assumptions.
Back to # 38 “ … what bounds normal. Is this defined by hindsight, or considered by inspired foresight.”
According to common analysis, these events were safe as judged by outcome; however risk is evident and related to TCH, but a higher 6 deg 50 ft TCH is not without risk - consider the big picture.
An important factor is what the crew knew (# 38, knowledge, understanding, learning).
Was the approach planned (low) - company policy, training, local practice.
Planned (low), but not as expected - normal pilot variability; or planned (3 deg) and not as expected.
Influencing factors - upslope illusion (# 41, 42), understanding (belief, trust) of landing performance, subconscious bias (pax comfort), standard procedures on non standard runway (special conditions required) unfamiliarity with landing-performance limited operations - the ‘actual’ min distance margins vs those normally achieved.
The day / night observation is interesting - follow the PAPI; why not by day?
Discussion on RNAV is disturbing (or are these head down, armchair, computer views).
A lovely clear day, great scenery, enjoy the view, add experience in locating and using PAPI, visually judging approach path - knowledge, understanding, learning; and debrief - the good, not so good, and the interesting - differences, ambiguities, thoughts and judgements - why, and learn.
The balance of the professionally based arguments, indicates that operations at this airport are safe, but the eye catching, perspective biasing videos of normal varibility are turned into news.
Look, think, check for complacency; how many good landings vs a few videos; or is normal variability in landing on this runway not as imagined by the safety experts - those who set the safety limits in the first instance.
If not as imagined, then look at the videos, FDR, adjust WAI to relate to WAD, and revise safety assumptions.
Back to # 38 “ … what bounds normal. Is this defined by hindsight, or considered by inspired foresight.”
