Originally Posted by
Confusious
If insurance companies made such a move then it would no doubt set a precedent for all CATC "high risk" airfields. Net result would be that airlines would not fly to said airfields and industry wide redundancies.
For a land short , fatalities are foreseeable unless clean living, tough fuselages and luck comes to play, as in the Fokker 50 at the Mog. US Bangla went off piste in a slightly different fashion, didn't end well but was great for memes. No operator, regulator or airport authority will be able to state that they were unaware of the risk. in calling in the crew for a debrief, if that is punitive in nature, it would add to the culpability in due course. Knowingly placing the crew in harms way along with 160+ pax, starts to add up.
If the crew are evidently having problems that impact the safety of the flights outcome & that outcome has a reasonably foreseeable probability of loss of life bystanders, then the requirements of all operators and airports and regulators is quite clear. Whether they do anything about it is simply a point of evidence in the case when they have a bad day and the vultures start coming out of the woodwork.
The crews inherent desire to achieve the task enables risky practices to continue, we are enablers of moral bankruptcy of the airlines, the regulators and the airport authorities. We make the stupid and risky conditions work and that permits those responsible to get away with their intent, which is to systemically disregard their own SMM's.
An objection on the grounds of employment is a poor choice. Airlines are profit focused, regulators intent used to be clear but is now totally lost in confusion, and the airports want the flights. If your employer is conducting arson for hire, objecting to the arson and what that does to employment is hard to argue. Perhaps the employer gets to focus on fixing things instead.
ICAO pushed the SMM wheelbarrow, knowingly disregarding catastrophic outcomes doesn't seem to make for a safety program, it is more like a night out in Vegas.
This airport is just one of many, but they all suffer from the inertia that the only consequences are the crew being dragged to an office for tea 'n bikkies. The day is yet young and stuff happens when we ignore obvious hints.
P.S. There is no relief under any SMM risk matrix that says, well its just too hard so we keep on doing it. Might work for a firing squad, but the compliant SMM response is to stop the exposure.
[END OF STORY]. If there is a high risk of a catastrophic outcome and it cannot be mitigated to a low risk or minor consequence, the mandatory requirement per the ICAO Ch 5 is to cease that activity. See Figures 5-2, 5-3, 5-4 below. Same in flight test... how that plays out downwind of the smoke and body bags is an interesting question. These figures and hazard management exist in every version of the
ICAO Doc 9859 AN/474.
5.3.3 Safety risks assessed as initially falling in the intolerable region are unacceptable under any
circumstances. The probability and/or severity of the consequences of the hazards are of such a magnitude, and the
damaging potential of the hazard poses such a threat to the viability of the organization, that immediate mitigation action
is required. Generally speaking, two alternatives are available to the organization to bring the safety risks to the tolerable
or acceptable regions:
a) allocate resources to reduce the exposure to, and/or the magnitude of, the damaging potential of the
consequences of the hazards; or
b) if mitigation is not possible, cancel the operation.
5.6.3 Second, the safety risk index obtained from the safety risk assessment matrix must then be exported to a safety risk tolerability matrix that describes the tolerability criteria. The criterion for a safety risk assessed as 4B is,
according to the tolerability table in Figure 5-5, “unacceptable under the existing circumstances”. In this case, the safety
risk falls in the intolerable region of the inverted triangle. The safety risk of the consequences of the hazard is
unacceptable. The organization must:
a) allocate resources to reduce the exposure to the consequences of the hazards;
b) allocate resources to reduce the magnitude or the damaging potential of the consequences of the
hazards; or
c) cancel the operation if mitigation is not possible.
any bets on the type of organizations we are talking about?
These are from 9859 Rev 2, Rev 3 brought in some prettier graphics that continue on Rev 4. Curiously, ICAO considered that the matter should migrate from Chapter 5 to Chapter 2... may be they thought it was kind of important.
