WIZZ AIR Skiathos vid
172, performance relates to distance from the threshold.
The height, normally rad alt - wheels, relates to the flare segment of the published distance; TCH - touchdown.
Although different altitudes could change the actual distance achieved, this will not change the published performance.
Re this thread; arguably a low flat approach could extend the flare distance, but the discussion in this case is the height over the road.
Based on the videos most landings appear to be around the visual aiming point, and relative to that, not that many ‘short’. However, these short landings may be being judged with respect to other runway threshold positions, particularly if the alternative runway markings and PAPI positioning are not considered.
The height over the road relates to safety; thus the aircraft position relative to the PAPI (eyeball, flt-deck height over road) might be the only comparison - which we (don't) have. Thus on this runway the approach might not appear unusual to the crew, even with some variability below the PAPI path.
The height, normally rad alt - wheels, relates to the flare segment of the published distance; TCH - touchdown.
Although different altitudes could change the actual distance achieved, this will not change the published performance.
Re this thread; arguably a low flat approach could extend the flare distance, but the discussion in this case is the height over the road.
Based on the videos most landings appear to be around the visual aiming point, and relative to that, not that many ‘short’. However, these short landings may be being judged with respect to other runway threshold positions, particularly if the alternative runway markings and PAPI positioning are not considered.
The height over the road relates to safety; thus the aircraft position relative to the PAPI (eyeball, flt-deck height over road) might be the only comparison - which we (don't) have. Thus on this runway the approach might not appear unusual to the crew, even with some variability below the PAPI path.
Meh, it was only dickheads and spotters. Had he clipped a few, nothing of value would have been lost.
The issue is not the planes height over the threshold, it is allowing the great unwashed to stand around in the approach area.
The issue is not the planes height over the threshold, it is allowing the great unwashed to stand around in the approach area.
fdr
Yes that’s all fine but only relates to expected performance and the legalities of dispatch etc.
Nowhere does it say thou shall not be 8ft over the threshold or 80ft when flying manually and visual, well it didn’t when I were a lad.
New thou shall nots were published regularly so maybe now it is written.
At one point it was in the manuals that we could land deep at xxx airports as long as we were down by x intersection due to length of rwy and taxi distance!
OK not a 747, equally not a small turboprop.
That did change eventually and it was just mandated touchdown zone, nothing really about how you got to it.
Yes that’s all fine but only relates to expected performance and the legalities of dispatch etc.
Nowhere does it say thou shall not be 8ft over the threshold or 80ft when flying manually and visual, well it didn’t when I were a lad.
New thou shall nots were published regularly so maybe now it is written.
At one point it was in the manuals that we could land deep at xxx airports as long as we were down by x intersection due to length of rwy and taxi distance!
OK not a 747, equally not a small turboprop.
That did change eventually and it was just mandated touchdown zone, nothing really about how you got to it.
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Just fascinating how a pairing of some of the most potent symbols of the popularity and/or value of civil aviation - namely, a beach, a tourist destination, and a summertime flight arrival - has provoked such serious and detailed discussion of actual flying stuff by actual pilots, on a forum for ..... well, not for SLF-attorneys in this instance.
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fdr
Yes that’s all fine but only relates to expected performance and the legalities of dispatch etc.
Nowhere does it say thou shall not be 8ft over the threshold or 80ft when flying manually and visual, well it didn’t when I were a lad.
New thou shall nots were published regularly so maybe now it is written.
At one point it was in the manuals that we could land deep at xxx airports as long as we were down by x intersection due to length of rwy and taxi distance!
OK not a 747, equally not a small turboprop.
That did change eventually and it was just mandated touchdown zone, nothing really about how you got to it.
Yes that’s all fine but only relates to expected performance and the legalities of dispatch etc.
Nowhere does it say thou shall not be 8ft over the threshold or 80ft when flying manually and visual, well it didn’t when I were a lad.
New thou shall nots were published regularly so maybe now it is written.
At one point it was in the manuals that we could land deep at xxx airports as long as we were down by x intersection due to length of rwy and taxi distance!
OK not a 747, equally not a small turboprop.
That did change eventually and it was just mandated touchdown zone, nothing really about how you got to it.
"please enlighten us, young man, what other training and policy do you deliberately disregard?"
The training trains per the FCTM or OM-B etc, anything other than that is a deviation, and may be wonderful or career limiting dependent on the circumstances. As one who used to look at the data and determine if a crew had acted deliberately or not, I would suggest that most operations want you to target what you are trained to, otherwise it makes people doing what I used to do spill our coffee laughing at what the crew considered as being reasonable on the day.
Even in test flying, the intent is to do what you have briefed and trained to do. I guess you can brief the guy beside you that you intend to cross the fence at head height as you think that is the best thing for safety. You would get a couple of points for CRM, the guy beside you may get some for saying no.
The problem with ad-hoc FPA and TCH is that you do one thing always, and then on one flight where it is apparently critical to achieve the performance that you always have, you deliberately alter the aiming point which potentially ends up with a destabilised condition into the flare.
Yes, in the military we were trained to touch down on the numbers, and there was landing gear left behind on occasions. The punters are paying for an unexciting arrival, if they want excitement then they should go to 6-flags, or go fly Spirit...
You are a grown up, whatever you consider to be correct and to be justifiable to your management and to the jury should suffice. Deliberately deviating as it was considered to be a great idea that is not as trained would be written up by persons like me as being a deliberate deviation. If you do that, be very good, and don't F*@# it up.
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Had somebody lost their life as a result of this stunt, your Wizz heroes would probably be sat in a Greek jail facing charges of one sort or another. I also wouldn't rule out passengers onboard that aircraft seeking compensation for their lives being put in danger. I would be furious if I had been sat in the back of that. Don't trivialise this.
Consequence is obvious. Probability, given there are at least two vids in the public domain of very low approaches (this and CFE) is significant.
Mitigation is diversion of the road and/or level crossing type controls together with restrictions on loitering in the undershoot area.
There is a clear risk that for whatever reason an aircraft may be low over the fence.
Consequence is obvious. Probability, given there are at least two vids in the public domain of very low approaches (this and CFE) is significant.
Mitigation is diversion of the road and/or level crossing type controls together with restrictions on loitering in the undershoot area.
Consequence is obvious. Probability, given there are at least two vids in the public domain of very low approaches (this and CFE) is significant.
Mitigation is diversion of the road and/or level crossing type controls together with restrictions on loitering in the undershoot area.
But should main the focus of this thread be mitigation of the risk to the other members of the public, the passengers?
Only half a speed-brake
Main learning point is to understand why they did not go around. And transform that into better self-awareness so when the time arrives and we'd be facing (literally) a confusing picture at the edge of spare mental capacity, that alone would be a pre-trained trigger.
For the moment we have people arguing that aiming at a 150 m marker is a good plan. Well, it's a start.
Despite the threshold being displaced so that the largest going aircraft aiming for the 150 marker would have a reasonable clearance at the pavement edge. That one is just not painted in correct aiming spot for this size of airplane.
Moving forward. Could we have a show of hands who agrees the f/o was pretty much tool-less to call a G/A for margins reduced too thin? Apart for imminent contact, I don't think he did have any. Unless specifically briefed and explained which did not happen judging by the outcome.
The landing's messed but not too badly. It's the low arrival before they salvaged it (around 300 mtrs to shore) which is the bigger debriefing point.
For the moment we have people arguing that aiming at a 150 m marker is a good plan. Well, it's a start.
Despite the threshold being displaced so that the largest going aircraft aiming for the 150 marker would have a reasonable clearance at the pavement edge. That one is just not painted in correct aiming spot for this size of airplane.
Moving forward. Could we have a show of hands who agrees the f/o was pretty much tool-less to call a G/A for margins reduced too thin? Apart for imminent contact, I don't think he did have any. Unless specifically briefed and explained which did not happen judging by the outcome.
The landing's messed but not too badly. It's the low arrival before they salvaged it (around 300 mtrs to shore) which is the bigger debriefing point.
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I was told by a BA Cpt in the 1970's a low approach was required at Skiathos. A note on the approach plate stated you had to check the harbour had the correct lights showing it was closed before landing. Harbourmaster was also ATC - he could not be in 2 places at the same time.
… except that nothing is ever normal
FD, Conf, “… why they did not go around” … “earlier”.
IMHO we will never know, nor might the crew, especially if their viewpoint, their mental understanding of the approach appeared ‘good enough’. Also, if this understanding, thoughts and action were based on tacit knowledge. This knowledge is difficult to explain, generally acquired through demonstration and practice - experience.
The landing flare; how - when, do we judge and learn from ‘not such a good one’. More often after the event ‘I didn't expect that’; yes opportunity to learn for the individual, less so for others
There are many HF - cognitive theories as to why crews press-on, plan continuation bias, cognitive overload which are difficult to change.
Its time that the industry accepted this, that human behaviour is not going to change through blame or train, instead change the operating environment.
What did the crew see, comprehend, decide;- unknown.
However, their view appeared to satisfy their plan. The view was probably looking ahead to the landing aiming point, and assessing the aircraft trajectory with respect to that, not over the road
Is that how we do it, can we describe how we do it, or how we might assess the boundary of acceptable deviation. Experience, not from an external video. Context, our viewpoint sets the scene.
And for clarification, what is the height of the road with respect to the threshold, or with respect to the touchdown markers (up-sloping runway), and how might these affect the visual-mental picture with respect to a ‘normal’ landing, except that nothing is ever normal.
IMHO we will never know, nor might the crew, especially if their viewpoint, their mental understanding of the approach appeared ‘good enough’. Also, if this understanding, thoughts and action were based on tacit knowledge. This knowledge is difficult to explain, generally acquired through demonstration and practice - experience.
The landing flare; how - when, do we judge and learn from ‘not such a good one’. More often after the event ‘I didn't expect that’; yes opportunity to learn for the individual, less so for others
There are many HF - cognitive theories as to why crews press-on, plan continuation bias, cognitive overload which are difficult to change.
Its time that the industry accepted this, that human behaviour is not going to change through blame or train, instead change the operating environment.
What did the crew see, comprehend, decide;- unknown.
However, their view appeared to satisfy their plan. The view was probably looking ahead to the landing aiming point, and assessing the aircraft trajectory with respect to that, not over the road
Is that how we do it, can we describe how we do it, or how we might assess the boundary of acceptable deviation. Experience, not from an external video. Context, our viewpoint sets the scene.
And for clarification, what is the height of the road with respect to the threshold, or with respect to the touchdown markers (up-sloping runway), and how might these affect the visual-mental picture with respect to a ‘normal’ landing, except that nothing is ever normal.
FD, Conf, “… why they did not go around” … “earlier”.
IMHO we will never know, nor might the crew, especially if their viewpoint, their mental understanding of the approach appeared ‘good enough’. Also, if this understanding, thoughts and action were based on tacit knowledge. This knowledge is difficult to explain, generally acquired through demonstration and practice - experience.
The landing flare; how - when, do we judge and learn from ‘not such a good one’. More often after the event ‘I didn't expect that’; yes opportunity to learn for the individual, less so for others
There are many HF - cognitive theories as to why crews press-on, plan continuation bias, cognitive overload which are difficult to change.
Its time that the industry accepted this, that human behaviour is not going to change through blame or train, instead change the operating environment.
What did the crew see, comprehend, decide;- unknown.
However, their view appeared to satisfy their plan. The view was probably looking ahead to the landing aiming point, and assessing the aircraft trajectory with respect to that, not over the road
Is that how we do it, can we describe how we do it, or how we might assess the boundary of acceptable deviation. Experience, not from an external video. Context, our viewpoint sets the scene.
And for clarification, what is the height of the road with respect to the threshold, or with respect to the touchdown markers (up-sloping runway), and how might these affect the visual-mental picture with respect to a ‘normal’ landing, except that nothing is ever normal.
IMHO we will never know, nor might the crew, especially if their viewpoint, their mental understanding of the approach appeared ‘good enough’. Also, if this understanding, thoughts and action were based on tacit knowledge. This knowledge is difficult to explain, generally acquired through demonstration and practice - experience.
The landing flare; how - when, do we judge and learn from ‘not such a good one’. More often after the event ‘I didn't expect that’; yes opportunity to learn for the individual, less so for others
There are many HF - cognitive theories as to why crews press-on, plan continuation bias, cognitive overload which are difficult to change.
Its time that the industry accepted this, that human behaviour is not going to change through blame or train, instead change the operating environment.
What did the crew see, comprehend, decide;- unknown.
However, their view appeared to satisfy their plan. The view was probably looking ahead to the landing aiming point, and assessing the aircraft trajectory with respect to that, not over the road
Is that how we do it, can we describe how we do it, or how we might assess the boundary of acceptable deviation. Experience, not from an external video. Context, our viewpoint sets the scene.
And for clarification, what is the height of the road with respect to the threshold, or with respect to the touchdown markers (up-sloping runway), and how might these affect the visual-mental picture with respect to a ‘normal’ landing, except that nothing is ever normal.
Its time that the industry accepted this, that human behaviour is not going to change through blame or train, instead change the operating environment.
In the main, blame or train left the industry years ago. All pilots are aware (or should be) of the criteria for a stable approach and what actions MUST be carried out if the criteria is not met. So not going around is inexcusable which is wholly different to casting blame. So the HF influence in this event is a direct willingness to press on and land regardless of how they were trained and what is clearly set out in their procedures.
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You have no idea how they were trained or what’s set out in their procedures.
I will shed a little light on the subject.
They were very probably (although I can’t be 100% sure) sent into the sim to train for a narrow runway.
To start that sim would be an A320, not the A321 they were flying. Then the sim would be VERY unlikely to have dedicated Skiathos visuals. It would have been a generic airport, just with a 30m wide runway. They may not even have trained on one so short.
Then if they were very lucky, the captain may have sat on the jump seat to Skiathos before operating in there. If he/she did jumpseat, they would have seen a training captain do pretty much what they did. Why? Because that’s what happens in Skiathos. Maybe the trainer might have been 15-20 ft higher, but that’s about it.
If we go right back to basics at this place, the touch down markings (the bit you actually aim for) are 150m from the threshold. The PAPIs are at the same position. As FD has already pointed out, if you aim for these points (as you have been trained) your wheels over the threshold are 8ft. Probably about 30 over the road.
So their “willingness to press on” is because that’s how they were trained. It’s how we have ALL been trained. And it’s why EVERY approach into Skiathos looks like a minor variation of this one.
What I will end with (and it’s my last post on the matter, because I’m obviously not some Sky God, just an ordinary line guy) is if you think you could do better fill your boots. I feel for these Wizz guys, everything is stacked against them. And then some Cuck Yeager wanna be’s come on here and tell them how badly they have flown.
Sorry, am going to take issue with this one.
You have no idea how they were trained or what’s set out in their procedures.
I will shed a little light on the subject.
They were very probably (although I can’t be 100% sure) sent into the sim to train for a narrow runway.
To start that sim would be an A320, not the A321 they were flying. Then the sim would be VERY unlikely to have dedicated Skiathos visuals. It would have been a generic airport, just with a 30m wide runway. They may not even have trained on one so short.
Then if they were very lucky, the captain may have sat on the jump seat to Skiathos before operating in there. If he/she did jumpseat, they would have seen a training captain do pretty much what they did. Why? Because that’s what happens in Skiathos. Maybe the trainer might have been 15-20 ft higher, but that’s about it.
If we go right back to basics at this place, the touch down markings (the bit you actually aim for) are 150m from the threshold. The PAPIs are at the same position. As FD has already pointed out, if you aim for these points (as you have been trained) your wheels over the threshold are 8ft. Probably about 30 over the road.
So their “willingness to press on” is because that’s how they were trained. It’s how we have ALL been trained. And it’s why EVERY approach into Skiathos looks like a minor variation of this one.
What I will end with (and it’s my last post on the matter, because I’m obviously not some Sky God, just an ordinary line guy) is if you think you could do better fill your boots. I feel for these Wizz guys, everything is stacked against them. And then some Cuck Yeager wanna be’s come on here and tell them how badly they have flown.
You have no idea how they were trained or what’s set out in their procedures.
I will shed a little light on the subject.
They were very probably (although I can’t be 100% sure) sent into the sim to train for a narrow runway.
To start that sim would be an A320, not the A321 they were flying. Then the sim would be VERY unlikely to have dedicated Skiathos visuals. It would have been a generic airport, just with a 30m wide runway. They may not even have trained on one so short.
Then if they were very lucky, the captain may have sat on the jump seat to Skiathos before operating in there. If he/she did jumpseat, they would have seen a training captain do pretty much what they did. Why? Because that’s what happens in Skiathos. Maybe the trainer might have been 15-20 ft higher, but that’s about it.
If we go right back to basics at this place, the touch down markings (the bit you actually aim for) are 150m from the threshold. The PAPIs are at the same position. As FD has already pointed out, if you aim for these points (as you have been trained) your wheels over the threshold are 8ft. Probably about 30 over the road.
So their “willingness to press on” is because that’s how they were trained. It’s how we have ALL been trained. And it’s why EVERY approach into Skiathos looks like a minor variation of this one.
What I will end with (and it’s my last post on the matter, because I’m obviously not some Sky God, just an ordinary line guy) is if you think you could do better fill your boots. I feel for these Wizz guys, everything is stacked against them. And then some Cuck Yeager wanna be’s come on here and tell them how badly they have flown.
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I agree with Jonty, JSI is a special place. Short, narrow runway with a hump, sat on made up ground between two islands. It's not the place where you do an hour in a Sim and off you go. All approaches are are low and "exciting".
It would be useful if anyone commenting on this thread started their post by stating if they had trained for or operated an aircraft into JSI. These people I will happily listen to. The rest should stop criticising something they don't fully understand....
'bill
It would be useful if anyone commenting on this thread started their post by stating if they had trained for or operated an aircraft into JSI. These people I will happily listen to. The rest should stop criticising something they don't fully understand....
'bill
