… except that nothing is ever normal
FD, Conf, “… why they did not go around” … “earlier”.
IMHO we will never know, nor might the crew, especially if their viewpoint, their mental understanding of the approach appeared ‘good enough’. Also, if this understanding, thoughts and action were based on tacit knowledge. This knowledge is difficult to explain, generally acquired through demonstration and practice - experience.
The landing flare; how - when, do we judge and learn from ‘not such a good one’. More often after the event ‘I didn't expect that’; yes opportunity to learn for the individual, less so for others
There are many HF - cognitive theories as to why crews press-on, plan continuation bias, cognitive overload which are difficult to change.
Its time that the industry accepted this, that human behaviour is not going to change through blame or train, instead change the operating environment.
What did the crew see, comprehend, decide;- unknown.
However, their view appeared to satisfy their plan. The view was probably looking ahead to the landing aiming point, and assessing the aircraft trajectory with respect to that, not over the road
Is that how we do it, can we describe how we do it, or how we might assess the boundary of acceptable deviation. Experience, not from an external video. Context, our viewpoint sets the scene.
And for clarification, what is the height of the road with respect to the threshold, or with respect to the touchdown markers (up-sloping runway), and how might these affect the visual-mental picture with respect to a ‘normal’ landing, except that nothing is ever normal.