Main learning point is to understand why they did not go around. And transform that into better self-awareness so when the time arrives and we'd be facing (literally) a confusing picture at the edge of spare mental capacity, that alone would be a pre-trained trigger.
For the moment we have people arguing that aiming at a 150 m marker is a good plan. Well, it's a start.
Despite the threshold being displaced so that the largest going aircraft aiming for the 150 marker would have a reasonable clearance at the pavement edge. That one is just not painted in correct aiming spot for this size of airplane.
Moving forward. Could we have a show of hands who agrees the f/o was pretty much tool-less to call a G/A for margins reduced too thin? Apart for imminent contact, I don't think he did have any. Unless specifically briefed and explained which did not happen judging by the outcome.
The landing's messed but not too badly. It's the low arrival before they salvaged it (around 300 mtrs to shore) which is the bigger debriefing point.