Air France B777 control issues landing CDG
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Thinking about some of the earlier mentioned incidents:
does anyone believe that a competent pilot might be more concerned about complying with FDM readings rather than physics or his own pilot’s knowledge?
does anyone believe that a competent pilot might be more concerned about complying with FDM readings rather than physics or his own pilot’s knowledge?
Thanks - The flight parameters show the control columns (ie pitch control) were desynchronised for 14 seconds from 07:51:16 until 07:51:30. The control wheels (ie roll control) were desynchronised for two brief periods during the same time period (07:51:16 - 07:51:18 and 07:51:23 - 07:51:28). Updated above.
Last edited by BuzzBox; 28th Apr 2022 at 12:14.
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Only half a speed-brake
On a second thought, you have tacile feedback and actually you can feel what he is doing exactly with 50 lbs of force.
Enough for a pilot to notice.
Is it me or does the reaction to the initial confusing bank, by additive increasing inputs, sound like spatial disorientation and reading his PFD in the opposite sense by the PF?
Is so the puzzles observed all fall into place.
Enough for a pilot to notice.
Is it me or does the reaction to the initial confusing bank, by additive increasing inputs, sound like spatial disorientation and reading his PFD in the opposite sense by the PF?
Is so the puzzles observed all fall into place.
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Revealing 50 lbs of opposing force - unless the mechanism was misadjusted soft (speculation, don't even know how it works) and uncoupled too easily.
The control column breakout mechanism is a cam and roller mechanism, held together by springs. The flight parameters in the report show the control columns were ‘desynchronised’ for about 15 seconds. After that, they again moved in unison. The control wheel jam breakout mechanism has two force limiters and two lost motion devices that allow the other control wheel to continue roll control if one of the control wheels jams. The flight parameters show the control wheels were desynchronised for two brief periods of 2 seconds and 5 seconds duration during the same period the control columns were desynchronised.
The force required to override either breakout mechanism is 50 lb.
The force required to override either breakout mechanism is 50 lb.
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On a second thought, you have tacile feedback and actually you can feel what he is doing exactly with 50 lbs of force.
Enough for a pilot to notice.
Is it me or does the reaction to the initial confusing bank, by additive increasing inputs, sound like spatial disorientation and reading his PFD in the opposite sense by the PF?
Is so the puzzles observed all fall into place.
Enough for a pilot to notice.
Is it me or does the reaction to the initial confusing bank, by additive increasing inputs, sound like spatial disorientation and reading his PFD in the opposite sense by the PF?
Is so the puzzles observed all fall into place.
Does AF have procedures for transfer of control. At my airline, one pilot is the PF, one the PM. Anytime the PF for whatever reason takes control, that person states (out loud) “I have the aircraft “. Then the PF responds with “You have the aircraft.” No confusion, no fighting.
Are AF pilots unable to understand blue sky/ brown ground and the presentation of the aircraft’s attitude on their instruments? Is that what you’re implying?
Does AF have procedures for transfer of control. At my airline, one pilot is the PF, one the PM. Anytime the PF for whatever reason takes control, that person states (out loud) “I have the aircraft “. Then the PF responds with “You have the aircraft.” No confusion, no fighting.
Does AF have procedures for transfer of control. At my airline, one pilot is the PF, one the PM. Anytime the PF for whatever reason takes control, that person states (out loud) “I have the aircraft “. Then the PF responds with “You have the aircraft.” No confusion, no fighting.
For your first point, spatial disorientation can happen, it has happened before to pilots from all over the world, it will probably happen again.
Maybe standardizing the attitude indicator would avoid a fraction of these disorientations.
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If both pilots believe the aircraft is going in the wrong direction (with only one being right about the direction), both are going to take action because they both believe (with only one being right) that the aircraft is in a bad position, and one golden rule is "if things don't go as expected, take action"
1) Say clearly "I have control"
2) Take control
If you jump to point 2), it is going to be messy.
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At some stage this industry decided to sell cheap tickets and become really competitive.
My understanding is that we can't have all we want at the same time. Top tier (not talking about flight hours) pilots will take a good screening process to hire and a nice syllabus to qualify them. And that's to begin with... But the industry demand cheap tickets.
If a normal G/A scares a Capt to the point he quietly pushes the control column thinking 15° pitch is just too much, I'd pay tickets to watch his previous checkrides and carefully listen to what it's like flying with him.
...And that's from someone who has already seen 10,000h+ "captainS" crashing on the simulator (and being approved on their recurrent lately).
My understanding is that we can't have all we want at the same time. Top tier (not talking about flight hours) pilots will take a good screening process to hire and a nice syllabus to qualify them. And that's to begin with... But the industry demand cheap tickets.
If a normal G/A scares a Capt to the point he quietly pushes the control column thinking 15° pitch is just too much, I'd pay tickets to watch his previous checkrides and carefully listen to what it's like flying with him.
...And that's from someone who has already seen 10,000h+ "captainS" crashing on the simulator (and being approved on their recurrent lately).
Last edited by Latestormer; 29th Apr 2022 at 02:14. Reason: typo
The question is: Having established the go-around attitude, why did the FO then start trying to raise the nose further?
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Latestormer :
Quite agree with your post , except here we are not talking about a low cost/ low pay/ cheap airline, quite the contrary in fact .
Would be interesting to read later the age/experience gradient between the two. Although AF, as far as I know, does no normally put 250h cadets on their 777, they sometimes put 2 captains.
pilots will take a good screening process to hire and a nice syllabus to qualify them. And that's to begin with...
Would be interesting to read later the age/experience gradient between the two. Although AF, as far as I know, does no normally put 250h cadets on their 777, they sometimes put 2 captains.
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Just to be clear : I did not say this was the case, just reporting the rumor I heard, I am aware of the subtle difference between sleepiness and fatigue, but I am using here in purpose the generic term "fatigue" to describe the rumor I heard.
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I doubt that's the case here. The flight parameters show the pitch was stabilised at just under 15° during the initial go-around and stayed there for several seconds. The FO then started moving the control column aft. The Capt almost immediately opposed the rearward movement, presumably with sufficient force to desynchronise the control columns. At that point, the control column on the FO's side kept moving aft, while the control column on the Capt's side moved forward. The net result was an increase in the pitch attitude to 24°.
The question is: Having established the go-around attitude, why did the FO then start trying to raise the nose further?
The question is: Having established the go-around attitude, why did the FO then start trying to raise the nose further?
Quite agree with your post , except here we are not talking about a low cost/ low pay/ cheap airline, quite the contrary in fact .
Would be interesting to read later the age/experience gradient between the two. Although AF, as far as I know, does no normally put 250h cadets on their 777, they sometimes put 2 captains.
Would be interesting to read later the age/experience gradient between the two. Although AF, as far as I know, does no normally put 250h cadets on their 777, they sometimes put 2 captains.
Don't get me wrong. I ain't saying that experience is not important. But once I got asked:
"Which one would you hire? 22 thousand flying hours or 5 thousand?"
I also blindly answered "The most experienced for sure."
To my surprise the reply was something like: "Well, I'd hire the one that does not hit a seawall during a visual approach or crashes into the ocean from a 10 minute fall".
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If both pilots believe the aircraft is going in the wrong direction (with only one being right about the direction), both are going to take action because they both believe (with only one being right) that the aircraft is in a bad position, and one golden rule is "if things don't go as expected, take action"
For your first point, spatial disorientation can happen, it has happened before to pilots from all over the world, it will probably happen again.
Maybe standardizing the attitude indicator would avoid a fraction of these disorientations.
For your first point, spatial disorientation can happen, it has happened before to pilots from all over the world, it will probably happen again.
Maybe standardizing the attitude indicator would avoid a fraction of these disorientations.
Spatial disorientation is something that should have gone long before you step into a triple. Scan anyone? FFS
I don't see it that way. FO was the PF. CA should never touch the controls without announcing it (but probably veeery used to do things like that, most likely doing that for years, until he almost killed everybody). Also, you're biased thinking that it was the captain counter-reacting the FO input. Somone could clearly state the other way around since these events happened simultaneously. I'd say that we have another somatogravic illusion case here. But let's wait for what BEA has to say.
Biased? Where did you get that from? I could not care less if it was the Capt or FO. That said, have a close look at the traces in the flight parameters section of the report. The control column traces closely follow each other until slightly after the FO's control column began to move further aft at 07:51:16.
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On the Wki AF incidents and accidents , a Greenpeace graffiti on an aircraft is noted there as an airline incident, but accidents such as the hard landing ( Caracas) ,or the landing outside of runway ( Cayenne) and a few more serious incidents are missing
If you want a serious list go to the BEA or NTSB not self made lists by non professionals.
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The whole thing is a dogs dinner from start to finish.
It starts with the decision to manually fly the approach after a 2-crew night flight when the viz is low and the cloud base is just above Cat 1 decision height. What follows is a localiser deviation, caused either by the PF or the localiser signal itself. The PM at some point starts to make un-announced control column inputs and a go around is flown from around 1000’. Plenty of time to perhaps rehearse the go around actions before pushing TOGA. TOGA is then pushed but there’s no call for a flap change despite having landing flap set. After about 20 secs the PF notices a positive climb and puts the gear up. What’s PM doing at this point? The gear goes up whilst we still have landing flap and we get the config warning. Not ideal during a busy period. The PF over pitches to 24 degrees and the PM instead of clearly taking control pushes the other way and we get a control column breakout/disconnect. Other stuff going on too, second TOGA push for example but that’s the nuts and bolts of it. A total shambles.
What would I have done differently. I’d have started by suggesting to the FO that maybe today wasn’t the day to practice his hand flying skills. If it was going wrong on the approach I’d have suggested putting in the AP and going around. Failing that “I have control” as a last resort.
It would be interesting to know the relative experience levels of the two pilots. Older and more experienced First Officers can make for an interesting dynamic.
l guess we will know in due course!
It starts with the decision to manually fly the approach after a 2-crew night flight when the viz is low and the cloud base is just above Cat 1 decision height. What follows is a localiser deviation, caused either by the PF or the localiser signal itself. The PM at some point starts to make un-announced control column inputs and a go around is flown from around 1000’. Plenty of time to perhaps rehearse the go around actions before pushing TOGA. TOGA is then pushed but there’s no call for a flap change despite having landing flap set. After about 20 secs the PF notices a positive climb and puts the gear up. What’s PM doing at this point? The gear goes up whilst we still have landing flap and we get the config warning. Not ideal during a busy period. The PF over pitches to 24 degrees and the PM instead of clearly taking control pushes the other way and we get a control column breakout/disconnect. Other stuff going on too, second TOGA push for example but that’s the nuts and bolts of it. A total shambles.
What would I have done differently. I’d have started by suggesting to the FO that maybe today wasn’t the day to practice his hand flying skills. If it was going wrong on the approach I’d have suggested putting in the AP and going around. Failing that “I have control” as a last resort.
It would be interesting to know the relative experience levels of the two pilots. Older and more experienced First Officers can make for an interesting dynamic.
l guess we will know in due course!
Last edited by zzz; 29th Apr 2022 at 19:06.