Air France B777 control issues landing CDG
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I do find a 5 sec pre brief of the go around is extremely useful in cases like. 800 ft isn't a lot of margin but I'd feel confident taking few seconds to just remind the other guy what we're about to do up until 500' AGL. It is standard practice in my company nowadays
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Hi, the go-around was a mess, according to the BEA press release.
The question that I have is , how and why the 777 needed a go-around in the first place.
I mean, what about the control inpunts that gave it a left bank, with up to 60 deg. control wheel deflection ?
Any thoughts on those ?
The question that I have is , how and why the 777 needed a go-around in the first place.
I mean, what about the control inpunts that gave it a left bank, with up to 60 deg. control wheel deflection ?
Any thoughts on those ?
It almost looks like some kind of incapacitation, and that the PF “lost it” for a bit. Agree about the lack of an announced takeover being contributory; it’s difficult to work out who was doing what for a while but I suspect the PF still had the thrust levers even though the PM was providing much of the pitch/roll input. Aeroplanes can be operated multi-pilot but most of them are designed for only one person at a time on the flying controls.
There may be more revelations that change the look of it but at the moment it doesn’t appear to be their finest hour...
There may be more revelations that change the look of it but at the moment it doesn’t appear to be their finest hour...
Hi, the go-around was a mess, according to the BEA press release.
The question that I have is , how and why the 777 needed a go-around in the first place.
I mean, what about the control inpunts that gave it a left bank, with up to 60 deg. control wheel deflection ?
Any thoughts on those ?
The question that I have is , how and why the 777 needed a go-around in the first place.
I mean, what about the control inpunts that gave it a left bank, with up to 60 deg. control wheel deflection ?
Any thoughts on those ?
Stabilization criteria include bank angle.
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A number of things don’t make sense here: Firstly the ADS data suggests that the localiser deviation occurred after the initiation of the go around, not as the report suggests that the go around was as a result of the deviation. The report states that the pf was flying manually - you can clearly hear the autopilot disconnect wailer during the incident - as far as I recall (never tried) pushing the AP disconnect when the A/P is already disconnected would not trigger the wailer. Lastly the master warning is clearly audible - the only thing I can think of that would trigger that would be a config gear warning.
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.
Do Air France use V-bar flight directors?
(Reason for extreme control inputs.)
I had a similar situation, when the copilot started mixing the (bright pink) flight director with the (black) aircraft index on the attitude indicator. The FD said turn left, and he thought the aircraft was turning left (mixing FD with aircraft index), so he gave the aircraft full right, and nearly turned the aircraft upside down. Again, this was just at 1500 ft on t/o, at night with no ground lights. Luckily the aircraft shouted ‘bank angle’, while I was changing frequency, and I recovered.
Note: In the AF go-around the FD would have indicated 10 degree up pitch, or less if the speed had dropped off. If the f/o was mixing FD and aircraft index, he may well pull back harder - not understanding why the aircraft index (aka the bright pink FD) was not moving with his inputs. So he pulls harder and harder.
P
Do Air France use V-bar flight directors?
(Reason for extreme control inputs.)
I had a similar situation, when the copilot started mixing the (bright pink) flight director with the (black) aircraft index on the attitude indicator. The FD said turn left, and he thought the aircraft was turning left (mixing FD with aircraft index), so he gave the aircraft full right, and nearly turned the aircraft upside down. Again, this was just at 1500 ft on t/o, at night with no ground lights. Luckily the aircraft shouted ‘bank angle’, while I was changing frequency, and I recovered.
Note: In the AF go-around the FD would have indicated 10 degree up pitch, or less if the speed had dropped off. If the f/o was mixing FD and aircraft index, he may well pull back harder - not understanding why the aircraft index (aka the bright pink FD) was not moving with his inputs. So he pulls harder and harder.
P
Last edited by silverstrata; 1st May 2022 at 06:27.
Ummm, no. First push of either TO/GA switch commands the go-around pitch attitude (around 15°). The autothrottle activates in THR mode to provide sufficient thrust for a minimum climb rate of 2,000 ft/min.
(And in the three reasons you give for blaming recent incidents on aircraft design (which also involves humans); remember, if the automatics are not doing what is needed, pilots should reduce the level of automation, perhaps as far as taking fully manual control, if necessary).
I am deeply concerned and worried about the apparent reduction of flying safety that seems to be happening. We are not even talking about serious mechanical failures such as double engine failures or an engine exploding and causing major damage - (all three recent examples of which were expertly flown by the pilots and crews by the way, as I said).
No, we are seeing absolute bread-and-butter - very easy manoeuvres - that are being botched - in some cases with fatal results. Why? No pilot goes to work intending to do a bad job, so what is going on with selection, testing and recurrent training?
And should I be concerned about going on a flight with my family, in case the pilots don't remember how to take-off or land, or go-around? A ridiculous question, surely?
.
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No, we are seeing absolute bread-and-butter - very easy manoeuvres - that are being botched - in some cases with fatal results. Why? No pilot goes to work intending to do a bad job, so what is going on with selection, testing and recurrent training?
Flying the later approach manually may not have been the wisest decision under the circumstances - but it shouldn't have been a problem. That's the elephant in the room. We're really only a failure from a total **** show.
With the risk how hubris. I was FO to a Captain how tried a to pull off a raw data to a 200 ft ceiling after he had seen me do a couple during the day. It didn't end well, he asked if I could take over (big of him!) which I did. Below the deck I gave it back to him so he could practice his smooth landings.
As normal line pilots, we don't dictate our training, (or our SOPs).
At a (now defunct) UK airline, I asked the training management if I could use the cardboard bomber they had at head office in my own time, after hours, to practise memory drills and scenarios etc., on my own.
No they said, (gee, thanks guys), so I was back to practising stuff using a half-sized cockpit poster in the spare room at home.
At a (now defunct) UK airline, I asked the training management if I could use the cardboard bomber they had at head office in my own time, after hours, to practise memory drills and scenarios etc., on my own.
No they said, (gee, thanks guys), so I was back to practising stuff using a half-sized cockpit poster in the spare room at home.
The report states that the pf was flying manually - you can clearly hear the autopilot disconnect wailer during the incident - as far as I recall (never tried) pushing the AP disconnect when the A/P is already disconnected would not trigger the wailer.
At a (now defunct) UK airline, I asked the training management if I could use the cardboard bomber they had at head office in my own time, after hours, to practise memory drills and scenarios etc., on my own.
No they said, (gee, thanks guys), so I was back to practising stuff using a half-sized cockpit poster in the spare room at home.
No they said, (gee, thanks guys), so I was back to practising stuff using a half-sized cockpit poster in the spare room at home.
Uplinker, #170, I appreciate your comments and in principle, agree.
You identify a key aspect, the inability to understand after the fact; the human element, human factors, ourselves. There are many different approaches to this, scientific and practical, significantly that by identifying issues which we can learn are of greater value opposed to attempting to ‘understand’ error.
One issue is the inherent uncertainty in situations and human behaviour, humans abhor uncertainty thus fill in the gaps, some of which involves assumptions. e.g your “… supposedly highly trained, examined and experienced individuals cannot do something as simple as …” might assume standards of training, checking, or that the situation as perceived by the crews was ‘simple’.
To us with hindsight yes, but to a surprised crew (or do we assume that crews should not be surprised), their comprehension of the situation is built on what they ‘see’ at that time (that instant which we cannot revisit).
We should not seek absolute understanding, nor comparison; instead consider the uncertainties in the situation, aspects what we don't or cannot know. Avoid what is / was, and alternatively consider what could be / have been. Question if there are issues from which we might learn.
Other posts have diverse views - a simple GA; but with an apparent control malfunction - ‘simple’ is redefined.
‘Everything in war is very simple. But the simplest thing is difficult.’ Von Clausewitz
Uncertainty requires judgement at the time; hindsight assumes knowledge after the fact, clarity, yes-no decisions, and procedural perfection.
You identify a key aspect, the inability to understand after the fact; the human element, human factors, ourselves. There are many different approaches to this, scientific and practical, significantly that by identifying issues which we can learn are of greater value opposed to attempting to ‘understand’ error.
One issue is the inherent uncertainty in situations and human behaviour, humans abhor uncertainty thus fill in the gaps, some of which involves assumptions. e.g your “… supposedly highly trained, examined and experienced individuals cannot do something as simple as …” might assume standards of training, checking, or that the situation as perceived by the crews was ‘simple’.
To us with hindsight yes, but to a surprised crew (or do we assume that crews should not be surprised), their comprehension of the situation is built on what they ‘see’ at that time (that instant which we cannot revisit).
We should not seek absolute understanding, nor comparison; instead consider the uncertainties in the situation, aspects what we don't or cannot know. Avoid what is / was, and alternatively consider what could be / have been. Question if there are issues from which we might learn.
Other posts have diverse views - a simple GA; but with an apparent control malfunction - ‘simple’ is redefined.
‘Everything in war is very simple. But the simplest thing is difficult.’ Von Clausewitz
Uncertainty requires judgement at the time; hindsight assumes knowledge after the fact, clarity, yes-no decisions, and procedural perfection.
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I wrote that badly - the FD pitch bar will adjust as soon as you start climbing to command speed, the pitch commanded is obviously dependant on the thrust set so yes it does pitch to give 2000 fpm. Don’t think the initial pitch commanded is a fixed value, certainly not 10° - probably an increment below the PLIs but good luck finding that in the FCOM. In this case the PF pushed the TOGAs twice and got THR REF, which gave 23° pitch in this case to maintain the speed. Things happen fast at 23° pitch with THR REF.
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Ummm no again...
It commands a MINIMUM of 2000 fpm not 2000.
The initial pitch attitude commanded is what is required to maintain the actual IAS when the TOGA was pressed. (Min command speed up to window +25)
It commands a MINIMUM of 2000 fpm not 2000.
The initial pitch attitude commanded is what is required to maintain the actual IAS when the TOGA was pressed. (Min command speed up to window +25)
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Pushing the TOGA switch a second time will have caused the thrust to increase from an already generous amount to full whack. On an airplane at max landing weight that would have changed the maneuver from impressive to full-on carnival ride. Clearly they weren't awake before, but they will be now.....
Re safety concerns (comfort level) #179, the study - ‘Distress call from the flight deck: Cross-Cultural survey of aviation professionals reveals perception that flight safety is decreasing’, identifies the issues. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268271017
A short extract for those who cannot get full access:-
Safety in numbers
In response to the question “Do you think aviation is safe?” several people responded “yes…”, paused, seemingly conflicted, and then qualified their response with explanations like: “it is statistically safe” or “safer than all the other modes of transportation”. They generally described behavioural, procedural, and operational examples of “safety” in their daily work. This revealed a distinction between safety as the active experience of an activity (e.g. flying) in contrast to the “safety level” described by statistics reflecting the outcomes of that activity (e.g. fatalities or hull losses). A review of the interview data reveals that, with very few exceptions, safety was discussed as the qualitative, tangible experience of the risk involved in the activity, and this risk is compared to some cognitive or affective baseline – what could be considered the “comfort level” of the individual. Although it may seem obvious that practitioners will not discuss safety in terms of trends and statistics, it is relevant to our community of researchers and decision-makers to occasionally remind ourselves of the distinction. Accident statistics based on outcomes are used as the universal measure of safety presented to the public as well as for risk management and in decision-making. The interview data highlights the disconnect between quantitative safety statistics and ‘real-time safety’ as part of the ongoing, dynamic, daily activities of pilots, controllers, and other aviation professionals. Logically it seems that the two are not independent: if the work is not carried out in a conservative, consistent, conscientious manner (i.e. “safely”) then the statistics should reflect that and aviation’s laudatory safety record will not be maintained. Over time. But who can afford to wait for the statistics to prove the veracity of these warnings?
Conclusion
Through this study of the differences in perspectives and beliefs of aviation professionals across national cultures, the trade-off between economic and safety interests was identified as a common concern. According to a diverse sample of pilots and controllers, while aviation statistics may still portray a healthy industry, the operational reality is another matter altogether: the impact of economic scarcity and the ever-increasing focus on profits has reduced safety through changes in management practices, organisational structure, and regulations.
With very low accident rates, should the regulators change their safety perspective?
In this incident, assuming that either a mechanical restriction or crew interaction contributed to the situation (presumably unforeseen), then is risk viewed as a threat - regulatory, statistical risk management, or as a managed risk with a successful outcome; non fatal normal landing ?
‘… when an employee feels at risk he or she also is at risk. Thus, “the risk of accidents are increased not because of a biased perception of risk, but rather because risk is perceived ‘correctly’, i.e. is in accordance with objective [Regulatory statistical ?] risk”
https://safety177496371.wordpress.co...on-and-safety/
A short extract for those who cannot get full access:-
Safety in numbers
In response to the question “Do you think aviation is safe?” several people responded “yes…”, paused, seemingly conflicted, and then qualified their response with explanations like: “it is statistically safe” or “safer than all the other modes of transportation”. They generally described behavioural, procedural, and operational examples of “safety” in their daily work. This revealed a distinction between safety as the active experience of an activity (e.g. flying) in contrast to the “safety level” described by statistics reflecting the outcomes of that activity (e.g. fatalities or hull losses). A review of the interview data reveals that, with very few exceptions, safety was discussed as the qualitative, tangible experience of the risk involved in the activity, and this risk is compared to some cognitive or affective baseline – what could be considered the “comfort level” of the individual. Although it may seem obvious that practitioners will not discuss safety in terms of trends and statistics, it is relevant to our community of researchers and decision-makers to occasionally remind ourselves of the distinction. Accident statistics based on outcomes are used as the universal measure of safety presented to the public as well as for risk management and in decision-making. The interview data highlights the disconnect between quantitative safety statistics and ‘real-time safety’ as part of the ongoing, dynamic, daily activities of pilots, controllers, and other aviation professionals. Logically it seems that the two are not independent: if the work is not carried out in a conservative, consistent, conscientious manner (i.e. “safely”) then the statistics should reflect that and aviation’s laudatory safety record will not be maintained. Over time. But who can afford to wait for the statistics to prove the veracity of these warnings?
Conclusion
Through this study of the differences in perspectives and beliefs of aviation professionals across national cultures, the trade-off between economic and safety interests was identified as a common concern. According to a diverse sample of pilots and controllers, while aviation statistics may still portray a healthy industry, the operational reality is another matter altogether: the impact of economic scarcity and the ever-increasing focus on profits has reduced safety through changes in management practices, organisational structure, and regulations.
With very low accident rates, should the regulators change their safety perspective?
In this incident, assuming that either a mechanical restriction or crew interaction contributed to the situation (presumably unforeseen), then is risk viewed as a threat - regulatory, statistical risk management, or as a managed risk with a successful outcome; non fatal normal landing ?
‘… when an employee feels at risk he or she also is at risk. Thus, “the risk of accidents are increased not because of a biased perception of risk, but rather because risk is perceived ‘correctly’, i.e. is in accordance with objective [Regulatory statistical ?] risk”
https://safety177496371.wordpress.co...on-and-safety/
Last edited by alf5071h; 4th May 2022 at 07:42. Reason: or