EK 231 20 December DXB IAD near crash?
I cannot honestly believe that this was a deliberate act of one person, nor technical sabotage, and yet fail to see how any professional crew could permit this to happen, and then continue the flight. Surely ATC must also have had this departure flagged and analysed? They too must have reported the incident. Perhaps a wall of silence has been constructed and enforced
I, like so many others, remain baffled.
I, like so many others, remain baffled.
things up - even highly trained "professionals". Several recent commercial airline crashes fall into this category. Asiana 777 at SFO - where 3 out of 4 pilots on the flight deck failed to recognize that the airspeed was dangerously low. Pakistan A320 at Karachi - where the pilots tried to land at ~220 knots with the gear up. The previously mentioned Emirates 777 at Dubai where the crew elected to do a go-around after landing - with the engines and throttles at idle - despite having plenty of runway left to safely stop. Those are just 3 that come quickly to mind - I'm sure there are more...
All defy logical explanation - oh sure there were other issues involved such as miss-use or misunderstanding of automatics - but no one can explain how a competent flight deck crew could allow those things to happen. But they did, and people died as a result.
That is a gross oversimplification of a lot of factors that led to that accident, none more so than the culture at Emirates which is referred to in many areas as punitive. Was it mishandled? Yes. We’re there a lot of factors at play? Yes. They went around as the RAAS also activated - a go around irrespective of whether you think there was ‘plenty of runway left to safely stop.’
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Anything can f*ck up, humans, mechanics, even an almighty computer program. It's the recovery, the overcoming of such incidents that matters. Many recent ground course refresher gurus in the aviation industry have found a trendy word for it: Resilience. What is not invoked though, is the fact that you can only be resilient if you can fall back on something else, mainly basics, experience, grown instincts. However, the modern industry has deprived its offsprings of that. It puts bums in hot seats with 250 hours of mainly synthetic or schematic training, sometimes without any meaningful solo exposure. Now we are surprised that pilots confronted with incidents did not fall back on the most simple and common sense escape, named flying...... Let's face it: They can't and it's not their fault.
This begs the question if there is a way out. The industry has relentlessly said 'sure, we will simply install some more automations, limiters, inhibitors to protect the poor aircraft and its passengers from those incapable pilots'. The chief pilots and managers approved it gleefully, it gives them more power with myriads of SOPs, bulletins, new mandatory techniques (for our benefit!) and a very handy scapegoat if we don't follow them religiously.
Old farts like me say that we need to get back to real training and experience, only to realize that this is not feasible due to the sheer mass of bums needed and already on line. Even covid didn't cleanse the overcapacities that were deplored world wide, almost every government pumping billions in an unnecessary uphold of the overblown industry that helped create this problem.
We could fall back on statistics and reassure us that the accident/incident rate is still extremely low, lower than at the time of us old farts even, but it does not satisfy me. I would like a mix of self reflection by all participants. Manufacturers can do better, airline managers can do better, authorities can do better, individual pilots can do better. Mainly by not simply passing the buck to someone else, but to improve what responsibility each one bears.
This however does not absolve the responsible bodies of short term measures. They seem obvious, as there is an apparent lack of skill to overcome very simple mishaps, basically the reason we are still in the pilot seats.
This begs the question if there is a way out. The industry has relentlessly said 'sure, we will simply install some more automations, limiters, inhibitors to protect the poor aircraft and its passengers from those incapable pilots'. The chief pilots and managers approved it gleefully, it gives them more power with myriads of SOPs, bulletins, new mandatory techniques (for our benefit!) and a very handy scapegoat if we don't follow them religiously.
Old farts like me say that we need to get back to real training and experience, only to realize that this is not feasible due to the sheer mass of bums needed and already on line. Even covid didn't cleanse the overcapacities that were deplored world wide, almost every government pumping billions in an unnecessary uphold of the overblown industry that helped create this problem.
We could fall back on statistics and reassure us that the accident/incident rate is still extremely low, lower than at the time of us old farts even, but it does not satisfy me. I would like a mix of self reflection by all participants. Manufacturers can do better, airline managers can do better, authorities can do better, individual pilots can do better. Mainly by not simply passing the buck to someone else, but to improve what responsibility each one bears.
This however does not absolve the responsible bodies of short term measures. They seem obvious, as there is an apparent lack of skill to overcome very simple mishaps, basically the reason we are still in the pilot seats.
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Anything can f*ck up, humans, mechanics, even an almighty computer program. It's the recovery, the overcoming of such incidents that matters. Many recent ground course refresher gurus in the aviation industry have found a trendy word for it: Resilience. What is not invoked though, is the fact that you can only be resilient if you can fall back on something else, mainly basics, experience, grown instincts. However, the modern industry has deprived its offsprings of that. It puts bums in hot seats with 250 hours of mainly synthetic or schematic training, sometimes without any meaningful solo exposure. Now we are surprised that pilots confronted with incidents did not fall back on the most simple and common sense escape, named flying...... Let's face it: They can't and it's not their fault.
This begs the question if there is a way out. The industry has relentlessly said 'sure, we will simply install some more automations, limiters, inhibitors to protect the poor aircraft and its passengers from those incapable pilots'. The chief pilots and managers approved it gleefully, it gives them more power with myriads of SOPs, bulletins, new mandatory techniques (for our benefit!) and a very handy scapegoat if we don't follow them religiously.
Old farts like me say that we need to get back to real training and experience, only to realize that this is not feasible due to the sheer mass of bums needed and already on line. Even covid didn't cleanse the overcapacities that were deplored world wide, almost every government pumping billions in an unnecessary uphold of the overblown industry that helped create this problem.
We could fall back on statistics and reassure us that the accident/incident rate is still extremely low, lower than at the time of us old farts even, but it does not satisfy me. I would like a mix of self reflection by all participants. Manufacturers can do better, airline managers can do better, authorities can do better, individual pilots can do better. Mainly by not simply passing the buck to someone else, but to improve what responsibility each one bears.
This however does not absolve the responsible bodies of short term measures. They seem obvious, as there is an apparent lack of skill to overcome very simple mishaps, basically the reason we are still in the pilot seats.
This begs the question if there is a way out. The industry has relentlessly said 'sure, we will simply install some more automations, limiters, inhibitors to protect the poor aircraft and its passengers from those incapable pilots'. The chief pilots and managers approved it gleefully, it gives them more power with myriads of SOPs, bulletins, new mandatory techniques (for our benefit!) and a very handy scapegoat if we don't follow them religiously.
Old farts like me say that we need to get back to real training and experience, only to realize that this is not feasible due to the sheer mass of bums needed and already on line. Even covid didn't cleanse the overcapacities that were deplored world wide, almost every government pumping billions in an unnecessary uphold of the overblown industry that helped create this problem.
We could fall back on statistics and reassure us that the accident/incident rate is still extremely low, lower than at the time of us old farts even, but it does not satisfy me. I would like a mix of self reflection by all participants. Manufacturers can do better, airline managers can do better, authorities can do better, individual pilots can do better. Mainly by not simply passing the buck to someone else, but to improve what responsibility each one bears.
This however does not absolve the responsible bodies of short term measures. They seem obvious, as there is an apparent lack of skill to overcome very simple mishaps, basically the reason we are still in the pilot seats.
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Got my ATPL in 1999, ATP, 5 types, 15K hours with passengers in the back since. Was always instructed that the moment you get airborne, you fly by instrument reference. Not sure her looking at her instruments is the big issue here. I do switch off the AP/AT/FD whenever I feel it's okay ( no company limits on that), and if I screw up, I will get a call from the safety department asking how training can get improved to prevent that from happening again. I am sure that the last sentence will get lost in the EU/ME culturere, but I really feel it's the way forward.
what this lady in the video does is the incorrect technique; looks straight down at rotate. Give me strength
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’…..elected to do a go-around….’
That is a gross oversimplification of a lot of factors that led to that accident, none more so than the culture at Emirates which is referred to in many areas as punitive. Was it mishandled? Yes. We’re there a lot of factors at play? Yes. They went around as the RAAS also activated - a go around irrespective of whether you think there was ‘plenty of runway left to safely stop.’
That is a gross oversimplification of a lot of factors that led to that accident, none more so than the culture at Emirates which is referred to in many areas as punitive. Was it mishandled? Yes. We’re there a lot of factors at play? Yes. They went around as the RAAS also activated - a go around irrespective of whether you think there was ‘plenty of runway left to safely stop.’
RAAS activation absolutely should not mean a mandatory go-around! (Subscribing to that view means that you must also agree with the decision behind the A380 diversion from MAN because the computer said no).
Airmanship should allow the Commander to make a rational decision based on the live situation. RAAS is o tool which provides information but the part of it which warns of “Long Landing” considers touchdown zone but takes no account of the amount of runway remaining. That’s when airmanship should come into play…. but fear culture trumped airmanship with catastrophic consequences.
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Surely if you haven't managed to touch down within first third of the runway, which is what RAAS is normally configured for, a go-around is a sensible thing to do?
History is full of runway overruns caused by rational decision making when the aircraft has already floated half down the runway.
History is full of runway overruns caused by rational decision making when the aircraft has already floated half down the runway.
Paxing All Over The World
I fear that basic airmanship has been overtaken by the desire for profits. For it is THAT which drives the mgmt attitude. We also know that pax want to pay as little as possible. Thus the first loop is complete.
It was profits that made Southwest tell Boeing they didn't want to pay for conversion courses. Boeing then accepted as they wanted to make more money.
EK has access to some of the deepest pockets in the world. Yet still they want more.
It was profits that made Southwest tell Boeing they didn't want to pay for conversion courses. Boeing then accepted as they wanted to make more money.
EK has access to some of the deepest pockets in the world. Yet still they want more.
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Anything can f*ck up, humans, mechanics, even an almighty computer program. It's the recovery, the overcoming of such incidents that matters. Many recent ground course refresher gurus in the aviation industry have found a trendy word for it: Resilience. What is not invoked though, is the fact that you can only be resilient if you can fall back on something else, mainly basics, experience, grown instincts
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There has been no mention of this event in the UAE press. Had this taken place at JFK, LHR, CDG, wherever, it would have been headline news.
No doubt an official report will eventually be issued, perhaps 2 years from now. Meanwhile, this news seemingly needs to be buried.
No doubt an official report will eventually be issued, perhaps 2 years from now. Meanwhile, this news seemingly needs to be buried.
short flights long nights
You have just confirmed what is wrong with the industry i.e. Airmanship has been eliminated by punitive airline culture.
RAAS activation absolutely should not mean a mandatory go-around! (Subscribing to that view means that you must also agree with the decision behind the A380 diversion from MAN because the computer said no).
Airmanship should allow the Commander to make a rational decision based on the live situation. RAAS is o tool which provides information but the part of it which warns of “Long Landing” considers touchdown zone but takes no account of the amount of runway remaining. That’s when airmanship should come into play…. but fear culture trumped airmanship with catastrophic consequences.
RAAS activation absolutely should not mean a mandatory go-around! (Subscribing to that view means that you must also agree with the decision behind the A380 diversion from MAN because the computer said no).
Airmanship should allow the Commander to make a rational decision based on the live situation. RAAS is o tool which provides information but the part of it which warns of “Long Landing” considers touchdown zone but takes no account of the amount of runway remaining. That’s when airmanship should come into play…. but fear culture trumped airmanship with catastrophic consequences.
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Got my ATPL in 1999, ATP, 5 types, 15K hours with passengers in the back since. Was always instructed that the moment you get airborne, you fly by instrument reference. Not sure her looking at her instruments is the big issue here. I do switch off the AP/AT/FD whenever I feel it's okay ( no company limits on that), and if I screw up, I will get a call from the safety department asking how training can get improved to prevent that from happening again. I am sure that the last sentence will get lost in the EU/ME culturere, but I really feel it's the way forward.
4 airlines of which 3 in the EU and all 3 actually encourage(d) manual flying. If you want to fly all the way up to FL raw data you are welcome to do it. In that way you can simply not compare Europe with the ME.
On topic: until the initial report is published we should give this EK crew some slack. Until proven otherwise I refuse that they did not rotate simply because someone forgot to se the MCP correctly.
I can't be the only pilot who looks both outside AND inside while rotating; Mostly looking out but regularly, briefly flicking the eyes to the PFD and back out is what I do - surely others do as well? It's not difficult.
Good points, glofish: However we don't yet know what went wrong with this take-off, so we can't really say if the flight-crew were incompetent or if they had a system failure, an incapacitation, or made an incorrect selection.
But as you say; new pilots of today can go from a PA-28 onto the flight deck of a big jet, without the years of flying basic turbo-props with basic instrumentation that develops and cements our basic flying skills and situational awareness.
These new pilots are faced with sophisticated automation which they have to master, and get very little opportunity to hand fly. It is then very easy to get locked-in to using the automatics - sometimes it is mandated, sometimes the airspace is challenging in which one naturally wants to use most of their brain for situational awareness, so hand flying is not really appropriate. This can easily lead to one's skills going rusty - or not developing in the first place - which becomes a spiral of not wanting to embarrass oneself by hand flying and cocking it up.
Airline training departments must recognise this and provide proper 'space' for pilots to practise hand flying without flight directors. As I have often said, an easy start down this road would be if the XAAs mandated three manually flown raw data approaches every six months, and recorded in our log books, as we used to have to do for auto-lands.
Good points, glofish: However we don't yet know what went wrong with this take-off, so we can't really say if the flight-crew were incompetent or if they had a system failure, an incapacitation, or made an incorrect selection.
But as you say; new pilots of today can go from a PA-28 onto the flight deck of a big jet, without the years of flying basic turbo-props with basic instrumentation that develops and cements our basic flying skills and situational awareness.
These new pilots are faced with sophisticated automation which they have to master, and get very little opportunity to hand fly. It is then very easy to get locked-in to using the automatics - sometimes it is mandated, sometimes the airspace is challenging in which one naturally wants to use most of their brain for situational awareness, so hand flying is not really appropriate. This can easily lead to one's skills going rusty - or not developing in the first place - which becomes a spiral of not wanting to embarrass oneself by hand flying and cocking it up.
Airline training departments must recognise this and provide proper 'space' for pilots to practise hand flying without flight directors. As I have often said, an easy start down this road would be if the XAAs mandated three manually flown raw data approaches every six months, and recorded in our log books, as we used to have to do for auto-lands.
Fascinating that this thread has been, the previous poster has a point. Everything to date has been based on FR24 data and a leaked EK CONOTAM with a hint from some people of roster removals. I know current EK people are reluctant to post due big brother. The only mainstream news organisation to run with it has been Bloomberg.
In addition theses days any event near an airport or city tends to be picked up on a camera somewhere as in the PIA crash. Despite Dubai being a very technology connected place I haven't seen any pictures of a 777 skimming rooftops. No in cabin phone videos of what would have been a very noisy ground roll despite the passengers disembarking in the land of the free. A bit more enquiry is needed.
In addition theses days any event near an airport or city tends to be picked up on a camera somewhere as in the PIA crash. Despite Dubai being a very technology connected place I haven't seen any pictures of a 777 skimming rooftops. No in cabin phone videos of what would have been a very noisy ground roll despite the passengers disembarking in the land of the free. A bit more enquiry is needed.
No worries. EK safest airline 2021, newest report of Jacdec.
https://www.spiegel.de/reise/jacdec-...f-aadcfd8fcee8
https://www.spiegel.de/reise/jacdec-...f-aadcfd8fcee8
the moment you get airborne you should use instrument reference. She actually rotate using the FD. That is wrong!
4 airlines of which 3 in the EU and all 3 actually encourage(d) manual flying. If you want to fly all the way up to FL raw data you are welcome to do it. In that way you can simply not compare Europe with the ME.
On topic: until the initial report is published we should give this EK crew some slack. Until proven otherwise I refuse that they did not rotate simply because someone forgot to se the MCP correctly.
4 airlines of which 3 in the EU and all 3 actually encourage(d) manual flying. If you want to fly all the way up to FL raw data you are welcome to do it. In that way you can simply not compare Europe with the ME.
On topic: until the initial report is published we should give this EK crew some slack. Until proven otherwise I refuse that they did not rotate simply because someone forgot to se the MCP correctly.
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