EK 231 20 December DXB IAD near crash?
Maybe I should have been more verbose. The “mistake made” referred to the possible following of the FDs commanding level(ish) flight. Once that (sin) was done, maybe the illusion of climbing was created through the acceleration complicating an instantaneous pitch up recovery.
Secondly, the illusion may be present even with all that information in front of you. The information stops you succumbing to it.
Secondly, the illusion may be present even with all that information in front of you. The information stops you succumbing to it.
Last edited by compressor stall; 2nd Jan 2022 at 11:07.
It's quite astonishing that in 2022 we have a situation where Boeing aircraft automation is so poorly understood that it leads to both real and near disasters in a way that Airbus aircraft have never. Yet Airbus took the flack for many years for building overly automated aircraft. Having the FD point at the ground when radar altitude is less than 100ft in the takeoff regime (regardless of the MCP setting) is an example of 20th century avionics engineering that needs to change immediately. It's a completely nonsense command.
What would a 777 do if the mcp was set
to 0000 and just before V1 the autopilot was engaged by a confused PM ? Not saying this happened . Would auto pilot engage ? Would flight directors maintain level flight ? How long to turn off auto pilot and rotate it including some startle factor ?
to 0000 and just before V1 the autopilot was engaged by a confused PM ? Not saying this happened . Would auto pilot engage ? Would flight directors maintain level flight ? How long to turn off auto pilot and rotate it including some startle factor ?
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Torukmacto wrote
With the autopilot engaged on the ground it feels like the controls have jammed. The software was changed after the Air France incident so that the autopilot cannot be engaged on the ground with the aircraft moving.
What would a 777 do if the mcp was set
to 0000 and just before V1 the autopilot was engaged by a confused PM
to 0000 and just before V1 the autopilot was engaged by a confused PM
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Hmmm..... well, that would then be a rather questionable course of action . Taking a somehow not correctly working airplane up to high altitude and flying on ...
Would be only be reasonable if the issue had definitely and benignly been resolved. Can´t think of what that might be, however.
Ok, I guess it´s best to await the results of the investigation - if there is one.
?
Thanks to suninmyeyes for trying it and reporting it here!
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DNF
It just might have self rotated, remember the stabilizer trim is set to provide for V2+ with an engine out on most aircraft so there may have been some downward force on it. I've seen A330s start to self rotate when very light (I know that's different on several scores).
Anyway, enough to place EK on my DNF list until they sort out their safety culture.
Anyway, enough to place EK on my DNF list until they sort out their safety culture.
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42go. As stated above I was not trying to prove anything, I just wanted to see what happened in a similar scenario. I have no idea where the 1100 came from. It is possible the automatics did not want to descend below the programmed acceleration altitude or that somewhere in the brains of the AIMS there is some bit of intelligence that does not want the aircraft to descend in ALT to 0000.
There was no GPWS call out in the above simulation.
There was no GPWS call out in the above simulation.
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Reluctantly, and with no intention to scaremonger, I enquire as to whether the professional among us pundits have considered the 'unthinkable', as opposed to an inadvertent 'misuse of automatics' explanation.
I put forward no details of my thinking, just a suggestion that the Flight Data Management System will provide the analysis of all flight and engine control inputs throughout the delayed take-off and subsequent extreme low altitude/height climb-out.
It is the responsibility of the carrier and the UAE authorities to rapidly analyse and explain exactly what happened; the crew are alive and with us.. They too must contribute to the explanation.
I cannot honestly believe that this was a deliberate act of one person, nor technical sabotage, and yet fail to see how any professional crew could permit this to happen, and then continue the flight. Surely ATC must also have had this departure flagged and analysed? They too must have reported the incident. Perhaps a wall of silence has been constructed and enforced
I, like so many others, remain baffled.
I put forward no details of my thinking, just a suggestion that the Flight Data Management System will provide the analysis of all flight and engine control inputs throughout the delayed take-off and subsequent extreme low altitude/height climb-out.
It is the responsibility of the carrier and the UAE authorities to rapidly analyse and explain exactly what happened; the crew are alive and with us.. They too must contribute to the explanation.
I cannot honestly believe that this was a deliberate act of one person, nor technical sabotage, and yet fail to see how any professional crew could permit this to happen, and then continue the flight. Surely ATC must also have had this departure flagged and analysed? They too must have reported the incident. Perhaps a wall of silence has been constructed and enforced
I, like so many others, remain baffled.
Last edited by RoyHudd; 2nd Jan 2022 at 18:14.
Agreed.
I wondered earlier if there was a pitch problem, and if there was then it almost certainly would have revealed itself only after Vr was called, by which point they were obviously well past V1 and therefore committed to the take-off.
There could well have been a serious brown trouser moment, while the 4 pilots tried to work out what the hell was going on as they accelerated down the runway - too late to RTO; and they eventually managed to haul it into to the air at the last moment.
They then might have convinced themselves that they must have done something procedurally wrong, and there was nothing faulty with the aircraft, so they continued their flight and perhaps did not put in a report, hoping it would not be spotted?
I wondered earlier if there was a pitch problem, and if there was then it almost certainly would have revealed itself only after Vr was called, by which point they were obviously well past V1 and therefore committed to the take-off.
There could well have been a serious brown trouser moment, while the 4 pilots tried to work out what the hell was going on as they accelerated down the runway - too late to RTO; and they eventually managed to haul it into to the air at the last moment.
They then might have convinced themselves that they must have done something procedurally wrong, and there was nothing faulty with the aircraft, so they continued their flight and perhaps did not put in a report, hoping it would not be spotted?
Maybe like neither pilot realised who was PF/PM after the thrust was set. A rotate call should have prompted a reaction or, if the call was missed, PF would surely rotate before they ran off the end. Neither seems to have happened. Fatigue, distraction, who knows. But as neither Airbus of Boeing procedures use FDs at take off, there is some other factor in play.
Well I guess it's right back to basics then ................ henceforth the control column will now be known as the "HOUSES LEVER"
Used to train/examine in a very large airline (high quality, international not mid east) which brought 250 hour cadets into a long haul, big jet environment ........... we reckoned that as they were getting command of their 777 fifteen years or so down the road that they had less than 15 hours of hand flying (i.e. autopilot in 100 feet after take-off and out at 1,000 feet before landing). So, if and when the info comes out i.e hours and years flying, more detail is required to get to the root of it.
I often flew the first commercial sector of a cadet's career and indeed the first time they had flown a real aircraft bigger than a light piston twin with 3-400 people down the back. I have also had to recover the aircraft in an extreme condition when the cadet did something that I would not have believed that a pilot would ever do (looking down vertically on the runway numbers through the copilot's window circa 50-100 feet was one ........ got the wind check at 1,000 feet - he decided there was a crosswind and over the threshold promptly and forcefully pushed full rudder ....... xwind factor was, in fact, about 2 kts but hey, rudder for a crosswind isn't it or at least that's what his course buddy told him. There is a lot of blind leading the partially sighted going on.
Company also had a lot of heavy landings until we figured out that pilots were using the FD to flare ..... not looking out at all.
Don't get me wrong ....... I would never have made it through these courses to a widebody jet with 250 hours. At those experience levels you need to grab every piece of info you have to get you through the course.
However, there is an other side to it ........ now training/examining on turbo props in my retirement and we have a major problem with poor skill levels with highly experienced airline pilots.
.......... where are we going .............
Used to train/examine in a very large airline (high quality, international not mid east) which brought 250 hour cadets into a long haul, big jet environment ........... we reckoned that as they were getting command of their 777 fifteen years or so down the road that they had less than 15 hours of hand flying (i.e. autopilot in 100 feet after take-off and out at 1,000 feet before landing). So, if and when the info comes out i.e hours and years flying, more detail is required to get to the root of it.
I often flew the first commercial sector of a cadet's career and indeed the first time they had flown a real aircraft bigger than a light piston twin with 3-400 people down the back. I have also had to recover the aircraft in an extreme condition when the cadet did something that I would not have believed that a pilot would ever do (looking down vertically on the runway numbers through the copilot's window circa 50-100 feet was one ........ got the wind check at 1,000 feet - he decided there was a crosswind and over the threshold promptly and forcefully pushed full rudder ....... xwind factor was, in fact, about 2 kts but hey, rudder for a crosswind isn't it or at least that's what his course buddy told him. There is a lot of blind leading the partially sighted going on.
Company also had a lot of heavy landings until we figured out that pilots were using the FD to flare ..... not looking out at all.
Don't get me wrong ....... I would never have made it through these courses to a widebody jet with 250 hours. At those experience levels you need to grab every piece of info you have to get you through the course.
However, there is an other side to it ........ now training/examining on turbo props in my retirement and we have a major problem with poor skill levels with highly experienced airline pilots.
.......... where are we going .............
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There are a relatively small number of people who get to fly 350-ton airplanes in their career. The number of people who train on those airplanes is smaller. An even smaller number of those trainers get to train on 350-ton airplanes at a number of airlines around the planet.
That last group can tell you a few stories (if they are willing to be candid) that would reveal that quite often you have 300 innocent passengers who are entrusting their lives to flightdeck occupants who are utterly bereft of any skill, awareness or initiative, and are visibly uneasy and uncertain at every phase of flight.
A personal sim favorite is to clear two of these occupants for a visual approach. There will be a two minute flurry of FMC programming and then the approach will be flown from downwind all the way to the threshold without anyone ONCE looking out the window until they are forced to at 50' when the pitch bar commands level flight.
The threat goes way beyond any degradation in manual flying skills as these never existed in the first place - there are any number of active widebody pilots who are temperamentally unsuited to the chair.
That last group can tell you a few stories (if they are willing to be candid) that would reveal that quite often you have 300 innocent passengers who are entrusting their lives to flightdeck occupants who are utterly bereft of any skill, awareness or initiative, and are visibly uneasy and uncertain at every phase of flight.
A personal sim favorite is to clear two of these occupants for a visual approach. There will be a two minute flurry of FMC programming and then the approach will be flown from downwind all the way to the threshold without anyone ONCE looking out the window until they are forced to at 50' when the pitch bar commands level flight.
The threat goes way beyond any degradation in manual flying skills as these never existed in the first place - there are any number of active widebody pilots who are temperamentally unsuited to the chair.
SLF for many years starting in the 60s. I always had confidence that the guys up front had, at the very least, the necessary stick & rudder flying skills. It didn't prevent accidents but, arguably, their skills avoided many more. I honestly have to say that these days I'm a lot more concerned about who is on the FD than I ever was before. Many of the above comments from professionals, such as Dropp the Pilot and others, echo what I have felt for some time simply after reading official accident and incident reports. I'm very selective about which carriers I fly with but there are no guarantees!
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The longer version of the same video was uploaded yesterday. The PF looks down immediately after the rotate call at 25:23 and glances out the window maybe once in the next 2-3 minutes.
Airbus A380 Full Cockpit Flight
Airbus A380 Full Cockpit Flight
The nauseating flurry of flight deck selfies with the obligatory “shades” on to look that extra bit cool for their page or channel is incredible. I do genuinely worry for the future of the profession and the downward trend of flying skills and knowledge as excellently outlined in the posts above.
The longer version of the same video was uploaded yesterday. The PF looks down immediately after the rotate call at 25:23 and glances out the window maybe once in the next 2-3 minutes.
Airbus A380 Full Cockpit Flight
Airbus A380 Full Cockpit Flight
Got my ATPL in 1999, ATP, 5 types, 15K hours with passengers in the back since. Was always instructed that the moment you get airborne, you fly by instrument reference. Not sure her looking at her instruments is the big issue here. I do switch off the AP/AT/FD whenever I feel it's okay ( no company limits on that), and if I screw up, I will get a call from the safety department asking how training can get improved to prevent that from happening again. I am sure that the last sentence will get lost in the EU/ME culturere, but I really feel it's the way forward.