EK 231 20 December DXB IAD near crash?
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I apologize if this has already been pointed out but, there have been several suggestions that manual flying skills need to be improved by relying less on automation to fly the aircraft. A number of boasts about how some 'hand fly' to high altitude in an effort to keep those manual skills sharp. While that's all well and good, this issue was on the runway during takeoff. The takeoff manoeuvre is probably the most repetitive manual manoeuvre a pilot will ever perform. Both in real life and simulated life, so while an over reliance on automation is in itself an important issue pilots need to address, I fail to see how any recommendation for additional manual flying skills relates to this event. If I understand this event correctly, the automation wasn't engaged until the aircraft was placed in a positive and normal climbing attitude and from that point onward, ops normal.
Some assume that all pilots are taught when to look through or ignore the FD never mind when they clearly see GIGO. I often wonder about that?
Willie
Some assume that all pilots are taught when to look through or ignore the FD never mind when they clearly see GIGO. I often wonder about that?
Willie
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Willie,
it is all linked together: selecting the wrong people to be pilots, not training them properly on the fundamentals of flying, then leads to a culture of automanship/SOPship instead of airmanship. A system emerges which is perpetuating itself: not properly selected and trained pilots will create incidents, which will lead to stricter automation policies and tighter flight data monitoring, and a more punishing culture, since the people judging and punishing also don't know better, and the vicious circle continues. Grandchildren of the magenta line.
You need the basic ability to keep your aircraft in a safe envelope at all times, in all flight phases, at all altitudes, by flying pitch an power. Period. This is not negotiable.
Once you have mastered this, you can start to become part of a companies culture, which uses automation to its full benefit, which however also regularly practises hand flying, including FD off and autothrust off.
Such companies exist, and they have some rules, when not to hand fly, and also a non-written culture when it is appropriate to do so. In such a culture, the flight data monitoring guys will also judge you, however they will know that regular appropriate handflying is part of the job, and it will not be a nitpicking exercise like one guy who said that he was called to the office for manually avoiding stall warning in a wind drop instead of waiting until the AP drops out when approaching stall.
Most pilots will understand what I mean. And this does not mean non-discipline towards SOPs or cowboy-style flying.
In such a culture, you develop a different look on your instruments, you will instinctively realise when a FD is useful and when it is indicating sheeeeeed. Your instrument scanning will also be much better in fully automated flight. You will have much more capacity to oversee everything that is happening around you, your situational awareness will increase tremendously. Your eyes will constantly wonder around, all the instruments, outside view, etc, and you will never be just staring on a FD, because you know how to position your ship in the air and you let it fly. You will not stir your stick or yoke.
Once you have reached that level, you will never ever missrotate in such a blatantly wrong way as it seems has happened on that 777.
it is all linked together: selecting the wrong people to be pilots, not training them properly on the fundamentals of flying, then leads to a culture of automanship/SOPship instead of airmanship. A system emerges which is perpetuating itself: not properly selected and trained pilots will create incidents, which will lead to stricter automation policies and tighter flight data monitoring, and a more punishing culture, since the people judging and punishing also don't know better, and the vicious circle continues. Grandchildren of the magenta line.
You need the basic ability to keep your aircraft in a safe envelope at all times, in all flight phases, at all altitudes, by flying pitch an power. Period. This is not negotiable.
Once you have mastered this, you can start to become part of a companies culture, which uses automation to its full benefit, which however also regularly practises hand flying, including FD off and autothrust off.
Such companies exist, and they have some rules, when not to hand fly, and also a non-written culture when it is appropriate to do so. In such a culture, the flight data monitoring guys will also judge you, however they will know that regular appropriate handflying is part of the job, and it will not be a nitpicking exercise like one guy who said that he was called to the office for manually avoiding stall warning in a wind drop instead of waiting until the AP drops out when approaching stall.
Most pilots will understand what I mean. And this does not mean non-discipline towards SOPs or cowboy-style flying.
In such a culture, you develop a different look on your instruments, you will instinctively realise when a FD is useful and when it is indicating sheeeeeed. Your instrument scanning will also be much better in fully automated flight. You will have much more capacity to oversee everything that is happening around you, your situational awareness will increase tremendously. Your eyes will constantly wonder around, all the instruments, outside view, etc, and you will never be just staring on a FD, because you know how to position your ship in the air and you let it fly. You will not stir your stick or yoke.
Once you have reached that level, you will never ever missrotate in such a blatantly wrong way as it seems has happened on that 777.
Willie, the logic of your argument is sound - agreed; however, the issue is not automation per se, but in the use of technology, computation, displays.
Unfortunately the regulators do not appear to appreciate that point of view. At best they require operators to define a policy / philosophy for the use of automation (read technology), but neither policy or philosophy are sufficient to prevent accidents - that requires people.
Unfortunately the regulators do not appear to appreciate that point of view. At best they require operators to define a policy / philosophy for the use of automation (read technology), but neither policy or philosophy are sufficient to prevent accidents - that requires people.
Willie
It’s about developing a scan, being able to computate said information and react to it.
The inability of being able to carry out such a task has been demonstrated many time, one of the worst demonstrations was with an Air India 747 that rolled on its back after a simple, single horizon failure. Latterly Airfrance 447.
Its not very different to target fixation.
The inability of being able to carry out such a task has been demonstrated many time, one of the worst demonstrations was with an Air India 747 that rolled on its back after a simple, single horizon failure. Latterly Airfrance 447.
Its not very different to target fixation.
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"Manual flying" at many airlines (including the airline in the spotlight) means disconnecting the AP but leaving the FD and ATHR connected.
This is not only of zero value in maintaining, developing, or recovering any piloting skills, in many cases it exposes your passengers to risks.
Flying any SID out of any European airport in this fashion results in one of the two people in the flight deck being lost from the monitoring role, and the second of two being lost as soon as ATC gives a "direct to xxxxx" clearance and his head wobbles down to the CDU. A non-monitored flight deck at 2000 feet is not a good look.
I do recall my brave cockpit companion proudly announcing to me during taxi in LHR that he had decided to hand-fly the Dover departure.. I had to tell ground control to "say again" the taxi clearance as it took a few seconds for me stop laughing at the idea.
This is not only of zero value in maintaining, developing, or recovering any piloting skills, in many cases it exposes your passengers to risks.
Flying any SID out of any European airport in this fashion results in one of the two people in the flight deck being lost from the monitoring role, and the second of two being lost as soon as ATC gives a "direct to xxxxx" clearance and his head wobbles down to the CDU. A non-monitored flight deck at 2000 feet is not a good look.
I do recall my brave cockpit companion proudly announcing to me during taxi in LHR that he had decided to hand-fly the Dover departure.. I had to tell ground control to "say again" the taxi clearance as it took a few seconds for me stop laughing at the idea.
It is not just the ME and FE airlines that mandate continuous full automation. You would perhaps think that airlines with the experience to know better would allow manual handling when conditions are appropriate.
But even British Airways mandate continuous Auto Thrust selection from take off to touch down on all types.
Manual handling is usually defined as “manual control of the aircraft Flight Path and Velocity” So the only time a BA pilot flies “manually” is every six months or so when practiced in the Sim!
The last BA pilots allowed full manual handling during normal route operations were the B747- 400 crews, where the SOP was Autopilot disconnect / Autothrottle disconnect.
But even British Airways mandate continuous Auto Thrust selection from take off to touch down on all types.
Manual handling is usually defined as “manual control of the aircraft Flight Path and Velocity” So the only time a BA pilot flies “manually” is every six months or so when practiced in the Sim!
The last BA pilots allowed full manual handling during normal route operations were the B747- 400 crews, where the SOP was Autopilot disconnect / Autothrottle disconnect.
Paxing All Over The World
Money. It is always the money. If the accountants discover that automation will give better financial results on paper then that is what gets mandated.I expect they factor near miss and prangs into their spreadsheets....
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Manual Flying
SIN to DXB in a widebody. 0100 schedule departure but several hours late. (Me 50+ year old captain, F/O 35 year old). Glorious flying weather, DXB in sight before the descent point. F/O disconnects A/P at descent point and barely moves the controls until the flare. Me working like a one armed paperhanger complying with his requests for flaps, gear, radio calls, crew landing brief, tiny bye bye to the pax and other small distractions. I was often out of the loop and worn out when we landed. In a courteous way I asked why he had decided to give up the wonderful automatics available and instead just sit staring at the instruments when he had such a glorious night outside with views even! " I like a challenge he said!"
I heard later after I had left the Company that the F/O was made Fleet Manager.
I've often wanted to tell that little tale....and now I have.
I did fly for a UK airline and during recurrent simulator training I was amazed how often the first action of pilots when an emergency was simulated was to disconnect the auto pilot. Honest!
I heard later after I had left the Company that the F/O was made Fleet Manager.
I've often wanted to tell that little tale....and now I have.
I did fly for a UK airline and during recurrent simulator training I was amazed how often the first action of pilots when an emergency was simulated was to disconnect the auto pilot. Honest!
Last edited by simmy; 5th Jan 2022 at 20:20. Reason: Grammar
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SIN to DXB in a widebody. 0100 schedule departure but several hours late. (Me 50+ year old captain, F/O 35 year old). Glorious flying weather, DXB in sight before the descent point. F/O disconnects A/P at descent point and barely moves the controls until the flare. Me working like a one armed paperhanger complying with his requests for flaps, gear, radio calls, crew landing brief, tiny bye bye to the pax and other small distractions. I was often out of the loop and worn out when we landed. In a courteous way I asked why he had decided to give up the wonderful automatics available and instead just sit staring at the instruments when he had such a glorious night outside with views even! " I like a challenge he said!"
I heard later after I had left the Company that the F/O was made Fleet Manager.
I've often wanted to tell that little tale....and now I have.
I did fly for a UK airline and during recurrent simulator training I was amazed how often the first action of pilots when an emergency was simulated was to disconnect the auto pilot. Honest!
I heard later after I had left the Company that the F/O was made Fleet Manager.
I've often wanted to tell that little tale....and now I have.
I did fly for a UK airline and during recurrent simulator training I was amazed how often the first action of pilots when an emergency was simulated was to disconnect the auto pilot. Honest!
Granted, a crew briefing should have been done before, as the PA, but the rest sounds like standard PM tasks, whether flying manual or not.
He might have asked/informed you earlier but what kept you from asking/ordering the automatics back on when you couldn't keep up?
We routinely fly manual from descent point till landing and if one or the other feels overloaded or out of the loop or there is any other reason someone feels like it, the automatics go back on.
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In a courteous way I asked why he had decided to give up the wonderful automatics available and instead just sit staring at the instruments when he had such a glorious night outside with views even!
Unrelated to this thread but the smoothest flying I ever witnessed from another pilot also gave the impression that she wasn't touching the controls, even though she flew a perfect CDA from top of descent with all the automatics off.
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SIN to DXB in a widebody. 0100 schedule departure but several hours late. (Me 50+ year old captain, F/O 35 year old). Glorious flying weather, DXB in sight before the descent point. F/O disconnects A/P at descent point and barely moves the controls until the flare. Me working like a one armed paperhanger complying with his requests for flaps, gear, radio calls, crew landing brief, tiny bye bye to the pax and other small distractions. I was often out of the loop and worn out when we landed. In a courteous way I asked why he had decided to give up the wonderful automatics available and instead just sit staring at the instruments when he had such a glorious night outside with views even! " I like a challenge he said!"
I heard later after I had left the Company that the F/O was made Fleet Manager.
I've often wanted to tell that little tale....and now I have.
I did fly for a UK airline and during recurrent simulator training I was amazed how often the first action of pilots when an emergency was simulated was to disconnect the auto pilot. Honest!
I heard later after I had left the Company that the F/O was made Fleet Manager.
I've often wanted to tell that little tale....and now I have.
I did fly for a UK airline and during recurrent simulator training I was amazed how often the first action of pilots when an emergency was simulated was to disconnect the auto pilot. Honest!
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this issue was on the runway during takeoff. The takeoff manoeuvre is probably the most repetitive manual manoeuvre a pilot will ever perform. Both in real life and simulated life, so while an over reliance on automation is in itself an important issue pilots need to address, I fail to see how any recommendation for additional manual flying skills relates to this event. If I understand this event correctly, the automation wasn't engaged until the aircraft was placed in a positive and normal climbing attitude and from that point onward, ops normal.
Some assume that all pilots are taught when to look through or ignore the FD never mind when they clearly see GIGO. I often wonder about that?
Willie
Some assume that all pilots are taught when to look through or ignore the FD never mind when they clearly see GIGO. I often wonder about that?
Willie
None of that really matters, though, if it turns out the PF in this event ignored the "rotate" call or there was no "rotate" call and the PF failed to act in its absence.
The rest is just people anonymously beating their own meat over personal views.
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I still fail to understand how during a takeoff, a crew of 4 pilots failed to notice that the pitch angle was less than adequate.
How many times have you been in a jet with an initial climb out angle of less than 10 degrees nose up? Something doesn't add up.
How many times have you been in a jet with an initial climb out angle of less than 10 degrees nose up? Something doesn't add up.
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