Boeing 737 Max Recertification Testing - Finally.
My gut reaction to the story was.... disgust.
Some measure success by money. If it's pro-bono, then sure, but even then, is this case one in which the plaintiffs will be made whole or does this prolong their suffering so a lawyer can prove he can win? This isn't an additional action by the defense to claw back previous concessions. Consider this - Boeing is a company. It has no feelings. At best the disgust is for fellow lawyers hired to stop another cash settlement increase gained by furthering the pain of the plaintiffs. Did the plaintiffs' legal team tell them they would be made whole? Did they simply suggest that nebulous "We'll make Boeing pay!"
The pain the ET-302 pilots felt was due entirely to mishandling. The event had previously proven to be easily controllable; it was far from inevitable, as losing an engine, half the hydraulics, and an asymmetric portion of the lift enhancement system was.
The pilots of American 191 had not been handed a playbook 5 months ahead of the crash. If they had they would have refused to even operate the plane. Clearly no aircraft would be operated with an engine missing and half the hydraulics eliminated. I doubt the pilots of that flight were stunned - that they in fact were working to solve a problem and not mentally incapacitated.
"(The fact that the DC-10 was a "perfectly flyable airframe" ... " It was not - why this gross misrepresentation?
Because Ethiopia benefited from the crash we will never know how it came to be that those two pilots mishandled the stall warning (before, and not part of MCAS) and then the MCAS reaction, both required memory item lists. What is interesting is the composition of the ET-302 crew was very similar to the Lion Air accident crew - long time NG pilot paired with a low-hour first officer. Why was that combination assigned a plane that had a world-wide known adverse reaction to a sensor defect; a reaction that can be easily seen by the trim wheel continuing to turn long after it would normally stop and felt by the increased trim forces that were easily countered with a thumb switch, when neither of them had demonstrated an ability to do so?
Whatever the motive, this action cannot cause Boeing to hurt and cannot give anyone their loved ones back. The only winners will be lawyers on both sides and Ethiopia.
The pain the ET-302 pilots felt was due entirely to mishandling. The event had previously proven to be easily controllable; it was far from inevitable, as losing an engine, half the hydraulics, and an asymmetric portion of the lift enhancement system was.
The pilots of American 191 had not been handed a playbook 5 months ahead of the crash. If they had they would have refused to even operate the plane. Clearly no aircraft would be operated with an engine missing and half the hydraulics eliminated. I doubt the pilots of that flight were stunned - that they in fact were working to solve a problem and not mentally incapacitated.
"(The fact that the DC-10 was a "perfectly flyable airframe" ... " It was not - why this gross misrepresentation?
Because Ethiopia benefited from the crash we will never know how it came to be that those two pilots mishandled the stall warning (before, and not part of MCAS) and then the MCAS reaction, both required memory item lists. What is interesting is the composition of the ET-302 crew was very similar to the Lion Air accident crew - long time NG pilot paired with a low-hour first officer. Why was that combination assigned a plane that had a world-wide known adverse reaction to a sensor defect; a reaction that can be easily seen by the trim wheel continuing to turn long after it would normally stop and felt by the increased trim forces that were easily countered with a thumb switch, when neither of them had demonstrated an ability to do so?
Whatever the motive, this action cannot cause Boeing to hurt and cannot give anyone their loved ones back. The only winners will be lawyers on both sides and Ethiopia.
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I didn't say mentally incapacitated. I said they experienced pain of awareness of imminent, untimely death. And all the more so, based on the dedication and commitment to safe flight operations which they assuredly held as they attained their positions.
As to the airframe, I quoted an aviator who had posted that information (on an unrelated thread) and in fact has posted on this one. Of course, "flyable" - if they knew what had gone wrong with the airplane. That should be obvious.
If you want to believe that the difficulties of corruption or heaven knows what else claimed to be wrong in Ethiopia means that those two pilots did not experience pain of imminent, untimely death - feel free. And also obviously, the point was, and is, that awareness of imminent, untimely death does cause pain, perhaps not like a root canal, but not unknown in the law.
And not least, lead counsel is quite accomplished in lawyering stuff. I'm not sure that your knowledge of same is any better than my own essentially non-existent knowledge of Mechanical Engineering.
As to the airframe, I quoted an aviator who had posted that information (on an unrelated thread) and in fact has posted on this one. Of course, "flyable" - if they knew what had gone wrong with the airplane. That should be obvious.
If you want to believe that the difficulties of corruption or heaven knows what else claimed to be wrong in Ethiopia means that those two pilots did not experience pain of imminent, untimely death - feel free. And also obviously, the point was, and is, that awareness of imminent, untimely death does cause pain, perhaps not like a root canal, but not unknown in the law.
And not least, lead counsel is quite accomplished in lawyering stuff. I'm not sure that your knowledge of same is any better than my own essentially non-existent knowledge of Mechanical Engineering.
Nothing can bring back the dead passengers but a monetary settlement is a way to in measurable and well understood terms, to acknowledge and atone for wrong doing. I do not see how anybody could argue that there was NOT a significant period of time, perhaps 17 seconds, where the passengers must have known they were likely to die. That mental anguish has to qualify as pain and suffering in my opinion.
My point, however is that this is a chance for Boeing to reset their sadly battered image. Yes it will cost them money but acknowledging the pain and suffering shows there is some humanity in corporate America. Digging in to fight this to the bitter end just looks bad and shrieks of the kind of short term thinking that permeates Boeing and is responsible for breaking the greatest civil aviation manufacturer that ever existed.
And yes I get that there is undoubtedly some unseemly lawyer money grubbing going on, but the lawyers negligence didn't kill all those people, Boeing's negligence did.
My point, however is that this is a chance for Boeing to reset their sadly battered image. Yes it will cost them money but acknowledging the pain and suffering shows there is some humanity in corporate America. Digging in to fight this to the bitter end just looks bad and shrieks of the kind of short term thinking that permeates Boeing and is responsible for breaking the greatest civil aviation manufacturer that ever existed.
And yes I get that there is undoubtedly some unseemly lawyer money grubbing going on, but the lawyers negligence didn't kill all those people, Boeing's negligence did.
Last edited by Big Pistons Forever; 22nd Mar 2023 at 18:42.
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What Big Pistons said, yes.
Only point I see as necessary to add is that plaintiffs' attorneys, if they are to stand even a slight chance against the Big-Law machines that represent corporate defendants particularly in litigation with massive reach like this case, need resources to carry the fight. The plaintiffs have the burden of proof. Fulfilling it, and doing so against Big-Law (and its connectedness sometimes), requires resources. I won't drift the thread (more) relating about "litigation reform" and "loser pays lawyer fees" initiatives - the resources to fight the depths of Boeing's pockets had to be on hand at the start and had to come from someplace along the attorneys' prior engagements.
Only point I see as necessary to add is that plaintiffs' attorneys, if they are to stand even a slight chance against the Big-Law machines that represent corporate defendants particularly in litigation with massive reach like this case, need resources to carry the fight. The plaintiffs have the burden of proof. Fulfilling it, and doing so against Big-Law (and its connectedness sometimes), requires resources. I won't drift the thread (more) relating about "litigation reform" and "loser pays lawyer fees" initiatives - the resources to fight the depths of Boeing's pockets had to be on hand at the start and had to come from someplace along the attorneys' prior engagements.
Ok then - as soon as this latest action was brought, Boeing should have offered $1 Billion per passenger and $1 Billion per extended family member. Wipe the company clean, all the retirement funds, every supplier, every employee bankrupted, and pull Boeing as manufacturer of record for every plane they have built. This will wipe out American and Southwest and maybe even Ethiopian. Revenge will only be complete when Boeing no longer exists.
But is $1 Billion each enough? Maybe it should be more.
Because pain is immeasurable and cannot be offset with cash, the families will still hurt - and they will always hurt. And this latest legal action will not extinguish that pain - it will enhance it. Both sides representing this are cynical and cruel. Neither side will admit a dollar value to place on human life. They each have a number, but they know that making that evaluation is morally corrupt. If the defense makes an offer, the plaintiffs will reject it as "too little." So they intend to compel a jury to make that decision for them, a jury forced to take the immoral task of picking a monetary value for human life and human suffering.
I see no mention of that monetary value here either. Why not?
I agree - it "looks bad" because that is the goal of the plaintiffs lawyers. They made an infinite demand without evidence. What would the typical reaction be?
I don't question lead counsel's ability. His is an appealing, if lacking in concrete evidence, argument, the sort lawyers are rewarded for making. And it is helped that it is fueled by outrage from a false story - of brave pilots doing everything correctly and per the procedures and still the plane's control was wrested from them as certainly as if the wings had been cut off. Based on that falsehood there could be only one source of the event.
The claims for Ethiopia are heavily weighed by their acceptance and operation of a plane with a known defect by pilots never trained to manage the documented defect, nor for management of long recognized, unrelated problems. We could know exactly the names of the people who made that sequence of decisions, perhaps discover the reasons they had. But there's no money to be had from them.
"(The fact that the DC-10 was a "perfectly flyable airframe" ... " It was not - why this gross misrepresentation?
But is $1 Billion each enough? Maybe it should be more.
Because pain is immeasurable and cannot be offset with cash, the families will still hurt - and they will always hurt. And this latest legal action will not extinguish that pain - it will enhance it. Both sides representing this are cynical and cruel. Neither side will admit a dollar value to place on human life. They each have a number, but they know that making that evaluation is morally corrupt. If the defense makes an offer, the plaintiffs will reject it as "too little." So they intend to compel a jury to make that decision for them, a jury forced to take the immoral task of picking a monetary value for human life and human suffering.
I see no mention of that monetary value here either. Why not?
I agree - it "looks bad" because that is the goal of the plaintiffs lawyers. They made an infinite demand without evidence. What would the typical reaction be?
I don't question lead counsel's ability. His is an appealing, if lacking in concrete evidence, argument, the sort lawyers are rewarded for making. And it is helped that it is fueled by outrage from a false story - of brave pilots doing everything correctly and per the procedures and still the plane's control was wrested from them as certainly as if the wings had been cut off. Based on that falsehood there could be only one source of the event.
The claims for Ethiopia are heavily weighed by their acceptance and operation of a plane with a known defect by pilots never trained to manage the documented defect, nor for management of long recognized, unrelated problems. We could know exactly the names of the people who made that sequence of decisions, perhaps discover the reasons they had. But there's no money to be had from them.
"(The fact that the DC-10 was a "perfectly flyable airframe" ... " It was not - why this gross misrepresentation?
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On money damages and human life: actually there is rational process. In exchange for waiving rights to litigate their claims arising from the 9/11 terrorist hijackings and crashes, the victims' families presented their claims to a unique type of neutral arbiter under a "special claims process" (the exact nomenclature might be slightly different). This also was the process for claims resulting from the oil-drilling rig disaster, Deepwater Horizon.
The process isn't presented as exact. But in these mass torts - highly notorious instances of liabilities - the work of the designated claims adjudicator has been - unless I've missed some big news - widely accepted. The work done by Ken Feinberg in both matters (and others) didn't purport either to be precise or to bleed corporate defendants into oblivion.
So I'll disagree that the claims at issue in the case in Chicago are mere exercises in excess, or whatever other derision sought to be given to them.
But as to the culpability of the national government in that country, rather than Boeing, perhaps the company should have retained a person with both the insight and knowledge you advocate, in its p.r., lobbying, expert witness cadre, or even at counsel table. Candidly I'm not sure you could find any international civil aviation litigation attorneys who - outside of advocating for a client or for their own practices - would agree that a corrupt government, as you assert, replaces as the legally responsible party the grossly negligent manufacturer. Perhaps at some upcoming professional conference someplace, some worthy on the big-ticket air crash litigation circuit will advocate your corrupt Ethiopian government theory of the case, .... or even mention this thread in the "hallway networking."
As to AA 191, see please the NTSB report (1979), pp. 22-25, describing results of simulator tests.
The process isn't presented as exact. But in these mass torts - highly notorious instances of liabilities - the work of the designated claims adjudicator has been - unless I've missed some big news - widely accepted. The work done by Ken Feinberg in both matters (and others) didn't purport either to be precise or to bleed corporate defendants into oblivion.
So I'll disagree that the claims at issue in the case in Chicago are mere exercises in excess, or whatever other derision sought to be given to them.
But as to the culpability of the national government in that country, rather than Boeing, perhaps the company should have retained a person with both the insight and knowledge you advocate, in its p.r., lobbying, expert witness cadre, or even at counsel table. Candidly I'm not sure you could find any international civil aviation litigation attorneys who - outside of advocating for a client or for their own practices - would agree that a corrupt government, as you assert, replaces as the legally responsible party the grossly negligent manufacturer. Perhaps at some upcoming professional conference someplace, some worthy on the big-ticket air crash litigation circuit will advocate your corrupt Ethiopian government theory of the case, .... or even mention this thread in the "hallway networking."
As to AA 191, see please the NTSB report (1979), pp. 22-25, describing results of simulator tests.
Thread Starter
Ethiopian was flyable using the processes and techniques that Boeing had recommended (as one of the Indonesian crews had demonstrated) - something that the pilots failed to do for whatever reason.
The AA 191 DC-10 was NOT flyable using the processes and techniques that were recommended at that time. Yes, it was flyable - but not with the processes and techniques that the manufacturer recommended, and the crew had been trained with. The crew followed their training to the letter - training that did not account for the type of failure they experienced which had dramatically altered the stall characteristics of the aircraft.
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Quite.
I only referred to 191 for the point that awareness of imminent and untimely death is a form of damage that could be compensated at law. The detailed discussions of what the ET302 passengers experienced led me to think, "wonder what the state of mind was of those aviators in Chicago as the final moments flashed before them - would they not have experienced something quite similar to the type of pain at issue in this case?"
I only referred to 191 for the point that awareness of imminent and untimely death is a form of damage that could be compensated at law. The detailed discussions of what the ET302 passengers experienced led me to think, "wonder what the state of mind was of those aviators in Chicago as the final moments flashed before them - would they not have experienced something quite similar to the type of pain at issue in this case?"
Quite.
I only referred to 191 for the point that awareness of imminent and untimely death is a form of damage that could be compensated at law. The detailed discussions of what the ET302 passengers experienced led me to think, "wonder what the state of mind was of those aviators in Chicago as the final moments flashed before them - would they not have experienced something quite similar to the type of pain at issue in this case?"
I only referred to 191 for the point that awareness of imminent and untimely death is a form of damage that could be compensated at law. The detailed discussions of what the ET302 passengers experienced led me to think, "wonder what the state of mind was of those aviators in Chicago as the final moments flashed before them - would they not have experienced something quite similar to the type of pain at issue in this case?"
Damages for the pilots and cabin crew of ET-302 are an employer problem.
The pilots of AA-191 lost key controls available to normal flight. ET-302 did not. The pilots of AA-191 had no warning of what could happen and what could be done. ET-302 crew had every bit of information required. The pilots of AA-191 did not take actions that demonstrably made the situation worse. On ET-302 almost every step was witer a half-measure or made it worse.
Yeah - I know about the simulator testing - where they worked out that if the AA-191 pilots knew the exact configuration of the plane that they might have recovered, but the pilots in the crash did not have that preparation. But that report includes the following:
"Under these circumstances, none of the pilots believed it was reasonable to expect the flightcrew of Flight 191 to react in the same manner as did the simulator pilots who were aware of Flight 191's profile and were able to recover from the stall."
In other words, having been told about the condition the subsequent pilots expected to survive. Told, just like ET-302 pilots were told, or should have been told by their employer. If there was concern for their passengers, they (the pilots and the company and the CAA) had roughly 5 months to work out how to follow the memory list items for the stall warning and then the MCAS increments. If they didn't care about the passengers before that, it also doesn't matter to me what they thought during.
In fact, isn't it a tremendous moral hazard to shield people from responsibility? Boeing has already admitted fault but ...
Boeing took the hit as the alternative was to tell Ethiopia they would never be sold another plane, particularly after Ethiopia immediately misrepresented the event to the public, a case you refuse to acknowledge by deflecting. Ethiopia absolved Boeing of all blame by purchasing more 737 MAX aircraft, though no doubt benefiting Ethiopia from discounts due to the adverse publicity from the misrepresentation.
The plaintiff lawyer might know this, but there is the saying "A man will not admit knowing when his job depends on him not knowing" so I expect no acknowledgement either way.
But this is America, where even now the US Supreme Court, with hundreds or thousands of cases submitted, chose to spend their day hearing about a disagreement between a maker of a dog chew toy and a maker of a toxic drink. I wonder, what will Justice Kavanaugh have to say? We know he likes beer. 16 years ago, Louis Vuitton lost a similar suit against another dog chew-toy company at the Federal level.
Ok then - as soon as this latest action was brought, Boeing should have offered $1 Billion per passenger and $1 Billion per extended family member. Wipe the company clean, all the retirement funds, every supplier, every employee bankrupted, and pull Boeing as manufacturer of record for every plane they have built. This will wipe out American and Southwest and maybe even Ethiopian. Revenge will only be complete when Boeing no longer exists.
But is $1 Billion each enough? Maybe it should be more.
Because pain is immeasurable and cannot be offset with cash, the families will still hurt - and they will always hurt. And this latest legal action will not extinguish that pain - it will enhance it. Both sides representing this are cynical and cruel. Neither side will admit a dollar value to place on human life. They each have a number, but they know that making that evaluation is morally corrupt. If the defense makes an offer, the plaintiffs will reject it as "too little." So they intend to compel a jury to make that decision for them, a jury forced to take the immoral task of picking a monetary value for human life and human suffering.
I see no mention of that monetary value here either. Why not?
I agree - it "looks bad" because that is the goal of the plaintiffs lawyers. They made an infinite demand without evidence. What would the typical reaction be?
I don't question lead counsel's ability. His is an appealing, if lacking in concrete evidence, argument, the sort lawyers are rewarded for making. And it is helped that it is fueled by outrage from a false story - of brave pilots doing everything correctly and per the procedures and still the plane's control was wrested from them as certainly as if the wings had been cut off. Based on that falsehood there could be only one source of the event.
The claims for Ethiopia are heavily weighed by their acceptance and operation of a plane with a known defect by pilots never trained to manage the documented defect, nor for management of long recognized, unrelated problems. We could know exactly the names of the people who made that sequence of decisions, perhaps discover the reasons they had. But there's no money to be had from them.
"(The fact that the DC-10 was a "perfectly flyable airframe" ... " It was not - why this gross misrepresentation?
But is $1 Billion each enough? Maybe it should be more.
Because pain is immeasurable and cannot be offset with cash, the families will still hurt - and they will always hurt. And this latest legal action will not extinguish that pain - it will enhance it. Both sides representing this are cynical and cruel. Neither side will admit a dollar value to place on human life. They each have a number, but they know that making that evaluation is morally corrupt. If the defense makes an offer, the plaintiffs will reject it as "too little." So they intend to compel a jury to make that decision for them, a jury forced to take the immoral task of picking a monetary value for human life and human suffering.
I see no mention of that monetary value here either. Why not?
I agree - it "looks bad" because that is the goal of the plaintiffs lawyers. They made an infinite demand without evidence. What would the typical reaction be?
I don't question lead counsel's ability. His is an appealing, if lacking in concrete evidence, argument, the sort lawyers are rewarded for making. And it is helped that it is fueled by outrage from a false story - of brave pilots doing everything correctly and per the procedures and still the plane's control was wrested from them as certainly as if the wings had been cut off. Based on that falsehood there could be only one source of the event.
The claims for Ethiopia are heavily weighed by their acceptance and operation of a plane with a known defect by pilots never trained to manage the documented defect, nor for management of long recognized, unrelated problems. We could know exactly the names of the people who made that sequence of decisions, perhaps discover the reasons they had. But there's no money to be had from them.
"(The fact that the DC-10 was a "perfectly flyable airframe" ... " It was not - why this gross misrepresentation?
Apples and Oranges.
Ethiopian was flyable using the processes and techniques that Boeing had recommended (as one of the Indonesian crews had demonstrated) - something that the pilots failed to do for whatever reason.
The AA 191 DC-10 was NOT flyable using the processes and techniques that were recommended at that time. Yes, it was flyable - but not with the processes and techniques that the manufacturer recommended, and the crew had been trained with. The crew followed their training to the letter - training that did not account for the type of failure they experienced which had dramatically altered the stall characteristics of the aircraft.
Ethiopian was flyable using the processes and techniques that Boeing had recommended (as one of the Indonesian crews had demonstrated) - something that the pilots failed to do for whatever reason.
The AA 191 DC-10 was NOT flyable using the processes and techniques that were recommended at that time. Yes, it was flyable - but not with the processes and techniques that the manufacturer recommended, and the crew had been trained with. The crew followed their training to the letter - training that did not account for the type of failure they experienced which had dramatically altered the stall characteristics of the aircraft.
Quite.
I only referred to 191 for the point that awareness of imminent and untimely death is a form of damage that could be compensated at law. The detailed discussions of what the ET302 passengers experienced led me to think, "wonder what the state of mind was of those aviators in Chicago as the final moments flashed before them - would they not have experienced something quite similar to the type of pain at issue in this case?"
I only referred to 191 for the point that awareness of imminent and untimely death is a form of damage that could be compensated at law. The detailed discussions of what the ET302 passengers experienced led me to think, "wonder what the state of mind was of those aviators in Chicago as the final moments flashed before them - would they not have experienced something quite similar to the type of pain at issue in this case?"
If I may,
WR 6-3 is making a comment on 191 and in a perfect world, with better information to the crew, the aircraft was indeed able to fly, but the crew were not in possession of that information, and they followed accurately their training, and that failure in SA that had nothing to do with the crew put a flyable aircraft into an impossible position.
ME & TD, your objections are valid, but WR's indication of the importance of information to the crew to permit them to effect a viable response is indicative of the complex nature of aviation.
In 191's case, the lack of cues to the condition of the left slat, and the abruptness of the subsequent stall on one wing only was not the crews fault, all 3 of you believe that, it is the NTSBs findings and it happens to have the weight of truth. The 191 case is germane in the same way as 302 and co are to the question of crew comprehension, and that leads to the emotional trauma inflicted on the crew as well as all others on board. I personally think the emotional harm in those seconds to. a crew that have an absolute comprehension that the aircraft they are responsible for along with the welfare of all on board, is about to be destroyed, they know with certainty what is about to occur and would know that their endeavours for reasons they usually do not fully comprehend, is going to fail. There is extreme mental pain in that, mercifully only for a short period of time.
As for Boeing, it is time to eject their corporate management that has destroyed the fabric of a once proud and capable engineering company while chasing short term values to boost their own pocket change. The takeover of Boeing by MDD management, those that had led MDD from being a pioneer to a corruption plagued company, who then oversaw the corruption of Boeing from 95 onwards, they need to be sacked wholesale, and held accountable for the damage. The debacle has cost Boeing billions, and yet they cannot find the moral fortitude to give generously to the victims of their negligence, which stems from the greed and short sighted policies of the company. That there would be a disaster such as this was forewarned by the disgusting action that Boeing took against the QA staff that identified the falsification of production on the B737NG back in the early 2000's, where the ring frames were disclosed to Boeing management as being falsely produced by hand instead of complying with the CNC production, a method that Boeing demanded and got an extended fatigue life for the B737 for. The corruption of that included the mute accessory to the falsification by the FAA, and the courts, the pillars of jurisprudence, dismissing the suits by the QA staff who were sacked by Boeing for doing their job.
The 'pain' of impending death appears to be unique to US law.
Many years ago, shortly after the law was introduced, as an expert witness to illustrate what might have been perceived and when - seen, felt, heard, etc, based on the flight path relative to geographic location, interpreted from the FDR; … CFIT
The likelihood of perception (human aspects) was to be judged by the court re timing, context, and individual personal aspects.
There appeared to be a wide range in perception; flight crew quickly, attempted recovery action and voice.
A flight attendant less so; a jump seat view vs cabin, but greater than passengers, but all ranging across individual effects of expectation from previous flight experiences, or even novice fear of flying.
Thus whilst the time period in which the fear of impending death was not clearly identifiable, it was concluded more likely to be in the range of consciousness for everyone.
The aviation content of this discussion is related to situation awareness as outlined by Endsley in 'Design for Situation Awareness' - Theoretical Underpinnings.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
And for those who may have to judge, or choose to do so with hindsight - previous posts; see 'Human and organizational biases affecting the management of safety' - 2. Beliefs about the nature of human behavior.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
,
Many years ago, shortly after the law was introduced, as an expert witness to illustrate what might have been perceived and when - seen, felt, heard, etc, based on the flight path relative to geographic location, interpreted from the FDR; … CFIT
The likelihood of perception (human aspects) was to be judged by the court re timing, context, and individual personal aspects.
There appeared to be a wide range in perception; flight crew quickly, attempted recovery action and voice.
A flight attendant less so; a jump seat view vs cabin, but greater than passengers, but all ranging across individual effects of expectation from previous flight experiences, or even novice fear of flying.
Thus whilst the time period in which the fear of impending death was not clearly identifiable, it was concluded more likely to be in the range of consciousness for everyone.
The aviation content of this discussion is related to situation awareness as outlined by Endsley in 'Design for Situation Awareness' - Theoretical Underpinnings.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
And for those who may have to judge, or choose to do so with hindsight - previous posts; see 'Human and organizational biases affecting the management of safety' - 2. Beliefs about the nature of human behavior.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
,
Last edited by alf5071h; 24th Mar 2023 at 07:01.
As to situational awareness, from that link to Endsley:
"In actual practice, however, long term memory structures can be used to circumvent the limitations of working memory. "
"Where scripts, set sequences of actions, have been developed for given situation conditions, much of the load on working memory for generating alternate behaviors and selecting among them is also diminished."
"Of prime importance is that this process can be almost instantaneous due to the superior abilities of human pattern matching mechanisms."
Where does the responsibility to commit sequences of actions and the underlying patterns to long term memory lie?
What if those materials were labeled as "Memory Items"? Should the users be expected to memorize them in proximity to a disaster that occurred recently?
What if the airline, recognizing they had taken no relevant training action or confirmation action, had parked the plane until Boeing produced the updated software or the pilots demonstrated what Endsley said was the appropriate action for them to have taken?
In hindsight it was a terrible idea to allow the AoA system to produce valid, but incorrect AoA data. In hindsight it was terrible the FAA approved that.
"In actual practice, however, long term memory structures can be used to circumvent the limitations of working memory. "
"Where scripts, set sequences of actions, have been developed for given situation conditions, much of the load on working memory for generating alternate behaviors and selecting among them is also diminished."
"Of prime importance is that this process can be almost instantaneous due to the superior abilities of human pattern matching mechanisms."
Where does the responsibility to commit sequences of actions and the underlying patterns to long term memory lie?
What if those materials were labeled as "Memory Items"? Should the users be expected to memorize them in proximity to a disaster that occurred recently?
What if the airline, recognizing they had taken no relevant training action or confirmation action, had parked the plane until Boeing produced the updated software or the pilots demonstrated what Endsley said was the appropriate action for them to have taken?
In hindsight it was a terrible idea to allow the AoA system to produce valid, but incorrect AoA data. In hindsight it was terrible the FAA approved that.
As to situational awareness, from that link to Endsley:
"In actual practice, however, long term memory structures can be used to circumvent the limitations of working memory. "
"Where scripts, set sequences of actions, have been developed for given situation conditions, much of the load on working memory for generating alternate behaviors and selecting among them is also diminished."
"Of prime importance is that this process can be almost instantaneous due to the superior abilities of human pattern matching mechanisms."
Where does the responsibility to commit sequences of actions and the underlying patterns to long term memory lie?
What if those materials were labeled as "Memory Items"? Should the users be expected to memorize them in proximity to a disaster that occurred recently?
What if the airline, recognizing they had taken no relevant training action or confirmation action, had parked the plane until Boeing produced the updated software or the pilots demonstrated what Endsley said was the appropriate action for them to have taken?
In hindsight it was a terrible idea to allow the AoA system to produce valid, but incorrect AoA data. In hindsight it was terrible the FAA approved that.
"In actual practice, however, long term memory structures can be used to circumvent the limitations of working memory. "
"Where scripts, set sequences of actions, have been developed for given situation conditions, much of the load on working memory for generating alternate behaviors and selecting among them is also diminished."
"Of prime importance is that this process can be almost instantaneous due to the superior abilities of human pattern matching mechanisms."
Where does the responsibility to commit sequences of actions and the underlying patterns to long term memory lie?
What if those materials were labeled as "Memory Items"? Should the users be expected to memorize them in proximity to a disaster that occurred recently?
What if the airline, recognizing they had taken no relevant training action or confirmation action, had parked the plane until Boeing produced the updated software or the pilots demonstrated what Endsley said was the appropriate action for them to have taken?
In hindsight it was a terrible idea to allow the AoA system to produce valid, but incorrect AoA data. In hindsight it was terrible the FAA approved that.
The decision making heuristics that give timely responses are great, when we are responding in a correct manner to the condition that exists, when we have failed to detect the problem, or incorrectly assumed consequence to that problem, then the training needs to have a pretty fast OODA like cycle embedded in it, that if doing what we think is the solution is not working, check again what the problem is, and then apply a response. In time critical situations, there is limited time to get a determination that what we are doing ain't working, so what we though was the case may not be so, or the intervention we apply was not as good as we expected it to be. If the review (we apply "confirmations", and for a rather high number of cases, "the verbal confirmation done ain't worth the paper it's not printed on....") is flawed, the response is likely to be flawed. The response can independently be incorrect, or not the sole option the pilot has. 90% of the time in the simulator covers "stuff" that is pure box ticking, covering day to day operations. The sim time applied to improving the decision making and SA awareness of the pilot is still underrepresented. Such training can be done effectively by PTT, or FBT, and is not a box tick, it is experiential expansion of the skills of the crew member.
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What is interesting is the composition of the ET-302 crew was very similar to the Lion Air accident crew - long time NG pilot paired with a low-hour first officer. Why was that combination assigned a plane that had a world-wide known adverse reaction to a sensor defect; a reaction that can be easily seen by the trim wheel continuing to turn long after it would normally stop and felt by the increased trim forces that were easily countered with a thumb switch, when neither of them had demonstrated an ability to do so?
It is my understanding that the ET crew did actually do what was required of them to recover initially, what killed them was re-engaging the stab trim switches .. a fatal move indeed.
As for crew composition, I think that's irrelevant, and if anything, the finger should be pointed at Boeing even more. On a worldwide scale (with the exception of the US), the 737 is typically flown by relatively young captains with new first officers, for many of whom it's their first rating. Boeing knew this and it's nothing unique to ET or Lion. It makes unleashing a system with such deadly latent threats/faults look to be even more criminal.
"Both pilots demonstrated an ability to do so in their sim training, hence why they occupied those seats." was not included in the Final Report. They had no sim training after the Lion Air Preliminary report, the Emergency AD, or the FCOM update. In practice the simulators were unable to have a valid, but incorrect AoA sensor reading, so they could not have been trained in a sim at all.
Still, they also failed to shut off the autothrottle and establish a pitch and power setting in accordance with the stall warning procedure.
Read the FDR graphs - they did nothing that was required to recover initially. They did many things that they were told to never do. They could have re-enable the trim and re-trimmed the plane, but did not do that either.
It is relevant that a plane with a known, uncorrected defect, would be put into the hands of a crew similar to the one that crashed, particularly on a newly purchased, pride of country airplane. At the time of ET-302 it wasn't a latent defect. It was clearly exposed.
Still, they also failed to shut off the autothrottle and establish a pitch and power setting in accordance with the stall warning procedure.
Read the FDR graphs - they did nothing that was required to recover initially. They did many things that they were told to never do. They could have re-enable the trim and re-trimmed the plane, but did not do that either.
It is relevant that a plane with a known, uncorrected defect, would be put into the hands of a crew similar to the one that crashed, particularly on a newly purchased, pride of country airplane. At the time of ET-302 it wasn't a latent defect. It was clearly exposed.
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Of course, a simple pitch/power action could have made life easier, though given they were in a climb, with ATC given directions, etc, so not something to do as a first action, given it'll need leveling off in a rising terrain situation. And not much later, it was already past the point of no-return, the crash became unavoidable.