Boeing 737 Max Recertification Testing - Finally.
I don't think, these senior managers are incompetent.
They are highly competent, they managed to fool about everybody monitoring/guarding the design (and maybe the manufacturing) of the B737 MAX. Including the oversight organizations FAA, EASA and several "follow the light" others around the globe.
The difference is, these highly competent senior (and maybe also the less senior as expected) managers did have a goal in mind, significantly deviating from US/EU and other area's laws, how the design of an airplane needs to take place as well, the idea of technicians/engineers, how airplanes should be designed/build.
This MAX debacle wasn't an accident (apart from the crashes itself), it was carefully planned inside Boeing, how this development should be done, in a way, to prioritize the profit over decent quality. Unfortunately, Murphy came around the corner and the whole origami game imploded/crashed, with nearly 350 lives lost, over USD 20B damage to Boeing and its stakeholders as well as a ruined reputation for both Boeing and the FAA, with the probable extension to the shattered USA reputation as a whole (though Trump helped enormously with that too).
This newly found issue, just shows, it's considered a normalcy to ad-hoc deviate from approved specifications, across the board. I'd say, this is just criminal intend.
They are highly competent, they managed to fool about everybody monitoring/guarding the design (and maybe the manufacturing) of the B737 MAX. Including the oversight organizations FAA, EASA and several "follow the light" others around the globe.
The difference is, these highly competent senior (and maybe also the less senior as expected) managers did have a goal in mind, significantly deviating from US/EU and other area's laws, how the design of an airplane needs to take place as well, the idea of technicians/engineers, how airplanes should be designed/build.
This MAX debacle wasn't an accident (apart from the crashes itself), it was carefully planned inside Boeing, how this development should be done, in a way, to prioritize the profit over decent quality. Unfortunately, Murphy came around the corner and the whole origami game imploded/crashed, with nearly 350 lives lost, over USD 20B damage to Boeing and its stakeholders as well as a ruined reputation for both Boeing and the FAA, with the probable extension to the shattered USA reputation as a whole (though Trump helped enormously with that too).
This newly found issue, just shows, it's considered a normalcy to ad-hoc deviate from approved specifications, across the board. I'd say, this is just criminal intend.
Thread Starter
Seems to be, part of the mountings in the body at the tail end of the -7 and -8 are manufactured, deviating from the approved specifications. In plain English, I'd call that "hand-made", to save on special manufacturing tools/mechanisms.
In the past, other Boeing suppliers interpreted the prescribed CNC method as to be done "by handcraft" (in the end, the CNC machine input is, somehow, handmade too, so, just skip the CNS machine itself, saves money). I forgot, which part/airplane this was for. It does increase the manufacture tolerances (considerably).
In the past, other Boeing suppliers interpreted the prescribed CNC method as to be done "by handcraft" (in the end, the CNC machine input is, somehow, handmade too, so, just skip the CNS machine itself, saves money). I forgot, which part/airplane this was for. It does increase the manufacture tolerances (considerably).
Educated guess is that they flubbed something in the 'finishing' process - possibly a heat treat or similar - or perhaps the part is made from the wrong alloy. The 'no immediate' safety of flight usually means the ultimate strength of the part is unaffected but the fatigue life is. So some straight forward analysis can provide a revised fatigue life - letting them know how long they have to repair/replace in-service parts. Ideally they can perform corrective action during a normal maintenance cycle with minimal disruption.
Delivery is a different issue - it's a real problem to deliver aircraft with a known defect - hence the impact on deliveries rather than in-service aircraft.
BTW, Spirit is an independent company - hasn't been part of Boeing for a couple decades. So blaming Boeing is a little unfair.
Thanks for the educated guesses as of what the issue at hand is.
I am probably way too naive but what is there to gain in obfuscating the matter to the degree the PR does ? Obviously you don’t want to jump to conclusions but given the overall MAX context I’d day frank and transparent communication would be a good start…
I am probably way too naive but what is there to gain in obfuscating the matter to the degree the PR does ? Obviously you don’t want to jump to conclusions but given the overall MAX context I’d day frank and transparent communication would be a good start…
Spirit manufactures aerostructures for every Boeing commercial aircraft currently in production, including the majority of the airframe content for the Boeing B737, the most popular major commercial aircraft in history.
From Spirit:
https://www.spiritaero.com/programs/mro-services/
I expect Boeing to be a top customer, but Spirit doesn't appear interested in being captive - given the turmoil from COVID and from the 737 MAX stoppage, it would be insane not to diversify.
Get On-the-Ground MRO support for Your Fleet
Spirit is bringing more than a century of aviation expertise to a growing number of locations, so you get the industry's best closer to where you fly. With Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) from countries around the world and experience servicing nearly all aircraft platforms, Spirit is the go-to partner for global MRO solutions.
Airbus | Boeing | Bombardier | De Havilland Aircraft | Embraer | Gulfstream | MHI RJ Aircraft
Spirit is bringing more than a century of aviation expertise to a growing number of locations, so you get the industry's best closer to where you fly. With Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) from countries around the world and experience servicing nearly all aircraft platforms, Spirit is the go-to partner for global MRO solutions.
Airbus | Boeing | Bombardier | De Havilland Aircraft | Embraer | Gulfstream | MHI RJ Aircraft
I expect Boeing to be a top customer, but Spirit doesn't appear interested in being captive - given the turmoil from COVID and from the 737 MAX stoppage, it would be insane not to diversify.
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Random Thoughts.
The Frames for an earlier type were supposed to be made by CNC machining to a tolerance of 3000th of an - inch perhaps? When the women swat team arrived there was a frame or frames on cloth covered tables being shaped effectively by hand.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.
The failure of two AoA sensors (let alone the surviving flight) in five months was an horrific coincidence, since they failed for quite disparate reasons. (In that early era the part was not deemed to be capable of causing a 'catastrophic' series of events.) I'm mindful of the vulnerability of a dual-sensor system. It's not beyond the bounds of possibility to have both units fail due to a common bombardment. Sully comes to mind. It seems almost certain the Ethiopian unit failed in such a manner. So, if two are lost, the new software can, or will be able to access a computed AoA, and the dangers will be radically muted anyway. Why is it that I still wish the system just wasn't there?
Real flying. I recall being a non-operating pilot on an almost new DC10 for my first visit to New York. At less than 1,000' at night, the bloke grabbed a handful of power and positioned for another runway. It was nifty flying, but I can imagine pulling a smidgen of g during such a manoeuvre and the thought of the elevators becoming a soft wet mush is all too real. Why should an aircraft exist that needs MCAS? I know the history, and have a certain sympathy if the cowling lift came as a compete surprise. With the benefit of hindsight, that would have been the moment to take the hit and call a meeting with investors.
The actions and inactions of people after the first crash is case-study material for university level psychology research. My own hobby-horse is the effect the meagre warning had on the Ethiopian flight crew. That is, knowing the end result had ended in a crash probably made the warning briefing counterproductive.
The Frames for an earlier type were supposed to be made by CNC machining to a tolerance of 3000th of an - inch perhaps? When the women swat team arrived there was a frame or frames on cloth covered tables being shaped effectively by hand.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.
The failure of two AoA sensors (let alone the surviving flight) in five months was an horrific coincidence, since they failed for quite disparate reasons. (In that early era the part was not deemed to be capable of causing a 'catastrophic' series of events.) I'm mindful of the vulnerability of a dual-sensor system. It's not beyond the bounds of possibility to have both units fail due to a common bombardment. Sully comes to mind. It seems almost certain the Ethiopian unit failed in such a manner. So, if two are lost, the new software can, or will be able to access a computed AoA, and the dangers will be radically muted anyway. Why is it that I still wish the system just wasn't there?
Real flying. I recall being a non-operating pilot on an almost new DC10 for my first visit to New York. At less than 1,000' at night, the bloke grabbed a handful of power and positioned for another runway. It was nifty flying, but I can imagine pulling a smidgen of g during such a manoeuvre and the thought of the elevators becoming a soft wet mush is all too real. Why should an aircraft exist that needs MCAS? I know the history, and have a certain sympathy if the cowling lift came as a compete surprise. With the benefit of hindsight, that would have been the moment to take the hit and call a meeting with investors.
The actions and inactions of people after the first crash is case-study material for university level psychology research. My own hobby-horse is the effect the meagre warning had on the Ethiopian flight crew. That is, knowing the end result had ended in a crash probably made the warning briefing counterproductive.
Thread Starter
Entirely coincidentally, next week an august and esteemed (well, mostly, anyway) group of aviation attorneys are convening for a "continuing legal education" and networking conference
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The actions and inactions of Boeing senior executives has resulted in avoidable costs exceeding 25 Billion dollars. It has crippled the company, likely permanently, and yet the same old pathologies of cheap and nasty shortcuts to maximize short term profits at the expense of long term viability, still seem prevalent, thus my comment about consequence free incompetence.
For Boeing, these senior management actions still gave the profit to the shareholders in the form of share-buy-back over a long period of time. Oh, and the shareholders do think in the same framework, still do expect Boeing to emerge from its current engineering mess (or sold in parts for a profit). These people understand, they have a miss, every now and then, as long as the long term implementation of their goals works out OK, so be it. Unforeseen was, this MAX debacle has become such a big miss.......
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The example I referred to is what Loose rivets refers to in its first paragraph:
The Frames for an earlier type were supposed to be made by CNC machining to a tolerance of 3000th of an - inch perhaps? When the women swat team arrived there was a frame or frames on cloth covered tables being shaped effectively by hand.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.
Educated guess is that they flubbed something in the 'finishing' process - possibly a heat treat or similar - or perhaps the part is made from the wrong alloy. The 'no immediate' safety of flight usually means the ultimate strength of the part is unaffected but the fatigue life is. So some straight forward analysis can provide a revised fatigue life - letting them know how long they have to repair/replace in-service parts. Ideally they can perform corrective action during a normal maintenance cycle with minimal disruption.
- When the leader of a team is prepared to accept sloppy work, the team's delivered quality will gradually degrade.
- When a degraded team gets a new leader, that leader has a very difficult job to bring back suitable standards.
- When a supplier does deliver shoddy quality products and the "customer" does not take action, the supplier's standards will not improve.
- When the customer shows shoddy behavior, the suppliers will gradually start to deliver degraded quality to that customer, since, hey, nobody cares, so why should we ?
- When customer A accepts shady quality and customer B keeps up the standard, the supplier will gradually move its second grade staff to work for customer A projects and the better ones for customer B projects.
So, yeah, degrading standards also influence independent suppliers. So, when the customer (Boeing) lets slip on quality standards, the supplier will be very tempted to follow (over time), since quality is expensive, and it'll save a lot of money to follow the lower customer's quality standards. Oh, see YT for reports about this.
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Thanks for the educated guesses as of what the issue at hand is.
I am probably way too naive but what is there to gain in obfuscating the matter to the degree the PR does ? Obviously you don’t want to jump to conclusions but given the overall MAX context I’d day frank and transparent communication would be a good start…
I am probably way too naive but what is there to gain in obfuscating the matter to the degree the PR does ? Obviously you don’t want to jump to conclusions but given the overall MAX context I’d day frank and transparent communication would be a good start…
Oh, of course, Boeing's secrecy pathway could very well be needed to avoid another (large?) batch of scandals........
A change of law, to make (senior) management by definition personally responsible for intentional deviations from a proper implementation of legal requirements around the airplane design/manufacturing, would help tremendously to solve these issues, ehhh, greed above suitable quality / follow the rules.
I do wonder though, whether the passage of 30 years has dulled the institutional memory of the consequences of corporate negligence as regards safety. I suppose however, that’s the job of the corporate legal team to keep upper management aware of their legal duty of care.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.
The Frames for an earlier type were supposed to be made by CNC machining to a tolerance of 3000th of an - inch perhaps? When the women swat team arrived there was a frame or frames on cloth covered tables being shaped effectively by hand.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.
.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.
.
Random Thoughts.
The Frames for an earlier type were supposed to be made by CNC machining to a tolerance of 3000th of an - inch perhaps? When the women swat team arrived there was a frame or frames on cloth covered tables being shaped effectively by hand.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.
The failure of two AoA sensors (let alone the surviving flight) in five months was an horrific coincidence, since they failed for quite disparate reasons. (In that early era the part was not deemed to be capable of causing a 'catastrophic' series of events.) I'm mindful of the vulnerability of a dual-sensor system. It's not beyond the bounds of possibility to have both units fail due to a common bombardment. Sully comes to mind. It seems almost certain the Ethiopian unit failed in such a manner. So, if two are lost, the new software can, or will be able to access a computed AoA, and the dangers will be radically muted anyway. Why is it that I still wish the system just wasn't there?
Real flying. I recall being a non-operating pilot on an almost new DC10 for my first visit to New York. At less than 1,000' at night, the bloke grabbed a handful of power and positioned for another runway. It was nifty flying, but I can imagine pulling a smidgen of g during such a manoeuvre and the thought of the elevators becoming a soft wet mush is all too real. Why should an aircraft exist that needs MCAS? I know the history, and have a certain sympathy if the cowling lift came as a compete surprise. With the benefit of hindsight, that would have been the moment to take the hit and call a meeting with investors.
The actions and inactions of people after the first crash is case-study material for university level psychology research. My own hobby-horse is the effect the meagre warning had on the Ethiopian flight crew. That is, knowing the end result had ended in a crash probably made the warning briefing counterproductive.
The Frames for an earlier type were supposed to be made by CNC machining to a tolerance of 3000th of an - inch perhaps? When the women swat team arrived there was a frame or frames on cloth covered tables being shaped effectively by hand.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.
The failure of two AoA sensors (let alone the surviving flight) in five months was an horrific coincidence, since they failed for quite disparate reasons. (In that early era the part was not deemed to be capable of causing a 'catastrophic' series of events.) I'm mindful of the vulnerability of a dual-sensor system. It's not beyond the bounds of possibility to have both units fail due to a common bombardment. Sully comes to mind. It seems almost certain the Ethiopian unit failed in such a manner. So, if two are lost, the new software can, or will be able to access a computed AoA, and the dangers will be radically muted anyway. Why is it that I still wish the system just wasn't there?
Real flying. I recall being a non-operating pilot on an almost new DC10 for my first visit to New York. At less than 1,000' at night, the bloke grabbed a handful of power and positioned for another runway. It was nifty flying, but I can imagine pulling a smidgen of g during such a manoeuvre and the thought of the elevators becoming a soft wet mush is all too real. Why should an aircraft exist that needs MCAS? I know the history, and have a certain sympathy if the cowling lift came as a compete surprise. With the benefit of hindsight, that would have been the moment to take the hit and call a meeting with investors.
The actions and inactions of people after the first crash is case-study material for university level psychology research. My own hobby-horse is the effect the meagre warning had on the Ethiopian flight crew. That is, knowing the end result had ended in a crash probably made the warning briefing counterproductive.
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But, that's not due to the manufacture deviation, needing hammering to let the parts fit on assembly, though simply due to the ancient B737 design, grandfathered into the current MAX, so, the MAX will have the same fuselage breakups, when the time comes for those kinds of incidents.
The Frames for an earlier type were supposed to be made by CNC machining to a tolerance of 3000th of an - inch perhaps? When the women swat team arrived there was a frame or frames on cloth covered tables being shaped effectively by hand.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit.
At Renton it was all activity - and noise. Production was in full swing. Long-service riveters getting stuck in putting it all together, laid in various uncomfortable positions to do so, blue jeans and workboots sticking out from various places. Not quite Betty and Margo assembling a B-17 in WW2, but it did make the observer recollect those old photos.
At Toulouse there were few staff around, just a handful in white coats looking at the CNC machine displays. The machines were just getting on with it.
I suppose others here, like me, have looked out on 737 wings and noticed the lines of riveting. Sort-of in a straight line, but somehow not perfectly evenly spaced. Now that maybe just what the designer intended, but some here will look and wonder ...
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There are other types of lawyerly get-togethers where ""Chatham House" rules, which stipulate non-attribution, are adhered to. These are found predominantly in the academic world (especially "working groups" reviewing drafts of publications).
Perhaps someone at the conference, happily realizing its resumption after a long Covid-induced hiatus, will live-tweet impressions or summaries of panel discussions. I wouldn't hold my breath however awaiting this (but if it occurs, I can let it be known).
My own interest is particularly focused on the "trans-Atlantic" aspects of current affairs in international aviation liability, insurance and finance matters. Whereas U.S. once was said to hold and preserve a "gold standard", the devaluation which has occurred might in fact be continuing, and not yet arrested let alone reversed. And needless to elaborate, with the disruptions of normal commercial compliance with aircraft registration, leases, insurance and so on, and "bombs bursting in air" in fairly major warfare, problems ordinarily situated at nominal degrees of difficulty become closer to crisis, or intractable. (EUROCONTROL's October conference last year, anticipating the application of lessons learned from the difficulties of summer 2022 to expected traffic loads in 2023's summer season, is a good example.)
Not only across the Atlantic, but back home too. FAA reauthorization pends in the den-of-thieves, Washington, and the Congress of the United States. There is no Senate-confirmed Administrator; who knows what will become of the safety-conclave outputs produced recently? What I'm rambling on trying to say, it seems, is that this feels like a pretty crticial time in civil aviation especially insofar as a conference in Brussels or Paris or Montreal would see things. And skeptics could be surprised just how seriously the quite significant majority of lawyers who really work in this field take the very same considerations as pilots, particulalry professional ones, are concerned with.
There is regulatory theatre and then there is regulatory action. The theatre happens at the political level and won’t measurably move the needle. The real change is enabled by the senior management at the working level.
In Industry the metric for measuring manager worth is money, in government it is people.
I don’t really see in the FAA any substantive organizational changes that will create the effective teams that are adequately resourced with the right people to provide the day to day oversight that has been lost due to regulatory capture in the last 20 years.
Lawyers provide reactive oversight. The bad thing happens and then they engage to right the wrong. The regulator is supposed to provide the proactive oversight so that the bad thing doesn’t happen in the first place. Sadly the expectation that industry will spontaneously do the right thing is made a mockery of by what happened at inter alia Enron, BP, Exxon and of course the poster child of C Suite malfeasance, Boeing.
Effective oversight in aviation is really hard. Too much and you stifle innovation, too little and people die. Sadly I think the polarization and politicization in most Western governments has made effective aviation regulation almost impossible.
In Industry the metric for measuring manager worth is money, in government it is people.
I don’t really see in the FAA any substantive organizational changes that will create the effective teams that are adequately resourced with the right people to provide the day to day oversight that has been lost due to regulatory capture in the last 20 years.
Lawyers provide reactive oversight. The bad thing happens and then they engage to right the wrong. The regulator is supposed to provide the proactive oversight so that the bad thing doesn’t happen in the first place. Sadly the expectation that industry will spontaneously do the right thing is made a mockery of by what happened at inter alia Enron, BP, Exxon and of course the poster child of C Suite malfeasance, Boeing.
Effective oversight in aviation is really hard. Too much and you stifle innovation, too little and people die. Sadly I think the polarization and politicization in most Western governments has made effective aviation regulation almost impossible.
Thread Starter
There was someone who wrote a short while ago, possibly on here, that they needed to visit the production lines at both Renton and Toulouse.
At Renton it was all activity - and noise. Production was in full swing. Long-service riveters getting stuck in putting it all together, laid in various uncomfortable positions to do so, blue jeans and workboots sticking out from various places. Not quite Betty and Margo assembling a B-17 in WW2, but it did make the observer recollect those old photos.
At Toulouse there were few staff around, just a handful in white coats looking at the CNC machine displays. The machines were just getting on with it.
I suppose others here, like me, have looked out on 737 wings and noticed the lines of riveting. Sort-of in a straight line, but somehow not perfectly evenly spaced. Now that maybe just what the designer intended, but some here will look and wonder ...
At Renton it was all activity - and noise. Production was in full swing. Long-service riveters getting stuck in putting it all together, laid in various uncomfortable positions to do so, blue jeans and workboots sticking out from various places. Not quite Betty and Margo assembling a B-17 in WW2, but it did make the observer recollect those old photos.
At Toulouse there were few staff around, just a handful in white coats looking at the CNC machine displays. The machines were just getting on with it.
I suppose others here, like me, have looked out on 737 wings and noticed the lines of riveting. Sort-of in a straight line, but somehow not perfectly evenly spaced. Now that maybe just what the designer intended, but some here will look and wonder ...
As for the 737 wing - it's assembled on the same type of Gemco automated machinery that puts together the 767 and 777 wings (except of course for the 777X composite wing).
