Boeing 737 Max Recertification Testing - Finally.
Perhaps you need to read the Ethiopian report that details the answers Boeing supplied to Ethiopian pilots.
I don't fault the pilots specifically. The airline had the obligation to ensure they were properly trained and the Ethiopian CAA had the obligation to see the training was correct and correctly done. Given both pilots mishandled the stick shaker, it's clear their training was inadequate.
Part of Boeing's response to questions from the Ethiopian pilots:
They were not in a frame of mind to understand that the Lion Air crash was initiated by bringing the flaps-up during a stick shaker event, even though Boeing underlined "flaps up flight" in their response. Had they cut the autothrottle, used pitch and power, and not changed the flap configuration, the situation would have been an annoyance. We won't know why the Chief Pilot and CAA did not take measures to ensure they would be in the correct frame of mind.
The key is that I agree it should not be up to pilots. It should be up to their management and their CAA to ensure that if there is a known defect in the airplane that either the plane is pulled from service or the pilots are well rehearsed in managing when the defect rears its ugly head. This already applies to a large number of "fly with a defect":items.
I don't fault the pilots specifically. The airline had the obligation to ensure they were properly trained and the Ethiopian CAA had the obligation to see the training was correct and correctly done. Given both pilots mishandled the stick shaker, it's clear their training was inadequate.
Part of Boeing's response to questions from the Ethiopian pilots:
The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other Airplane systems.
The key is that I agree it should not be up to pilots. It should be up to their management and their CAA to ensure that if there is a known defect in the airplane that either the plane is pulled from service or the pilots are well rehearsed in managing when the defect rears its ugly head. This already applies to a large number of "fly with a defect":items.
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I don't fault the pilots specifically. The airline had the obligation to ensure they were properly trained and the Ethiopian CAA had the obligation to see the training was correct and correctly done. Given both pilots mishandled the stick shaker, it's clear their training was inadequate.
Originally Posted by BOEING
The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other Airplane systems.
ALSO, what is missing, is that MCAS will repeatedly fire after 10 seconds of no-trim-input. Something highly relevant to both B737MAX crashes.
They were not in a frame of mind to understand that the Lion Air crash was initiated by bringing the flaps-up during a stick shaker event, even though Boeing underlined "flaps up flight" in their response. Had they cut the autothrottle, used pitch and power, and not changed the flap configuration, the situation would have been an annoyance. We won't know why the Chief Pilot and CAA did not take measures to ensure they would be in the correct frame of mind.
The key is that I agree it should not be up to pilots. It should be up to their management and their CAA to ensure that if there is a known defect in the airplane that either the plane is pulled from service or the pilots are well rehearsed in managing when the defect rears its ugly head. This already applies to a large number of "fly with a defect":items.
IF this MCAS issue had not hit 2 non-US airlines, it would have been only a matter of time, before a US airline would encounter this issue.
I didn't use the word "knowingly" did I? If there is insult you are the one who just created it.
Why would I refer to a known defect for an airline that did not know there was a defect? One airline had the full nature of the defect laid out before them and with a response directly to their pilots.
Strange game. The only winning move is to ignore you. Still I encourage anyone interested in what happened to read the full FDR charts.
Why would I refer to a known defect for an airline that did not know there was a defect? One airline had the full nature of the defect laid out before them and with a response directly to their pilots.
Strange game. The only winning move is to ignore you. Still I encourage anyone interested in what happened to read the full FDR charts.
I hope that Boeing will be forced to give a reponse in this court case as to why they felt that MCAS system on the MAX needed to be given the authority to override the pilot.
The 737NG had column cutout* switches to ensure that it there could be no nose down trip from either the pickle switches or the automated systems if the pilot had the column pulled back.
Also on the 737NG, the pilots had options either to disable just trim inputs from the automation or all trip inputs but this was taken away on the MAX.
If either of these two safety mechanisms had been left in place, the outcomes of the two accidents may have been different.
If Boeing were so interested in minimizing changes (pilot training) between the NG and the MAX, what were the underlying engineering/aerodynamic drivers that made them feel that MCAS needed to have the power to overrule those safetys.
The 737NG had column cutout* switches to ensure that it there could be no nose down trip from either the pickle switches or the automated systems if the pilot had the column pulled back.
Also on the 737NG, the pilots had options either to disable just trim inputs from the automation or all trip inputs but this was taken away on the MAX.
If either of these two safety mechanisms had been left in place, the outcomes of the two accidents may have been different.
If Boeing were so interested in minimizing changes (pilot training) between the NG and the MAX, what were the underlying engineering/aerodynamic drivers that made them feel that MCAS needed to have the power to overrule those safetys.
Last edited by soarbum; 29th Jan 2023 at 22:34. Reason: * I initially called the column cutout switches by the wrong name
Yes, the MAX has those cutout switches but they are wired not to interfere with MCAS trimming nose down.
https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ETH...1NZ/index.html
Also https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/bo...to-the-pilots/
https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ETH...1NZ/index.html
Also https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/bo...to-the-pilots/
Psychophysiological entity
The fact, it did need a trim-blib every couple of seconds to avoid the MCAS would take-over was NOT known.
. . . . There are simply too many other (higher level) important items, to expect pilots to have to deal with something like the MCAS intricacies.
Last edited by Loose rivets; 29th Jan 2023 at 23:57.
Such a design would seem to negate the procedure for a runaway stabilizer if due to MCAS fault. All the schematics I've seen for NG/MAX trim show that the cutout switches completely disable the electric trim system, which is the system used by MCAS, STS, and autopilot to move the stabilizer. In other words, with the switches in cutout, the only method to move the stabilizer is with the manual trim wheels. Is this not correct?
I hope that Boeing will be forced to give a reponse in this court case as to why they felt that MCAS system on the MAX needed to be given the authority to override the pilot.
The 737NG had column cutout* switches to ensure that it there could be no nose down trip from either the pickle switches or the automated systems if the pilot had the column pulled back.
Also on the 737NG, the pilots had options either to disable just trim inputs from the automation or all trip inputs but this was taken away on the MAX.
If either of these two safety mechanisms had been left in place, the outcomes of the two accidents may have been different.
If Boeing were so interested in minimizing changes (pilot training) between the NG and the MAX, what were the underlying engineering/aerodynamic drivers that made them feel that MCAS needed to have the power to overrule those safetys.
The 737NG had column cutout* switches to ensure that it there could be no nose down trip from either the pickle switches or the automated systems if the pilot had the column pulled back.
Also on the 737NG, the pilots had options either to disable just trim inputs from the automation or all trip inputs but this was taken away on the MAX.
If either of these two safety mechanisms had been left in place, the outcomes of the two accidents may have been different.
If Boeing were so interested in minimizing changes (pilot training) between the NG and the MAX, what were the underlying engineering/aerodynamic drivers that made them feel that MCAS needed to have the power to overrule those safetys.
Even on the previous generation cutting both systems was recommended as trim runaway is so rapid in making the situation bad that pilots have no time to figure out if the automation has failed or there is a loose piece of wire short circuiting the trim switch.
This is fundamental and was certainly not explained to the FAA and operators when deciding on grandfathering approval and pilot training.
I still don't see why they decided to remove the AUTO trim cutout switch and replace it with a "B/U" which seems to do exactly the same as "PRI"
This leaves pilots with just the nuclear option of disabling all electric trim and reverting to the reduced size manual trim wheel.
The only explanation is that they felt that MCAS was so important that it should not be possible for the pilot to fly without it in which case why did they not classify MCAS as DAL-A.
The pilots could over-rule MCAS at any time. Press the trim switch on the wheel and MCAS trim command stops. That's clearly seen in the FDR graphs. The pilots retained the ability to set whatever trim status they wanted at any time. The source of the problem is the SMYD with a side of ADIRU - their design to pass on false AoA and a false stall warning is the source of the problem. As I mentioned even the Autopilot was trying to force the nose down when the ET302 crew got it to engage. Forcing the nose down on a stall warning is the action pilots should take (though they should actually set pitch and power appropriate for the weight and altitude.)
They changed the switches because (AFIAK) the NG guidance was that for any trim runaway, both switches are to be used, so operationally it made no difference.
The first Lion Air crew flew just fine with the manual trim wheel. It went so fine, they re-enabled electric trim, MCAS gave another kick, and they turned it back off.
If you are looking for the regulatory smoking gun, that was fired a long time before MAX was a twinkle in anyone's eye when they allowed a false stall warning to be acceptable and did not seek a way to invalidate a failed AoA sensor, perhaps as detected by loss of continuity in the de-ice circuit which occurs when the external vane is stripped from the plane.
They changed the switches because (AFIAK) the NG guidance was that for any trim runaway, both switches are to be used, so operationally it made no difference.
The first Lion Air crew flew just fine with the manual trim wheel. It went so fine, they re-enabled electric trim, MCAS gave another kick, and they turned it back off.
If you are looking for the regulatory smoking gun, that was fired a long time before MAX was a twinkle in anyone's eye when they allowed a false stall warning to be acceptable and did not seek a way to invalidate a failed AoA sensor, perhaps as detected by loss of continuity in the de-ice circuit which occurs when the external vane is stripped from the plane.
Boeing told the FAA that MCAS was just an extension of the speed trim system.
1) MCAS was much more that a STS extension as the they were fundamentally modifying the logic of the stabiliser trim to accomodate it.
From the excellent and detailed blog by Peter Lemme at https://www.satcom.guru/2019/08/conn...to-action.html
" 737 MAX Autopilot MCAS Trim Commands
MCAS ENGAGE is an FCC output discrete entirely unique to the MAX. It drives the COLUMN CUTOUT OVERRIDE relay in the column switch module. The relay serves two functions: to command high trim rate and to allow for AND command in the presence of AFT column cutout.
The MCAS ENGAGE discrete is routed to the actuator instead of FLAPS DN discrete to force high trim rate.
The AND trim command bypasses the AFT column cutout switch."
2) In the original MAX certification submission, Boeing listed the changes to the stab cutout switches as “Stab Trim cutout switches panel nomenclature” It was not just nomeclature, they were removing the ability to isolate MCAS/STS/autopilot inputs but still leave the Elec trim active. Again, why they would want to do this when they were going out of their way to minimise other cockpit changes has never been fully explained.
It will be up to the court to decide if these and other obfuscations were part of a deliberate attempt by the company to mislead the FAA regarding the impact of MCAS on other aircraft systems.
1) MCAS was much more that a STS extension as the they were fundamentally modifying the logic of the stabiliser trim to accomodate it.
From the excellent and detailed blog by Peter Lemme at https://www.satcom.guru/2019/08/conn...to-action.html
" 737 MAX Autopilot MCAS Trim Commands
MCAS ENGAGE is an FCC output discrete entirely unique to the MAX. It drives the COLUMN CUTOUT OVERRIDE relay in the column switch module. The relay serves two functions: to command high trim rate and to allow for AND command in the presence of AFT column cutout.
The MCAS ENGAGE discrete is routed to the actuator instead of FLAPS DN discrete to force high trim rate.
The AND trim command bypasses the AFT column cutout switch."
2) In the original MAX certification submission, Boeing listed the changes to the stab cutout switches as “Stab Trim cutout switches panel nomenclature” It was not just nomeclature, they were removing the ability to isolate MCAS/STS/autopilot inputs but still leave the Elec trim active. Again, why they would want to do this when they were going out of their way to minimise other cockpit changes has never been fully explained.
It will be up to the court to decide if these and other obfuscations were part of a deliberate attempt by the company to mislead the FAA regarding the impact of MCAS on other aircraft systems.
Psychophysiological entity
Let's be the Devil's advocate again. MCAS is starting to be described as a kind of intermittent electric Stick Pusher. The high rate gives this impression.
To use the existing STS system to motor the nose down to keep stick loads within certification boundaries, and do it gently, seems fairly logical. But just supposing that added algorithm hadn't been given the grand name of MCAS! It's no longer a thing, just more processing. It's possible no one would have ever known something new was involved, given the existing chaos.
However, Boeing did give the game away. In the midst of the crash threads, I spotted mention of MCAS in a South American airline's Pilot's Handbook. Just a few lines. It was possibly the only such mention in the World.
I think it's important to go back to focussing on the single AoA sensor that should have been listed in the "Catastrophic" catagory, and hopefully required duplication. The history of that refurbished or older part is pivotal in the Lion Air disaster . . . and perhaps, Boeing.
******
Was there a pre-MAX 737 that like the MAX, had only ONE three-phase motor in the tail? What I'm getting at is - did the change to the cutout switches' wiring, coincide with the introduction of the two clutches that selected mechanical power from the single electric motor for the jack screw? (AP and Pickle Switches?)
To use the existing STS system to motor the nose down to keep stick loads within certification boundaries, and do it gently, seems fairly logical. But just supposing that added algorithm hadn't been given the grand name of MCAS! It's no longer a thing, just more processing. It's possible no one would have ever known something new was involved, given the existing chaos.
However, Boeing did give the game away. In the midst of the crash threads, I spotted mention of MCAS in a South American airline's Pilot's Handbook. Just a few lines. It was possibly the only such mention in the World.
I think it's important to go back to focussing on the single AoA sensor that should have been listed in the "Catastrophic" catagory, and hopefully required duplication. The history of that refurbished or older part is pivotal in the Lion Air disaster . . . and perhaps, Boeing.
******
. . . they were removing the ability to isolate MCAS/STS/autopilot inputs but still leave the Elec trim active.
AFAIK the NG had a single motor, but separate inputs from the FCC and the pilot (Why are they called pickle switch? Looks it up. Seems like it was the name for the bomb release) wheel mounted trim switches, a separate path. Anyone with an NG FCOM see what it says to do with trim runaway?
Separate trim channels would not have helped Lion Air as the flight that was successful was fine with manual trim and it would not have helped the accident/crash as they didn't use the cut out switches at all. It might have helped ET302 but they had failed to use the wheel mounted trim switches properly even when they were effective.
Had the logic been to invalidate the AoA when the vane heater continuity failed then ET302 would not have crashed. For Lion Air invalidating both AoA sensors due to disagreement would have worked. In both cases, AFAIK, all systems depending on AoA would have seen the invalidation and ceased all automation and Lion Air would have also been fine.
The other change I would look at is adding a vane stop that is in a shorter range than the counterweight stop. If the vane is destroyed then the vane stop would have nothing to stop against allowing additional travel. Even a momentary excursion into that area would be used to invalidate the AoA sensor. It might also serve as a check on the electrical setting as only a few degrees of additional travel would be used - so a check of the electrical vs the mechanical would form a barrier to the Lion Air electrical mis-calibration and would make for a simple test on a replacement - if the AoA system goes invalid when moved against either (or both) vane-stop then the sensor is suspect. This would have also prevented the Lion Air crash as the miscalibrated sensor would either be caught at the factory or could have been easily caught by the maintainers. It would move the failure to setting the wrong requirements for the sensor - and that could be caught with marking on the fuselage for the sensor vane travel limits.
For all the "but they hid it" about MCAS, the FAA would not have seen the AoA subsystem flaws fixed. All the FAA would have done is to ask for more paperwork; there is no indication anyone felt that the trim runaway procedure would fail to be used. Certainly after the Lion Air crash I didn't see any news of 737 MAX pilots refusing to fly, maybe in private? I believe no CAA grounded the 737 MAX after the Lion Air crash, even after the preliminary report made clear the human factors problem. Grounding only happened after ET302, suggesting a general opinion that the failure mode was expected to be handled as a trivial or annoying matter, the way the first Lion Air crew did, and that inexperience and lack of familiarity was the main problem, one that was solved with the Emergency AD.
Separate trim channels would not have helped Lion Air as the flight that was successful was fine with manual trim and it would not have helped the accident/crash as they didn't use the cut out switches at all. It might have helped ET302 but they had failed to use the wheel mounted trim switches properly even when they were effective.
Had the logic been to invalidate the AoA when the vane heater continuity failed then ET302 would not have crashed. For Lion Air invalidating both AoA sensors due to disagreement would have worked. In both cases, AFAIK, all systems depending on AoA would have seen the invalidation and ceased all automation and Lion Air would have also been fine.
The other change I would look at is adding a vane stop that is in a shorter range than the counterweight stop. If the vane is destroyed then the vane stop would have nothing to stop against allowing additional travel. Even a momentary excursion into that area would be used to invalidate the AoA sensor. It might also serve as a check on the electrical setting as only a few degrees of additional travel would be used - so a check of the electrical vs the mechanical would form a barrier to the Lion Air electrical mis-calibration and would make for a simple test on a replacement - if the AoA system goes invalid when moved against either (or both) vane-stop then the sensor is suspect. This would have also prevented the Lion Air crash as the miscalibrated sensor would either be caught at the factory or could have been easily caught by the maintainers. It would move the failure to setting the wrong requirements for the sensor - and that could be caught with marking on the fuselage for the sensor vane travel limits.
For all the "but they hid it" about MCAS, the FAA would not have seen the AoA subsystem flaws fixed. All the FAA would have done is to ask for more paperwork; there is no indication anyone felt that the trim runaway procedure would fail to be used. Certainly after the Lion Air crash I didn't see any news of 737 MAX pilots refusing to fly, maybe in private? I believe no CAA grounded the 737 MAX after the Lion Air crash, even after the preliminary report made clear the human factors problem. Grounding only happened after ET302, suggesting a general opinion that the failure mode was expected to be handled as a trivial or annoying matter, the way the first Lion Air crew did, and that inexperience and lack of familiarity was the main problem, one that was solved with the Emergency AD.
Alarmingly true. It was almost certainly that technique that got the pre LionAir home. There was so much on that flight that in a perfect world should have been promulgated as high priority.
This is an important statement, partly because MCAS did what it was supposed to do - a mere extension of existing software, and if I were acting for Boeing, that would be my prime defence: There are many hundreds of small software processes going on at any one moment. At what level of complexity should Boeing be obliged to tell the customer/trainers just what is being processed?
This is an important statement, partly because MCAS did what it was supposed to do - a mere extension of existing software, and if I were acting for Boeing, that would be my prime defence: There are many hundreds of small software processes going on at any one moment. At what level of complexity should Boeing be obliged to tell the customer/trainers just what is being processed?
It's not enough to operate effectively in normal conditions, the non-normal conditions (i.e., failure modes) must be safe as well.
I stand in solidarity with the grieving families.
Jobs and share prices "trump" aviation safety.
Psychophysiological entity
Mmm . . . defence lawyers must be able to turn off their compassionate circuits.
It wasn't until the aftermath that the 'seriousness categories' became generally known. Of course, just what can escalate into the Catastrophic range is hard to assess, since the crisis can go into a Butterfly effect of chance happenings, and I'm fairly sure the designers will be somewhat resistant to any component being labelled thus.
It wasn't until the aftermath that the 'seriousness categories' became generally known. Of course, just what can escalate into the Catastrophic range is hard to assess, since the crisis can go into a Butterfly effect of chance happenings, and I'm fairly sure the designers will be somewhat resistant to any component being labelled thus.
I hope that Boeing will be forced to give a reponse in this court case as to why they felt that MCAS system on the MAX needed to be given the authority to override the pilot.
The 737NG had column cutout* switches to ensure that it there could be no nose down trip from either the pickle switches or the automated systems if the pilot had the column pulled back.
Also on the 737NG, the pilots had options either to disable just trim inputs from the automation or all trip inputs but this was taken away on the MAX.
If either of these two safety mechanisms had been left in place, the outcomes of the two accidents may have been different.
If Boeing were so interested in minimizing changes (pilot training) between the NG and the MAX, what were the underlying engineering/aerodynamic drivers that made them feel that MCAS needed to have the power to overrule those safetys.
The 737NG had column cutout* switches to ensure that it there could be no nose down trip from either the pickle switches or the automated systems if the pilot had the column pulled back.
Also on the 737NG, the pilots had options either to disable just trim inputs from the automation or all trip inputs but this was taken away on the MAX.
If either of these two safety mechanisms had been left in place, the outcomes of the two accidents may have been different.
If Boeing were so interested in minimizing changes (pilot training) between the NG and the MAX, what were the underlying engineering/aerodynamic drivers that made them feel that MCAS needed to have the power to overrule those safetys.
Stabilizer trim switches on each control wheel, those rocker switches for pilot elec trim control
Control column actuated stabilizer trim cutout switches stop operation of the main electric and autopilot trim when the control column movement opposes trim direction
On Aft Electronic Panel:
Stabilizer Trim Override Switch In Position OVERRIDE – Bypasses the control column actuated stabilizer trim cutout switches to restore power to the stabilizer trim switches.
On Control Stand:
Stabilizer Trim Main Electric (MAIN ELECT) Cutout Switch - CUTOUT – Deactivates stabilizer trim switch operation.
Stabilizer Trim AUTOPILOT Cutout Switch - NORMAL – Normal operating position. CUTOUT – · Deactivates autopilot stabilizer trim operation. · Autopilot disengages if engaged.
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Re: soarburn and court case(s) (## 924, 933)
The Deferred Prosecution Agreement in the criminal case against Boeing still is in place and the court has not ruled that it will be changed in any manner whatsoever. The crash victims' families are seeking to have the DPA re-opened but that still is a long way from happening.
A point at which misunderstanding of this particular court case may have begun is the fact that Boeing was required to be "arraigned" in the federal district court in Texas. Of course ordinarily the arraignment of a criminal defendant happens at the start of the courtroom proceedings, not two years into a three-year DPA (though federal criminal practice is not part of my legal portfolio and perhaps this procedural stance of the Boeing case is not actually highly unusual - but so far, it does appear to be just that, highly unusual). The reason the court - evidently - agreed to have the government and the victims' families toss the case back in time to the arraignment phase is because it is at the arraignment phase when crime victims ordinarily have an opportunity to present their views on what the terms of release will be for a criminal defendant. It gets a bit artificial, does it not? - Boeing, as "the defendant", had not quite exactly been arrested, had it? - nor was it being held in custody by any law enforcement agency. But inasmuch as the arraignment is the procedural phase at which the individuals who have become "crime victims" may exercise their statutory rights to address the court specifically on the terms of setting the defendant free pending further proceedings, and since that step was skipped in this case, the court - evidently - agreed to put time, procedurally speaking, back on the game clock.
Now having said all that.... the company entered a plea of Not Guilty? What? How can it have acknowledged what it did acknowledge in the DPA, and then go on to plead Not Guilty? Of course it was not going to plead guilty, I realize, but.... this could get interesting still. It's not at such a dramatic juncture yet, but the crash victims' families have shown some major tenacity, is it not so? And reading the court filing they entered in connection with the arraignment -- look, reams upon reams have been written and published decrying what Boeing did and failed to do. This particular court filing, in my estimation anyhow, is right up there at the top, impact-wise.
The Deferred Prosecution Agreement in the criminal case against Boeing still is in place and the court has not ruled that it will be changed in any manner whatsoever. The crash victims' families are seeking to have the DPA re-opened but that still is a long way from happening.
A point at which misunderstanding of this particular court case may have begun is the fact that Boeing was required to be "arraigned" in the federal district court in Texas. Of course ordinarily the arraignment of a criminal defendant happens at the start of the courtroom proceedings, not two years into a three-year DPA (though federal criminal practice is not part of my legal portfolio and perhaps this procedural stance of the Boeing case is not actually highly unusual - but so far, it does appear to be just that, highly unusual). The reason the court - evidently - agreed to have the government and the victims' families toss the case back in time to the arraignment phase is because it is at the arraignment phase when crime victims ordinarily have an opportunity to present their views on what the terms of release will be for a criminal defendant. It gets a bit artificial, does it not? - Boeing, as "the defendant", had not quite exactly been arrested, had it? - nor was it being held in custody by any law enforcement agency. But inasmuch as the arraignment is the procedural phase at which the individuals who have become "crime victims" may exercise their statutory rights to address the court specifically on the terms of setting the defendant free pending further proceedings, and since that step was skipped in this case, the court - evidently - agreed to put time, procedurally speaking, back on the game clock.
Now having said all that.... the company entered a plea of Not Guilty? What? How can it have acknowledged what it did acknowledge in the DPA, and then go on to plead Not Guilty? Of course it was not going to plead guilty, I realize, but.... this could get interesting still. It's not at such a dramatic juncture yet, but the crash victims' families have shown some major tenacity, is it not so? And reading the court filing they entered in connection with the arraignment -- look, reams upon reams have been written and published decrying what Boeing did and failed to do. This particular court filing, in my estimation anyhow, is right up there at the top, impact-wise.
